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To Justice William Johnson Monticello, June 12, 1823
DEAR SIR,-- Our correspondence is of that accommodating
character, which admits of suspension at the convenience of either
party, without inconvenience to the other. Hence this tardy
acknowledgment of your favor of April the 11th. I learn from that
with great pleasure, that you have resolved on continuing your
history of parties. Our opponents are far ahead of us in
preparations for placing their cause favorably before posterity. Yet
I hope even from some of them the escape of precious truths, in angry
explosions or effusions of vanity, which will betray the genuine
monarchism of their principles. They do not themselves believe what
they endeavor to inculcate, that we were an opposition party, not on
principle, but merely seeking for office. The fact is, that at the
formation of our government, many had formed their political opinions
on European writings and practices, believing the experience of old
countries, and especially of England, abusive as it was, to be a
safer guide than mere theory. The doctrines of Europe were, that men
in numerous associations cannot be restrained within the limits of
order and justice, but by forces physical and moral, wielded over
them by authorities independent of their will. Hence their
organization of kings, hereditary nobles, and priests. Still further
to constrain the brute force of the people, they deem it necessary to
keep them down by hard labor, poverty and ignorance, and to take from
them, as from bees, so much of their earnings, as that unremitting
labor shall be necessary to obtain a sufficient surplus barely to
sustain a scanty and miserable life. And these earnings they apply
to maintain their privileged orders in splendor and idleness, to
fascinate the eyes of the people, and excite in them an humble
adoration and submission, as to an order of superior beings.
Although few among us had gone all these lengths of opinion, yet many
had advanced, some more, some less, on the way. And in the
convention which formed our government, they endeavored to draw the
cords of power as tight as they could obtain them, to lessen the
dependence of the general functionaries on their constituents, to
subject to them those of the States, and to weaken their means of
maintaining the steady equilibrium which the majority of the
convention had deemed salutary for both branches, general and local.
To recover, therefore, in practice the powers which the nation had
refused, and to warp to their own wishes those actually given, was
the steady object of the federal party. Ours, on the contrary, was
to maintain the will of the majority of the convention, and of the
people themselves. We believed, with them, that man was a rational
animal, endowed by nature with rights, and with an innate sense of
justice; and that he could be restrained from wrong and protected in
right by moderate powers, confided to persons of his own choice, and
held to their duties by dependence on his own will. We believed that
the complicated organization of kings, nobles, and priests, was not
the wisest nor best to effect the happiness of associated man; that
wisdom and virtue were not hereditary, that the trappings of such a
machinery, consumed by their expense, those earnings of industry,
they were meant to protect, and, by the inequalities they produced,
exposed liberty to sufferance. We believed that men, enjoying in
ease and security the full fruits of their own industry, enlisted by
all their interests on the side of law and order, habituated to think
for themselves, and to follow their reason as their guide, would be
more easily and safely governed, than with minds nourished in error,
and vitiated and debased, as in Europe, by ignorance, indigence and
oppression. The cherishment of the people then was our principle,
the fear and distrust of them, that of the other party. Composed, as
we were, of the landed and laboring interests of the country, we
could not be less anxious for a government of law and order than were
the inhabitants of the cities, the strongholds of federalism. And
whether our efforts to save the principles and form of our
constitution have not been salutary, let the present republican
freedom, order and prosperity of our country determine. History may
distort truth, and will distort it for a time, by the superior
efforts at justification of those who are conscious of needing it
most. Nor will the opening scenes of our present government be seen
in their true aspect, until the letters of the day, now held in
private hoards, shall be broken up and laid open to public view.
What a treasure will be found in General Washington's cabinet, when
it shall pass into the hands of as candid a friend to truth as he was
himself! When no longer, like Caesar's notes and memorandums in the
hands of Anthony, it shall be open to the high priests of federalism
only, and garbled to say so much, and no more, as suits their views!
With respect to his farewell address, to the authorship of
which, it seems, there are conflicting claims, I can state to you
some facts. He had determined to decline re-election at the end of
his first term, and so far determined, that he had requested Mr.
Madison to prepare for him something valedictory, to be addressed to
his constituents on his retirement. This was done, but he was
finally persuaded to acquiesce in a second election, to which no one
more strenuously pressed him than myself, from a conviction of the
importance of strengthening, by longer habit, the respect necessary
for that office, which the weight of his character only could effect.
When, at the end of his second term, his Valedictory came out, Mr.
Madison recognized in it several passages of his draught, several
others, we were both satisfied, were from the pen of Hamilton, and
others from that of the President himself. These he probably put
into the hands of Hamilton to form into a whole, and hence it may all
appear in Hamilton's hand-writing, as if it were all of his
composition.
I have stated above, that the original objects of the
federalists were, 1st, to warp our government more to the form and
principles of monarchy, and, 2d, to weaken the barriers of the State
governments as coordinate powers. In the first they have been so
completely foiled by the universal spirit of the nation, that they
have abandoned the enterprise, shrunk from the odium of their old
appellation, taken to themselves a participation of ours, and under
the pseudo-republican mask, are now aiming at their second object,
and strengthened by unsuspecting or apostate recruits from our ranks,
are advancing fast towards an ascendancy. I have been blamed for
saying, that a prevalence of the doctrines of consolidation would one
day call for reformation or revolution. I answer by asking if a
single State of the Union would have agreed to the constitution, had
it given all powers to the General Government? If the whole
opposition to it did not proceed from the jealousy and fear of every
State, of being subjected to the other States in matters merely its
own? And if there is any reason to believe the States more disposed
now than then, to acquiesce in this general surrender of all their
rights and powers to a consolidated government, one and undivided?
You request me confidentially, to examine the question, whether
the Supreme Court has advanced beyond its constitutional limits, and
trespassed on those of the State authorities? I do not undertake it,
my dear Sir, because I am unable. Age and the wane of mind
consequent on it, have disqualified me from investigations so severe,
and researches so laborious. And it is the less necessary in this
case, as having been already done by others with a logic and learning
to which I could add nothing. On the decision of the case of Cohens
vs. The State of Virginia, in the Supreme Court of the United
States, in March, 1821, Judge Roane, under the signature of Algernon
Sidney, wrote for the Enquirer a series of papers on the law of that
case. I considered these papers maturely as they came out, and
confess that they appeared to me to pulverize every word which had
been delivered by Judge Marshall, of the extra-judicial part of his
opinion; and all was extra-judicial, except the decision that the act
of Congress had not purported to give to the corporation of
Washington the authority claimed by their lottery law, of controlling
the laws of the States within the States themselves. But unable to
claim that case, he could not let it go entirely, but went on
gratuitously to prove, that notwithstanding the eleventh amendment of
the constitution, a State could be brought as a defendant, to the
bar of his court; and again, that Congress might authorize a
corporation of its territory to exercise legislation within a State,
and paramount to the laws of that State. I cite the sum and result
only of his doctrines, according to the impression made on my mind at
the time, and still remaining. If not strictly accurate in
circumstance, it is so in substance. This doctrine was so completely
refuted by Roane, that if he can be answered, I surrender human
reason as a vain and useless faculty, given to bewilder, and not to
guide us. And I mention this particular case as one only of several,
because it gave occasion to that thorough examination of the
constitutional limits between the General and State jurisdictions,
which you have asked for. There were two other writers in the same
paper, under the signatures of Fletcher of Saltoun, and Somers, who,
in a few essays, presented some very luminous and striking views of
the question. And there was a particular paper which recapitulated
all the cases in which it was thought the federal court had usurped
on the State jurisdictions. These essays will be found in the
Enquirers of 1821, from May the 10th to July the 13th. It is not in
my present power to send them to you, but if Ritchie can furnish
them, I will procure and forward them. If they had been read in the
other States, as they were here, I think they would have left, there
as here, no dissentients from their doctrine. The subject was taken
up by our legislature of 1821 - '22, and two draughts of
remonstrances were prepared and discussed. As well as I remember,
there was no difference of opinion as to the matter of right; but
there was as to the expediency of a remonstrance at that time, the
general mind of the States being then under extraordinary excitement
by the Missouri question; and it was dropped on that consideration.
But this case is not dead, it only sleepeth. The Indian Chief said
he did not go to war for every petty injury by itself, but put it
into his pouch, and when that was full, he then made war. Thank
Heaven, we have provided a more peaceable and rational mode of
redress.
This practice of Judge Marshall, of travelling out of his case
to prescribe what the law would be in a moot case not before the
court, is very irregular and very censurable. I recollect another
instance, and the more particularly, perhaps, because it in some
measure bore on myself. Among the midnight appointments of Mr.
Adams, were commissions to some federal justices of the peace for
Alexandria. These were signed and sealed by him, but not delivered.
I found them on the table of the department of State, on my entrance
into office, and I forbade their delivery. Marbury, named in one of
them, applied to the Supreme Court for a mandamus to the Secretary of
State, (Mr. Madison) to deliver the commission intended for him. The
court determined at once, that being an original process, they had no
cognizance of it; and therefore the question before them was ended.
But the Chief Justice went on to lay down what the law would be, had
they jurisdiction of the case, to wit: that they should command the
delivery. The object was clearly to instruct any other court having
the jurisdiction, what they should do if Marbury should apply to
them. Besides the impropriety of this gratuitous interference, could
anything exceed the perversion of law? For if there is any principle
of law never yet contradicted, it is that delivery is one of the
essentials to the validity of the deed. Although signed and sealed,
yet as long as it remains in the hands of the party himself, it is in
fieri only, it is not a deed, and can be made so only by its
delivery. In the hands of a third person it may be made an escrow.
But whatever is in the executive offices is certainly deemed to be in
the hands of the President; and in this case, was actually in my
hands, because, when I countermanded them, there was as yet no
Secretary of State. Yet this case of Marbury and Madison is
continually cited by bench and bar, as if it were settled law,
without any animadversion on its being merely an obiter
dissertation of the Chief Justice.
It may be impracticable to lay down any general formula of
words which shall decide at once, and with precision, in every case,
this limit of jurisdiction. But there are two canons which will
guide us safely in most of the cases. 1st. The capital and leading
object of the constitution was to leave with the States all
authorities which respected their own citizens only, and to transfer
to the United States those which respected citizens of foreign or
other States: to make us several as to ourselves, but one as to all
others. In the latter case, then, constructions should lean to the
general jurisdiction, if the words will bear it; and in favor of the
States in the former, if possible to be so construed. And indeed,
between citizens and citizens of the same State, and under their own
laws, I know but a single case in which a jurisdiction is given to
the General Government. That is, where anything but gold or silver
is made a lawful tender, or the obligation of contracts is any
otherwise impaired. The separate legislatures had so often abused
that power, that the citizens themselves chose to trust it to the
general, rather than to their own special authorities. 2d. On every
question of construction, carry ourselves back to the time when the
constitution was adopted, recollect the spirit manifested in the
debates, and instead of trying what meaning may be squeezed out of
the text, or invented against it, conform to the probable one in
which it was passed. Let us try Cohen's case by these canons only,
referring always, however, for full argument, to the essays before
cited.
- It was between a citizen and his own State, and under a law
of his State. It was a domestic case, therefore, and not a foreign
one.
- Can it be believed, that under the jealousies prevailing
against the General Government, at the adoption of the constitution,
the States meant to surrender the authority of preserving order, of
enforcing moral duties and restraining vice, within their own
territory? And this is the present case, that of Cohen being under
the ancient and general law of gaming. Can any good be effected by
taking from the States the moral rule of their citizens, and
subordinating it to the general authority, or to one of their
corporations, which may justify forcing the meaning of words, hunting
after possible constructions, and hanging inference on inference,
from heaven to earth, like Jacob's ladder? Such an intention was
impossible, and such a licentiousness of construction and inference,
if exercised by both governments, as may be done with equal right,
would equally authorize both to claim all power, general and
particular, and break up the foundations of the Union. Laws are made
for men of ordinary understanding, and should, therefore, be
construed by the ordinary rules of common sense. Their meaning is
not to be sought for in metaphysical subtleties, which may make
anything mean everything or nothing, at pleasure. It should be left
to the sophisms of advocates, whose trade it is, to prove that a
defendant is a plaintiff, though dragged into court, torto collo,
like Bonaparte's volunteers, into the field in chains, or that a
power has been given, because it ought to have been given, et alia
talia. The States supposed that by their tenth amendment, they had
secured themselves against constructive powers. They were not
lessoned yet by Cohen's case, nor aware of the slipperiness of the
eels of the law. I ask for no straining of words against the General
Government, nor yet against the States. I believe the States can
best govern our home concerns, and the General Government our foreign
ones. I wish, therefore, to see maintained that wholesome
distribution of powers established by the constitution for the
limitation of both; and never to see all offices transferred to
Washington, where, further withdrawn from the eyes of the people,
they may more secretly be bought and sold as at market.
But the Chief Justice says, "there must be an ultimate arbiter
somewhere." True, there must; but does that prove it is either party?
The ultimate arbiter is the people of the Union, assembled by their
deputies in convention, at the call of Congress, or of two-thirds of
the States. Let them decide to which they mean to give an authority
claimed by two of their organs. And it has been the peculiar wisdom
and felicity of our constitution, to have provided this peaceable
appeal, where that of other nations is at once to force.
I rejoice in the example you set of seriatim opinions. I
have heard it often noticed, and always with high approbation. Some
of your brethren will be encouraged to follow it occasionally, and in
time, it may be felt by all as a duty, and the sound practice of the
primitive court be again restored. Why should not every judge be
asked his opinion, and give it from the bench, if only by yea or nay?
Besides ascertaining the fact of his opinion, which the public have a
right to know, in order to judge whether it is impeachable or not, it
would show whether the opinions were unanimous or not, and thus
settle more exactly the weight of their authority.
The close of my second sheet warns me that it is time now to
relieve you from this letter of unmerciful length. Indeed, I wonder
how I have accomplished it, with two crippled wrists, the one
scarcely able to move my pen, the other to hold my paper. But I am
hurried sometimes beyond the sense of pain, when unbosoming myself to
friends who harmonize with me in principle. You and I may differ
occasionally in details of minor consequence, as no two minds, more
than two faces, are the same in every feature. But our general
objects are the same, to preserve the republican form and principles
of our constitution and cleave to the salutary distribution of powers
which that has established. These are the two sheet anchors of our
Union. If driven from either, we shall be in danger of foundering.
To my prayers for its safety and perpetuity, I add those for the
continuation of your health, happiness, and usefulness to your
country.
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