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The Anti-Federalist Papers
The Constitutional Convention Debates
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- MR. WILSON
- . . . This proposition had been before made and
failed, but he was so confirmed by reflection in the opinion of its
utility, that he thought it incumbent on him to make another
effort. The Judiciary ought to have an opportunity of remonstrating against projected encroachments on the people as weil as on
themselves. It had been said that the Judges, as expositors of the
Laws would have an opportunity of defending their constitutional
rights. There was weight in this observation, but this power of
the Judges did not go far enough. Laws may be unjust, may be
unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive, and yet may not
be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give
them effect. Let them have a share in the Revisionary power,
and they will have an opportunity of taking notice of these
characters of a law, and of counteracting, by the weight of their
opinions the improper views of the Legislature.
- MR. MADISON
- seconded the motion.
- MR. GORHAM
- did not see the advantage of employing the
Judges in this way. As Judges they are not to be presumed to
possess any peculiar knowledge of the mere policy of public
measures. Nor can it be necessary as a security for their constitutional rights. The Judges in England have no such additional
provision for their defence, yet their jurisdiction is not invaded.
He thought it would be best to let the Executive alone be
responsible, and at most to authorize him to call on Judges for
their opinions.
- MR. ELLSWORTH
- approved heartily of the motion. The aid of the
Judges will give more wisdom and firmness to the Executive.
They will possess a systematic and accurate knowledge of the
Laws, which the Executive can not be expected always to pos
sess. The law of Nations also will frequently come into questiom
Of this the Judges alone will have competent informatiom.
- MR. MADISON
- considered the object of the motion as of great
importance to the meditated Constitution. It would be useful to
the Judiciary department by giving it an additional opportunity of
defending itself against Legislative encroachments. It would be
useful to the Executive, by inspiring additional confidence and
firmness in exerting the revisionary power. It would be useful to
the Legislature by the valuable assistance it would give in preserving a consistency, conciseness, perspicuity and technical
propriety in the laws, qualities peculiarly necessary, and yet
shamefully wanting in our republican Codes. It would moreover
be useful to the Community at large as an additional check
against a pursuit of those unwise and unjust measures which
constituted so great a portion of our calamities. If any solid
objection could be urged against the motion, it must be on the
supposition that it tended to give too much strength either to the
Executive or Judiciary. He did not think there was the least
ground for this apprehensiom It was much more to be apprehended that notwithstanding this co-operation of the two depart
ments, the Legislature would still be an overrnatch for them.
Experience in all the States had evinced a powerful tendency in
the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex. This was the
real source of danger to the American Constitutions, and suggested the necessity of giving every defensive authority to the
other departments that was consistent with republican principles.
- MR. MASON
- said he had always been a friend to this provision.
It would give a confidence to the Executive, which he would not
otherwise have, and without which the Revisionary power would
be of little avaih.
- MR. GERRY
- did not expect to see this point which had undergone full discussion, again revived. The object he conceived of
the Revisionary power was merely to secure the Executive
department against legislative encroachment. The Executive there
fore who will best know and be ready to defend his rights ought
alone to have the defence of them. The motion was liable to
strong objections. It was combining and mixing together the
Legislative and the other departments. It was establishing an improper coalition between the Executive and Judiciary depart
ments. It was making Statesmen of the Judges, and setting them
up as the guardians of the Rights of the people. He relied for his
part on the Representatives of the people as the guardians of their
Rights and interests. It was making the Expositors of the Laws,
the Legislators which ought never to be done. A better expedient
for correcting the laws, would be to appoint as had been done in
Pennsylvania a person or persons of proper skill, to draw bills for
the Legislature.
- MR. STRONG
- thought with Mr. Gerry that the power of making
ought to be kept distinct from that of expounding, the laws. No
maxim was better established. The Judges in exercising the
function of expositors might be influenced by the part they had
taken, in framing the laws.
- MR. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS.
- Some check being necessary on the
legislature, the question is in what hands it should be lodged.
On one side it was contended that the Executive alone ought to
exercise it. He did not think that an Executive appointed for
years, and impeachable whilst in office would be a very effectual
check. On the other side it was urged that he ought to be
reinforced by the Judiciary department. Against this it was ob
jected that Expositors of laws ought to have no hand in making
them, and arguments in favor of this had been drawn from
England. What weight was due to them might be easily determined by an attention to facts. The truth was that the Judges in
England had a great share in the Legislatiom They are consulted
in difficult and doubtful cases. They may be and some of them
are members of the Legislature. They are or may be members of
the privy Council, and can there advise the Executive as they will
do with us if the motion succeeds. The influence of English
Judges may have in the latter capacity in strengthening the
Executive check can not be ascertained, as the King by his
influence in a manner dictates tbe laws. There is one difference
in the two Cases however which disconcerts all reasoning from
the British to our proposed Constitution. The British Executive
has so great an interest in his prerogatives and such powerful
means of defending them that he will never yield any part of
them. The interest of our Executive is so inconsiderable and so
transitory, and bis means of defending it so feeble, that there is
the justest ground to fear his want of firmness in resisting
incroachments. He was extremely apprehensive that the auxiliary
firmness and weight of the Judicially would not supply the deficiency. He concurred in thinking the public liberty in greater
danger from Legislative usurpations than from any other source.
It had been said that the Legislature ought to be relied on as the
proper Guardians of liberty. The answer was short and conclusive. Either bad laws will be pushed or not. On the latter
supposition no check will be wanted. On the former a strong
check will be necessary. And this is the proper supposition.
Emissions of paper money, largesses to the people a remission
of debts and similar measures, will at some times be popular
and will be pushed for that reason. At other times such measures
will coincide with the interests of the Legislature themselves,
and that will be a reason not less cogent for pushing them. It
may be thought that the people will not be deluded and misled in
the latter case. But experience teaches another lesson. The press
is indeed a great means of diminishing the evil, yet it is found to
be unable to prevent it altogether.
- MR. L. MARTIN
- considered the association of the Judges with
the Executive as a dangerous innovation, as well as one which
could not produce the particular advantage expected from it. A
knowledge of Mankind, and of Legislative affairs cannot be
presumed to belong in a higher degree to the Judges than to the
Legislature. And as to the Consitutionality of laws, that point
will come before the Judges in their proper official character. In
this character they have a negative on the laws. Join them with
the Executive in the Revision and they will have a double
negative. It is necessary that the Supreme Judiciary should have
the confidence of the people. This will soon be lost, if they are
employed in the task of remonstrating against popular measures
of the Legislature. Besides in what mode and proportion are they
to vote in the Council of Revision.
- MR. MADISON
- could not discover in the proposed association
of the Judges with the Executive in the Revisionary check on the
Legislature any violation of the maxim which requires the great
departments of power to be kept separate and distinct. On the
contrary he thought it an auxiliary precaution in favor of the
maxim. If a Constitutional discrimination of the departments on
paper were a sufficient security to each against encroachments of
the others, all further provisions would indeed be superfluous.
But experience had taught us a distrust of that security, and that
it is necessary to introduce such a balance of powers and inter
ests, as will guarantee the provisions on paper. Instead therefore
of contenting ourselves with laying down the Theory in the
Constitution that each department ought to be separate and dis
tinct, it was proposed to add a defensive power to each which
should maintain the Theory in practice. In so doing we did noT
blend the departments together. We erected effectual barriers fot
eeping them separate. The most regular example of this theory
was in the British Constitution. Yet it was not only the practice
there to admit the Judges to a seat in the legislature, and in the
Executive Councils, and to submit to their previous examination
all laws of a certain description, but it was a part of their
Constitution that the Executive might negative any law whatever,
a part of their Constitution which had been universally regarded
as calculated for the preservation of the whole. The objection
against a union of the Judiciary and Executive branches in the
revision of the laws, had either no foundation or was not carried
far enough. If such a Union was an improper mixture of powers,
or such a Judiciary check on the laws, was inconsistent with the
Theory of a free Constitution, it was equally so to admit the
Executive to any participation in the making of laws, and the
revisionary plan ought to be discarded altogether.
- COLONEL MASON
- observed that the defence of the Executive
was not the sole object of the Revisionary power. He expected
even greater advantages from it. Notwithstanding the precautions
taken in the Constitution of the Legislature, it would still so
much resemble that of the individual States, that it must be
expected frequently to pass unjust and pernicious laws. This
restraining power was therefore essentially necessary. It would
have the effect not only of hindering the final passage of such
laws, but would discourage demagogues from attempting to get
them passed. It had been said by Mr. L. Martin; that if the
Judges were joined in this check on the laws, they would have a
double negative, since in their expository capacity of Judges they
would have one negative. He would reply that in this capacity
they could impede in one case only, the operation of laws. They
could declare an unconstitutional law void. But with regard to
every law however unjust oppressive or pernicious, which did
not come plainly under this description, they would be under the
necessity as Judges to give it a free course. He wished the further
use to be made of the Judges, of giving aid in preventing every
improper law. Their aid will be the more valuable as they are in
the habit and practice of considering laws in their true principles,
and in all their consequences.