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The Anti-Federalist Papers
The Constitutional Convention Debates
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MR. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS
was pointedly against his being so
chosen. He will be the mere creature of the Legislative: if
appointed and impeachable by that body. He ought to be elected
by the people at large, by the freeholders of the Country. That
difficulties attend this mode, he admits. But they have been
found superable in New York and in Connecticut and would he
believed be found so, in the case of an Executive for the
United States. If the people should elect, they will never fail to
prefer some man of distinguished character, or services; some
man, if he might so speak, of continental reputation.-If the
Legislature elect, it will be the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of
faction; it will be like the election of a pope by a conclave of
cardinals; real merit will rarely be the title to the appointment
He moved to strike out "National Legislature" and insert "citizens of United States."
MR. SHERMAN thought that the sense of the Nation would be
better expressed by the Legislature, than by the people at large.
The latter will never be sufficiently informed of characters, and
besides will never give a majority of votes to any one man. They
will generally vote for some man in their own State, and the
largest State will have the best chance for the appointment. If the
choice be made by the Legislature, a majority of voices may be
made necessary to constitute an election.
MR. WILSON TWO arguments have been urged against an
election of the Executive Magistrate by the people. l. The exam
ple of Poland where an Election of the supreme Magistrate is
attended with the most dangerous commotions. The cases he
observed were totally dissimilar. The Polish nobles have re
sources and dependents which enable them to appear in force,
and to threaten the Republic as well as each other. In the next
place the electors all assemble in one place, which would not be
the case with us. The second argument is that a majority of the
people would never concur. It might be answered that the concur
rence of a majority of people is not a necessary principle of
election, nor required as such in any of the States. But allowing
the objection all its force, it may be obviated by the expedient
used in Massachusetts where the Legislature by majority of
voices, decide in case a majority of people do not concur in
favor of one of the candidates. This would restrain the choice to
a good nomination at least, and prevent in a great degree intrigue
and cabal A particular objection with him against an absolute
election by the Legislature was that the Executive in that case
would be too dependent to stand the mediator between the
intrigues and sinister views of the Representatives and the gen
eral liberties and interests of the people.
MR. PINCKNEY did not expect this question would again have
been brought forward. An Election by the people being liable to
the most obvious and striking objections. They will be led by a
few active and designing men. The most populous States by
combining in favor of the same individual will be able to carry
their points. The National Legislature being most immediately
interested in the laws made by themselves, will be most attentive
to the choice of a fit man to carry them properly into execution.
MR. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS It is said that in case of an election
by the people the populous States will combine and elect whom
they please; Just the reverse. The people of such States cannot
combine. If there be any combination it must be among their
representatives in the Legislature. It is said the people will be led
by a few designing men. This might happen in a small district. It
can never happen throughout the continent. In the election of a
Governor of New York, it sometimes is the case in particular
spots, that the activity and intrigues of little partizans are suc
cessful, but the general voice of the State is never influenced by
such artifices. It is said the multitude will be uninformed. It is
true they would be uninformed of what passed in the Legislative
Conclave, if the election were to be made there, but they will not
be uninformed of those great and illustrious characters which
have merited their esteem and confidence. If the Executive be
chosen by the National Legislature, he will not be independent
of it, and if not independent, usurpation and tyranny on the part
of the Legislature will be the consequence. This was the case in
England in the last Century. It has been the case in Holland
where their Senates have engrossed all power. It has been the
case every where. He was surprised that an election by the
people at large should ever have been likened to the Polish
election of the first Magistrate. An election by the Legislature
will bear a real likeness to the election by the Diet of Poland.
The great must be the electors in both cases, and the corruption
and cabal which are known to characterise the one would soon
find their way into the other. Appointments made by numerous
bodies, are always worse than those made by single responsible
individuals, or by the people at large.
COLONEL MASON It is curious to remark the different language
held at different times. At one moment we are told that the
Legislature is entitled to thorough confidence, and to indefinite
power. At another, that it will be governed by intrigue and
corruption, and cannot be trusted at all But not to dwell on this
inconsistency he would observe that a Government which is to
last ought at least to be practicable. Would this be the case if the
proposed election should be left to the people at large. He
conceived it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper
character for chief Magistrate to the people, as it would, to refer
a trial of colours to a blind man. The extent of the Country
renders it impossible that the people can have the requisite capac
ity to judge of the respective pretensions of the Candidates.
MR. WILSON could not see the [contradiction] stated [by Colo
nel Mason] The Legislature might deserve confidence in some
respects, and distrust in others. In acts which were to affect them
and their Constituents precisely alike confidence was due. In
others jealousy was warranted. The appointment to great offices,
where the Legislature might feel many motives not common to
the public, confidence was surely misplaced. This branch of
business it was notorious was most corruptly managed of any
that had been committed to legislative bodies....
MR. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS It is necessary to take into one
view all that relates to the establishment of the Executive; on the
due formation of which must depend the efficacy and utility of
the Union among the present and future States. It has been a
maxim in Political Science that Republican Government is not
adapted to a large extent of Country, because the energy of the
Executive Magistracy can not reach the extreme parts of it. Our
Country is an extensive one. We must either then renounce the
blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive with sufficient
vigor to pervade every part of it. This subject was of so much
importance that he hoped to be indulged in an extensive view of
it. One great object of the Executive is to control the Legisla
ture. The Legislature will continually seek to aggrandize and
perpetuate themselves; and will seize those critical moments
produced by war, invasion or convulsion for that purpose. It is
necessary then that the Executive Magistrate should be the guard
ian of the people, even of the lower classes, against Legislative
tyranny, against the Great and the wealthy who in the course of
things will necessarily compose the Legislative body. Wealth
tends to corrupt the mind and to nourish its love of power, and to
stimulate it to oppression. History proves this to be the spirit of
the opulent. The check provided in the second branch was not
meant as a check on Legislative usurpations of power, but on the
abuse of lawful powers, on the propensity in the first branch to
legislate too much to run into projects of paper money and
similar expedients. It is no check on Legislative tyranny. On the
contrary it may favor it, and if the first branch can be seduced
may find the means of success. The Executive therefore ought to
be so constituted as to be the great protector of the Mass of the
people.-It is the duty of the Executive to appoint the officers
and to command the forces of the Republic: to appoint
- ministerial officers for the administration of public affairs
- officers for the dispensation of Justice.
Who will be the best Judges
whether these appointments be well made? The people at large,
who will know, will see, will feel the effects of them. Again
who can judge so well of the discharge of military duties for the
protection and security of the people, as the people themselves
who are to be protected and secured?-He finds too that the
Executive is not to be re-eligible. What effect will this have?
- It will destroy the great incitement to merit public esteem by
taking away the hope of being rewarded with a reappointment. It
may give a dangerous turn to one of the strongest passions in the
human breast. The love of fame is the great spring to noble and
illustrious actions. Shut the Civil road to Glory and he may be
compelled to seek it by the sword.
- It will tempt him to make
the most of the short space of time allotted him, to accumulate
wealth and provide for his friends.
- It will produce violations
of the very constitution it is meant to secure.
In moments of
pressing danger the tried abilities and established character of a
favorite Magistrate will prevail over respect for the forms of the
Constitution The Executive is also to be impeachable. This is a
dangerous part of the plan It will hold him in such dependence
that he will be no check on the Legislature, will not be a firm
guardian of the people and of the public interest. He will be the
tool of a faction, of some leading demagogue in the Legislature.
These then are the faults of the Executive establishment as now
proposed. Can no better establishment be devised? If he is to be
the Guardian of the people let him be appointed by the people. If
he is to be a check on the Legislature let him not be impeacha
ble. Let him be of short duration. that he may with propriety be
re-eligible. It has been said that the candidates for this office will
not be known to me people. If they be known to the Legislature,
they must have such a notoriety and eminence of Character, that
they cannot possibly be unknown to the people at large. It cannot
be possible that a man shall have sufficiently distinguished him
self to merit this high trust without having his character pro
claimed by fame throughout the Empire. As to the danger from
an unimpeachable magistrate he could not regard it as formida
ble. There must be certain great officers of State; a minister of
finance, of war, of foreign affairs etc. These he presumes will
exercise their functions in subordination to the Executive, and
will be amenable by impeachment to the public Justice. Without
these ministers the Executive can do nothing of consequence. He
suggested a biennial election of the Executive at the time of
electing the first branch, and the Executive to hold over, so as to
prevent any interregnum in the administration. An election by
the people at large throughout so great an extent of country could
not be influenced, by those little combinations and those momen
tary lies which often decide popular elections within a narrow
sphere. It will probably be objected that the election will be
influenced by the members of the Legislature; particularly of the
first branch, and that it will be nearly the same thing with an
election by the Legislature itself. It could not be denied that such
an influence would exist. But it might be answered that as the
Legislature or the candidates for it would be divided, the enmity
of one part would counteract the friendship of another: that if the
administration of the Executive were good, it would be unpopu
lar to oppose his re-election, if bad it ought to be opposed and a
reappointment prevented; and lastly that in every view this indi
rect dependence on the favor of the Legislature could not be so
mischievous as a direct dependence for his appointment. He saw
no alternative for making the Executive independent of the Leg
islature but either to give him his office for life, or make him
eligible by the people-Again, it might be objected that two
years would be too short a duration. But he believes that as long
as he should behave himself well, he would be continued in his
place. The extent of the Country would secure his re-election
against the factions and discontents of particular States. It de
served consideration also that such an ingredient in the plan would
render it extremely palatable to the people. These were the
general ideas which occurred to him on the subject, and which
led him to wish and move that the whole constitution of the
Executive might undergo reconsideration....
MR. MADISONIf it be a fundamental principle of free Govern
ment that the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary powers should
be separately exercised, it is equally so that they be independently
exercised. There is the same and perhaps greater reason why the
Executive should be independent of the Legislature, than why
the Judiciary should: A coalition of the two former powers would
be more immediately and certainly dangerous to public liberty. It
is essential then that the appointment of the Executive should
either be drawn from some source, or held by some tenure, that
will give him a free agency with regard to the Legislature. This
could not be if he was to be appointable from time to time by the
Legislature. It was not clear that an appointment in the first
instance even with an ineligibility afterwards would not establish
an improper connection between the two departments. Certain it
was that the appointment would be attended with intrigues and
contentions that ought not to be unnecessarily admitted. He was
disposed for these reasons to refer the appointment to some other
source. The people at large was in his opinion the fittest in itself
It would be as likely as any that could be devised to produce an
Executive Magistrate of distinguished Character. The people gen
erally could only know and vote for some Citizen whose merits
had rendered him an object of general attention and esteem.
There was one difficulty however of a serious nature attending
an immediate choice by the people. The right of suffrage was
much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and
the latter could have no influence in the election on the score of
the Negroes. The substitution of electors obviated this difficulty
and seemed on the whole to be liable to fewest objections.
MR. GERRY If the Executive is to be elected by the Legisla
ture he certainly ought not to be re-eligible. This would make
him absolutely dependent. He was against a popular election.
The people are uninformed, and would be misled by a few
designing men. He urged the expediency of an appointment of
the Executive by Electors to be chosen by the State Executives.
The people of the States will then choose the first branch: The
legislatures of the States the second branch of the National
Legislature, and the Executives of the States, the National Exec
utive. This he thought would form a strong attachment in the
States to the National System. The popular mode of electing the
chief Magistrate would certainly be the worst of all. If he should
be so elected and should do his duty, he will be turned out for it
like Governor Bowdoin in Massachusetts and President Sullivan
in New Hampshire.