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DredScott-case
(2/11) Syllabus
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I.
- Upon a writ of error to a Circuit Court of the United
States, the transcript of the record of all the proceedings
of the case is brought before this court, and is open to its
inspection and revision.
- When a plea to the jurisdiction, in abatement, is overruled
by the court upon demurrer, and the defendant pleads in bar,
and upon these pleas the final judgment of the court is in
his favor -- if the plaintiff brings a writ of error, the
judgment of the court upon the plea in abatement is before
this court, although it was in favor of the plaintiff -- and
if the court erred in overruling it, the judgment must be
reversed, and a mandate issued to the Circuit Court to
dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.
- In the Circuit Courts of the United States, the record must
show that the case is one in which, by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, the court had jurisdiction -- and
if this does not appear, and the court gives judgment either
for plaintiff or defendant, it is error, and the judgment
must be reversed by this court -- and the parties cannot by
consent waive the objection to the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court.
- A free negro of the African race, whose ancestors were
brought to this country and sold as slaves, is not a
"citizen" within the meaning of the Constitution of the
United States.
- When the Constitution was adopted, they were not regarded in
any of the States as members of the community which
constituted the State, and were not numbered among its
"people or citizens." Consequently, the special rights and
immunities guarantied to citizens do not apply to them. And
not being "citizens" within the meaning of the Constitution,
they are not entitled to sue in that character in a court of
the United States, and the Circuit Court has not
jurisdiction in such a suit.
- The only two clauses in the Constitution which point to this
race, treat them as persons whom it was morally lawful to
deal in as articles of property and to hold as slaves.
- Since the adoption of the Constitution of the United States,
no State can by any subsequent law make a foreigner or any
other description of persons citizens of the United States,
nor entitle them to the rights and privileges secured to
citizens by that instrument.
- A State, by its laws passed since the adoption of the
Constitution, may put a foreigner or any other description
of persons upon a footing with its own citizens, as to all
the rights and privileges enjoyed by them within its
dominion and by its laws. But that will not make him a
citizen of the United States, nor entitle him to sue in its
courts, nor to any of the privileges and immunities of a
citizen in another State.
- The change in public opinion and feeling in relation to the
African race, which has taken place since the adoption of
the Constitution, cannot change its construction and
meaning, and it must be construed and administered now
according to its true meaning and intention when it was
formed and adopted.
- The plaintiff having admitted, by his demurrer to the plea
in abatement, that his ancestors were imported from Africa
and sold as slaves, he is not a citizen of the State of
Missouri according to the Constitution of the United States,
and was not entitled to sue in that character in the Circuit
Court.
- This being the case, the judgment of the court below, in
favor of the plaintiff on the plea in abatement, was
erroneous.
II.
- But if the plea in abatement is not brought up by this writ
of error, the objection to the citizenship of the plaintiff
is still apparent on the record, as he himself, in making
out his case, states that he is of African descent, was born
a slave, and claims that he and his family became entitled
to freedom by being taken, by their owner, to reside in a
Territory where slavery is prohibited by act of Congress --
and that, in addition to this claim, he himself became
entitled to freedom by being taken to Rock Island, in the
State of Illinois -- and being free when he was brought back
to Missouri, he was by the laws of that State a citizen.
- If, therefore, the facts he states do not give him or his
family a right to freedom, the plaintiff is still a slave,
and not entitled to sue as a "citizen," and the judgment of
the Circuit Court was erroneous on that ground also, without
any reference to the plea in abatement.
- The Circuit Court can give no judgment for plaintiff or
defendant in a case where it has not jurisdiction, no matter
whether there be a plea in abatement or not. And unless it
appears upon the face of the record, when brought here by
writ of error, that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, the
judgment must be reversed.
The case of Capron v. Van Noorden (2 Cranch, 126)
examined, and the principles thereby decided, reaffirmed.
- When the record, as brought here by writ of error, does not
show that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, this court has
jurisdiction to revise and correct the error, like any other
error in the court below. It does not and cannot dismiss the
case for want of jurisdiction here; for that would leave the
erroneous judgment of the court below in full force, and the
party injured without remedy. But it must reverse the
judgment, and, as in any other case of reversal, send a
mandate to the Circuit Court to conform its judgment to the
opinion of this court.
- The difference of the jurisdiction in this court in the
cases of writs of error to State courts and to Circuit
Courts of the United States, pointed out; and the mistakes
made as to the jurisdiction of this court in the latter
case, by confounding it with its limited jurisdiction in the
former.
- If the court reverses a judgment upon the ground that it
appears by a particular parts of the record that the Circuit
Court had not jurisdiction, it does not take away the
jurisdiction of this court to examine into and correct, by a
reversal of the judgment, any other errors, either as to the
jurisdiction or any other matter, where it appears from
other parts of the record that the Circuit Court had fallen
into error. On the contrary, it is the daily and familiar
practice of this court to reverse on several grounds, where
more than one error appears to have been committed. And the
error of a Circuit Court in its jurisdiction stands on the
same ground, and is to be treated in the same manner as any
other error upon which its judgment is founded.
- The decision, therefore, that the judgment of the Circuit
Court upon the plea in abatement is erroneous, is no reason
why the alleged error apparent in the exception should not
also be examined, and the judgment reversed on that ground
also, if it discloses a want of jurisdiction in the Circuit
Court.
- It is often the duty of this court, after having decided
that a particular decision of the Circuit Court was
erroneous, to examine into other alleged errors, and to
correct them if they are found to exist. And this has been
uniformly done by this court when the question are in any
degree connected with the controversy, and the silence of
the court might create doubts which would lead to further
and useless litigation.
III.
- The facts upon which the plaintiff relies, did not give him
his freedom, and make him a citizen of Missouri.
- The clause in the Constitution authorizing Congress to make
all needful rules and regulations for the government of the
territory and other property of the United States, applies
only to territory within the chartered limits of some one of
the States when they were colonies of Great Britain, and
which was surrendered by the British Government to the old
Confederation of the States, in the treaty of peace. It does
not apply to territory acquired by the present Federal
Government, by treaty or conquest, from a foreign nation.
The case of the American and Ocean Insurance
Companies v. Canter (1 Peters, 511) referred to and
examined, showing that the decision in this case is not
in conflict with that opinion, and that the court did
not, in the case referred to, decide upon the
construction of the clause of the Constitution above
mentioned, because the case before them did not make it
necessary to decide the question.
- The United States, under the present Constitution, cannot
acquire territory to be held as a colony, to be governed at
its will and pleasure. But it may acquire territory which,
at the time, has not a population that fits it to become a
State, and may govern it as a Territory until it has a
population which, in the Judgment of Congress, entitles it
to be admitted as a State of the Union.
- During the time it remains a Territory, Congress may
legislate over it within the scope of its constitutional
powers in relation to citizens of the United States -- and
may establish a Territorial Government -- and the form of
this local Government must be regulated by the discretion of
Congress -- but with powers not exceeding those which
Congress itself by the Constitution, is authorized to
exercise over citizens of the United States, in respect to
their rights of persons or rights of property.
IV.
- The territory thus acquired, is acquired by the people of
the United States for their common and equal benefit,
through their agent and trustee, the Federal Government.
Congress can exercise no power over the rights of persons or
property of a citizen in the Territory which is prohibited
by the Constitution. The Government and the citizen,
whenever the Territory is open to settlement, both enter it
with their respective rights defined and limited by the
Constitution.
- Congress have no right to prohibit the citizens of any
particular State or States from taking up their home there,
while it permits citizens of other States to do so. Nor has
it a right to give privileges to one class of citizens which
it refuses to another. The territory is acquired for their
equal and common benefit -- and if open to any, it must be
open to all upon equal and the same terms.
- Every citizen has a right to take with him into the
Territory any article of property which the Constitution of
the United States recognizes as property.
- The Constitution of the United States recognizes slaves as
property, and pledges the Federal Government to protect it.
And Congress cannot exercise any more authority over
property of that description than it may constitutionally
exercise over property of any other kind.
- The act of Congress, therefore, prohibiting a citizen of the
United States from taking with him his slaves when he
removes to the Territory in question to reside, is an
exercise of authority over private property which is not
warranted by the Constitution -- and the removal of the
plaintiff, by his owner, to that Territory, gave him no
title to freedom.
V.
- The plaintiff himself acquired no title to freedom by being
taken, by his owner, to Rock Island, in Illinois, and
brought back to Missouri. This court has heretofore decided
that the status or condition of a person of African descent
depended on the laws of the State in which he resided.
- It has been settled by the decisions of the highest court in
Missouri; that, by the laws of that State, a slave does not
become entitled to his freedom, where the owner takes him to
reside in a State where slavery is not permitted, and
afterwards brings him back to Missouri.
Conclusion
. It follows that it is apparent upon the record that
the court below erred in its judgment on the plea in abatement,
and also erred in giving judgment for the defendant, when the
exception shows that the plaintiff was not a citizen of the
United States. And as the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction,
either in the case stated in the plea in abatement, or in the one
stated in the exception, its judgment in favor of the defendant
is erroneous, and must be reversed.
COUNSEL:
It was now argued by Mr. Blair and Mr. G.F. Curtis for
the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. Geyer and Mr. Johnson for the
defendant in error.
The reporter regrets that want of room will not allow him to
give the arguments of counsel; but he regrets it the less,
because the subject is thoroughly examined in the opinion of the
court, the opinions of the concurring judges, and the opinions of
the judges who dissented from the judgment of the court.
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