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Carabao Island's

Fort Frank

Charles M Bogart

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While the tactical withdrawal to Bataan had been completed succesfully, much of its strategic success was lost due to poor staff work at the USAFFE HQ. Three major staff blunders in regard to the coast defense of Manila and Subic Bay command were to be costly.

1. The transfer of many noncombatants to Fort Mills, to the extent that they outnumbered the combat troops two to one.

2. The abandonment of Fort Wint

3. The failure to provide any field forces to defend the Cavite shore opposite Fort Frank.  Prewar planning had always assumed that a field army would defend this area.

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On February 1, 1906 Major General John P. Story as chairman of the National Coast Defense Board submitted to William H. Taft, Secretary of War a final report outlining a proposed coastal defense system for the United States and its possessions. Ten stateside and one overseas ports, Subic Bay, were declared "ports of first importance" for armament with modern coastal defense weapons. A further eight United States Forts and six overseas ports were designated "ports of secondary importance" for armament. Second from last, ahead of Port Sorsogan, Philippine Islands but after Guam was the entrance to Manila Bay. A total of eight 14 inch. two 12 inch, four 6 inch, twelve 3 inch guns and eight 12 inch mortars were recommended to protect Manila Bay.

When Admiral Dewey's fleet seized Manila Bay in 1898 the Spanish had mounted coastal defense guns on the islands of Corregidor, Caballo and El Fraile. In addition guns had been placed on the mainland on the Bataan and Cavite side of the Bay. The only island unfortified was Carabao lying only 500 years offshore from Cavite Province.

What General Story and his committee recommended and what actually happened in the construction of coastal defense installations in the Philippines again demonstrated that recommendations and studies prepared by blue ribbon committees often have little impact of later decisions. The manner in which the defense of Manila Bay rose in ascendency over Subic Bay is outlined in my article "Subic Bay and Fort Wint", also published by CORREGIDOR THEN AND NOW.

Corregidor was an effective bottle stopper for the closing of Manila Bay in clear weather. This was not the case for a dark rainy night or a fog shrouded morning. In order to give complete coverage of the South Channel, the waters between Corregidor and Cavite forts would have to be placed on the islands of El Fraile and Carabao. Earlier at the request of the Army President Theodore Roosevelt on April 11, 1902 by Executive Order had set aside the islands of Manila Bay as military reservations. The Executive Order included the 44.5 acres of Carabao Island. This action was affirmed by Congress on July 1, 1902 and reaffirmed by Executive Order on March 14, 1904.

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The development of a coastal defense fort on Carabao Island presented Corps of Engineers with two problems. The first was that except in one spot the island had sheer cliffs of 100 feet rising from the ocean and ending in a narrow crest line down the center of the island. The second was that Carabao was dominated by the Pico de Loro Hills on the Cavite shore which rise to a height of 2,225 feet as compared with Carabao's 185 feet. Any enemy battery established here would soon render the rear slopes of Carabao untenable while to place the guns on the forward slopes would make the gun batteries an inviting target for attacking warships. The Corps of Engineers solution called for the mounting of the guns on the reverse side and establishment of a field army in the Pico de Loro Hills to keep an attack enemy's field artillery out of range of Carabao.

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In order to quickly develop a workable defense of Manila Bay, first priority was given to fortifying Corregidor and Carabao with the now designated Fort Mills and Fort Frank respectively. Fort Frank was named in honor of Brigadier General Royal T. Frank and was designated on outpost the Manila Harbour Defense which was headquartered at Fort Mills. Armament for Fort Franks consisted of two 14 inch disappearing guns mounted in two separate batteries. At the northern end of the island was located Battery Greer and 1,200 feet to the south in the western bulge was Battery Crofton. Located to the rear of Battery Crofton on the north-south axis of the island were the two mortar pits of Battery Koehler each with four M-1908 mortars. While the shoreward side of Fort Frank was to be protected by a field army on the mainland in the event of war, the Corps of Engineers apparently did not put full faith in this plan for the batteries were connected to each other by a deep communication trench.

In the War Department Annual Report for 1913 Brigadier General E. Weaver, Chief of Coast Artillery reported in regard to the coastal defense Manila Bay:

The Armament of Corregidor Island is completed and mounted with the exception of four mortars which are now under manufacture and will be shipped this fall.

On Carabao Island the emplacements for the 14 inch batteries and mortar batters are practically completed. The guns and carriages will be shipped in the fall (1912) and mounted probably before the close of the fiscal year (June 30, 1913). With the installation of this armament the strength of the defenses of Manila Bay will be greatly increased. The fire control and search light installations for Carabao have proceeded simultaneous with the battery construction, and the mounting of the guns will complete the defense at that point.

On Caballa Island (Fort Hughes) the emplacements have been started, and the armament for the batteries are under construction.

It is believed that the last obstacle to the success of the project for the fortification of El Fraile Island (Fort Drum) has been met by the latest plan of construction.

The following year Brigadier General Weaver reported that "Fortification construction continues at the entrance to Manila Bay and has progressed to include the completion of Fort Frank, Carabao Island; that at El Fraile and Caballo Islands is making good progress."

In order to man the batteries of Fort Frank three companies of Artillery would be needed. As coast artillery companies varied in accordance to the battery to be manned, troop strength for Fort Frank batteries was 11 officers and 349 men divided as 3 officers and 67 men per 14 inch battery and 5 officers and 215 men for the mortar battery. There were of course additional officers and troops assigned to Fort Frank's Headquarters for administrative purposes. A normal tour of duty at Fort Frank was four months with the remainder of the year spent at Fort Mills. There was no formal assignment of any coast artillery company to any one particular battery in the Harbor Defense of Manila Bay due to the lack of sufficient manpower to fight all the batteries at once. A 14 inch coast artillery complement therefore could for example be expected man many of the various 14 inch batteries or for that matter any of the batteries comprising the Manila Harbor Defense system.

Troop strength was such in early 1941 that the 78 men of Battery D 91st CA(PS) [PS: Philippine Scouts] were responsible for manning Battery Geary (eight 12 inch mortars) and twelve 75mm shore defense guns at Fort Mills at Batteries Greer and Crofton at Fort Frank. This of course was an impossible mission since for full manning Battery Crofton needed 67 men and Battery Geary needed 215 men. In reality the harbor defense of Manila Bay was more in a caretaker status than a war footing.

In early 1911 the blessing and curse of modern communication technology reached Fort Frank. That year a 1/8 kilowatt radio was installed on Carabao Island as well as at Fort Drum, Fort Wint and Fort Mills. Fort Frank was assigned the call letters PIA. The following year Fort Mills radio was upgraded to 10 kilowatts. A 1 kilowatt radio intended for Fort Wint was also retained at Fort Mills. Fort Frank kept its 1/8 kilowatt radio but its call signal changed to WVL. A 1/8 kilowatt radio was also installed at Fort Hughes that year. The 1 kilowatt station retained at Fort Mills was finally transferred to Fort Wint in 1913. On October 3, 1914 Brigadier General G. P. Scriven, Chief Signal Officer of the Army, in his annual report stated:

Radiotelegraph stations were maintained and radio operators furnished at Fort Mills, Fort Wint and Fort McKinley. The small radio Stations heretofore maintained on Carabao, El Fraile, and Caballo Islands have been discontinued, their use no longer being necessary following the laying of submarine cables between the points.

The fortifications of Manila Bay at the outbreak of World War 1 represented the most modern type of coastal defense works in the world. The garrison of Fort Frank and the other forts settled down to the humdrum "romantic" duties of soldiering in the Far East. The war in Europe was away and those German Naval and Army units in the Far East were quickly captured or chased out of the area by the Japanese and British by the end of 1914. However when war was declared by the United States on April 6, Fort Frank and the other forts of Manila Bay were brought to war footing. The Secretary of the Army ordered that no troops were to be withdrawn from the Philippines for use in Europe, and that additional troops be raised in the islands. This directive was complied with by the Army, and in fact Philippine Army strength was increased. This fact should make an interesting advanced study as to the reason behind this order , since coast defencse forts on both coasts in the United States were stripped of men and in some cases equipment. As Germany posed a more "real" threat to the East Coast than to the Philippines was the garrison in the Philippines increased mainly in fear of Japan changing sides?

Conclusion of the war saw a slow rundown in the strength of the troops in the Philippines. With the United States having promised the Philippines freedom in 1946, and little desire being expressed by the people of the nation to enter into an Asian conflict Congress cut back on funds for the Army in the Philippines. In addition to the dead hand of the Washington Naval Treaty, which forbade upgrading of coastal defense fortifications in the United States islands of Hawaii, suddenly gripped the Philippines. The outbreak of World War II in September, 1939 thus found Fort Frank and the other forts of Manila Bay equipped with obsolescent or obsolete fortifications and weapons. Indeed some officers who served there at this time and reviewed this article think this is an understatement.

The fall of France in June,1940 to Germany, coupled with Japan's increasing pro-Axis and anti-United States/Great Britain outlook led to a start at modernizing the Manila Bay forts. A scarcity of funds, equipment, materiel and construction workers however resulted in only a partial correction of obvious deficiencies. Since first consideration was given to Fort Mills, little was left for the other forts. The result was that upgrading at Fort Frank was limited to the construction of Battery Frank North. This Construction consisted of three 360° Panama mounts for 155 mm guns.

General Moore's after action report states that three Panama mounts were built but four guns were in the battery. Exact location of this battery is not known. In addition there were two concrete shell magazines, one fuse magazine and one temporary galvanized iron observing station. Also in recognition of the vulnerability of Fort Frank to air attacks, Battery Ermita consisting of four mobile 3 inch guns was established on Carabao.

December 8, 1941 found Fort Frank possessing the following armament and garrison:

 

 

BATTERY

No. Guns Cal. Type Troop Vertical Range Feet
Crofton 1 14-in DC F-91 PS 17,000
Creer 1 14-in DC D-2 PA 17,000
Koehler (2 Pits) 8 12-in M-1908 Mortars D-2 PA 14,000
Frank 4 155-mm Pan GPF D-2 PA

F-92 *

17,000
Ermita (AA) 4 3-in AA

E-91 PS

27,000 ft. (Vert.)**
Beach Defense 3 75-mm   F-91 PS 7,000
Fixed S/L 1   HD Det. Hq-91 PS * F-92 at Corregidor - Ed
AA S/L 1   Sperry 60-IN Det.-60 CA

**Due to the age of the powder and shells, combined with their long storage in the Far East, this range was seldom reached during the campaign.

 

An interesting fact observable from the above is that with the exception of the detachment from the 60th CA all of the garrison of Fort Frank were Philippine Scout troops. Battery D 2nd CA (Philippine Army) was transferred to Fort Frank on February 12, from Bataan. It consisted of 86 men and officers. The primary purpose of Fort Frank was to prevent enemy ships from sneaking into Manila Bay by hugging the Cavite Coast line and also to cover the southern edge of the defense mine field which extended from the tip of Bataan to the shore of Cavite.

General Douglas MacArthur's original plan for the defense of Luzon was to defeat the enemy as he landed. Inexperienced and insufficient troops with little transportation and few modern weapons prevented this plan from being carried out. The Japanese successfully landed troops on December 10, 1941 at both Vigan and Aparri in the north, and on December 12 at Legaspi in the south. Local American and Filipino resistance was quickly overcome and the Japanese started a drive for Manila. MacArthur, in response, ordered a series of delaying positions be taken up by the American/Filipino force to slow and delay the enemy while defense positions were established on Bataan. This mission was carried out successfully and on January 7, 1942 Lieutenant General Jonathan Wainwright's Northern Luzon Force and General Jones’ South Luzon Force retreated onto Bataan.

While the tactical withdrawal to Bataan had been completed succesfully, much of its strategic success was lost due to poor staff work at the United States Air Force Far East headquarters. Three major staff blunders in regard to the coast defense of Manila and Subic Bay command were to be costly.

These were first, the transfer of many noncombatants to Fort Mills, to the extent that they outnumbered the combat troops two to one, secondly, the abandonment of Fort Wint and thirdly, the failure to provide any field forces to defend the Cavite shore opposite Fort Frank. Prewar planning had always assumed that a field army would defend this area. At a minimum the field force would consist of an infantry battalion and a battery of field artillery. As the after action report of General George Moore commander of the Harbor Defense of Manila and Subic Bay stated:

However this plan was not followed and the Japanese were able to occupy this important observation post (Pico de Lora Hills) early in January, 1942, and from it to adjust heavy concentrations of artillery fire on Forts Frank and Drum.

The broken terrain between Ternate and Erestinga Point on the Cavite shore south of Fort Drum offered excellent defiladed positions for artillery.

 

On December 25, 1941 Colonel Boudreau reported to General Moore the abandonment of Fort Wint and the withdrawal of his troops behind the Bataan main line of resistance. As Boudreau was senior to Lieutenant Colonel Bill Stennis, commanding Fort Frank, he was ordered two days later to take Command of Fort Frank. This command Boudreau kept until the end of the battle.

Until December29, 1941, no serious air attack had been launched against all of the Manila Bay forts. Japanese airpower had concentrated against American air and naval forces. On this day however a major air strike was directed against Fort Mills causing serious damage to above ground structures and killing about 20 men and wounding another 80. From this day forward, Corregidor was to feel the weight of Japanese bombs. As yet Fort Frank not been hit or fired its guns in anger, but in compliance with a USAFFE directive January 5,1942 it placed its troops on half rations.

On January 31,1942 Battery Koehler's 12 inch mortars, which had not been fired for a number of years, spoke in anger for the first time. Having detected Japanese preparations to bombard Fort Frank from the Pico de Lora HilIs, counter fire was laid down on those positions within its range. A total 30 rounds were fired at gun positions near Ternate by the mortars to which the 155mm guns added 36 rounds. These Japanese guns were part of the Kondo Detachment and initially consisted of four 105mm and two 150mm guns. In mid-February another two l50mm guns would be added to this force.

The remainder of the siege was to see constant counter battery operations carried out against Japanese positions in the Pico de Lora Hills. As the Japanese usually held their fire until the sun was at their back, visual plotting of the batteries from Fort Frank was almost impossible. In order to overcome this handicap Captain Ivey and a small party of enlisted men crossed to the Cavite shore. Here for a few days they were able, by walkie-talkie, to direct Fort Frank's and Drum's, guns on to targets. The Japanese due to the accuracy of the American fire, suspected that a forward observation post was operating in the vicinity and conducted an infantry sweep of the area dislodging Captain Ivey's party and finally forcing it to return to Fort Frank on February 15.

Shortly after 8 a.m. on February 6, 1942 Japanese 105mm and 155mm howitzers and guns on the Cavite mainland opened fire on Forts Drum, Hughes and Mills. This fire which lasted until almost 11 was returned by Battery Roberts (6 inch) at Fort Drum and Batteries Koehler and Frank North at Fort Frank. Surprisingly Fort Frank was not subjected to any Japanese artillery fire this day, but it did incur its first casualties when one of Battery Koehler's mortars suffered a muzzle burst. Casualties were one Philippine Scout killed and seven wounded, including Captain R.J. White, the battcry commander.

The following day the Japanese included Fort Frank in their bombardment. From this time on, all the Manila Bay forts were to suffer from Japanese guns on the Cavite mainland. This fire was answered by all the forts and in particular Fort Frank. The lack of forward observers to adjust the first of the American guns however, greatly reduced their effectiveness. To help correct this problem on February 9 a photographic flight was made over the Cavite shore. These pictures were of some temporary help in connection with Captain Ivey's radio reports. The pictures however became of less value after February 15 when the Japanese shifted their gun positions.

Brigadier General Steve Mellink, then a major on Corregidor, in commenting on the problem of locating these gun positions stated in an article in Coast Artillery Journal in 1945:

The enemy fired in the morning only, thus having the sun for a background. Attempts to locate the enemy guns by smoke or flash failed… the enemy put up smoke rings to coincide with the firing of the guns, and no flash was visible in the daytime. A system of gun location which used the travel of sound waves through the ground was finally devised but the system proved too complicated and delicate. Best results were obtained by taking the line of fall of duds and studying a fire control map of the area.

On February 16 the Japanese struck what appeared to be a death blow to Fort Frank, by blowing up the pipeline that carried fresh water from the Calumpan Dam on the mainland to the fort. Though Fort Frank had a distillation plant that was not put into operation, it was vulnerable to shell fire and low on fuel. Japanese troops were in such close proximity to Fort Frank that the following day the three 75mm beach defense guns were able to open on Japanese troops moving about in the open on the mainland.

On February 18 the Japanese concentrated most of their fire power on Fort Frank. At 9:30 p.m. they scored a hit on Battery Frank North Number 4 gun wounding seven of its crew. Shell fire was kept up against the fort into the night. As the shells continued to hit in and around Carabao Island the harbor boat Neptune tried to approach Fort Frank to deliver supplies. Forced to pull away from the pier once due to the shelling she returned again at 3:30 a.m. on February 19. As Neptune started to tie up to the pier she was hit on the bow by a Japanese shell that set afire 15 drums of gasoline intended for the fort's generators, and 500 powder charges for the 155mm guns. The gasoline blaze quickly had Neptune afire from bow to stern and the crew abandoned over the side. All supplies aboard the ship were lost. In addition, floating burning gasoline came ashore and set the island's vegetation on fire in a number spots. It was only with great difficulty that the blazes were extinguished.

Loss of the gasoline supplies heightened Fort Frank's critical fuel problem. To conserve fuel, Colonel Boudreau called for volunteers to return to the mainland and repair the blown water pipe. A party of 15 men landed later that day and began to repair the water pipe. While so engaged they were attacked by a number of Japanese, but assisted by Fort Frank's 75mm gut beat off the attack, killing 25 to 30 of the enemy. The engagement however prevented the water line from being repaired.

Starting at 9:30 a.m. on February 20 Fort Frank along with Fort Mills and Hughes was subjected to a shelling that saw a round hitting each fort on an average of one a minute until late that afternoon. The next day was peaceful as the Japanese ceased firing to reposition their artillery. Battery Frank North however was active on February 29 taking under fire Japanese troops near Ternate and Maragondon on the Cavite mainland while the 75mm guns fired on Japanese troops at Calumpan on February 26. The lull which now took place was put to good use by Fort Frank and the other forts as they strengthened fortifications and repositioned guns.

 

A further cut in the food issue at Fort Frank and the other forts came on March 2 when each ration was cut to three-eights normal issue. That same day an attack by two dive-bombers caused little damage to the fort but resulted in one aircraft being shot down by Battery Ermita. A few days later Battery Koehler's 12 inch mortars hit Japanese artillery positions being prepared near Pico del Oro. Koehler's salvos of eight 670-pound shells, when equipped with instantaneous fuses, were the most effective counter-batter instrument possessed when using high explosive shells, which were in short supply, did little real damage as most of the shells fired were armor piercing and thus exploded only after penetrating the ground for some distance. Only batteries Frank North, Ermita and 75mm guns had any large number of high explosive shells.

Battery Ermita drew blood again on March 6 when it shot down a Japanese plane on reconnaissance over the fort. It was also on this day that a Filipino civilian delivered to the fort a Japanese demand for its surrender. The substance of the message according to General Moore was:

Surrender Carabao and save lives, the whole area along coast line of Cavite Providence is now a Japanese Military Reservation, large guns in large numbers are being massed there, Carabao will be reduced by our mighty artillery fire, likewise Drum, after reduction of Drum and Carabao our invincible artillery will pound Corregidor into submission, batter it, weaken it preparatory to a final assault by crack Japanese landing troops. Be wise, surrender now and receive preferential Japanese treatment.

Needless to say this demand for surrender was ignored.

With fuel stocks running low a new attempt was made on March 9 to repair the water line. Under cover of a barrage of shells from the 75mm guns a party landed on the mainland and after nine hours repaired the break. Amazingly, the Japanese did not interfere with the repair of the waterpipe though it lay on ground they occupied. For the remainder of March, Fort Frank was to have ample water.

The first part of March saw the 75mm guns firing numerous rounds of shrapnel at enemy concentrations while Battery Frank North struck at supposed Japanese gun positions. The enemy reply to these shots was feeble or non-existent. This, however changed on March 15 when the Hayakawa detachment's two 240mm howitzers opened fire on Forts Frank and Drum. At this same time 155mm guns also hit Mills and Hughes. Hardest hit was Fort Frank which lost two guns each at Batteries Frank North and Ermita to direct hits, plus repairable damages to the other guns of these batteries. AIso destroyed was a machine gun post, while Battery Koehler had seven of its mortars damaged. In all more than 500 shells hit Fort Frank this day.

Next day the bombardment continued. General Moore's after-action report stated of this continued bombardment: "A 240mm shell hit at junction of the vertical wall and emplacement floor at Battery Koehler, penetrated 18 inches of concrete, passed under a 6-foot concrete wall and exploded under the powder room. The floor was broken up and 60 cans mortar powder overturned but none was set off."

On the following day Battery Koehler was back in action but still under fire from the Japanese. Counter fire from Fort Frank and the other forts was light in comparison with the Japanese barrage. The principal targets on Fort Frank were Batteries Koehler and Crofton. Battery Crofton from this time was to suffer on a number of occasions damaging near misses. It was able only to remain in operation by cannibalizing parts from Battery Greer. As soon as Crofton opened fire the Japanese would bring a wall of fire down around the open battery.

The morning of March 20 brought tragedy to Fort Frank. The garrison was lined up in Crofton Tunnel to be inoculated. While waiting in line 240mm shell penetrated the roof of the tunnel and exploded. Killed were 28 men while 26 were wounded, several of these latter mortally. The wounded and dead were removed that night to Fort Mills. This did not prevent Battery Koehler from firing back at the enemy this night or the next day. The day’s shelling by the Japanese however marked the last firing of the 240mm howitzers from Cavite as the Hayakawa Detachment was disbanded on March and its guns transferred to Bataan.

 For the remainder of March and the first part of April a continued exchange of fire fights occurred between the Cavite shore and Forts Frank, Drum and Hughes. The exchange was fairly one-sided, however, as the Japanese had a secure supply line and observable targets. The morning of March 27 brought a new threat to Fort Frank when 45 bancas were observed assembled on a mainland beach south of the fort. Fearing an amphibious assault these boats were taken under fire by the 75mm guns and destroyed. These bancas in fact had been gathered for an assault on Fort Frank, but the troops assigned to the attack had to be shifted to Bataan to support the fight there.

The final phase in the reduction of the Manila Bay Harbor Defense forts started on April 9 with the fall of Bataan. Japanese artillery could now be shifted to Bataan close to Corregidor, the main link in the Manila Bay defense. On April 10 Fort Frank permanently lost its mainland water supply when the Japanese removed two lengths of pipe from the water line. As no extra pipe existed, Fort Frank was unable to repair the break and was forced to fall back on its distillation plant. Though the 240mm howitzers were gone, Fort Frank still suffered from Japanese 155mm gun fire and occasional air attacks. This shelling and bombing was of sufficient intensity and accuracy to prevent any significant firing of Fort Frank's guns at targets of opportunity and in conducting counter battery fire.

So the temporary end of Fort Frank under the U.S. flag started at 11:30 p.m. on May 5, 1942, as the Japanese commenced an amphibious assault on Corregidor. At 10:20 a.m. on May 6 with the Japanese tanks landing on Corregidor, General Wainwright told General Moore that he proposed to surrender at noon. He then ordered General Moore to instruct his troops to destroy all their weapons larger than a .45 caliber pistol and to hoist a white flag. This instruction was transmitted to Fort Frank and complied with by Colonel Boudreau. Japanese troops shortly thereafter peacefully occupied Fort Frank. The American garrison however was not evacuated to Manila until May 24.

Japanese at Fort Frank over the next three years were to recommission battery Crofton and add three 100mm guns. The American landing on Luzon on January 9, 1945, found the forts of Manila Bay garrisoned by a miscellaneous group of Japanese soldiers, designated the Manila Bay Entrance Defense Force under the command of Captain Akira Itagaki. Driving south from Lingayan Gulf, American troops of the 38th Division were in control of Bataan by February 19, 1945. With Bataan secure and Cavite shore captured by the 11th Airborne Division operational plans were set forth to recapture the Manila Bay forts. First to fall was Fort Mills. followed by Drum and Hughes. The fight for these forts was long and bitter resulting in high casualties for both sides in relation to the size of the objective.

The garrison of Carabao, based upon intelligence from a captured organization chart and prisoner interrogation, was estimated at 500 men. These were thought to be principally elements of a Japanese Naval landing unit. The date for the American assault landing was set for April 16, 1945. Prior to the assault the island was taken under fire from the Cavite shore 105mm and 155mrn Howitzers supported by 81mm and 4.2 inch mortars. Added to this was bombing by medium bombers and fighters dropping and 1,000 pound bombs and C-4 transports dropping 55 gallon drums Napalm. This was supported by gunfire from cruisers, destroyers and rocket ships. Principal target for the ships was the sea wall protecting the proposed landing area. This had to he knocked down if .a broad front (200 yards) was be provided for the landing. So intense was the bombardment that vegetation was stripped from the island.

Assault waves of the 1st Battalion of this 151st Infantry went ashore 9:03 a.m. April 16 supported by C Company, 113th engineers. The initial wave consisted of two platoons, one securing the beachhead while the other advanced to capture the crest line. Following units placed a block across the north side of the connecting ridge and then occupied the south side of the island. This was followed by securing the western peninsula and then the northern end of the island. No enemy troops were encountered in the sweep but a number of supply dumps were found and destroyed, while all caves were sealed by engineers using explosives and a bulldozer that had been winched to the top of the hill. The only living object found on the island was a pig.

Investigation of documents found showed that the garrison had slipped ashore to Cavite the week before the assault.

Though no resistance was encountered in the capture of Fort Frank, five men were killed and 18 wounded in an undetermined explosion about 11 a.m. Three causes were suggested for the explosion: a booby trap, a short artillery round, or a premature explosion of a demolition charge.

The post-war American and Philippine occupation of Carabao brought no attempt to restore the fortifications. When the Philippine government took possession of Carabao Island in 1946 it at first maintained a small garrison on the isIand but this was later withdrawn. Since then unauthorized scrap metal collectors have stripped Fort Frank of all its armament and have started to break up the concrete for its iron reinforcement rods. What the scavenger has not taken away is being reclaimed by the jungle.

 

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© Charles Bogart

 

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

 Seacoast Fortifications of the U.S. by E.R. Lewis, Washington, Smithsonian Institute Press, 1970.

Corregidor: The Saga of a Fortress by James H. and William M. Belote. New York. Harper and Row, 1967.

United States Army, Annual Reports. 1905-1920.

The Fall of the Philippines by Louis Morton. Washington, Department of the Army. 1953.

Report of the National Coast Defense Board, Washington. January 31, 1905.

Triumph in the Philippines by Robert R. Smith, Washington. Department of the Army, 1963.

38th Division, Avengers of Bataan, Washington,Unit history.

"Retaking the Harbor Defense of Manila and Subic Bay," by Perry R. McMahon. U.S. Coast Artillery Journal, July - August. 1945.

"Corrigidor, A Name, A Symbol. A Tradition," by W.C. Braley, U.S. Coast Artillery Journal, July - August, 1947.

"How the Japs Took Corregidor" by Stephen H. Mellnick, U.S. Coast Artillery Journal March, April, 1945.

"Coast Artillery in Action - From the Communiques." U.S. Coast Artillery Journal, various issues, 1942.

Army Post and Towns, by Charles J. Sullivan, Free Press, 1926 and 1935.

United States Military Reservation, National Cemeteries and Military Parks, Washington, Judge Advocate General. U.S. Army, 1907 and 1916.

Order of Battle of the U.S. Land Force in the World War, (1917-19), Washington, U.S. Army, 1949.

Harbor Defense of Manila and Subic Bays, October 26, 1940, Funds for Emergency Installations.

Report on the M8 Operation 19 January - 30 June 1945, by 38th Infantry Division, Washington, D.C.

Philippine Diary 1939-45, Steve M. Mellnik.

Report of Maj Gen George F. Moore - Commander HD of M and S.B. 14 February 1941 - 6 May 1942.

But Not In Shame, John Toland, New York, Random House, 1961.

Reports of General MacArthur. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966.

 

 

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THE AUTHOR

 Charles Bogart is a nuclear civil protection planner,whose major historical interest is in the coast artillery. He is from Kentucky.

 

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