|
|
In spite of the feverish preparations of the Red Army for the war, which was especially active in May-June 1941, the war crushed on the country unexpectedly, its horrible realities were new for the people and couldn’t help shocking vast millions. Among the shocked ones were the military personnel – professional officers and officials. From the very first days the type of warfare was sharply different from all previous military conflicts in which RKKA participated. The military conflict at Khasan Lake in 1938, Khalhin-Gol 1939, the Polish campaign in 1939 and the Winter War in 1939-1940 – in all of these cases the Red Army was carrying out offensive operations. Soviet military doctrines of 1930s recognised only one type of the military operations – offensive operations. These doctrines were basis for training of RKKA troops. Every exercise was a rehearsal of massive flank strikes of armour and their deep penetration into the rear of hypothetical enemy. This kind of tactics was based on so-called "Theory of deep operation". Even after the beginning of the war the Red Army tried to carry out offensive operations; actually, this was the only thing that the Red Army was trained to do. The main kind of engagement in that period was the encounter battle, the kind of battle in which the whole First strategic echelon, all regular Red Army was wiped out...
Here is represented an opinion of one of Soviet veteran, the man who fought whole war. His name is Vasyl Bykov, he is a Byelorussian writer. I disagree with most of his statements, but I think that any opinion have a right to be exist. Besides, he is a veteran while I am not. I bow before all participants of those WAR and ALWAYS respect theirs opinions... even if I strongly disagree.
Gradually, however, it became clear that this would not be a one-year-war, that it would be very different from all previous campaigns. It also became obvious that there would be a long way to victory and one had to adapt to the war’s extreme and violent environment. By the second year of the war troops have developed a special lifestyle. At the fronts where troops did not carry out large-scale operations, dug themselves deep into the ground, and stood in rigid defence, people had an illusory hope to survive – if not to see the victory, then at least the end of the week, the next morning.
![]() |
And people settled down - each one at the place where the war put him. The staff officers were quick to seize the surviving buildings of burnt-down villages in areas adjacent to the combat areas, they fortified their command and observation posts. The artillerymen built their own dugouts, constructing stoves out of metal barrels, milk-cans, and covered their beds (formed of soil) with branches of pine trees. A raincoat (plasch-palatka), this universal soldiers’ protection from cold and bad weather, would cover the entrance to a dugout. Throughout the whole war Germans used wool blankets, we in all cases managed with traditional grey overcoat – in fighting, at rest, sleeping during the night. The infantry in trenches, often nearly buried in snow or flooded by water, dug foxholes to protect them from the bad weather. The foxholes always had shelves for ammo and grenades, and a step from water, so that it would be easier to get out of the trench for assault.
Infantry actually very often had to get out of the trenches, even in long defensive operations that lasted for months. The high-ranking officers remembered and fanatically fulfilled the merciless order of the Supreme Commander: never leave the German invaders alone, never let them have rest, unceasingly attack and exhaust them. That’s what the troops did – attacked and exhausted the enemy. Even if they did not have enough weapons and ammo, even if the supporting artillery had one round per day, and commander’s permission was required for every round to be fired. During the defensive operations it was common to carry out reconnaissance in force, which would often turn into bloodbaths, and to carry out unceasing assaults to improve defensive positions. Some units, led by highly patriotic and devoted officers, would assault the same heights for months, losing thousands of men without any progress. Nobody cared for people. In the war there was limit, deficit and norm for every resource – except for people. From the rear areas, from numerous training and formation centres there was a steady flow of reinforcement – these were masses of people exhausted by drill, who barely knew how to fire a rifle, who often barely spoke any Russian. This was the consequence of another Soviet doctrine - "The theory of the permanent mobilization".
During several first days very few could overcome the shock. NCOs and commanding officers had to spend a lot of energy to make people in the attacking line to get up. Very often one could see the following scene on the battlefield: the company’s commander, running back and forth along the line of laying soldiers, makes every soldier to get up with kicking soldiers in the butts. A soldier gets up, the officer runs towards the next one, and while he tries to force the next soldier to get up, the first one is again on the ground, either dead or just scared. It is obvious that the company’s commander could live for a long time, running around under enemy’s fire. When the regiments and battalions were fought to the ground, the division would be taken to the rear area for replenishment and reinforcement. It was also purged by NKVD. Surviving officers were awarded - for faithful fulfilment of orders – that was a formulation for award nomination. Some officers were told to report to the Special Department (later - SMERSH), and the officer would disappear there. Probably one could see this officer would later in some penal battalion, without insignia. Probably one would not see him any more; he would be gone forever...
Not only the high-ranking officers, but also the political officers, representatives of Special Departments, court-martials and military prosecutors’ offices insured that nobody protested against this obvious insanity. The order of your commander is your law, and in the Army it was prohibited to complain about the commander’s decisions.
The war, meanwhile, taught its lessons. The lesson was not the pre-war military science, the military academies and doctrines, but personal, first-hand combat experience, which became the foundation of officers’ tactical skills. Very soon after the beginning of the war it turned out that the service regulations based on Civil War experiences, were outdated and useless, if not harmful.
The point which stated the commanding officer’s position (in front of the assaulting line of soldiers), which caused the commanding officers to get killed in many occasions, and their units to lose any battle-worthiness, was very typical example of the regulations obsolesce. Multi-echelon formation of troops for assault led to unnecessary losses, especially from the enemy’s mortar fire. Facing these and many other absurd situations, Stalin and the General Staff had to edit the service regulations, and during the war infantry fighting regulations in two parts were issued. While in the front-line troops any sentiment about the superiority of German tactics or weapons was severely punished (penal battalion, 10 years at concentration camp or even execution), the General Staff silently analysed this superiority and came to certain conclusions.
However, one should had learned and adapted from the enemy much more, and not only in the area of tactics. Although we bragged (of course, with propagandistic purposes) with the quality of our weapons, the German small arms were in all cases superior in terms of design and easier to use. Our much-praised PPSh with its very uncomfortable drum magazine was inferior to German "Schmeisser"; a bulky Mosin’s rifle, designed in 19th century with its bayonet was inferior to German carbine (The German "Mauzer" carbine was developed in 1898 as well as the Mauzer rifle. The German rifle was 4.1 kg weight while Mosin rifle - 4.0 kg, Mauzer's length with bayonet - 1.5m, Mosin's lehgth with bayonet - 1.65m. - Valera). The outdated, water-cooled "Maxim" machine-gun caused the crews a lot of headache, especially in the waterless southern regions of the country, and in bad weather with its textile ammo belts. Light Degtyarev machine-gun is remembered by machine gunners just for its heavy weight. When German infantry received new compact MG 42, our assaulting battalions had very few chances to survive under its heavy fire (up to 1000 rounds per minute). A single MG 42 in a favourable position could wipe out a whole battalion in a matter of minutes. (the MG-42 was about 11.5 kg and 1.2 metres - too heavy to be called "compact MG". The "Maxim" was heavy machine-gun, while MG-34 and MG-42 weren't. Bykov trying to compare weapons of different classes - it seems to me strange. I've asked several veteran infantrymen about Bykov's opinion. All of them said that his statements are incorrect. - Valera)
![]() |
By early 1943 the T-34-76 medium tank had lost its main advantages to the new German tanks and had become an easy prey for German anti-tank weapons, especially for heavy Tiger tanks. Their edge was especially obvious in defence, when repulsing assaults of our T-34s. Excellent optics and a mighty gun allowed Tigers to deal with dozens of our attacking tanks. Soviet tankers literally wept from frustration, when our tank battalions, just having started the assault (especially in open and flat terrain), got under fire of Tigers, camouflaged in villages and gardens.
Several tanks would be knocked out right away, while Tigers would remain invincible due to long distance. In many engagements tankers realised that they were not be able to reach the effective range and would abandon their vehicles and went back to the assault position under fire. Before they could reach the friendly troops, their vehicles were burning. The leadership eventually understood this trick and ordered to court-martial the whole surviving crews that lost their vehicles. Then the tankers had to use another trick: they would come closer and abandon their tanks under machine-gun fire from German tanks. Some of them were killed or wounded in the open field, but some would survive and make it to friendly troops. It was much harder to make it out from the burning vehicle; more precisely, it was almost impossible. Veterans remember the German mortar fire, which could reach you anywhere – in the forest, in the city, in the open field. For justice’s sake one has to mention that German soldiers also remember Russian mortar fire very well, especially the 120-mm regimental mortars.
Our losses in the offensive operations were horrible; most of the casualties were, of course, wounded. Lightly wounded had to leave the battlefield by themselves; heavily wounded had to stay under fire for a long time, receiving new wounds, and sometimes dying. Only the commissioned soldiers – medical orderlies were qualified to carry the wounded out from the battlefield. No other personnel was allowed to evacuate the wounded form the battlefield, attempts to rescue a wounded comrade were interpreted as deserting the battlefield and were severely punished – penal battalion or execution at the site.
Of course, female medics tried their best, but TO&E assumed just one medic per company; there would be dozens of wounded on the battlefield. How could they make it, no matter how hard they tried? They could not; the wounded had to wait for help for long time, lost a lot of blood and died on the battlefield or on their way to the hospital.
It is still unknown who is the author of the "genius" idea to employ women in the war. This seems to be a purely Soviet innovation, the Germans did not have anything like that till the end of the war. Given the obvious abundance of male "materiel", what was the need to send young and fragile girls under fire? What was the benefit form that? The benefit was nothing but making life happier for senior and political officers, who temporarily had no access to their wives and girlfriends at home. On their way to the front many of them would settle in staffs and rear offices as secretaries, operators, or medics – these were common positions to disguise those whom soldiers ironically called PPZh (sounds almost like PPSh, stands for pokhodno-polevaya zhena – a field wife). Those who made it to the battle zone were not treated as real soldiers – at war, which is purely men’s work, among masses of male soldiers they very soon demonstrated their uselessness. This goes even for female snipers, who would during quiet periods deploy in the no-man’s land, in direct proximity to the enemy.
It was a rule of thumb to consider every sniper’s shot to mean a dead German. In reality, everything was quite different. One could only stay several minutes in no-man’s land under heavy German fire, and every shot girls fired was not necessarily a kill. But during quiet periods the snipers’ activity was the only indicator of battle performance, and commanders were generous with these figures in their reports.
![]() |
The quiet periods were the peak of political activity. This was the time when strange, well-shaved colonels with the blue edgings on the uniform and brand new leather shoulder belts appeared in trenches and started warm conversations with soldiers. "So, how is it going? Is food OK? Is mail working well?" They received short and cold answers – these polite officers, unlike shouting and cursing field commanders, were feared and not respected. Soldiers quietly listened to the officers’ hasty international news and explanations of our troops’ missions stated in the last order of comrade Stalin. Later, after these officers had left the units, lower-ranked political officers would arrive, and taking some soldiers aside, offered them to enter the Communist party. It was considered improper to say no, and there was also no point: there was no difference, how to die – as a party member or as a regular soldier. They would hold a meeting somewhere behind a hill, would all vote in for accession in one accord and a week later a soldier would receive a membership card.
Party membership did not change much in a soldier’s life: if he survived, he would receive a rank of junior sergeant, and before the assault he would get a task of shouting "For Motherland, for Stalin!" in the attacking line.
No one knows whether they really shouted it or not. The legend about this rallying cry mainly comes from propaganda and we can read about it from military publications. In unceasing booming of the battle, among explosions and small-arms chat it was hard to hear one’s own voice, not to mention somebody’s absurd and strange rallying cry.
It was impossible to hear even "Hurrah", which soldiers really shouted in certain moments of the battle. After a failure, when the "debriefing" and search for the guilty started, the political officers would usually ask their subordinates, why one couldn’t hear the rallying cries? The objections were: "We did shout! Couldn’t you hear us?" Apparently, they could not hear because it is hard to hear something in the rear. It is also hard to see anything from the rear.
Generals and senior officers, as it goes in all the armies, did not command the troops directly, rather, they commanded the officers of lower ranks, as this was more convenient in all respects. The most honest and intelligent officers did this in a way that kept the senior command happy and at the same time did not oppress the subordinates. This allowed the offices to maintain a reputation of just bosses. However, this leadership style was not so usual; it was more of an exception from the rule. The common rule was full submissiveness before the senior command and merciless cruelty towards the subordinates; many have succeeded in this during the war. It was the degree of demand from subordinates that was the crucial factor in careers of the most outstanding generals of Stalin’s school. There was a case after the war when they court-martialed an officer, a well decorated one, a front-line colonel, commander of a Guards rifle regiment. The officer fought the war under other person’s name, using the papers of the real colonel, who had been killed, and with whom he served as an orderly. At the session they asked him a question: "How could you, missing the basic military education, only having a rank of sergeant, dare to bear responsibility for lives of hundreds of soldiers? How did you lead them?" Ex-sergeant answered this question with stunning logic: "That was very simple! Having received the order from the senior staff, I would call for battalion commanders and kick the shit out of them, so they run to fulfil the order like crazy!" Apparently, he knew how to "kick the shit out of them", if he had managed to earn four more decorations as an addition to the two that he had inherited illegally. He has truly learned Stalin’s science of victory. (Hardly it was common in Red Army. I've asked several veteran soldiers and officers, they said me it is mostly falsifications - Valera)
There is a common myth that the reasons for failures in the initial period of the war were, among other things the purges in the ranks of the higher officers of the Red Army that had taken place before the war. The purges were obviously a very evil thing. (However, not every officer was purged, the most experienced ones have survived and led the army. And later some officers were released. Just consider cases of Meretskov and Rokossovsky - Valera).
One of quite sound orders of the Commander in Chief was abolishment of the all-mighty military commissars’ institute, which was absolutely useless, duplicating chain of command (That's true! All veterans mention about this stupid decision of our HQ - Valera). This order can be partially explained by the relationships with the Western Allies (see also liquidation of Comintern); partially it can be explained by a huge deficit of officers due to the catastrophic failures of the initial stages of the war. Almost all the military schools set up intensive courses for political officers to be retrained into field commanders. However, apparently, it was impossible even for Stalin to make them good commanders, and some of the former commissars kept their offices. The office was totally useless in the war, somehow tolerable in the infantry, but totally absurd in other services, where an officer had to have special knowledge, not just skills of making leaflets and informing soldiers about the political situation.
![]() |
By the middle of the war the Army had learnt to fight the war; it had also learnt to cheat the leadership. Apparently, one could not survive without these two things. A case with battalion commander Andreev does not seem to be so unusual. This casual, civilian-looking commander was not a star, but he fought the war no worse than the others did. Sitting in a shell hole with his liaison personnels and orderlies, he coordinated the assault on the nearest village. Every minute the regiment commander required reports on battalion’s advance. Andreev, sipping vodka from a flask, cheerfully reported: "Advance successful... Trying to get a foothold on the northern outskirts...Got a foothold... destroying the enemy’s forward security".
At the meantime his companies were lying in the open field under sporadic mortar fire from the village. How would Andreev justify himself if the regiment’s commander appeared at the scene? Apparently, the battalion commander knew habits of the colonel and was pretty sure he would not arrive during the day. In the evening neighbouring battalions advanced and the Germans left the northern part of the village, which was subsequently occupied by Andreev’s troops. In the night the regiment’s commander arrived at the battlefield, and Andreev reported on a successful assault, which had never actually taken place. The regiment’s commander seemed to be happy. Apparently, he himself reported to the division’s staff in this manner, and the division’s staff – to the Corp’s staff. This was the rule of thumb, and all were happy with it. In general this was wiser and more honest, than assaulting the overwhelming enemy due to somebody’s dumb command, littering the battlefield with dead corpses. From the moral point of view the battalion commander’s actions were not so pure, but there was no place for morality in the war. The offensive, conceived in the high staffs, would often date-bound – for example, the anniversary of October revolution, the Red Army’s day, Stalin’s birthday, some other important dates. Most of the time allocated for preparation of the offensive was spent in the staffs, the units had much less time. Andreev’s battalion only had one night, and even this night was spent on re-deploying the troops. The commander himself had a chance to look at the battlefield, where he had to win or die, just one hour prior to the offensive. He also did not have any tanks and very little artillery support...
Of course, these tricks were dangerous. However, many things remained unpunished in combat – the ones that were most feared, were not so longing to expose themselves to the dangers of combat area. But if the troops were taken into the rear for replenishment or to the second echelon, many things surfaced; it was almost impossible to hide something illegal. "God-fathers" – representatives of the Special Department (from 1944 - "SMERSh" counterintelligence) would start night interrogations in the units. As the result, the leadership knew all the details of recent fighting, all the tricks that the unit commanders pulled. SMERSh representatives concentrated invisible but vigorous power in their hands; they controlled destinies and careers of commanders. Those officers that had not escaped captivity (even short-termed) or encirclement, from which they had broken out with weapons, were paid especially close attention. Normally these officers had to be very loyal, pleasing not only the superiors, but also the subordinates. Otherwise they risked their ranks, they could be sent to a penal battalion, which they had just left after serving the term or recovering from wounds, and even be thrown into a concentration camp for the rest of their lives. Another risk group among officers was, in contrast, loose and cool cowboys, who allowed themselves, especially at parties with alcohol, to make non-standard statements concerning pre-war life, the German tactics or NKVD’s actions. Very soon this kind of officer would disappear forever.
The notorious Order #227, also known among troops as "not a step back!" inflicted serious casualties on the officer corps. Although NKVD's "Zagradotryads" (a special troops armed with LMGs and SMGs, they formed to prevent regular infantry from retreatment without a permission) existed long before June 22, 1941, they were kind of "legalised" through this order. In the summer of 1942, attempting to convince himself and the higher command in unacceptability of further retreat, Stalin laid all the responsibility of this order’s fulfilment on the shoulders of junior commanders, who from that point were allowed to retreat only after exhausting all the possibilities for defence. Many officers paid their lives for this. From the very first days following the order publication, NKVD started intensive search for those who retreated without order. Under this category would fall a regiment commander, who received the late order to defend a certain area; a battalion commander who did not finish deployment of his troops during a short summer night and in the morning was devastated by German Luftwaffe; a junior lieutenant in charge of a mortar company, who got lost in empty steppe. Court-martials worked at full capacity those days. The senior staffs demanded daily, weekly and 10-day reports on the number of executions, by categories – NCOs and COs, members of the communist party and non-members, according to social status and ethnic composition. These kinds of indicators were the criteria for nomination in punishment bodies of all kinds. Nowadays for regular people these decorated ones are the same war heroes as everybody else, however, not many people know what they were awarded for. Especially strong coverage have those who have served the full term of the war "from the first till the last day". One could, of course, survive through several wars in SMERSh or court-martial. Not in the infantry...
Everybody knows that life expectancy was the shortest in the infantry. The maximum for a soldier in a rifle battalion was one week in offensive, one month in defensive operations, which was followed by "land department" or "health department", as the sad joke went in the infantry. Any other outcome was very unlikely. Other services with high casualty rates (for example, Armour Corps, Engineer Corps, Fighter and Shturmovik pilots in the Air Force) were at least highly appreciated. The main, if not only form of appreciation from the state was decoration.
![]() |
The hierarchy of awards and the nomination procedure were regulated mainly by the rule of thumb, not by legal rules. None of the subordinates could be awarded before his superior, none of the officers tried to award his subordinate before he was awarded himself. Awards were distributed not according to one’s merit, but according to the rank. Platoon leader would normally be awarded with the Order of the Red Star, the Order of the Great Patriotic War 2nd degree would go to company commander, battalion commander would receive the 1st degree. Battalion commander would often receive the Order of the Red Banner by the end of the war – by the way, this was the most respected of all the military decorations. In general, however, this was the award for the division commander and political officers serving in division and higher staffs. There were also numerous awards for the higher officers.
A strange metamorphosis occurred with the Order of Glory, which had been introduced in mid-war period for decoration of soldiers and NCOs and was never appreciated higher than the popular "For Bravery" medal by the troops. Back in 60s Konstantin Simonov created a documentary about the Cavaliers of this Order, raising the Order to the height of the Golden Star of the Hero (of the Soviet Union), and the Order kept this reputation till the present days. In pre-perestroika period the value of awards decreased – it seemed that every adult person had been decorated – either for military or civil service. The interesting thing was that people were awarded not just with some new "Labour Glory" order, but even with the Order of Lenin, which was one of the highest existing decorations. A diligent milking woman in a successful collective farm had more decorations than marshal who fought the whole war; a vague statute of the Order allowed decorating everyone from housewife to marshal. The only one who could not earn this decoration was a regular infantry soldier; its price was so high that a soldier did not have enough blood to earn it. Against the popular belief, there were not too many decorations during the war. For many soldiers, who lived to see the victory, the little Victory medal was the only reward for their efforts; all the other awards were the anniversary medals. During the war there was a little amount of money to be paid to every award holder, which had been abolished soon after the war – of course, according to "requests of the labour people".
The war has ended long time ago and the new generations have risen up during the last fifty years. It is sad though that the memory about the war is not only diminishing, but is also replaced by anti-memory, by propaganda stereotypes. Yes, we have defeated the most evil enemy – the German Nazism, but do we have a right to forget the price of our victory? What were the real goals of the war – was it mere destruction of Nazism? What did we bring to the people of liberated Europe with our bayonets? Have we made Poles, Czech, Slovakians, Hungarians, Rumanians, Bulgarians and Yugoslavians happier? Fifty years after the victory we have a right to ask ourselves a very basic question: in what way did we benefit from our victory? Take Germans, who lost the war, take the Japanese and Italians who also lost, and even more so, suffered dramatic national catastrophes. However, they have learnt certain lessons out of those catastrophes and have rebuilt their countries and lives in a way that we will never be able to build. So, is the historical fact of the victory really significant? Probably there is something more about it, something hidden? Or this is the Almighty’s extravagant decision to distribute His mercy: some get empty sound of victory, and the others get comfortable earthly life. Everyone gets what he deserves – as the dear to our harts socialistic principle of distribution of the earthly happiness says.
The more time passes since the memorable May of 1945, the more questions the war raises. Many of seemingly unshakeable values vanish and are replaced by new ones. The younger generations believe that this is the new time for them, which has nothing to do with the cursed past, which was the deserved destiny of their fathers and grandfathers. But let us not jump to conclusions. Still, many things in this world are tied together with a strong rope, and without loosing its knots it is not so easy to move on into the bright future. Although history, as we know, does not teach anything, one is not forbidden to learn from it. Of course this relates to the ones who want to learn something.
|
|