As the topic of Vlasovites came up recently it seems a good idea to discuss one instance when brother fought brother at the behest of the nazis. I'm referring to Operation APRIL THUNDERSTORM, of course, documented by two primary sources of information: (1) a narrative report prepared for the United States High Commissioner in Germany by LtCol V.P. Artemyev, "History of General Vlasov's Army: First Division ROA," an enclosure to Despatch No. 3051 from the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Frankfurt, 23 March 1951, to the Secretary of State (Item 761.55/3-2351, NA RG 59), and (2) Heeresgruppe Weichsel Ia Kriegstagebuch entry for 14 April 1945 (NA Microfilm Publication T311, Roll 169).
To begin w/ popular histories present generally accepted facts relating to the establishment of the pair of divisions and the separate brigade that comprised the so-called Russian Liberation Army. From them we can learn that the 1st Division was moved to the East, in early March, and a confrontation w/ advancing Red Armies. The nazis preferred to command the outfits directly, the Russians sought all orders to come from Vlasov. Command and control broke down and before long these former German concentration camp imates were swinging picks, axes and shovels constructing field fortifications behind the Oder front rather than grenades in Pommerania, their original destination. Elements of the division did go forward, observe their Soviet counterparts ensconced upon the left bank of the frontline river, and proceeded to go off unchaperoned on night patrols. Ultimately, scounting parties crossed to the east bank of the Oder and moved among Red Army personnel located there, taking prisoners and sowing dissention. Still, the major threat to their lives was clearly seen as a bridghead on the "German" side of the Oder, 8 to 10 kms wide and 3 to 4 kms deep by a bend in the Oder pointing eastward. That position, of course, was well fortified by the time the ROA arrived on the scene.
Let me quote extensively from Artemyev. "On 8 April Gen Bunyachenko (commander 600st Infantry Division [russian]/1st Infantry Division [ROA])unexpectedly received a new order from the commander of the German Ninth Army to prep the division for an assault on the fortifications around the bridge w/ the purpose of liquidating them. Thus the German commanders decided to place on the First Division a task which could not be fufilled by the Ninth army in long battles and under more favorable circumstances prior to the flood when the Red Army units had not time to dig in."
"General Bunyachenko, in short, considered the order illegal and contrary to instructions..."
"The drawing up of the (eventually approved) plan of the battle was entrusted to General Bunyachenko personally. The conditions for the battle were extemely unfavorable. A frontal attack and the possiblity of maneuvering were excluded because of the flood waters. The single possiblity of attack was only from the flanks of the bridge fortifications on a narrow strip between the Oder and the fringe of the floodlands along the Soviet defense zone. The narrow strip gradually widened as one advanced into the depth of the bridge defense works."
"Only one company could be deployed from the jump-off point for the attack and only then by setting its flanks on the shore of the river and the floodlands. Then by advancing, which was very doubtful, the width of the company front could be widened to battalion size. The attack had to advance along the line of the Oder river, explosing its front and flank to the adjacent fire of the Soviet defense line (to the east). And during the past months of quiet the defenses of the bridge fortifications had been well strengthened."
"...The chief condition which General Bunyachenko made was a full guarantee of his demand for artillery and aerial support in the amount which he demanded. The plan of the battle was approved and the attack was set for 0500 hours, 11 April 1945." ...
"From the north, from the direction of Frankfurt a company of the 2nd Regiment was to advance on the bridge's defense and from the south from Fuerstenberg a company of the 3rd Regiment. The 1st Regiment was in reserve and the remaining units of the division, in full battle readiness, stood in their own areas on the second line of defense and they were not to participate in the battle..."
"At 0445 on 11 April the artillery opened fire on the bridge fortifications and at 0500 hours from the north and south, the deployed companies attacked along the narrow funnel in an almost impossible terrain. For the Soviet troops on the defense this attack was entirely unexpected, even in spite of the artillery fire of the evening before. This was only natural since the Soviet command could not imagine that the Germans would undertake such a foolish attack under those conditions in which both sides found themselves. In substance this attack was senseless from the tactical point of view and was doomed to failure beforehand. But the Germans saw the meaning of this battle in something else."
"The Soviet defense did not show a great deal of stubborn fight - frightened and disheartened by the artillery preparation the Red soldiers dropped back from their positions, showing almost no resistance. Moreover mortar fire from the flanks pierced the entire strip from close range in a width of no more than 200 meters. And the mortars greatly supported the intensity of the fire. The curtain of fire was so strong that it was impossible to move forward. In the air appeared the German 'aviation' which was supposed to support the attack. Five delapidated German planes of the type 'H-123' w/ German pilots and the newly painted emblem of the ROA on the wings appeared over the field of battle, made a few passes at low altitude and then having dropped a small number of bombs, returned home."
"It was impossible to continue the attack on the bridge fortifications under such conditions. The attacking companies after moving ahead a few hundred meters dug in. With each new attempt to continue forward, the enemy's fire was renewed w/ new force. It became necessary to suppress the Soviet firing points and obstruct the DZOTs on both banks which were firing directly and at short range. The regimental commanders proceeded at this juncture to the positions held by the attacking troops to acquaint themselves at first hand w/ the situations. The picture was clear - the strip of land suitable for passage was a slaughtering place for the attackers. It was possible to continue the attempts to seize the defense points; it was possible to force the soldiers to advance and purposelessly perish under the enemy's fire; it was possible to throw company after company into this slaughtering place, battalion after battalion, but to attain success was unthinkable."
"It became evident that the Germans undertook this operation in order to bleed the division white, to exhaust its ammunition, to crush its morale and in this way to render it harmless. apparently the German command could not find another way to rid itself of the threat of an unruly and unreliable division, fearing as they did open insubordination or perhaps even an active march against themselves."
"After the reports of the regimental commanders were given, General Bunyachenko ordered further attempts to move to be stopped and to hold the area which they had taken. Having reported the situation to the Ninth Army commander, General Bunyachenko received a laconic order: 'Continue the attack! Throw the enemy out of the bridgehead area at any price and form a defense line along the left shore of the wedge between Frankfurt and Fuerstenberg. You are relieving the German units (391st Infantry/Security Division) on this part of the front.'"
You guessed it, dear reader. The ROA pulled out of the line that evening instead, abandoning hard won gains in favor of marching into the rear areas in search of rations, ammo, and fuel.
Contemporary German accounts let the Vlasovites off the hook so to speak because Operation APRIL THUNDERSTORM is reported in a matter of fact way. Two reinforced regimental groups drove into the bridgehead from north and south, during the night of 12/13 April (note date discrepency)in an attack suppored by the 391st Security Division. Ninth Army reported slight initial success (500 meters) before Russians were thrown back to their startlines. The northern regiment tried again but was defeated during daylight hours of 13 April, a wet but sunny day. One does not see, among captured German records, any great discouragement in all this, rather the contrary is true as the 1604th Russian Grenadier Regiment was loaded onto a military train in Third Panzer Army zone and rolled south for physical inclusion in the ROA. On 14 April, battlehardened 600th Infantry Division was transferred to Army Group Center control for a deployment to the south w/ Hitler's expressed approval (see T78, Roll 350, Frame 8933).
What of this peculiar deployment? Well it has to be admitted that it was undertaken scant hours prior to the commencement of Stalin's drive on Berlin. What the nazis referred to as the "Grossangriff" began 14 April with holding attacks designed to prevent Ninth Army from pulled back into its "Grosskampf-Hauptkampflinie," and soon events would overwelm all concerned, 16 April and forward.
The nazis committed their Russian allies in what was essentially a special operation. This is what Stalin's volunteers would do for his side. Upon the heels of this, reinforcements were thrown into action in the same manner as punishment troops were, in the Red Army.
In the final analysis, both sides of the great divide showed an interest in deploying "volunteer" companies, battalions, regiments, and divisions at key points of the battlefield. Brother against brother.
To return to the problem of the German People's Liberation Army, let us recall that the 1945 link up between east and west, in central Germany, was anticipated to be problematic by the Red Army and by Eisenhower's crusaders. Something like it had occurred in central Poland, September 1939, when the Red Army encountered an ally in the German Wehrmacht. Upon the earlier occasion, nazis complained of being shelled from the east immediately prior to establishing a physical connection. Six years later, Red Army commanders were cautioned to watch for American and British troops east of river Elbe, and ordered to shell them should they be found encrouching upon the Soviet zone of advance: "give them a taste of Russian artillery," being the phrase used. Prospects for an east-west military clash existed and these hopes buoyed the nazis in their final hour. Had war broken out between nations of the former anti-Hitler coalition, could we really doubt that a Moscow-controlled German People's Liberation Army would not have taken the field?