 
This
is scanned from a 1944 US Army Map. The difference between the campaigns was thay the
Americans retreated to Bataan, whereas the Japanese forces retreated to the mountains
around Baguio where large units could not be used to their best advantage.

Details
of Manila Bay.




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Fighting
valiantly, the United States Armed Forces in the Far Fast (USAFFE), led by General Douglas
MacArthur, was thrown back by the implacable advance or the enemy. Retreat to Bataan
became inevitable. On the Bataan peninsula the defending forces, following War Plan
Orange-3, regrouped for a last stand.
Delaying actions were fought
to permit withdrawal to Bataan, the bloodiest of which was fought by the 11th
and 21st Divisions on the Porac-Guagua line. The 26th Cavalry
Regiment protected the west flank of the 21st Division. As the entire USAFFE
struggled from south and north toward the Layac junction, the only approach to Bataan, the
delaying forces held their line on open and unprepared ground. From 1 January to 5 January
they stood fast against massive enemy aerial and artillery bombardment, concentrated tank
attacks and banzai charges. Casualties on both sides were heavy. The first
defensive in Bataan was the Hermosa-Dinalupihan line, where on 6 January 1942 the 71st
Division, the American 31st Infantry Regiment and the 26th Cavalry Regiment
fought off the pursuing enemy.
The aim of War Plan Orange-3
was to delay the invading enemy forces until the US Navy could gather together it's
Pacific Fleet and sail to the Philippines, on the way dealing with the Japanese Fleet. But
there was no US Navy fleet to gather together, for it now rested on the bottom of Pearl
Harbor.
The main battle position of
the USAFFE, the Abucay-Morong line, was attacked along its eastern flank on 9 January, but
the 5th Regimental Combat Team, reinforced by the 57th Infantry of the 21st Division
repulsed the attack. On 14 January the Japanese attacked the boundary of the 41st
and 51st Divisions. The 43rd Infantry, holding the left lank of the
41st Division, which was reinforced by the 23rd Infantry, 21st Division sharply
refused its flank. The 51st Infantry, holding the right flank of the 51st
Division, withdrew creating a gap through which the enemy advanced to the Salian River.
But a patrol of the 21st Division discovered the enemy, and elements of the
Division rushed to the Salian River valley where after a savage fight, they repulsed the
enemy. Farther to the west the enemy surprised and routed the 53rd Infantry.
Penetrating deep behind the main battle position along the Abo-Abo River valley, the enemy
advance was held up by combined elements of the 21st Division of the II
reserve, the 31st and the 51st Division of the Bani-Guirol forest
area.
The American 31st Infantry and the 45th
Infantry, Philippine Scouts, succeeded in partially restoring the abandoned line of the 51st
Division.
On 15 January the Morong sector, defended by the 1st
Regular Division, reinforced, came under heavy bombardment. But the line held.
A few days later, the enemy penetrated through a huge
gap in the Silangan-Natib area and established a roadblock on the Mauban ridge, thus
cutting off the 1st Regular Division from the rear area. Gravely threatened,
elements of the 71st and 91st Divisions and the 2nd
Regiment repeatedly attacked the roadblock but failed to dislodge the enemy.
Although the II Corps Sector had prevented a similar
envelopment in the Salian River battle, the I Corps position was now untenable. The
Abucay-Morong tine was abandoned on 24 January. The Orion-Bagac line was established two
clays later. Again in a desperate attempt to outflank the I Corps, the enemy landed crack
units on the west coast of southern Bataan. The aim was to outflank and to isolate the
frontline units from headquarters and supplies.
There were three ferocious battles in the
I.apiay-Longoskawayan Points area, fought from 23 to 29 January; in Quinawan-Aglaloma
Points area, fought from 23 January to 8 February; and Silaiim-Anyasan Points, fought from
27 January to 13 February. Of the 2,000 enemy troops committed to these battles, only 34
wounded soldiers returned to their lines.
On 27 January enemy troops were discovered in the rear
of the Orion-Bagac line, the Tuol River valley behind the 11th Regular Division
and in the Gogo-Cotar River valley behind the 1st Regular Division. The series
of engagements to eliminate these enemy salients became known as the Battle of the
Pockets, fought from 27 January through 17 February. Of the 2,000 Japanese troops
committed to this battle, only 377 were reported to have escaped.
After the battles of the points, pockets and Trail 2,
which were brilliant triumphs of the USAFFE, the enemy withdrew to regroup their forces
and to wait for reinforcements.
Meanwhile, on 12 March, General MacArthur, his family
and some staff officers of the USAFFE left on four PT boats for Mindanao, from where they
were flown to Australia. MacArthur's departure marked the end of the USAFFE on 22 March.
The defending army was renamed United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP), under the
command of Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright.
The Japanese High Command reinforced Homma's 14th
Imperial Japanese Army, and toward the end of March the enemy struck. The entire
Orion-Bagac line was subjected to vicious artillery and aerial bombardment, turning the
Mount Samat area into an inferno. The forest was set on fire, men were buried alive in
their foxholes and every inch of the ground was covered by enemy fire. The dust flames and
smoke darkened the mountain. The USAFFE artillery, which had backed the defenders, was
immobilized
At 1500 hours, the enemy infantry, spearheaded by tanks
which rolled over the bodies of the dead and living Filipino defenders, broke through the
main line of resistance of the 41st Infantry at Trail 29. Along Trail 6, the
enemy infantry, also spearheaded by tanks, crashed through the main line of resistance of
the 21st Infantry. By nightfall the enemy had penetrated about 1,500 yards
behind the main line of resistance of the 41st infantry, 1,000 yards behind the
23rd infantry.
On 4 April the enemy infantry attacked the 23rd
Infantry crashing through the line along Trail 4. The enemy swerved toward the east and
struck the flank of the 22nd Infantry. By nighttime the enemy had penetrated
1,000 yards beyond the main battle position of the 23rd Infantry. By the 6th of
April Mount Samat was surrounded. But the 21st Division, reforming its line to
resemble a horseshoe, still held the slopes of the mountain. The battle of Mount Samat was
called the most vicious encounter of the second battle of Bataan.
The night before the surrender, a series of earthquakes
rocked Bataan, two of which were of nature's making. In the morning heavy rain fell. Then
the sun shone. On 9 April 1942, at high noon, Major General Edward P. King, Jr., senior
American officer on the battle-torn peninsula surrendered the Bataan forces. The infamous
Death March began.

So isolated would the
Philippines become, no-one outside of the Philippines would know of this barbarity until
January 1944. In April 1943 ten American prisoners, aided by two
Filipino convicts, escaped from Davao, and were able to make contact with a Filipino
guerrilla unit. Through this contact, they were ultimately able to be evacuated by
submarine to Australia. Through interviews conducted with these men, the US received the
first information about the Death March and the conditions of the POW's under Japanese
captivity. In January 1944 the reports of Japanese atrocities written by Lieutenant
Colonel William Dyess, one of the escapees, were published in the Chicago Tribune and by
its news service. Based on this account, Secretary of State Cordell Hull warned Japan in a
blunt communique that America would hold Japan accountable for crimes committed against
American prisoners. By the end of the war, approximately 58% of their American
prisoners would die under Japanese custody. In Europe, by way of comparison, only 2% would
die under German custody.
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