Evaluation of the Situation 
of Sixth Army
in the Stalingrad Pocket

 

Evaluation of the Situation of Sixth Army in the Stalingrad Pocket.

25 November 1942

by the Commanding General of LI Army Corps
General of Artillery von Seydlitz

form. TOP SECRET

The Commanding General LI Army Corps, November 25, 1942
No. 603/43 g. Kdos.

To :
Commander-in-Chief, Sixth Army

Having received Army order of 24.11.1942 on the continuation of the battle I feel obliged with
a view to the gravity of the hour, to put my appreciation of the situation which has been
reinforced by the reports of the last 24 hours down in writing once again.

The Army is faced with a decisive either/or; break-out to the south-west in the general
direction of Kotelnikovo or destruction within a few days. This opinion is based on a sober
evaluation of the actual circumstances.

1. Since there is virtually no stock-pile of supplies at the outset of the battle, the supply situation
is the key factor for any decision.

For the supply situation of LI A.C. as of the evening of 23.11. see attachment.

The numbers speak for themselves.

Even the minor defensive engagements of the past few days have noticeably depleted
ammunition stocks. Should the corps be attacked on its full front, which must be expected
daily, then it will shoot itself completely dry within one or two days.

It is hardly to be expected that the ammunition situation is any better with the other army
corps that have already been heavily engaged for days.

From the calculations made, it is clear that an adequate supply by air lift of LI Corps alone
is questionable, therefore completely impossible for the whole army. What 30 Ju
(on November 23), or the further 100 Ju that have only been promised so far, can bring in,
is only a drop. To attach hopes to this, means grasping at a straw. Where the large number
of Ju required for the supply of the army is to come from, is nowhere in evidence. If they
exist at all, the planes will have to be flown in from all over Europe and North Africa.
Because of the distances to be covered, their own fuel requirements would be so great that
coverage is highly questionable given the fuel situation as experienced so far, not to mention
the operational consequences for the whole conduct of the war. Even if 500 planes were to
land daily instead of the envisaged 130, they could only bring in 1000 t of supplies, which
would not suffice to cover the needs of an army of approx. 200,000 men engaged in heavy
combat and without stockpiles. More than the coverage of the minimum fuel requirement,
a small fraction of our own ammunition types and maybe also a fraction of the required food for
humans, cannot be hoped for. The horses will all have died within a few days.
Tactical mobility will thereby be restricted even further, the distribution of supplies down to the
lines made more difficult and on the other hand, the fuel requirement increased.

There can be no doubt that the mass of the weather-proof Russian fighters will be deployed
for attacks against the incoming cargo planes and against Pitomnik and Peskovatka, the only
two air bases capable of handling bulk cargo. Heavy losses are inescapable, continuous
fighter cover over the long distances and for the two bases far from assured. The weather
situation will also variably influence the tonnage results.

The impossibility of adequate supply thus proven, the air lift can only delay the exhaustion
of supplies of the army by a few days, in the case of ammunition within 3 to 5 days, but not
prevent it. Extension of the food supply lies in our own hands up to a certain degree
(extension by 100% was ordered three days ago in LI Corps), Extension of fuel and
ammunition stocks depends almost entirely on the enemy.

2. The probable conduct of the enemy, for whom victory in a battle of destruction of classic
proportions beckons, is easy to predict. Knowing his active mode of combat it is hardly to
be questioned that he will continue his attacks against the encircled Sixth Army with
undiminished force. We must grant him that he recognises the need to destroy the army
before German relief operations can become effective. From experience we know that he
has no compunction about sacrificing human lives. Our successes in containing him,
especially on November 24 and the heavy losses we have seen him sustain at several points,
should not lead us to self-deception,

The enemy is probably not totally unaware of our supply problems. The more persistently and
harder he attacks, the more rapidly will we exhaust our ammunition. Even if no single attack
succeeds, success will come about when the army has shot itself dry and is defenceless.
To pretend that he does not recognise this would mean that we expect the enemy to act
mistakenly. In the history of war such an attitude has always led to defeat. It would be a
dangerous game and if it led to a catastrophe for Sixth Army, would have the most serious
consequences for the course, and maybe also the result, of the war.
 

3. Operationally the conclusion is irrefutable; if it digs in, Sixth Army can only escape
destruction if relief becomes effective within a few, i.e., within about 5 days, to such an
extent that the enemy must break off his attacks. There is not a shred of evidence that this
will happen. Should the relief only become effective later on, then the condition of
helplessness will inevitably come about, i.e the destruction of Sixth Army.

What measures the OKH has taken for the relief of Sixth Army, is not clear. Relief from the
west can only lie at a great distance, because our own security forces only stand to the
westwards of the upper Chir and from about Oblivskaya onwards on the lower Chir.
Therefore the deployment of relief forces must take place at a great distance from Sixth
Army. Even with the aid of the effective rail line via Millerovo, the deployment of an army
powerful enough to carry out a rapid penetration while simultaneously securing its northern
flank, will take weeks. To this must be added the time required for the operation itself which,
due to the inclemencies of the weather and the short days atthis time of the year, will be
far longer than during the summer.

The deployment of 2 Panzer divisions initiated near Kotelnikovo for relief from the south and
their attack must be calculated as requiring at least 10 days. The possibilities for a rapid
penetration by the attack are greatly inhibited by the need to protect the flanks, particularly the
eastern flank, that will grow longer with each step, leaving aside the unknown condition the
divisions are in and the question whether 2 Panzer divisions are strong enough at all.
One cannot count on the possibility of relief forces being deployed by means of a larger
number of motorised columns. Neither the vehicles nor the fuel can be available, otherwise
they would already have had to be made available earlier and at far lower cost in fuel, to
supply the so greatly exposed Stalingrad front.

4. The possibility that relief will become effective within the time dictated by the supply
situation is therefore nil. The OKH's order to hold the position until relief is here, is obviously
based on unrealistic foundations. It is therefore impossible to execute and will invariably lead
to catastrophe for the army. If the army is to be preserved, it must immediately obtain a
different order, or else immediately take a different decision itself.

With regard to the operational, political and moral effects, the idea of deliberately sacrificing
the army should be beyond any consideration.

5. From the comparison of the time scales based on the supply situation and the operational
requirements, including the probable actions of the enemy, the conclusion is so clear that further
considerations are hardly required. None the less, the following factors, all pointing in the same
direction, should be listed :

(a) The western perimeter is still far from being stabilised.

(b) On the northern front, it is impossible to contain a sharply concentrated attack by opposing
forces for a longer period of time, because after first having pulled out 16th Pz.Div., then
3rd Inf.Div. (mot), the front had to be withdrawn to a shorter, but almost completely
unprepared line.

(c) Tense situation on the southern front.

(d) Reduced combat strength of the heavily combed-out Volga front, particularly if the ice
cover on the river solidifies, which is to be expected soon, and is no longer a barrier for
the attackers.

(e) Due to lack of ammunition, prevention of continuous reinforcement of the enemy
bridgeheads on the Volga not possible. Enemy attacks to date have already required full
commitment of all local reserves there.

(f) Condition of the divisions, heavily depleted because of the attacks in Stalingrad.

(g) The army compressed in a scanty steppe area that offers hardly any usable shelters and
cover any longer, so that men and matériel everywhere exposed to the weather and enemy
air attacks.

(h) Expected advent of severe frost with almost complete lack of firewood on the major part
of the present perimeter lines.

(i) Only insufficient support by the Luftwaffe due to lack of favourably situated bases.

In contrast to this, no anti-aircraft protection, since all anti-aircraft formations must be
exclusively used for anti-tank combat.

A comparison with last year's Demjansk pocket can lead to dangerously false conclusions.
The distance to the German front was several times shorter. The supply requirements of one
encircled corps were far less, particularly since there were far fewer of the weapons required
here in the steppe (tanks, heavy artillery, mortars) to be supplied. Despite the short distance to
the German front, at the time the establishment of a very narrow corridor into the pocket
required weeks of heavy winter fighting.

6. The conclusion is clear.

Either Sixth Army defends itself in the pocket until it is shot dry, i.e., defenceless. Since, given
continued enemy attacks and their probable extension to sectors of the front that have been
quiet so far, this condition must occur before relief can become effective, such passive conduct
means the end of the army.

Or the army acts and breaks open the ring of encirclement. This is only still possible if the army
makes forces available by withdrawing them from the northern and Volga fronts, i.e., by
shortening the front, and attacks with them on the southern front, and then by giving up S
talingrad breaks out in the direction of the weakest opposition, i.e., towards Kotelnikovo
This decision requires leaving much matériel behind, but offers the chance of breaking the
southern jaw of the pincers, withdrawing the army and its weapon from catastrophe and
preserving it for further operations. By doing this, a parr of the enemy forces will remain
occupied for the duration, whereas if the army is destroyed in the pocket, it will cease to
occupy any enemy forces at all. A public announcement of the event that will not substantially
damage morale is possible. 'After having completely destroyed the Soviet armament centre
of Stalingrad, the army has withdrawn from the Volga while simultaneously smashing a
substantial enemy force.'

The expectation that the break-out will be successful is all the greater since the fighting to date
has frequently demonstrated a poor stability of enemy infantry forces in open ground and as
some of our own forces are still on the tributaries east of the Don and in the Aksai sector.
As regards timing, the breakout must be initiated and carried out immediately. Any delay
reduces its chances. With every delay the number of combatants and ammunition is
reduced. With every delay the enemy becomes stronger on the break-out front and can bring
in further forces of containment against the Kotelnikovo group. With every delay combat
power is reduced because of loss of horses and therefore loss of horse-drawn weapons.

If the OKH does not immediately rescind the order to dig-in, then conscience adamantly
dictates the duty towards the army and the German nation to seize the freedom of action
denied by the existing orders and to take advantage of the still existing possibility of averting
catastrophe by our own attack. The complete destruction of 200,000 combatants and their
total material is at risk. There is no other choice.

signed  von Seydiitz
General of Artillery

Comment by the Chief of Staff of Sixth Army, Major General Arthur Schmidt :
'We are not to wrack the Führer's brains for him, and neither is Gen. v. Seydlitz
those of the Commander in Chief.

For the correctness of the copy:
signed. Schatz, Lieutenant
 
 
 

ATTACHMENT TO 603/42 g.K.

Supply situation of LI A.C. as of 23. 1 1. evening

Ammunition (excl. 3rd mot. Div., 60th mot. Div and 94th Inf.Div.)
 
Hand-grenades
8cm mortar shells
light inf. rounds
heavy inf. rounds
light field how. 16
light field how. 18
heavy field how. 18
10cm guns
30% of complement
20% of complement
8% of complement
12% of complement
60% of complement
30% of complement
25% of complement
12% of complement

Armour-piercing ammunition approx. 30 - 40%.
Hand-grenades only meagre stocks.
Tracer and signal ammunition only very meagre stocks.
3rd Inf.Div. (mot), 60th Inf.Div (mot) and 94th Inf.Div, latter as of 22.11.
stand at:

light field how.            60%
heavy field how.         50%
heavy inf. rounds        25%
light inf. rounds           40%

Daily ammunition requirements of the corps (based on defensive combat to
date):

(a) 400 t in case of lighter combat (50 t per div.) = 200 Ju
(b) 800 t in case of heavy combat (100 t per div.) = 400 Ju

2. Fuel situation

Exact reports from the div. not obtainable.
Stocks as good as exhausted.

The most urgent driving to bring up supplies, deployment of anti-tank troops,
field guns, only possible for a short while longer,
Daily requirements of the corps under extreme economies:
80cbm (10 cbm per div.) = 40 Ju

3. Food situation
On average the div. dispose of:
7 full days soft food
4 full days bread
3.5 days flour

We must assume, however, that bakery operations have ceased because the mass
of the bakery company is deployed in the Karpovka valley.

Daily requirements of the corps (on half rations)

80 tons soft food = 40 Ju
70 tons tinned food = 35 Ju

Assuming half-rations, the supply of the corps will require in total :

(a) in case of lighter combat : 598 tons of supplies = 295 Ju
(b) in case of heavy combat : 990 tons of supplies = 495 Ju

Signed for the Commander of the Corps