
"Shells continued to arrive from the Cavite guns, but Corregidor was not to know what shelling meant until the fall of Bataan on April 8."
Engulfed
by the ravenous fangs
of
war striking fiercely in the
Far East after the treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor,
a comparatively small army of American and Philippine troops braced
itself as well as
possible for the inevitable
blow. In
view of the size at the defending army, hardly a member of that force was
to escape the realism of action. After the first explosion of war, not
many days passed before the action encompassed the 60th CA (AA) of
Corregidor. This
is the story of one of the units of that Regiment. Battery
D, 60th CA (AA), a 3” AA battery located at Kindley Field Corregidor (see
sketches) found itself inexorably pushed into the Far Eastern fray. Astride
the Kindley Field ridge,
her guns defied the vultures of the rising sun.
This position allowed the battery excellent observation in its sector
and command of the air defense of the east end of “The Rock.” Originally
a plan to locate
the battery near the Corregidor landing field had been contemplated, but
this plan gave way in favor of the one which placed the organization on the
ridge. Superior
observation from the ridge was
the deciding factor. All of the installations of the battery were
east of the water towers with the exception of the original kitchen and
storerooms. In
supplement of the 3”guns, a platoon of L Battery
60th CA (AA)
manned
two machine guns (.50 cal) on the ridge. For added local protection the
machine gun section of Battery D manned the four .30 cal machine guns
indicated on the sketch.
In
observing the sketch further the diagram of a tunnel will be noted.
Construction work on this tunnel began about March 20, 1942,
under the able and assiduous supervision of Staff Sergeant “Tim” Fackler. Such
a tunnel became a necessity for
the protection of materiel, supplies, and personnel.
Many of the
units in the vicinity used the tunnel as a dressing station for the wounded
during the terrific artillery onslaught from Bataan. Members of the 4th Marines on beach defense in the sector
repeatedly expressed gratitude for having such a place available in which to
care for their wounded until the arrival of an ambulance.
During intervals, when there was no necessity for having the entire
battery at the equipment, individuals were allowed to seek shelter in the
tunnel, but they remained subject to instantaneous call. Most
of the time, especially during the last days of the campaign, the
situation excluded the use of the tunnel as a
place of shelter for the troops. They were required near the materiel
constantly; so a blanket and a pile of leaves often sufficed for
a bunk.
If fortunate a man might have some sort of mask between himself and
the enemy artillery. The entire five months were not like that; during the
slack period during the later part of January and first part of February,
a fervent program of shack building took place.
Salvaged lumber from demolished structures began to make its
appearance at the position.
Soon a small village of shacks sprung from the plans and labor of
the defenders of Kindley Field Ridge. These shacks were surprisingly
comfortable and a credit to the builders. But war brings many good things
to an end.
The heavy shelling in April plowed up the miniature castles. So
heavy and continuous was the shelling and bombing after the fall of Bataan
that the personnel and materiel suffered greatly. The position astride the
ridge, so propitious before the fall of Bataan, became an excellent target
for the Nipponese artillery. The target was not neglected. The
never-ending shelling finally forced the higher command to order a new
position prepared. The work on this new position was in progress
when the Japanese invaded Corregidor. A complete description
of this preparation will be covered later in this story. The point has now
been reached to determine the sort of human being who found himself it the
center of this hell. He
was not an imposing figure -- for the most part just a recruit off the
April 1941 Republic. He was a volunteer enlistment. By
mystical military gyrations he found himself a member of Battery D-60th CA
(AA). Most of the battery was composed of soldiers just like him.
Upon the arrival of the recruits off the Republic, the 60th underwent an
expansion and reorganization. It became necessary to distribute the
older soldiers over the new regiment in order to sake nucleuses for the
new units being formed as well as the old. D Battery lost many of
her older soldiers to H Battery under this distribution. For
replacement D Battery received about 60% of its strength in recruits as
did all the other batteries. Luckily for D Battery, a capable veteran,
First Sergeant Dewey Brady, remained to propel the new men thru the rigors
of their recruit training. Hardly enough can be written in praise of the
untiring efforts of Sgt. Brady in molding the men under him into soldiers. When
the Republic unloaded her troops, the 60th found herself with a
preponderance of recruits and a training problem of acute proportion. How
the regiment leaped from the infant stage to the efficient fighting unit
it became is a study in hard work, tenacity, and perseverance. The
panegyric in this endeavor belongs to Col. Barr, Executive Officer of the
60th. who was responsible for the planning and execution of the recruit
training. The excellent results of the regiment during the war
reflects the success of the training program. Regretfully, many of
the efforts of Col. Barr met unnecessary adversities of a personal nature,
but in overcoming these obstacles he proved himself the more capable. In
Battery D the training of the recruits encompassed every old soldier in
the organization. The battery officers were young and inexperienced
but with the inimitable Sgt. Brady to depend upon, an organization of
loose ends became a smooth working unit. Young soldiers sweated at
Ordnance Point--drilling, marching, working, learning always with the
ebullient rancor only recruits know. Then, at last, a better life -
ephemeral as it was. Topside Barracks, the Post
Exchange, Spif bars, movies -- but never a cessation of training;
night marches, gun drills, director drills, height finder training, night
drills. The heat was on and necessarily so. Now the
height finder section was able to start an extensive program. As is so
familiar to the A-A soldier, the training of this unit became a
lengthy and tedious process. The observers may be the best in the world
but without constant practice their ability is to no avai1 because of lack
at coordination of their physical actions. Under the able supervision of
Sgt. Sullivan Battery D's height finder crew developed into the excellent
section it proved itself to be during the war. Results during wartime is the final and
absolute gauge of any military unit. D Battery is proud to be measured by
such a gage. Conditions during the war permitted no let up. All men
were 24 hr. soldiers. There is no relaxation when the enemy is at
the front door and there is no back door. The daylight bring bombers to be
shot from the skies -- the dark of night brings intermittent raiders.
Tomorrow a repetition. Only those actually on Corregidor can know the
strain on men and materiel as the 60th wrote its fame in the skies for the
whole world to read. The
performance of A.A. materiel brings back pleasant memories. While none of
the materiel was impervious to the bombs and shells, the durability of the
A.A. equipment on the rock was beyond all expectations. Unless actually
hit by the enemy, the materiel gave very little trouble. This was
especially true in D Battery --which was equipped with standard materiel;
M4 director #177, M-1 height finder #71, four 3” AA Gun M-3 on M2A2
mounts, two M-4 power plants with M-4 data transmission junction box and
cables system, and such other minor equipment as was necessary to fire the
battery. The organization was also supplied with 3” AA Mk II shell-MK
III Schovil (Powder Train) fuzed ammunition. This ammunition
presented a serious handicap due to its limitations. This will be
discussed later. Continuing with the materiel, D Battery itself
manned four .30 cal. AA MG for local security and the position was
supplemented by a platoon from L. Co 60th CA (AA) which manned two .50
cal, AA MGs.
The
immediate air warn system consisted of lookout stations located at several
points: One at each gun, one at the director, one at the height
finder, one at an observation tower, and one on top of the water tower.
A telephone system connected all these observation points. Upon
detection of a plane by any of the observers, the height finder and
director observers were immediately notified. The observer on top of
the water tower blew a whistle to alert the battery--every man racing to
his battle position. The battery commander, executive, and range
officer stationed themselves at the director. The 1st Sgt., Brady
was in direct command of the guns and was atop the water tower. As soon as
a target had been located, the aw observer seeing it gave its direction
and approximate altitude over the telephone. The director and height
finder went into action attempting to pick the target up and start
tracking. As soon as both were on target and data smooth, the range
officer notified Sgt. Brady who commanded the guns to “stand by.”
The guns crews have been matching pointers and are ready to load
when the command comes. As the target cores in' range, the range officer
signals Sgt. Brady who then commands “Commence Firing!” By regimental
order each gun was arbitrarily limited to six rounds per gun so it was
unnecessary to give any command to cease firing except when it became
immediately evident that the firing was to no avail. In such a case
a whistle signal was used. It should be noted that in this system a
great deal of dependence was placed upon the 1st Sgt. as he was given the
actual prerogative of firing the battery. This may appear to be an unusual
delegation of command but considering the experience, character, and
intelligence of Sgt. Brady, the confidence placed in him was not a
mistake. There is an exception. Such a set up left the battery open
to dire consequences in the case of Brady becoming a casualty. The
burden of administration also fell upon the First Sergeant. Regimental
headquarters handled the bulk of the paper work but the supervision of the
battery in the field was practically in the hinds of Sgt. Brady. Even a
great deal of the mess problem fell in his lap early in the war when the
mess sergeant broke his leg. The Mess problem was acute and most
important. Besides the actual members of D Battery the organization
fed 8 men from L Battery and a varying number of Air Corps officers who
were attached for rations. Shortly after the fall of Manila, D
Battery was able to salvage four truck loads of food from a half sunken
barge which had been towed from Manila to Corregidor and grounded near the
battery position. On or about April 24 the kitchen which had been
located near the “Love Nest” was blown up by a bomb. It became
necessary to move the kitchen as indicated on the sketch. This
latter kitchen remained until the last night. In reviewing the mess
situation it would be unworthy to omit the splendid and loyal work of the
Filipino helpers in the mess. These boys worked assiduously and undaunted
to the vary end. Their morale reflected the attitude of the entire
mess crew. In
fact, although the 60th CA (AA) was an organization made up chiefly of men
with less than a years service, the morale of D Battery as well as the
rest of the 60th CA (AA) was exemplary throughout the campaign.
Regretfully, upon the death of Sgt. Brady during the last part of April
the battery received a severe shock. The key man was dead and no one of
equivalent force remained in the battery to keep the loose ends together.
As a result of this unfortunate death, it became necessary to make a
change In the battery to prevent a loss of morale. Capt. Cornwall
was transferred to D Battery from C Battery to take over as battery
commander in an effort to stabilize the organization. This transfer
was sufficient to settle the battery; so that the Japanese invasion found
D Battery a staunch foe. Except for the few dismal days which
followed the loss of Sgt. Brady Can the efficiency of the battery be
questioned. D Battery was definitely in the war from beginning to
end. The
beginning had been anticipated. Over a week before the outbreak of war the
entire regiment moved into the field on a wartime basis. Orders were
issued to fire on any plane not identified as friendly. In pursuance
of such orders D Battery moved bag and baggage to a permanent position at
Kindley Field near the water towers there. Prior to this move preparations
were carried on to get the position in this vicinity ready for occupation.
Such preparation continued until completed; fortification, maintenance and
improvement continued during the war. The bombing of Hawaii made war a
stark reality, but the morning of Dec. 9th made the fact more poignant.
Around 3 AM several flights of planes flew near Corregidor and on to
Cavite and Nichols Field where they dropped their bombs. Upon approach of
the planes the battery was alerted but the enemy kept well out of range. Dec.
10th afforded more visual evidence of the enemy. 25 Japanese bombers
flying west over Bataan after having dropped their sticks on Cavite and
Manila presented a fine sight for the AA artillerymen, but unfortunately
the flight did not come in range of any guns. Battery D opened fire but
this was ineffective for the reason mentioned above. This was the first
time that many of the men had been present when an AA 3” gun fired.
Naturally all the men were green, but the firing was no less than
remarkable in view of their inexperience. This flight served as a training
medium, as also did the one of Dec. 13th. This time a flight of 17 planes
returning from Manila and Cavite did not take the precaution to avoid
Corregidor. Coming out of the clouds over the tail of the Island and
flying directly in prolongation of Corregidor, the flight looked for
all the world like the real thing. This time the Rock expected bombs for
sure, but this experience was to come another day as these bombers had
already dropped their loads. But a mistake they had made. With nothing to
gain they were in range. Brain, brawn, and hot steel went into
action as the 3” barked and bit. The air bristled with shell fragments.
Mr. Nippon suddenly realized his mistake. The formation split.
Eight planes flew in the direction of Batangas while the other nine headed
towards Bataan. This later group split up again into groups of
threes. Later reports alleged that several of these planes had crashed.
This incident gave Japan a poignant lesson. Not until Dec. 25 did the
Nipponese venture in range of Corregidor again. The
two firings just mentioned provided the teething-rIng for D Battery. Many
a strong tooth was cut on those two flights--teeth that were to gnash and
tear through the Japanese air force. The Republic recruits became
full fledged anti-aircraft soldiers. Those callowed youngsters had become
men overnight. Japan had provided unintentionally a training schedule far
batter than any target practice. Director men, height finder men,
gun crews, trackers, officers--all became one machine, smooth and
deadly in its effect. Christmas
afternoon brought a present flown in. Nine planes flew over Monkey
Point. D flattery opened fire without visible result. The planes
proceeded to Mariveles Harbor, bombing several objectives. One bomb
hit a Free French ship which immediately flared into flames. For 59
hours the blaze from this burning ship flashed across the channel as the
craft slowly submerged to its grave. Those kids who were used to
fireworks on Christmas day went to bed with a display carved in their
memories. They had just finished their Christmas dinner in the field when
the alert sounded for the nine planes. But Christmas day was merely
a prelude to the fireworks to follow. December
29! A beautiful tropical morning drifted away without a ripple of
dissonance. Then “Flash, flash, Corregidor.” In a
few minutes the skies seemed black with swarms of planes. From all
directions they came. From all directions they came. First the
bombers at approximately 4300 yds. altitude, but very rapidly the Japanese
realized such an altitude was suicide. When the second flight came
over the altitude was approximately 6800 yds. The altitudes gradually
increased with each flight over. One group of light barbers
attempted a dive bombing and strafing attack, but this was a one and only
trip. The sheet at lead thrown up discouraged any more such tricks. For 2
1/2 hours Corregidor suffered from aerial bombs and for 2 ½ hours
the 60th blazed away successfully at the Japs. After firing on four
flights of bombers D Battery went out of action temporarily. A stick of
bombs had cut the cable between the power plant and the junction box.
Sgt. Brady jumped from his position, gathered a crew and replaced
the cable. By this time the skies were obscured from the battery by
heavy black smoke pouring front a near by gasoline storage tank.
This tank had been hit by the same stick which had severed our cable.
Bombs continued to fall in the vicinity of the battery. Bomb
fragments put one gun out of action and injured four of the crew. The
smoke cleared. D Battery on target again. Three more flights
came over and D Battery fired on each with devastating results to the
enemy. As soon as the sky cleared, work started immediately to restore the
position and put all equipment in order. All night long shifts
worked, and at 9:00AM the next morning the battery was able to report it
was ready for action with Nippon. But
Mr. Nippon was not ready for action. The rising sun stayed behind the
clouds for several days. Not until Jan. 2 did Corregidor have another
raid. From the 2nd thru the 6th visits by the Japanese air force
became a daily occurrence. It is believed that these raids
originated at Formosa as they arrived around noon-time. Now the
altitude had increased. Now the Japs flew from 7200 to 8500 yds
altitude--far too high for D Battery to reach on many occasions. Our
altitude was definitely limited by the powder train fuzes. Some of the
most regrettable moments during the war were the times when we could only
watch the bombers pass and drop their loads--because the planes were out
of fuze range. When the planes did come in range, the rising sun went into
eclipse. Many bombs hit Corregidor during this period, but
surprisingly little damage was done to military objectives. The60th
made the cost too heavy for the enemy. Not until the 14th of Jan. did the
enemy return. One night flight flew over the Rock. The bombs did
little damage but the Japanese planes suffered very badly as a result of
the AA. The Japs lost heavily during these Jan. raids while the damage
done to the Harbor Defenses was slight. In view of the diminishing
returns for the enemy, Corregidor did not experience another air raid
until March 24,1942. Japan could not afford to lose so many planes
and obtain so little. The
excellent work of the A.A. Regiment had driven the enemy away, and
Corregidor remained untouched for days. Feb. 5 quiet reigned. Not
even then did the planes return. A new threat had arisen. Guns
from Cavite shore threw shells at Corregidor. During the lull prior to
this shelling the men were busy improving the position and constructing
wooden shacks for shelter. From the time of Cavite shelling began D
Battery was harassed intermittently. Cables were cut no less than four
times and the water lines were repaired at least 3 times. The water
problem was a constant source of concern. Pipes were blown to pieces
frequently by the shells and bombs. When these pipes were cut it became
necessary to haul water from different parts of the island by truck;
precarious trips at best. On
March 24, 1942, the Japanese started a drive which was to seal the fate of
the Philippine forces. That morning 60 odd Japanese planes raided the
Rock. D Battery’s guns took a heavy toll on the enemy: however, it was
quite noticeable that the tactics of the enemy were greatly improved. By
maneuvering the planes avoided a great deal of fire. The altitudes had
increased again– this time many of the flights were around 9300 yards.
These high altitudes handicapped all the batteries, especially those with
powder train fuzes. Bombings were daily once more. On March 25 the No. 4
gun was put out of action and five men were injured but none died. The gun
was repaired that night and the battery was ready for action prior to
midnight. Probably
the most spectacular event took place in the late afternoon of March 30.
Two bombers flying high and towards the north flew directly over
Corregidor. Several of the gun batteries opened fire as soon as the planes
were in range. The bursts appeared directly on the flight. A few seconds
passed. Then both planes began to smoke badly. Suddenly one burst into
flame, falling like a meteor from the sky. Twisting ball of fire, it fell
with a splash in the North Channel. Hardly a trace remained. There were no
survivors. All in seconds a scene superior to any of Hollywood’s best
flashed by to be obscured in the channel. The other plane was losing
altitude fast when it disappeared out of sight. The
next day an enemy bomb landed directly on the mess store room, but
fortunately the loss was slight. Air
raids occurred every day nearly to the end of the campaign. The batteries
equipped with mechanical fuzes had to bear most of the burden as the
altitudes were so high. Shells continued to arrive from the Cavite
guns, but Corregidor was not to know what shelling meant until the fall of
Bataan on April 8. The
night of the Bataan breakthrough all of D Battery stared at a spectacular
but ominous display of fireworks as the ordnance magazines near little
Baguio were destroyed by our troops. Flares of several different colors
filled the skies while the flames flooded the vicinity. Making dark
shadows, boats played between Bataan and Corregidor. The early morning
witnessed all sorts of craft evacuating troops from Bataan to the Rock.
The enemy stood at our front door. As soon as Bataan had surrendered, the
heavy guns on Bataan started raining their hardware on the Rock. Shell
after shell tore at the Harbor Defenses. D Battery along with the other
installations experienced a terrific onslaught of artillery. Planes flew
higher and dropped more bombs. Still the Battery fought viciously. During
the month of April the Japanese continued to shell and bomb our position.
Many times D Battery was unable to fire due to high altitudes, but when it
was possible the battery was in action. It was during this period that
most of the casualties occurred. On April 13 a shell killed Lt. Levagood
and Pvt. Jensen. Then on the 19th Pvt. Bingham was killed. On the 24th D
Battery received a terrible blow when Sgt. Brady was killed by the
shelling from Bataan. Cpl. Rogers was also killed on this date. On the
following day Pvt. Morris also died as a result of the shelling.
After the loss of Sgt. Brady, D Battery was never the same. Even
though the outfit was fighting until the last, a spark had died.
On
May 1, 1942 1 took over command of Battery D-6Oth CA (AA), relieving
Capt. Guyton. My orders from the Battalion Commander, Col. Breitung
was to prepare a new position of the side of Kindley Field ridge away from
the Bataan artillery fire of the Japanese. Authority had been granted for
the removal of only two guns from the ridge--the plan as I understood it
was to leave two guns on the ridge for beach defense and remove two guns
in order to place them in a battery protected position for AA defense.
The director and height finder and other installations were not to be
removed until ordered by Regimental Hqs. At
the time I took over command of the battery, the morale of the battery was
very poor due to casualties sustained and heavy artillery fire registered
on the battery position. It became necessary to practically
reorganize the battery by appointing a temporary 1st Sgt. and impressing
on the section leaders and other noncommissioned officers their duties and
obligations. The
period May 1-5 was one of continual enemy shelling from Bataan. Battery
D's position was hardly ever free from shelling during the entire period,
however, work on the new position progressed. The two guns positions
(also new director and height finder positions) were completed and the
guns were to be emplaced on the night of the fifth. Cable trenches
from the old height finder and director positions had been prepared
earlier, but had become useless due to the fact that on the night of May 2
the height finder was badly damaged by enemy shellfire and on May 4 the
director was totally destroyed by a direct hit from 240 mm shell.
Upon loss of these fire control instruments, the battalion commander
instructed that the emplacement of the two AA guns continue. They were to
be fired at planes regardless of the fact that the battery had no fire
control. Work was carried on with this in view. On
the night of May 5, a severe bombardment of the battery's position started
about 7:00 PM. The members of the battery were ordered to take cover.
The battery remained under cover until shelling lifted around 10:30PM.
In the mean time all communications had been shelled out. Shortly
thereafter a truck passed by on its way to Malinta Tunnel. The
occupants notified us that a landing had been made by the Japanese.
At the same time Japanese MG fire was heard in the vicinity of Kindley
Field water towers. The members of D Battery obtained arms and ammunition
as rapidly as possible and formed a defensive line from Ordnance Point to
the Marine position on the Bataan side of the Wilson Park Ridge. No
contact with the troops on the right or left was made; however, then were
several members of the Marine Corps present in the vicinity of the
peacetime Hqs of the 92nd CA.
It was decided that an effort be made to clear the water tower of
the MG.
Lt. Perkins and Pfc. Cisneros carried hand grenades forward and
actually succeeded in clearing the ridge and silencing the enemy MG
nest. Sporadic firing from
our line continued until dawn. During the night our own troops began to withdraw towards
Malinta Tunnel. There seemed
to be no coordination of units in the area at all and no reinforcements
nor support from the rear. In
the early hours of the morning many members of D Battery became
intermingled with other units withdrawing towards Malinta Tunnel.
By 7:00 AM most of the Battery had taken cover in the tunnel.
Postwar
comments:
The word “Republic” refers to the ship the recruits came to Manila
on. In
rereading the end of this account, it dwindles into nothing.
I guess when I wrote it I was unable to write the true events.
Our last night was a total rout* of our troops on the ent of
the
island. I lost contact with the
Marines, other troops, and any higher command.
Around midnight I told my people (those I
could
find) that they were on their own and “get to Malinta as soon as possible.” *Rout
from fear; we had seen no Japanese troops. Derivation:
Col. Cornwall's comments on the document explain its origin.
“This was written in Prison Camp (Cabanatuan) about May 1944, I think.
Members of Battery D in Prison supplied most of the facts.
It was written at the suggestion of Capt. Ames.”
After composition, this and other Battery histories were buried at
Cabanatuan and retrieved after the war. The
original, in the possession of Col. Cornwall,
was loaned to the undersigned, who
transcribed this copy in January 1983 while assigned to the Department of History, United States Military Academy.
Commentary:
Cornwall’s charge that the men were fearful describes most on the Rock. The men of "D" Btry were leaderless after Dewey Brady was
killed, and "D" was like a ship without a helm. Paul Cornwall was sent down there hold things together, but it was Brady that
had held things together, and Cornwall wasn't up to it. . Ben Guyton went to Malinta Tunnel (I am not sure why), but have heard he
cracked. Cornwall fails to mention that he failed in getting the men organized after
Dewey Brady was killed. From the info I received from friends in "D",
I hardly think they were routed. What they lacked was leadership! Cornwall
furnished none of that. Problem
was, he fails to mention that Ben Guyton, the Btry Cmdr., disappeared to the
tunnel and was not seen again. What effect did that have on the men? The
location of Denver was enough to unnerve a stone statue. Cornwall has never
impressed me. Paul Cornwall was a close friend of Karol Ames for many years after we returned. Karol thought he was a prince. Perhaps he was, but a leader he wasn't. He did not perform well at Denver
and it was all downhill from there.
|