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Excerpt from a stenography of the April 14-17 1940 conference of senior army officers at the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Agenda: Analysis of Combat Operations During 1940 Military Conflict with Finland
Chaired by: Voroshilov, Kulik

KRYUKOV (Col., 306 Rifle Regiment.): I would like to comment on nighttime offensives and breaking through fortified lines specifically in the night time. Nighttime combat is described in our Red Army's service regulations and is incorporated in the exercises we have been carrying out. In the past, as an instructor at the Course of Red Commanders, I was lecturing and instructing on nighttime combat. During the war with the White Finns, I had to change my tabs, turn into an infantryman and take command of the 306th Rifle Regiment.
VOICE: Did you mean, an all-arms commander?
KRYUKOV: Sorry, yes, that is all-arms commander. 306 Rifle, now a Red Banner regiment, on February 21 I was given an objective of taking over the Mutorando junction, where, according to field reconnaissance and the Northwestern Front intelligence section reports, the Mutorando junction had 2 steel-reinforced concrete pillboxes. However, the regiment's reconnaissance operation in the night of 20-21 February turned up four pillboxes and a tank gun shelter. When we will have taken over the Mutorando junction, we would also locate a concrete shelter and food depot, where we would find 60 2-tier bunks and a stock of ammunition and food supplies. The Mutorando junction had up grades of 45°, so it did not seem possible to use tanks with the so-called assault teams as blocking units. At 11:00 we had to begin the offensive. However, the entire junction started "talking" and it was clear that the attack was going to be very difficult, for the junction was flanked by wide open lakes and marshes on the right and the same - on the left.
To the left of us was operating the 136th Division. The prior speaker was the commander of that division. He mentioned his left-hand neighbors, who had been lagging behind, but, for some reason, he did not speak of his right-hand neighbors, who had been helping him. I will talk about them because we were working together. Our daytime offensive did not produce any result. I then ask my division commander to attack Mutorando at night. The division commander supported me, while the Corps commander, Comrade Akimov, said that not only he permitted the night attack but ordered to take it in the nighttime. As a result, we took Mutorando.
I must tell you about the unusual battle order. We decided not to use battle orders in the nighttime: the first wave - two battalions, the second - one battalion, or, as some regiments attacked, in three waves. Assigning me to the regiment, Comrade Timoshenko said:
"Remember, Kryukov, small teams of good guys can earn a lot of glory to your regiment."

I had the opportunity to build assault teams under command of young brave men. Having 11 days, I put all my attention to the training of these assault teams and they entirely proved to be effective in combat.
How did we arrange our battle lines for that nighttime offensive?
We carried out a daytime reconnaissance with the team leaders. The artillery was given orders to support recon teams with massive fire. The reconnaissance objectives were stated as follows:
1. Identify 'dead' spots
2. Check out approach paths, dead spots, determine the weaknesses of the pillboxes.
We later exploited these weaknesses, while the participation of the team leaders in reconnaissance ensured the effectiveness of infantry units. The offensive was supported by three artillery regiments; they rendered very strong support.
VOICE: Yeah, it is possible to assault when one has strong support.
KRYUKOV: I will tell you later what the artillery did when we took Mutorando.
VOICE: There have not been such things in history.
KRYUKOV: Now there are. At 21:00, the assault teams took their positions within the 150-200 m range off the adversary's frontline. I was in the middle of our line. On the signal, relayed by phone at 21:00, the assault teams, without a single shot, started crawling toward the pillboxes. At the time, a snowstorm started, which helped us accordingly. We thus had good conditions for an offensive. It must be said that when we had done our reconnaissance, we made cuts on trees, made special markings, so that people wouldn't get lost when implementing their combat objectives. Within exactly the hour since the offensive began, it was reported that all assault teams were sitting on top of the pillboxes and negotiating (Laughter).

VOROSHILOV: Negotiating with whom?

KRYUKOV: With the adversary.

VOROSHILOV: About their surrender?

KRYUKOV: Yes. The negotiations were held with the adversary about their surrender. These negotiations were going nowhere, so I ordered to use the explosives we had received for wadding around the pillboxes and tell their commanders, as was done: if they want to see their friends and relatives again, they better come out of the pillboxes with their hands up. These negotiations did not produce anything, even if we didn't really want to negotiate.
So we signaled to fire. Unfortunately, there didn't seem to be enough explosives for such pillboxes, two of them did blow up, but three largest ones survived. They, though, were so deformed that the doors were lodged and nobody could get out. Nor we, unfortunately, could get in. In the morning, on the division's order, more explosives were brought in and, by 8:00 AM we blew up the remaining pillboxes. Most interesting was the losses ratio. The attempts to take the Mutorando heights in the daytime had led to 70 casualties, 18 thereof dead. In the nighttime, we did not lose a single man, except for a commissar, who lost his hearing for three days, but that was his own fault - he came too close to the explosion. In three days, his hearing came back. The soldiers commented: "This is amusing, if we had been put in such pillboxes, we would be sitting there for three years and no Finnish pig could have gotten us out." The enemy lost 62 men.

VOICE: Weren't you shot at?

KRYUKOV: Right, we weren't shot at, for lest we be shot at, we had three artillery regiments, whose orders were to open fire the very moment the White Finns try to fire at us or counterattack. Every artillery regiment was assigned its own sector. They were to remain silent if the enemy did not open fire. I neighbored the 136th Division. At the time, they already took two pillboxes, that were located on the right flank of the Ilves fortification line, and thereby gave us the opportunity to take Mutorando.
The Turasken sector had four pillboxes. The 62nd Division, which was to develop an offensive on that front, had a 4 km-wide sector. 104 Rifle was in reserve under the Corps Commander, 129 Rifle was right-flanking the 13th Army, so the 62nd Division had only one regiment to advance on a sector 4 kilometers wide. In the night of February 21-22, the regiment, however, was advancing only on a span of 800-1000 m.
The following daytime action was not very successful.
I would like to draw attention to the last moment. We began to take over Mutorando on February 21, but broke through the fortification line only in the night of February 27-28, when two our battalions entered the Bolshak area, which helped further advance of the 136th Division. Penetrating the [Ilves] fortification line from behind ensured the success of the units advancing in the second echelon.
The second nighttime offensive. This heights was n-shaped. Our attempts to take it in the daytime failed. The regiment was taking casualties and advanced very slowly. I ask permission to stop the offensive and take the heights in the nighttime. The Corps Commander orders to take the heights by 23:00 and enter the Bolshak area by morning. This heights was probed and tested with assaults throughout February 26. At 22:00 we stormed it with a single battalion, and its assault team was outstanding. At the top of the heights, there was a bunker with a 176 mm gun on a permanent mount and four machineguns. The bunker was blown up and the heights was taken. Right at the time, we receive reports of 300 men preparing to counterattack from the Saimovo area - they apparently did not want to lose the heights. Then, a battalion of the 136th Div. showed up for joint operations. I dared to take command of that battalion too and, with two battalions, counterattacked myself, before the enemy, against the regulations and the handbook on nighttime offensives. Soldiers, crying "For Motherland!", "For Stalin!", "Hurrah!", rushed into counterattack. These "hurrahs" were rolling all over the forest and, by 2:00, all units were again assembled under their commanders and brought to order, the artillery also pulled in. The Saimovo village was taken; there was the headquarters of a Finnish special brigade, which was operating in the Ilves area and at Mutorando. The staff was fleeing in such haste that a half-typed-up order was left in the typewriter. Their mounts were already saddled and, in one of the bunkers, we found hot tea which we drank with pleasure because it was cool outside. Finally, when the regiment entered the Humeiko area, some buildings turned out burning - the first sign that the Finns began retreating.
Hence, these two nighttime offensives provide certain experience and assert that nighttime operations of the army require more attention. This objective had been correctly stated in the Army Commissar's orders: more and more time must be allocated for training in nighttime operations. Indeed, there the nighttime should not be any different from the daytime.
I would also like to touch the subject of NCOs. We should have much better NCOs than we have now. It is not a secret that the old Tsar's army was built around "unter-officers". We don't need "unter-officers" Prishibe'ev, we need really good NCOs, like in the old army. What needs to be done?
First, improving the quality of training in our regimental training centers. Second, and most important, we need more men on extended service. I remember my "wachtmeister" (sergeant) Za'ikin - he had been in the service for 36 years. Not only he knew every horse's name, he knew by name each officer's child. He kept saying: "I see through you, I know what you're thinking." I think, that's the kind of NCO we have to have. In the past, they were playing an important role in the army. It still remains so in our cavalry. We should transfer this example into the army. We need to grant the NCO more rights. You see, back in the old days, officers were always indebted by the "wachtmeister", they borrowed money from him, he lived in a nice apartment, was altogether, as the old saying goes, the tsar, the god and the commanding officer. Today's starshina (sergeant major) checks out the stables three, four days a day, not so with the old "wachtmeister". He stopped at the stables once a week, but everybody knew he has been there and brought things to order. Nowadays, the regiment's commander comes to the stables if not every day then every other one, and yet we still have dents and potholes at the stables.
About rank. Why can't we give the NCO officer another designation? So "unter-officer" doesn't sound quite appropriate these days, there are other names. Why can't we call him sergeant major, wachtmeister, corporal? Wachtmeister sounds very respectable. What is "starshina"? It just doesn't sound right, but when we say "wachtmeister", it sounds very presentable. (Laughter)
About the uniform. Our uniform is very basic, although one could hardly find anything better for the march than our soldier's blouse. Nonetheless, in the time of peace, the serviceman should put on something which would tighten up his waste - the tunic should fit tight on a soldier. Hence, he would perceive himself with more respect, see himself in a different way, be polite. The better one is dressed, the more well-mannered toward himself he is. When our commanders put on tattered sheepskins and then, get out of the truck to point out to subordinates about the mess, they told him - "Who are you?" If one is in a greatcoat and presents himself as an officer, he would immediately hear back: "Yes, sir! Will do right away!".
I suggest we have more than one kind of uniform. We need three kinds, Comrade Commissar. We keep saying: Infantry is the Queen of the battlefield!. But, her dress is far from the royal type. (Laughter) Our infantry has the worst kind of uniform. The Air Force, Navy - they got the best, the worst - "Here, Lord, take what we got no use for" - is sent to the infantry.
I had thought - the infantry service is the easiest. Now I must say, the infantry is the hardest service, yet we give it the worst we got. Let's look at the cavalryman's pants and those of the infantryman. Whose ones are better? The cavalryman's. Whose highboots are better made? The cavalryman's. I was in the cavalry for 20 years and now it makes me indignant of the way we treat the infantry this way. We need to give our infantryman a good dress tunic, for casual dressing - dress pants. Your serviceman will look elegant. At any rate, we need to have field, casual and dress uniforms.