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The Anti-Federalist Papers
The Constitutional Convention Debates
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- MR. MADISON:
- Why are counties of the same states
represented in proportion to their numbers?
Is it because the representatives are chosen by the people themselves?
So will be the representatives in the National Legislature. Is it because, the
larger have more at stake tnan the smaller. The case will be the
same with the larger and smaller States. Is it because the laws
are to operate immediately on their persons and properties? The
same is the case in some degree as the articles of confederation
stand, the same will be the case in a far greater degree under the
plan proposed to be substituted. In the cases of captures, of
piracies, and of offences in a federal army, the property and
persons of individuals depend on the laws of Congress. By the
plan proposed a compleat power of taxation, the highest prerogative
of supremacy is proposed to be vested in the National
Government. Many other powers are added which assimilate it to
the Government of individual States. The negative proposed on
the State laws, will make it an essential branch of the State
Legislatures and of course will require that it should be exercised
by a body established on like principles with the other branches
of those Legislatures. That it is not necessary to secure the
small States against the large ones he conceived to be equally
obvious -Was a combination of the large ones dreaded? This must
arise either from some interest common to Virginia, Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania and distinguishing them from the other
States or from the mere circumstance of similarity of size. Did
any such common interest exist? In point of situation they could
not have beep more effectually separated from each other by the
most jealous citizen of the most jealous State. In point of
manners, Religion, and the other circumstances which sometimes
beget affection between different communities, they were not
more assimilated than the other States.-In point of the staple
productions they were as dissimilar as any three other States in
the Union. The Staple of Massachusetts was fish, of Pennsylva
nia flour of Virginia Tobacco. Was a combination to be apprehended
from the mere circumstance of equality of size. Experience
suggested no such danger. The journals of Congress did not
present any peculiar association of these States in the votes
recorded. It had never been seen that different Counties in the
same State, conformable in extent, but disagreeing in other
circumstances, betrayed a propensity to such combinations.
Experience rather taught a contrary lesson. Among individuals of
superior eminence and weight in Society, rivalships were much
more frequent than coalitions. Among independent nations,
preeminent over their neighbours, the same remark was verified.
Carthage and Rome tore one another to pieces instead of uniting
their forces to devour the weaker nations of the Earth. The
Houses of Austria and Prance were hostile as long as they
remained the greatest powers of Europe: England and France
have succeeded to the preeminence and to the enmity. To this
principle we owe perhaps our liberty. A coalition between those
powers would have been fatal to us. Among the principal
members of ancient and Modern confederacies, we find the same
effect from the same cause, The contentions, not the Coalitions of
Sparta, Athens and Thebes, proved fatal to the smaller members
of the Amphyctionic Confederacy. The contentions, not the
combinations of Prussia and Austria, have distracted and oppressed
the Germanic empire. Were the large States formidable singly to
their smaller neighbours? On this supposition the latter ought to
wish for such a general Government as will operate with equal
energy on the former as on themselves. The more lax the band
the more liberty the larger will have to avail themselves of their
superior force. Here again Experience was an instructive
monitor. What is the situation of the weak compared with the strong
in those stages of civilization in which the violence of
individuals is least controled by an efficient Government. The Heroic
period of Ancient Greece, the feudal licentiousness of the middle
ages of Europe, the existing condition of the American Savages
answer this question. What is the situation of the minor
sovereigns in the great society of independent nations, in which the
more powerful are under no control but the nominal authority of
the law of Nations? Is not the danger to the former exactly in
proportion to their weakness. But there are cases still more in
point. What was the condition of the weaker members of the
Amphyctionic Confederacy Plutarch -life of Themistocles- will
inform us that it happened but too often that the strongest cities
corrupted and awed the weaker, and that Judgment went in favor
of the more powerful party. What is the condition of the lesser
states in the German Confederacy? We all know that they are
exceedingly trampled upon, and that they owe their safety as far
as they enjoy it, partly to their enlisting themselves, under the
rival banners of the preeminent members, partly to alliances
with neighbouring Princes which the Consitution of the Empire
does not prohibit. What is the state of things in the lax system of
the Dutch Confederacy? Holland contains about one half the
people, supplies about one half of the money, and by her
influence, silently and indirectly governs the whole republic. In a
word, the two extremes before us are a perfect separation and a
perfect incorporation, of the l3 States. In the first case they
would be independent nations subject to no law, but the law of
nations. In the last, they would be mere counties of one entire
republic, subject to one common law. In the fist case the
smaller States would have every thing to fear from the larger. In
the last they would have nothing to fear. The true policy of the
small States therefore lies in promoting those principles and that
form of Government which will most approximate the States to
the condition of counties. Another consideration may be added.
If the General Government be feeble, the large States distrusting
its continuance, and foreseeing that their importance and security
may depend on their own size and strength, will never submit to
a partition. Give to the General Government sufficient energy
and permanency, and you remove the objectiom Gradual
partitions of the large, and junctions of the small States will be
facilitated, and time may effect that equalization, which is wished
for by the small States now, but can never be accomplished at
once.
- DR. JOHNSON:
-
The controversy must be endless whilst Gentlemen
differ in the grounds of their arguments. Those on one side
considering the States as districts of people composing one
political Society, those on the other considering them as so many
political societies. The fact is that the States do exist as political
Societies, and a Government is to be formed for them in their
political capacity, as well as for the individuals composing them,
Does it not seem to follow, that if the States as such are to exist
they must be armed with some power of self-defence. This is the
idea of Colonel Mason who appears to have looked to the
bottom of this matter. Besides the Aristocratic and other
interests, which ought to have the means of defending themselves
the States have their interests as such, and are equally entitled to
like means. On the whole he thought that as in some respects
the States are to be considered in their political capacity, and in
others as districts of individual citizens, the two ideas embraced
on different sides, instead of being opposed to each other, ought
to be combined; that in one branch the people, ought to be
represented, in the other the States...
- MR. MADISON
- agreed with Dr. Johnson, that the mixed
nature of the Government ought to be kept in view, but thought
too much stress was laid on the rank of the States as political
societies. There was a gradation, he observed, from the smallest
corporation, with the most limited powers, to the largest empire
with the most perfect sovereignty. He pointed out the limitations
on the sovereignty of the States, as now confederated their laws
in relation to the paramount law of the Confederacy were
analogous to that of bye laws to the supreme law within a State.
Under the proposed Government the powers of the States will
be much farther reduced. According to the views of every
member, the General Government will have powers far beyond those
exercised by the British Parliament, when the States were part of
the British Empire. It will in particular have the power, without
the consent of the State Legislatures, to levy money directly on
the people themselves, and therefore not to divest such unequal
portions of the people as composed the several States, of an
equal voice, would subject the system to the reproaches and evils
which have resulted from the vicious representation in Great
Britain.
He entreated the gentlemen representing the small States to
renounce a principle which was confessedly unjust, which could
never be admitted, and if admitted must infuse mortality into a
Constitution which we wished to last forever. He prayed them to
ponder well the consequences of suffering the Confederacy to go
to pieces. It had been said that the want of energy in the large
states would be a security to the small. It was forgotten that this
want of energy proceeded from the supposed security of the
States against all external danger. Let each state depend on itself
for its security, and let apprehensions arise of danger from
distant powers or from neighbouring States, and the languishing
condition of all the States large as well as small, would soon be
transformed into vigorous and high toned Government. His great
fear was that their Governments would then have too much
energy, that these might not only be formidable in the large to
the small States, but fatal to the internal liberty of alh The same
causes which have rendered the old world the Theatre of
incessant wars, and have banished liberty from the face of it, would
soon produce the same effects here. The weakness and jealousy
of the small States would quickly introduce some regular military
force against sudden danger from their powerful neighbours. The
example would be followed by others, and would soon become
universal. In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are
constantly given to the Executive Magistrate. Constant
apprehension of war, has the same tendency to render the head too large
for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown
Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty. The
means of defence against foreign danger, have been always the
instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a
standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was
apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the
pretext of defending, have enslaved the people. It is perhaps
questionable, whether the best concerted system of absolute
power in Europe could maintain itself, in a situation, where no
alarms of external danger could tame the people to the domestic
yoke. The insular situation of Great Britain was the principal
cause of her being an exception to the general fate of Europe. It
has rendered less defence necessary, and admitted a kind of
defence which could not be used for the purpose of oppression.
These consequences he conceived ought to be apprehended
whether the States should run into a total separation from each
other, or should enter into partial confederacies. Either event
would be truly deplorable, and those who might be accessary to
either, could never be forgiven by their Country, nor by themselves.
- MR. HAMILTON
-
observed that individuals forming political Societies modify
their rights differently, with regard to suffrage.
Examples of it are found in all the States. In all of them some
individuals are deprived of the right altogether, not having the
requisite qualification of property. In some of the States the right
of suffrage is allowed in some cases and refused in others. To
vote for a member in one branch, a certain quantum of property,
to vote for a member in another branch of the Legislature, a
higher quantum af property is required. In like manner States
may modify their right of suffrage differently, the larger
appreing a larger, the smaller a smaller share of it. But as States are a
collection of individual men which ought we to respect most, the
rights of the people composing them, or of the artificial beings
resulting from the composition. Nothing could be more
preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has
been said that if the smaller States renounce their equality, they
renounce at the same time their liberty. The truth is it is a contest
for power, not for liberty, Will the men composing the small
States be less free than those composing the larger. The State of
Delaware having 4O,OOO souls will lose power, if she has one
tenth only of the votes allowed to Pennsylvania having ~OO~
but will the people of Delaware be less free, if each citizen has
an equal vote with each citizen of Pennsylvania. He admitted
that common residence within the same State would produce a
certain degree of attachment, and that this principle might have a
certain influence in public affairs. He thought however that this
might by some precautions be in a great measure excluded, and
that no material inconvenience could result from it, as there
could not be any ground for combination among the States
whose influence was most dreaded. The only considerable
distinction of interests, lay between the carrying and non-carrying
States, which divide instead of uniting the largest States. No
considerable inconvenience had been found from the division of
the State of New York into different districts of different sizes.
Some of the consequences of a dissolution of the Union, and
the establishment of partial confederacies, had been pointed
out. He would add another of a most serious nature. Alliances
will immediately be formed with different rival and hostile
nations of Europe, who will foment disturbances among ourselves,
and make us parties to all their own quarrels. Foreign Nations
having American dominions are and must be jealous of us. Their
representatives betray the utmost anxiety for our fate, and for the
result of this meeting, which must have an essential influence on
it. It had been said that respectability in the eyes of foreign
Nations was not the object at which we aimed, that the proper
object of republican Government was domestic tranquility and
happiness. This was an ideal distinctiom No Government could
give us tranquility and happiness at home, which did not possess
sufficient stability and strength to make us respectable abroad.
This was the critical moment for forming such a Government.
We should run every risk in trusting to future amendments. As
yet we retain the habits of uniom We are weak and sensible of
our weakness. Henceforward the motives will become feebler,
and the difficulties greater. It is a miracle that we were now here
exercising our tranquil and free deliberations on the subject. It
would be madness to trust to future miracles. A thousand causes
must obstluct a reproduction of them.
- MR. ELLSWORTH
- moved that the rule of suffrage in the second
branch be the same with that established by the articles of
confederatiom He was nat sorry on the whole he said that the
vote just passed, had determined against this rule in the first
branch. He hoped it would become a ground of compromise with
regard to the second branch. We were partly national, partly
federal. The proportional representation in the first branch was
conformable to the national principle and would secure the largt
States against the small. An equality of voices was conformable
to the federal principle and was necessary t0 secure the Small
States against the large. He trusted that on this middle ground a
compromise would take place. He did not see that it could or
any other. And if no compromise should take place, our meeting
would not only be in vain but worse than in vain. To the
Eastward he was sure Massachusetts was the only State tha
would listen to a proposition for excluding the States as equal
political Societies, from an equal voice in both branches. The
others would risk every consequence rather than part with sa
dear a right. An attempt to deprive them of it, was at once
cutting the body of America in two, and as he supposed would
be the case, somewhere about this part of it. The large States he
conceived would notwithstanding the equality of votes, have an
i nfluence that would maintain their superiority. Holland, as had
been admitted by Mr. Madison, had, notwithstanding a like
equality in the Dutch Confederacy, a prevailing influence in the
public measures. The power of self-defence was essential to the
small States. Nature had given it to the smallest insect of the
creatiom He could never admit that there was no danger of
combinations among the large States. They will like individuals
find out and avail themselves of the advantage to be gained by it
It was true the danger would be greater, if they were contiguous
and had a more immediate common interest. A defensive
combination of the small States was rendered more difficult by their
greater number. He would mention another consideration of
great weight. The existing confederation was founded on the
equality of the States in the article of suffrage, was it meant to
pay no regard to this antecedent plighted faith. Let a strong
Executive, a Judiciary and Legislative power be created, but Let
not too much be attempted, by which all may be lost. He was not
in general a half-way man, yet he preferred doing half the good
we could, rather than do nothing at all. The other half may be
added, when the necessity shall be more fully experienced.
- MR. WILSON
-
did not expect such a motion after the establishment
of the contrary principle in the first branch, and considering
the reasons which would oppose it, even if an equal vote had
been allowed in the first branch. The Gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Ellsworth) had pronounced that if the motion should
not be acceded to, of all the States North of Pennsylvania one
only would agree to any General Government. He entertained
more favorable hopes of Connecticut and of the other Northern
States. He hoped the alarms exceeded their cause, and that they
would not abandon a Country to which they were bound by so
many strong and endearing ties. But should the deplored event
happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments nor his duty. If
the minority of the people of America refuse to coalesce with the
majority on just the proper principles, if a separation must take
place, it could never happen on better grounds. The votes of
yesterday against the just principle of representation, were as 22
to 9O of the people of America. Taking the opinions to be the
same on this point, and he was sure if there was any room for
change, it could not be on the side of the majority, the question
will be shall less than one quarter of the United States withdraw
themselves from the Union, or shall more than tnree quarters
renounce the inherent, indisputable, and unalienable rights of
men, in favor of the artificial systems of States. If issue must be
joined, it was on this point he would choose to join it. The
gentleman from Connecticut in supposing that the prepondenancy
secured to the majority in tne first branch had removed the
objections to an equality of votes in tne second branch for the
security of the minority, narrowed the case extremely. Such an
equality will enable the minority to control on all cases
whatsoever, the sentiments and interests of the majority. Seven States
will control six. Seven States, according to the estimates that had
been used, composed twenty-four ninetieths of the whole people.
It would be in the power then of less than one third to overrule
two thirds whenever a question should happen to divide the
States in that manner. Can we forget for whom we are forming a
Government? Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called
States? Will our honest Constituents be satisfied with
metaphysical distinctions. Will they ought they to be satisfieded with being
told that the one third compose the greater number of States? The
rule of suffrage ought on every principle to be the same in the
second as in the first branch. If the Government be not laid on this
foundation, it can be neither solid nor lasting. Any other
principle will be local, confined and temporary. This will expand with
the expansion, and grow with the growth of the United States.
Much has been said of an imaginary combination of three States.
Sometimes a danger of monarchy, sometimes of aristocracy, has
been charged on it. No explanation however of the danger has
been vouchsafed. It would be easy to prove both from reason and
history that rivalships would be more probable than coalitions,
and that there are no coinciding interests that could produce the
latter. No answer has yet been given to the observations of Mr.
Madison, on this subject. Should the Executive Magistrate be
taken from one of the large States would not the other two be
thereby thrown into the scale with the other States, Whence then
the danger of monarchy? Are the people of the three large States
more aristocratic than those of the small ones. Whence then the
danger of aristocracy from their influence. It is all a mere illusion
of names? We talk of States, till we forget what they are
composed of. Is a real and fair majority, the natural hot-bed of
aristocracy? It is a part of the definition of this species of
Government or rather of tyranny, that the smaller number
governs the greater? It is true that a majority of States in the second
branch can not carry a law against a majority of the people in the
first. But this removes half only of the objection. Bad
Governments are of two sorts
- that which does too little
- that which does too much: that which fails through weakness; and
that which destroys through oppression?
Under which of these evils do the United States at present groan? Under the weakness and inefficiency of its Government. To remedy this weakness we
have been sent to this Convention. If the motion should be
agreed to, we shall leave the United States fettered precisely as
heretofore, with the additional mortification of seeing the good
purposes of the fair representation of the people in the first
branch, defeated in second. Twenty four will still control sixty
six. He lamented that such a disagreement should prevail on the
point of representation, as he did not foresee that it would
happen on the other point most contested, the boundary between
the General and the local authorities. He thought the States
necessary and valuable parts of a good system.
- MR. ELLSWORTH:
- The capital objection of Mr. Wilson, that
the minority will rule the majority, is not true. The power is
given to the few to save them from being destroyed by the many.
If an equality of votes had been given to them in both branches,
the objection might have had weight. Is it a novel thing that the
few should have a check on the many. Is it not the case in the
British Constitution the wisdom of which so many gentlemen
have united in applauding. Have not the House of Lords, who
form so small a proportion of the nation a negative on the laws,
as a necessary defence of their peculiar rights against the
encroachment of the Commons. No instance of a Confederacy has
existed in which an equality of voices has not been exercised by
the members of it. We are running from one extreme to another,
We are razing the foundations of the building, when we need
only repair the roof. No salutary measure has been lost for want
of a majority of the States, to favor it, If security be all that the
great States wish for the first branch secures them. The danger of
combinations among them is not imaginary. Although no
particular abuses could be foreseen by him, the possibility of them
would be sufficient to alarm him. But he could easily conceive
cases in which they might result from such combinations.
Suppose that in pursuance of some commercial treaty or
arrangement, three or four free ports and no more were to be established
would not combinations be formed in favor of Boston,
Philadelphia, and some port in Chesapeak. A like concert might be
formed in the appointment of the great officers. He appealed
again to the obligations of the federal pact which was still in
force, and which had been entered into with so much solemnity.
persuading himself that some regard would still be paid to the
plighted faith under which each State small as well as great, held
an equal right of suffrage in the general Councils. His remarks
were not the result of partial or local views. The State he
represented, Connecticut, held a middle rank.
- MR. MADISON
- did justice to the able and close reasoning of
Mr. Ellsworth but must observe that it did not always accord
with itself. On another occasion, the large States were described
by him as the Aristocratic States, ready to oppress the small
Now the small are the House of Lords requiring a negative to
defend them against the more numerous commons.
Mr. Ellsworth had also erred in saying that no instance had existed in
which confederated States had not retained to themselves a
perfect equality of suffrage. Passing over the German system in
which the King of Prussia has nine voices, he reminded
Mr. Ellsworth of the Lycian confederacy, in which the component
members had votes proportioned to their importance, and which
Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for that form of
Government. Had the fact been as stated by Mr. Ellsworth it
would have been of little avail to him, or rather would have
strengthened the arguments against him, the History and fate of
the several confederacies modern as well as Ancient,
demonstrating some radical vice in their structure. In reply to the appeal of
Mr. Ellsworth to the faith plighted in the existing federal
compact, he remarked that the party claiming from others an
adherence to a common engagement ought at least to be guiltless itself
of a violatiom Of all the States however Connecticut was
perhaps least able to urge this plea. Besides the various omissions to
perform the stipulated acts from which no State was free, the
Legislature of that State had by a pretty recent vote, positively,
refused to pass a law for complying with the Requisitions of
Congress and had transmitted a copy of the vote to Congress. It
was urged, he said, continually that an equality of votes in the
second branch was not only necessary to secure the small, but
would be perfectly safe to the large ones whose majority in the
first branch was an effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding this
apparent defence, the majority of States might sdll injure the
majority of people,
- They could obstruct the wishes and
interests of the majority.
- They could extort measures repugnant to
the wishes and interest of the Majority.
- They could impose
measures adverse thereto; as the second branch will probly
exercise some great powers, in which the first will not participate.
He admitted that every peculiar interest whether in any class of
citizens, or any descripdon of States, ought to be secured as far
as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack there ought to be
given a constitutional power of defence. But he contended that
the States were divided into different interests not by their
difference of size, but by other circumstances, the most material of
which resulted partly from climate, but principally from the
effects of their having or not having slaves. These two causes
concurred in forming the great division of interests in the United
States. It did not lie between the large and small States. It lay
between the Northern and Southern, and if any defensive power
were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to these two
interests. He was so strongly impressed with this important truth
that he had been casting about in his mind for some expedient
that would answer the purpose. The one which had occurred was
that instead of proportioning the votes of the States in both
branches, to their respective numbers of inhabitants computing
the slaves in the ratio of 5 to 3 they should be represented in one
branch according to the number of free inhabitants only, and in
the other according to the whole number counting the slaves as if
free. By this arrangement the Southern Scale would have the
advantage in one House, and the Northern in the other. He had
been restrained from proposing this expedient by two
considerations: one was his unwillingness to urge any diversity of interests
on an occasion where it is but too apt to arise of itself, the other
was, the inequality of powers that must be vested in the two
branches, and which would destroy the equilibrium of interests...
- MR. KING
- observed that the simple question was whether each
State should have an equal vote in the second branch; that it must
be apparent to those gentlemen who liked neither the motion for
this equality, nor the report as it stood; that the report was as
susceptible of melioration as the motion; that a reform would be
nugatory and nominal only if we should make another Congress
of the proposed Senate; that if the adherence to an equality of
votes was fixed and unalterable, there could not be less obstinacy
on the other side, and that we were in fact cut asunder
already, and it was in vain to shut our eyes against it, that he was
however filled with astonishrnent that if we were convinced that
every man in America was secured in all his rights, we should be
ready to sacrifice this substantial good to the phantom of State
sovereignty, that his feelings were more harrowed and his fears
more agitated for his Country than he could express, that he
conceived this to be the last opportunity of providing for its
liberty and happiness, that he could not therefore but repeat his
amazement that when a just Government founded on a fair
representation of the people of America was within our reach, we
should renounce the blessing, from an attachment to the ideal
freedom and importance of States, that should this wonderful
illusion continue to prevail, his mind was prepared for every
event, rather than to sit down under a Government founded in a
vicious principle of representation, and which must be as short
lived as it would be unjust.
- MR. BEDFORD.
- That all the states at present are equally
sovereign and independent, has been asserted from every quarter of
this house. Our deliberations here are a confirmation of the
position, and I may add to it, that each of them act from
interested, and many from ambitious motives. Look at the votes
which have been given on the floor of this house, and it will be
found that their numbers, wealth and local views, have actuated
their determinations, and that the larger states proceed as if our
eyes were already perfectly blinded. Impartiality, with them, is
already out of the question,the reported plan is their political
creed, and they support it, right or wrong. Even the diminutive
state of Georgia has an eye to her future wealth and greatness.
South Carolina, puffed up with the possession of her wealth and
negroes, and North Carolina, are all, from different views, united
with the great states. And these latter, although it is said they can
never, from interested views, form a coalition, we find closely
united in one scheme of interest and ambition, notwithstanding
they endeavor to amuse us with the purity of their principles and
the rectitude of their intentions, in asserting that the general
government must be drawn from an equal representation of the
people. Pretences to support ambition are never wanting. Their
cry is, where is the danger, and they insist that although the powers
of the general government will be increased, yet it will be for the
good of the whole, and although the three great states form
nearly a majority of the people of America, they never will hurt
or injure the lesser states. I do not, gentlemen, trust you. If you
possess the power, the abuse of it could not be checked, and
what then would prevent you from exercising it to our destruction.
You gravely alledge that there is no danger of combination,
and triumphantly ask, how could combinations be affected? "The
larger states," you say, "all differ in productions and commerce,
and experience shows that instead of combinations, they
would be rivals, and counteract the views of one another."
This, I repeat, is language calculated only to amuse us. Yes, sir,
the larger states will be rivals, but not against each other: they
will be rivals against the rest of the states. But it is urged that
such a government would suit the people, and that its principles
are equitable and just. How often has this argument been refuted,
when applied to a federal government? The small states never
can agree to the Virginia plan, and why then is it still urged. But
it is said that it is not expected that the state governments will
approve the proposed system, and that this house must directly
carry it to THE PEOPLE for their approbation. Is it come to this,
then, that the sword must decide this controversy, and that the
horrors of war must be added to the rest of our misfortunes. But
what have the people already said? We find the confederation
defective,go, and give additional powers to the confederation,
give to it the imposts, regulation of trade, power to collect the
taxes, and the means to discharge our foreign and domestic
debts. Can we not then, as their delegates, agree upon these
points? As their ambassadors, can we not clearly grant those
powers? Why then, when we are met, must entire, distinct, and
new grounds be taken, and a government, of which the people
had no idea, be instituted? And are we to be told, if we won't
agree to it, it is the last moment of our deliberations? I say, it is
indeed the last moment, if we do agree to this assumption of
power. The states will never again be entrapped into a measure
like this. The people will say the small states would confederate,
and grant further powers to congress, but you, the large states,
would not. Then the fault will be yours, and all the nations of the
earth will justify us. But what is to become of our public debts if
we dissolve the union? Where is your plighted faith? Will you
crush the smaller states, or must they be left unmolested? Sooner
than be ruined, there are foreign powers who will take us by the
hand. I say not this to threaten or intimidate, but that we should
reflect seriously before we act. If we once leave this floor, and
solemnly renounce your new project, what will be the consequence?
You will annihilate your federal government, and ruin
must stare you in the face. Let us then do what is in our
power --mend and enlarge the confederation, but not alter the
federal system. The people expect this, and no more. We all
agree in the necessity of a more efficient government, and
cannot this be done. Although my state is small, I know and
respect its rights, as much- at least- as those who have the honor
to represent any of the larger states.
- MR. KING
- was for preserving the States in a subordinate
degree, and as far as they could be necessary for the purposes
stated by Mr. Ellsworth. He did not think a full answer had been
given to those who apprehended a dangerous encroachment on
their jurisdictions. Expedients might be devised as he conceived
that would give them all the security the nature of things would
admit of. In the establishment of Societies the Constitution was
to the Legislature what the laws were to individuals. As the
fundamental rights of individuals are secure by express provisions
in the State Constitutions, why may not a like security be
provided for the Rights of States in the National Constitution. The
articles of Union between England and Scotland furnish an
example of such a provision in favor of sundry rights of Scotland.
When that Union was in agitation, the same language of
apprehension which has been heard from the smaller States, was in the
mouths of the Scotch patriots. The articles however have not
been violated and the Scotch have found an increase of
prosperity and happiness. He was aware that this will be called a mere
paper security. He thought it a sufficient answer to say that if
fundamental articles of compact, are no sufficient defence against
physical power, neither will there be any safety against it if there
be no compact. He could not sit down, without taking some
notice of the language of the honorable gentleman from Delaware,
Mr. Bedford. It was not he that had uttered a dictatorial
language. This intemperance had marked the honorable
gentleman himself. It was not he who with a vehemence unprecedented
in that House, had declared himself ready to turn his hopes from
our common Country, and court the protection of some foreign
hand. This too was the language of the Honorable member
himself. He was grieved that such a thought had entered into his
heart. He was more grieved that such an expression had dropped
from his lips. The gentleman could only excuse it to himself on
the score of passion. For himself whatever might be his distress,
he would never court relief from a foreign power.
- MR. GOWERNEUR MORRIS
- thought a Committee adviseable as
the Convention had been equally divided. He had a stronger
reason also. The mode of appointing the second branch tended
he was sure to defeat the object of it. What is this object, to
check the precipitation, changeableness, and excesses of the first
branch. Every man of observation had seen in the democratic
branches of the State Legislatures, precipitation,in Congress
changeableness, in every department excesses against personal
liberty private property and personal safety. What qualities are
necessary to constitute a check in this case. Abilities and
virtue,
are equally necessary in both branches. Something more then is
now wanted.
- The checking branch must have a personal interest
in checking the other branch: one interest must be opposed to
another interest. Vices as they exist, must be turned against each
other.
- It must have great personal property, it must have the
aristocratic spirit, it must love to lord it through pride, pride is
indeed the great principle that actuates both the poor and the
rich. It is this principle which in the former resists, in the latter
abuses authority.
- It should be independent. In Religion the
Creature is apt to forget its Creator. That it is otherwise in
political affairs, the late debates here are an unhappy proof. The
aristocratic body, should be as independent and as firm as the
democratic. If the members of it are to revert to a dependence on
the democratic choice, the democratic scale will preponderate.
All the guards contrived by America have not restrained the
Senatorial branches of the Legislatures from a servile
complaisance to the democratic. If the second branch is to be dependent
we are better without it. To make it independent, it should be for
life. It will then do wrong, it will be said. He believed so. He
hoped so. The Rich will strive to establish their dominion and
enslave the rest. They always did. They always will. The proper
security against them is to form them into a separate interest.
The two forces will then control each other. Let the rich mix
with the poor and in a Commercial Country, they will establish
an oligarchy. Take away commerce, and the democracy will
triumph. Thus it has been all the world over. So it will be among
us. Reason tells us we are but men, and we are not to expect any
particular interference of Heaven in our favor. By thus
combining and setting apart, the aristocratic interest, the popular interest
will be combined against it. There will be a mutual check and
mutual security.
- An independence for life, involves the necessary permanency.
If we change our measures no body will trust
us, and how avoid a change of measures, but by avoiding a
change of mem Ask any man if he confides in Congress if he
confides in the State of Pennsylvania if he will lend his money or
enter into contract. He will tell you no. He sees no stability. He
can repose no confidence. If Great Britain were to explain her
refusal to treat with us, the same reasoning would be employed.
He disliked the exclusion of the second branch from holding
offices. It is dangerous. It is like the imprudent exclusion of the
military officers during the war, from civil appointments. It
deprives the Executive of the principal source of influence. If
danger be apprehended from the Executive what a left-handed
way is this of obviating it. If the son, the brother or the friend
can be appointed, the danger may be even increased, as the
disqualified father etc can then boast of a disinterestedness
which he does not possess. Besides shall the best, the most able,
the most virtuous citizens not be permitted to hold offices. Who
then are to hold them? He was also against paying the Senators.
They will pay themselves if they can. If they can not they will be
rich and can do without it. Of such the second branch ought to
consist, and none but such can compose it if they are not to be
paid.He contended that the Executive should appoint the Senate
and fill up vacancies. This gets rid of the difficulty in the present
question. You may begin with any ratio you please, it will come
to the same thing. The members being independent and for life,
may be taken as well from one place as from another. It should
be considered too how the scheme could be carried through the
States. He hoped there was strength of mind enough in this
House to look truth in the face. He did not hesitate therefore to
say that loaves and fishes must bribe the Demogogues. They
must be made to expect higher offices under the general than the
State Government. A Senate for life will be a noble bait.
Without such captivating prospects, the popular leaders will oppose
and defeat the plan. He perceived that the first branch was to be
chosen by the people of the States, the second by those chosen
by the people. Is not here a Government by the States. A
Government by Compact between Virginia in the first and
second branch, Massachusetts in the first and second branch etc.
This is going back to mere treaty. It is no Government at all. It is
altogether dependent on the States, and will act over again the
part which Congress has acted. A firm Government alone can
protect our liberties. He fears the influence of the rich. They will
have the same effect here as elsewhere if we do not by such a
Government keep them within their proper sphere. We should
remember that the people never act from reason alone. The Rich
will take advantage of their passions and make these the
instruments for oppressing them. The Result of the Contest will be
a violent aristocracy, or a more violent despotism. The schemes
of the Rich will be favored by the extent of the Country.
The people in such distant parts can not communicate and
act in concert. They will be the dupes of those who have
more knowledge and intercourse. The only security against
encroachments will be a select and sagacious body of men,
instituted to watch against them on all sides. He meant only
to hint these observations, without grounding any motion on
them.