Description: 

This book describes the combat that took place at the V Corps sector, the area occupied by the US 2nd Inf. Div., the 395th RCT and the 3rd Bn, 393rd Rgt. (99. US Inf. Div.), the 741st Tank Bn, the 644th TD, the 801st TD and the 612TD units during the Ardennes Offensive. This area was part of the sector assigned to the American 2nd Infantry Division from December 1944 to the establishment of the American defensive positions along Elsenborn Ridge. The information presented is based on official U.S. Army documents (AARs - After Action Reports), combined with numerous interviews with members of the 2nd Infantry Division and its supporting troops, complemented by eye-witness testimonies of several members of other units that fought in the area. Official documents from the German side also grace the story, as well as eye-witness testimony from several former members of German combat units that fought in this sector of the Ardennes Offensive. The book describes the action starting during the Roer River Damm offensive and the battle fought at the "Northern Shoulder" of the Ardennes Offensive - Höfen, Wahlerscheid (Westwall Offensive), Krinkelt and Rocherath, Hünningen, Mürringen, Wirtzfeld and Elsenborn Ridge - from December 13th (Roer River Dam Offensive), 1944 until the retreat of U.S. forces and the establishment of a new frontline at Elsenborn. The "Northern Shoulder" was where the main thrust of the German Army was halted. After nearly six years of research in the area, and with the help of many veterans of both German and American units who fought there, an in-depth account of the combat in this sector of the Ardennes Offensive is presented. Many first-person accounts are provided to supplement the operational details found in the original U.S. and German Army documents. The text is supplemented by numerous period black & white photographs, maps, copies of original documents, and photographs of the area as it appears today. The many present-day photographs from the area will cause the reader to feel like they are stepping back in time, because, even with the passing of nearly sixty years, many of the "wounds" are still visible.

FOREWORD
by James W. Love,
Commander, Antitank Company,
38th Infantry Regiment, Second Infantry Division,

In June, 1974, thirty years after the Battle, in an interview with a British writer, General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel, commander of the 5th Panzer Army and south of the main 6th Panzer Army thrust in December, 1944, stated:

"The Battle of the Bulge was not fought solely in Bastogne. Here in the northern sector of the Ardennes, elements of tragedy, heroism and self-sacrifice exerted great influence upon the result of German intentions."
"Battles are won in the hearts of men, not only by the combination of fire and movement, but by working together. Teamwork is decisive, as was shown in the northern part of the Ardennes."

None of us who were there would for a moment in any way detract from the superb defensive actions of our brothers in arms in such places as St. Vith and Bastogne, both of which were in Von Manteuffel's zone of attack. Their consummate soldiery has been well recorded.
Not that historians have neglected the "North Shoulder". "A Time For Trumpets, The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge," written by the late Charles B. MacDonald, himself a rifle company commander in the 23d Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Infantry Division, published on the fortieth anniversary of the Battle, is probably the best one-volume account of the whole battle with appropriate emphasis where it belongs. There are others.
The lack of knowledge of the northern shoulder on the part of many is being remedied by writers such as Hans Wijers, a resident of The Netherlands, who lives within weekend distance of the north shoulder. Hans has written one book on the first three days of the Battle, "The Battle of the Bulge, The Losheim Gap - Doorway to the Meuse." This book skillfully weaves together essential, authentic history with personal recollections of those who took part--a good balance between the two.

Hans does well in describing combat in the miserable weather in the dense woods of the Krinkelter Wald and on the more open terrain around Losheimergraben and Bucholz Station. He describes the passage through the 99th Infantry Division lines by the 2nd Infantry Division in its attack toward the Roer River Dams on 13 December. This initial success was foiled by the start of the German counteroffensive, Operation "Entwerp," three days later.

The overwhelming combat power of the German attack forced these two divisions to break off their attack and to fight a delaying action by countless small-unit actions for two days. This successfully prevented the leading enemy troops from clearing the woods and preparing to assault the twin villages until late 17 December.

This is where Hans' second book, "The Battle of the Bulge - Holding the Line - US V Corps stops the Ist SS Pz. Corps" starts.

During the period covered by this book, 17-19 December, hardly anyone, except for a possible few at army group or higher level, had a clue about the strategic picture. For everyone down at the shooting level it was a matter of not letting your fellow squad members down, for supporting the company on your left or right. We knew we were in a helluva fight with an enemy that outnumbered us, at our particular level 2-, 3-, or even 10-to-1. It was not until years later that we got the big picture and learned how our small parts fit into the whole drama.

We now know that Hitler announced his plan to take Antwerp in mid-September 1944. In spite of the advice of his military advisers to adopt a less ambitious offensive, he insisted on Antwerp as the objective to be taken in about seven days. Such a grandiose plan would depend on three elements: surprise, sheer weight of numbers, and minimum hard fighting.

The first of these, surprise, was almost complete. Dense fog, bad weather and security measures by both sides permitted major units to be concentrated largely undetected.

The second element, numbers, was only partial. Much of his armies' damage and casualties from the campaign across France and Belgium had been repaired or replaced. However, many units had not had received adequate retraining. Only two divisions, the 1st and 12th SS Panzer divisions were at full strength.

Third, minimum hard fighting, was probably based on Hitler's pleasant memories of the German attack through roughly the same area in the late spring and summer of 1940. He remembered the dry roads and farmland across which his attack enjoyed easy going. Now, with the soft ground not yet frozen during the first week of his offensive, his tanks and other vehicles were road-bound, moving no faster, if as fast, as his infantry.

If we were surprised, so was he. For example, the sector through the Krinkelter Wald and Losheim Gap was, and had been, occupied by the newly arrived 99th Infantry Division for just over a month. The going in that area should have permitted "minimum hard fighting". What he did not know was that on 10 December, the veteran 2nd Infantry Division had moved north from St. Vith and the Schnee Eifel and was preparing for its own attack.

The area of Krinkelt-Rocherath, Büllingen, Wirtzfeld, Domaine Bütgenbach was athwart the axis of his main effort, der Schwerpunkt, that is, the Sixth Panzer Army, commanded by Oberstgruppenführer der Waffen-SS Josef ("Sepp") Dietrich. This area was the key to three of Dietrich's five Rollbahnen, battle routes. His army was comprised of all four of the Waffen-SS panzer divisions, five infantry, Volksgrenadier, divisions, one mechanized Panzergrenadier division, one parachute division, Skorzeny's Brigade, 800 tanks and assault guns and more artillery than the other two armies, the 5th and 7th, combined.

Since his ultimate objective, Antwerp, was some 80 to 100 miles away, Dietrich would have had to cross the Meuse at Liege, 35 miles away, by the third day in order to reach Antwerp on the seventh day. Further, the staff of the Sixth Panzer Army estimated that its infantry could cover the three-to-five miles from the line of departure to the Elsenborn Ridge by noon of the first day.

How badly did we upset Sepp's timetable? By the end of the third day, elements of his 1st SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions and his 277th Volksgrenadier Division were barely out of the woods and getting a toehold in Krinkelt-Rocherath and Domaine Bütgenbach. The 12th SS Panzer Division started the battle with 105 tanks and tank destroyers plus 12 Jagdpanthers (heavy tankdestroyers). By 21 December, the division had lost 67 tanks and tank destroyers in Krinkelt-Rocherath and 47 in Domaine Bütgenbach. It was no longer a viable force.

Dietrich never got to the Elsenborn Ridge. We thus deflected his attack to the south and west of the shoulder where, by Christmas Eve, it eventually ran out fuel, ammunition, tanks, food and the will to fight. This book tells the story of many of the countless small unit actions, which, together, gave the lie to Hitler's belief that the American soldier was a product of a decadent society, which could not produce real fighting men.

After the Battle of the Bulge over, on January 18, 1945, Winston Churchill told the House of Commons: "The Americans have engaged 30 to 40 men for one of us. It was the greatest American battle of the war and will, I believe, be regarded as an ever famous American victory."

James W. Love
Commander, Antitank Company,
38th Infantry Regiment,
Second Infantry Division,
January '42 to March '45
Williamsburg, VA, November 2002