Tero:
re: In the beginning . . .
>I think we are agreed that if the Red Army had succeeded in their attack of summer 1944 and reached Helsinki, Finland would have had Soviet troops stationed in her for many years.
The nation feared they would suffer the same fate the Baltic states did. Furthermore, the Soviet premise that the civil war wounds had not been healed was false. They thought they could drive a wedge to separate the different classes. That means that the Soviet propaganda was counter productive to the extreme. The formation of Terijoki government was such a clear indication that Stalin was after more than just the protective zone for Leningrad.
>1.) Finland was ready to quit the war if she could do so on favourable terms, i.e. avoid this same Soviet occupation.
Yes. The terms had to be realistic. Unconditional surrender was not an option.
>2.) Finland was prepared to act on behalf of the USSR to further Soviet war aims, specifically to clear German forces out of Finland, a situation which would free Soviet forces toed up there for other operations against the Germans, south of Leningrad.
That is basically true. Only here in Finland it is seen that the expulsion of the Germans was not done in behalf of the Soviets. We were still a sovereing state so it was done in the spirit of selfpreservation. And we had woved that we would not tolerate foreing troops hostile to the USSR on our soil already in 1939 before the Winter War and the Soviets held us to that.
>3.) The Finnish Army had repeatedly demonstrated that they were capable of inflicting very heavy casualties on the Red Army, casualties all out of proportion to the possible gains. A successful invasion would a long and very costly undertaking, at a time when Soviet forces were needed elsewhere.
My point exactly.
>Therefore, there was little point in invading a country which was now effectively on the sidelines, and which had expressed a (reluctant) willingness to act on behalf of the USSR to eliminate the Germans from that theatre.
Not eliminate. Just push out of our territory and away from the USSR boundaries.
>So, no Soviet invasion => no Soviet occupation.
Rather: 2 blocked Soviet invasions => no more Soviet attempts.
>This has been an interesting discussion. I was unaware that the USA had never declared war on Finland.
One of the more intriguing facts of WWII. And too often left out when the Anglo-American historians have made studies on the political happenings during WWII. The fate of Finland almost makes for a sort of anti-Vietnam story that would raise too many embarrasing and difficult guestions ?
Sun Jun 4 12:18:28 2000
Scott Schaffer
Finland (Jun, 2)
Juha
re: Finland (Jun, 2)
Mikhail
re: Finland (Jun, 2)
Stephen B.
re: How much do you ... (Jun, 2)
Henrik Krog
Probably..... (Jun, 2)
Juha
re: How much do you ... (Jun, 2)
Scott Fraser
re: Finland postwar (Jun, 2)
Robert A. Mosher
re: Finland (and Bulgaria) (Jun, 2)
Scott Fraser
In the beginning . . . (Jun, 4)
Carl-Fredrik Geust
re: In the beginning . . . (Jun, 4)
Tero
The role of the British delegates and Marshall aid (Jun, 4)
Jari Lievonen
re: The role of the British delegates and Marshall aid (Jun, 5)
- Tero
re: In the beginning . . . (Jun, 4)
Ilkka Mutanen
Some thoughts (Jun, 3)
Tero
My top 4 list of reasons (Jun, 3)
Carl-Fredrik Geust
Some additional comments (Jun, 3)
Henrik Krog
As to your point 1 (Jun, 3)
Max
re: As to your point 1 (Jun, 3)
Arashekino
re: As to your point 1 (Jun, 3)
Arashekino
re: Another thought (Jun, 3)
Tero
An MO forming already then ? (Jun, 4)
Mikhail
Bulgaria (Jun, 5)
Tero
re: As to your point 1 (Jun, 4)
Ilkka Mutanen
Stalin was serious (Jun, 3)
Max
re: Stalin was serious (Jun, 4)
Carl-Fredrik Geust
re: Stalin was serious (Jun, 4)
Tero
"Clear exaggeration" ? (Jun, 4)
Jari Lievonen
Russian losses summer 1944 (Jun, 5)
Ilkka Mutanen
Sorry, I was unclear (Jun, 9)
Tero
Both the 1939 and the 1944 go's were serious (Jun, 4)
Carl-Fredrik Geust
Answer to Henrik Krog (Jun, 3)
Mathias Forsberg
Finnish documents (Jun, 4)
Carl-Fredrik Geust
re: "Stella Polaris" and Finnish documents (Jun, 4)