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Evaluation of the Situation of Sixth Army in the Stalingrad Pocket.
25 November 1942
by the Commanding General of LI Army Corps
General of Artillery von Seydlitz
form. TOP SECRET
The Commanding General LI Army Corps, November
25, 1942
No. 603/43 g. Kdos.
To :
Commander-in-Chief, Sixth Army
Having received Army order of 24.11.1942 on the
continuation of the battle I feel obliged with
a view to the gravity of the hour, to put my
appreciation of the situation which has been
reinforced by the reports of the last 24 hours
down in writing once again.
The Army is faced with a decisive either/or; break-out
to the south-west in the general
direction of Kotelnikovo or destruction within
a few days. This opinion is based on a sober
evaluation of the actual circumstances.
1. Since there is virtually no stock-pile of supplies
at the outset of the battle, the supply situation
is the key factor for any decision.
For the supply situation of LI A.C. as of the evening of 23.11. see attachment.
The numbers speak for themselves.
Even the minor defensive engagements of the past
few days have noticeably depleted
ammunition stocks. Should the corps be attacked
on its full front, which must be expected
daily, then it will shoot itself completely dry
within one or two days.
It is hardly to be expected that the ammunition
situation is any better with the other army
corps that have already been heavily engaged
for days.
From the calculations made, it is clear that an
adequate supply by air lift of LI Corps alone
is questionable, therefore completely impossible
for the whole army. What 30 Ju
(on November 23), or the further 100 Ju that
have only been promised so far, can bring in,
is only a drop. To attach hopes to this, means
grasping at a straw. Where the large number
of Ju required for the supply of the army is
to come from, is nowhere in evidence. If they
exist at all, the planes will have to be flown
in from all over Europe and North Africa.
Because of the distances to be covered, their
own fuel requirements would be so great that
coverage is highly questionable given the fuel
situation as experienced so far, not to mention
the operational consequences for the whole conduct
of the war. Even if 500 planes were to
land daily instead of the envisaged 130, they
could only bring in 1000 t of supplies, which
would not suffice to cover the needs of an army
of approx. 200,000 men engaged in heavy
combat and without stockpiles. More than the
coverage of the minimum fuel requirement,
a small fraction of our own ammunition types
and maybe also a fraction of the required food for
humans, cannot be hoped for. The horses will
all have died within a few days.
Tactical mobility will thereby be restricted
even further, the distribution of supplies down to the
lines made more difficult and on the other hand,
the fuel requirement increased.
There can be no doubt that the mass of the weather-proof
Russian fighters will be deployed
for attacks against the incoming cargo planes
and against Pitomnik and Peskovatka, the only
two air bases capable of handling bulk cargo.
Heavy losses are inescapable, continuous
fighter cover over the long distances and for
the two bases far from assured. The weather
situation will also variably influence the tonnage
results.
The impossibility of adequate supply thus proven,
the air lift can only delay the exhaustion
of supplies of the army by a few days, in the
case of ammunition within 3 to 5 days, but not
prevent it. Extension of the food supply lies
in our own hands up to a certain degree
(extension by 100% was ordered three days ago
in LI Corps), Extension of fuel and
ammunition stocks depends almost entirely on
the enemy.
2. The probable conduct of the enemy, for whom
victory in a battle of destruction of classic
proportions beckons, is easy to predict. Knowing
his active mode of combat it is hardly to
be questioned that he will continue his attacks
against the encircled Sixth Army with
undiminished force. We must grant him that he
recognises the need to destroy the army
before German relief operations can become effective.
From experience we know that he
has no compunction about sacrificing human lives.
Our successes in containing him,
especially on November 24 and the heavy losses
we have seen him sustain at several points,
should not lead us to self-deception,
The enemy is probably not totally unaware of our
supply problems. The more persistently and
harder he attacks, the more rapidly will we exhaust
our ammunition. Even if no single attack
succeeds, success will come about when the army
has shot itself dry and is defenceless.
To pretend that he does not recognise this would
mean that we expect the enemy to act
mistakenly. In the history of war such an attitude
has always led to defeat. It would be a
dangerous game and if it led to a catastrophe
for Sixth Army, would have the most serious
consequences for the course, and maybe also the
result, of the war.
3. Operationally the conclusion is irrefutable;
if it digs in, Sixth Army can only escape
destruction if relief becomes effective within
a few, i.e., within about 5 days, to such an
extent that the enemy must break off his attacks.
There is not a shred of evidence that this
will happen. Should the relief only become effective
later on, then the condition of
helplessness will inevitably come about, i.e
the destruction of Sixth Army.
What measures the OKH has taken for the relief
of Sixth Army, is not clear. Relief from the
west can only lie at a great distance, because
our own security forces only stand to the
westwards of the upper Chir and from about Oblivskaya
onwards on the lower Chir.
Therefore the deployment of relief forces must
take place at a great distance from Sixth
Army. Even with the aid of the effective rail
line via Millerovo, the deployment of an army
powerful enough to carry out a rapid penetration
while simultaneously securing its northern
flank, will take weeks. To this must be added
the time required for the operation itself which,
due to the inclemencies of the weather and the
short days atthis time of the year, will be
far longer than during the summer.
The deployment of 2 Panzer divisions initiated
near Kotelnikovo for relief from the south and
their attack must be calculated as requiring
at least 10 days. The possibilities for a rapid
penetration by the attack are greatly inhibited
by the need to protect the flanks, particularly the
eastern flank, that will grow longer with each
step, leaving aside the unknown condition the
divisions are in and the question whether 2 Panzer
divisions are strong enough at all.
One cannot count on the possibility of relief
forces being deployed by means of a larger
number of motorised columns. Neither the vehicles
nor the fuel can be available, otherwise
they would already have had to be made available
earlier and at far lower cost in fuel, to
supply the so greatly exposed Stalingrad front.
4. The possibility that relief will become effective
within the time dictated by the supply
situation is therefore nil. The OKH's order to
hold the position until relief is here, is obviously
based on unrealistic foundations. It is therefore
impossible to execute and will invariably lead
to catastrophe for the army. If the army is to
be preserved, it must immediately obtain a
different order, or else immediately take a different
decision itself.
With regard to the operational, political and
moral effects, the idea of deliberately sacrificing
the army should be beyond any consideration.
5. From the comparison of the time scales based
on the supply situation and the operational
requirements, including the probable actions
of the enemy, the conclusion is so clear that further
considerations are hardly required. None the
less, the following factors, all pointing in the same
direction, should be listed :
(a) The western perimeter is still far from being stabilised.
(b) On the northern front, it is impossible to
contain a sharply concentrated attack by opposing
forces for a longer period of time, because after
first having pulled out 16th Pz.Div., then
3rd Inf.Div. (mot), the front had to be withdrawn
to a shorter, but almost completely
unprepared line.
(c) Tense situation on the southern front.
(d) Reduced combat strength of the heavily combed-out
Volga front, particularly if the ice
cover on the river solidifies, which is to be
expected soon, and is no longer a barrier for
the attackers.
(e) Due to lack of ammunition, prevention of continuous
reinforcement of the enemy
bridgeheads on the Volga not possible. Enemy
attacks to date have already required full
commitment of all local reserves there.
(f) Condition of the divisions, heavily depleted because of the attacks in Stalingrad.
(g) The army compressed in a scanty steppe area
that offers hardly any usable shelters and
cover any longer, so that men and matériel
everywhere exposed to the weather and enemy
air attacks.
(h) Expected advent of severe frost with almost
complete lack of firewood on the major part
of the present perimeter lines.
(i) Only insufficient support by the Luftwaffe due to lack of favourably situated bases.
In contrast to this, no anti-aircraft protection,
since all anti-aircraft formations must be
exclusively used for anti-tank combat.
A comparison with last year's Demjansk pocket
can lead to dangerously false conclusions.
The distance to the German front was several
times shorter. The supply requirements of one
encircled corps were far less, particularly since
there were far fewer of the weapons required
here in the steppe (tanks, heavy artillery, mortars)
to be supplied. Despite the short distance to
the German front, at the time the establishment
of a very narrow corridor into the pocket
required weeks of heavy winter fighting.
6. The conclusion is clear.
Either Sixth Army defends itself in the pocket
until it is shot dry, i.e., defenceless. Since, given
continued enemy attacks and their probable extension
to sectors of the front that have been
quiet so far, this condition must occur before
relief can become effective, such passive conduct
means the end of the army.
Or the army acts and breaks open the ring of encirclement.
This is only still possible if the army
makes forces available by withdrawing them from
the northern and Volga fronts, i.e., by
shortening the front, and attacks with them on
the southern front, and then by giving up S
talingrad breaks out in the direction of the
weakest opposition, i.e., towards Kotelnikovo
This decision requires leaving much matériel
behind, but offers the chance of breaking the
southern jaw of the pincers, withdrawing the
army and its weapon from catastrophe and
preserving it for further operations. By doing
this, a parr of the enemy forces will remain
occupied for the duration, whereas if the army
is destroyed in the pocket, it will cease to
occupy any enemy forces at all. A public announcement
of the event that will not substantially
damage morale is possible. 'After having completely
destroyed the Soviet armament centre
of Stalingrad, the army has withdrawn from the
Volga while simultaneously smashing a
substantial enemy force.'
The expectation that the break-out will be successful
is all the greater since the fighting to date
has frequently demonstrated a poor stability
of enemy infantry forces in open ground and as
some of our own forces are still on the tributaries
east of the Don and in the Aksai sector.
As regards timing, the breakout must be initiated
and carried out immediately. Any delay
reduces its chances. With every delay the number
of combatants and ammunition is
reduced. With every delay the enemy becomes stronger
on the break-out front and can bring
in further forces of containment against the
Kotelnikovo group. With every delay combat
power is reduced because of loss of horses and
therefore loss of horse-drawn weapons.
If the OKH does not immediately rescind the order
to dig-in, then conscience adamantly
dictates the duty towards the army and the German
nation to seize the freedom of action
denied by the existing orders and to take advantage
of the still existing possibility of averting
catastrophe by our own attack. The complete destruction
of 200,000 combatants and their
total material is at risk. There is no other
choice.
signed von Seydiitz
General of Artillery
Comment by the Chief of Staff of Sixth Army, Major
General Arthur Schmidt :
'We are not to wrack the Führer's brains
for him, and neither is Gen. v. Seydlitz
those of the Commander in Chief.
For the correctness of the copy:
signed. Schatz, Lieutenant
ATTACHMENT TO 603/42 g.K.
Supply situation of LI A.C. as of 23. 1 1. evening
Ammunition (excl. 3rd mot. Div., 60th mot. Div
and 94th Inf.Div.)
| Hand-grenades
8cm mortar shells light inf. rounds heavy inf. rounds light field how. 16 light field how. 18 heavy field how. 18 10cm guns |
30% of complement
20% of complement 8% of complement 12% of complement 60% of complement 30% of complement 25% of complement 12% of complement |
Armour-piercing ammunition approx. 30 - 40%.
Hand-grenades only meagre stocks.
Tracer and signal ammunition only very meagre
stocks.
3rd Inf.Div. (mot), 60th Inf.Div (mot) and 94th
Inf.Div, latter as of 22.11.
stand at:
light field how.
60%
heavy field how.
50%
heavy inf. rounds
25%
light inf. rounds
40%
Daily ammunition requirements of the corps (based
on defensive combat to
date):
(a) 400 t in case of lighter combat (50 t per
div.) = 200 Ju
(b) 800 t in case of heavy combat (100 t per
div.) = 400 Ju
2. Fuel situation
Exact reports from the div. not obtainable.
Stocks as good as exhausted.
The most urgent driving to bring up supplies,
deployment of anti-tank troops,
field guns, only possible for a short while longer,
Daily requirements of the corps under extreme
economies:
80cbm (10 cbm per div.) = 40 Ju
3. Food situation
On average the div. dispose of:
7 full days soft food
4 full days bread
3.5 days flour
We must assume, however, that bakery operations
have ceased because the mass
of the bakery company is deployed in the Karpovka
valley.
Daily requirements of the corps (on half rations)
80 tons soft food = 40 Ju
70 tons tinned food = 35 Ju
Assuming half-rations, the supply of the corps will require in total :
(a) in case of lighter combat : 598 tons of supplies
= 295 Ju
(b) in case of heavy combat : 990 tons of supplies
= 495 Ju
Signed for the Commander of the Corps