Radio and Teletype Room
of the 6th Army

Original German Army Radio and Teletype Messages 
concerning the battle of Stalingrad.  
 

Hitler promoted Erich von Manstein Fieldmarshall

July 3, 1942
In greatful appreciation of your exceptionally meritorious services in the victorious battles
of the Crimea, culminating in the annihilation of the enemy at Kerch and the conquest
of the mighty fortress of Sevastopol, I hereby promote you Field-Marshal. By your
 promotion and the creation of a commemorative shield to worn by all ranks who took
 part in the Crimean campaign, I pay tribute before the whole German people to the
 heroic achievements of the troops fighting under your command.
 Signed :  Adolf Hitler
 

Hitler radioed Paulus to leave his headquarters at Golubinski and to fly into Stalingrad.

Saturday - November 21, 1942
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF WILL PROCEED WITH HIS STAFF TO STALINGRAD.
THE 6TH ARMY WILL FORM AN ALL-ROUND DEFENSIVE POSITION AND
AWAIT FURTHER ORDERS'
Signed :  Adolf Hitler
 

A few hours later Paulus received another message from Hitler by radio :

Saturday - November 21, 1942
THOSE UNITS OF THE 6TH ARMY THAT REMAIN BETWEEN THE DON AND
VOLGA WILL HENCEFORTH BE DESIGNATED FORTRESS STALINGRAD.
Signed :  Adolf Hitler

From his new headquarters at Gumrak airport Paulus reported by teletype to the German
High Command :

Sunday - November 22, 1942  - 6.00 pm
ARMY ENCIRCLED. DESPITE HEROIC RESISTANCE WHOLE OF TSARITSA
VALLEY, RAILWAY FROM SOVIETSKI TO KALACH, THE DON BRIDGE AT
KALACH, HIGH GROUND ON WEST BANK AS FAR AS GOLUBINSKAYA,
OLSINSKI AND KRAINI INCLUSIVE NOW IN RUSSIAN HANDS.

FURTHER, ENEMY FORCES ARE ADVANCING FROM THE SOUTHEAST
THROUGH BUZINOVKA NORTHWARDS AND ALSO IN GREAT STRENGTH
FROM THE WEST.

SITUATION AT SUROVIKINO AND CHIR UNKNOWN.
INTENSE PATROL ACTIVITY ON THE STALINGRAD AND NORTHERN FRONTS.
ATTACKS ON IV ARMY CORPS RE-PULSED AND ALSO ON 76TH INFANTRY
DIVISION. 76TH INFANTRY DIVISION REPORTS SMALL LOCAL PENETRA-TIONS.

ARMY HOPES TO BE ABLE TO CONSTRUCT A WESTERN FRONT EAST OF THE
DON ALONG THE GOLUBAYA LINE. SOUTHERN FRONT EAST OF THE DON
STILL OPEN. WHETHER INTENSIVE WEAKENING OF THE NORTHERN FLANK
WILL PERMIT CONSTRUCTION OF THIN LINE RUNNING KARPOVKA-
MARINOVKA-GOLUBINKA APPEARS PROBLEMATICAL.

THE DON NOW FROZEN AND CAN BE CROSSED. FUEL SUPPLIES ALMOST
EXHAUSTED. TANKS AND HEAVY WEAPONS WILL THEN BE IMMOBILIZED.
AMMUNITION SITUATION ACUTE. FUEL SUPPLIES AVAILABLE FOR A
FURTHER SIX DAYS.

THE ARMY INTENDS TO HOLD THE AREA STILL IN ITS POSSESSION BETWEEN
STALINGRAD AND THE DON AND HAS TAKEN ALL STEPS TO IMPLEMENT
THIS DECISION.

THIS IS, HOWEVER, CONDITIONAL ON CLOSING THE SOUTHERN FRONT AND
ON RECEIVING AMPLE AIRBORNE SUPPLIES.

REQUEST FREEDOM OF DECISION IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE TO
CONSTRUCT SOUTHERN DEFENSIVE POSITION. THE SITUATION COULD
THEN COMPEL THE ABANDONMENT OF STALINGRAD AND THE NORTHERN
FRONT, AND AN ATTACK IN MAXIMUM STRENGTH AGAINST ENEMY ON
SOUTHERN FRONT BETWEEN THE DON AND THE VOLGA WITH OBJECTIVE T
HE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTACT \VITH FOURTH PANZER ARMY.
PROSPECTS OF A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK WESTWARDS ARE UNPROMISING
IN VIEW OF ENEMY STRENGTH AND TERRAIN DIFFICULTIES THAT SECTOR."
Signed :  Friedrich Paulus, Commander of the 6th Army

Paulus was caught, how tightly was not yet certain but von Weichs at Army Group B's
command post in Starobelsk was sufficiently alarmed to send the following teletype to
high command at 6:45 P.M. that day  :

Monday - November 23, 1942  - 6.45 pm
DESPITE THE EXCEPTIONAL GRAVITY OF THE DECISION TO BE TAKEN,
WITH THE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH I AM WELL
AWARE, I MUST
REPORT THAT I REGARD IT AS NECESSARY TO ACCEPT GENERAL PAULUS'S
PROPOSAL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SIXTH ARMY. MY REASONS ARE
AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE SUPPLYING OF THE TWENTY DIVISIONS THAT CONSTITUTE THIS
ARMY IS NOT FEASIBLE BY AIR WITH THE AIR TRANSPORT AVAILABLE,
AND IN FAVORABLE WEATHER CONDITIONS IT WILL ONLY BE POSSIBLE
TO SUPPLY THE ENCIRCLED FORCES BY AIR WITH ONE-TENTH OF THEIR
ESSENTIAL DAILY REQUIREMENTS.

2. SINCE THE PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS DO NOT OFFER ANY
CERTAINTY OF RAPID PENETRATION OF THE ENCIRCLING ENEMY FORCES
FROM THE OUTSIDE, THE ATTACK TO RELIEVE SIXTH ARMY CANNOT, IN
VIEW OF THE TIME REQUIRED TO ASSEMBLE THE RELIEVING FORCE, BE
MOUNTED BEFORE THE IOTH OF DECEMBER. THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF
HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE DETAILED TIMETABLE FOR THE ASSEMBLY
OF THE UNITS IN QUESTION. THE RAPID DETERIORATION OF SIXTH ARMY'S
SITUATION AS REGARDS SUPPLIES INDICATES THAT THESE MUST BE
EXHAUSTED WITHIN A FEW DAYS. AMMUNITION WILL SOON BE
EXPENDED, SINCE THE ENCIRCLED FORCE IS BEING ATTACKED FROM
ALL SIDES.

HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT A BREAKTHROUGH BY SIXTH ARMY IN A
SOUTHWESTERLY DIRECTION WILL RESULT IN FAVORABLE
DEVELOPMENTS TO THE SITUATION AS A WHOLE.

WITH THE TOTAL DISSOLUTION OF THE THIRD ROMANIAN ARMY, SIXTH
ARMY IS NOW THE ONLY FIGHTING FORMATION CAPABLE OF INFLICTING
DAMAGE ON THE ENEMY. THE PROPOSED DIRECTION OF ATTACK, OPENING
TOWARD THE SOUTHWEST AND THEN BEING FOLLOWED BY THE NORTHERN
WING ADVANCING ALONG THE RAILWAY FROM CHIR TO MOROZOVSKAYA,
WILL RESULT IN A RELAXATION OF THE EXISTING TENSION IN THE
SVETNOYE-KOTELNIKOVO AREA. FINALLY, THE REMAINING COMBAT
STRENGTH OF SIXTH ARMY WILL PROVIDE AN ESSENTIAL REINFORCEMENT
FOR THE NEW DEFENSE FRONT THAT MUST NOW BE BUILT AND FOR THE
PREPARATION OF OUR COUNTERATTACK.

I AM WELL AWARE THAT THIS PROPOSED OPERATION WILL ENTAIL HEAVY
LOSSES, PARTICULARLY IN ARMS AND EQUIPMENT, BUT THESE WILL BE FAR
LESS THAN THOSE THAT MUST ENSUE IF THE SITUATION IS LEFT TO
DEVELOP, AS IT MUST DO, IN EXISTING CONDITIONS, WITH THE
INEVITABLE STARVING OUT OF THE ENCIRCLED ARMY AS THE CERTAIN
RESULTS.
Signed : von Weichs, commander of Army Group B