Paulus and Stalingrad; the names are always linked,
the German commander who suffered
one of the greatest military defeats in history
and the hitherto unknown Russian city where that
defeat took place.
Friedrich Paulus was born in 1890, in that narrow
window of time which brought him to the
First World War as a junior officer and to the
Second as a general. His birthplace was
Breitenau, a little country town deep in Hesse.
His ancestors were of basic country stock
but some became minor public servants; Paulus's
father was the cashier of an approved
school. He inherited good health, a fine physique
and a noble bearing from those forebears
but he was far from being a 'von' a prefix frequently
but mistakenly attributed to him. He
soon suffered from his lack of social status.
After performing well at school, he applied for
a cadetship in the Imperial Navy but was refused.
Disappointed, he turned to the study of law
at Marburg University but was quickly released
from this when the German Army started to
expand in 1910 and to widen the social spectrum
from which new officers came. He was
accepted as an officer cadet by a provincial
unit, the IIIth infantry Regiment, a unit which also
carried the earlier title of 'Markgraf Ludwig's
3rd Baden Regiment'. Within two years, he
was a lieutenant and it was then that he met
his future wife, Elena Rosetti-Solescu, a beautiful
young woman one year his senior, from a wealthy
and aristocratic Romanian family. Her two
brothers were serving in Paulus's regiment and
it was through them that Paulus met his bride
while all were on leave together in the Black
Forest. Their first child, a daughter, was born
in 1914, the year in which Paulus went off to
war.
The IIIth Infantry Regiment was part of the 28th
Infantry Division, 14th Corps, 7th Army.
The 7th Army was not part of the great drive
through Belgium of the Schlieffen Plan but
performed the more mundane task of pushing out
from the Rhine through the Vosges to
confront the right-flank French forces on the
frontier and hold them there by steady action
to prevent the French high command transferring
forces to their threatened left flank. The
French, in turn, had their own plan for a violent
general offensive in Lorraine, and there
followed the 'Battles of the Frontier' in which
the French attacks were cut to ribbons.
Paulus's position at this time was Adjutant of
his regiment's 3rd Battalion. In October
1914, after the Battle of the Marne, and the
extension of the Western Front towards the
coast, the Army found itself north of Arras where
the four-year-long trench warfare was
beginning. Paulus's regiment may have been in
action against British troops on the
Vermelles sector in late October but the sources
are conflicting and it may be that the French
were his only opponents in this hectic opening
phase.
Paulus had to leave the front in November because
of illness and he never returned to his
first regiment. His next posting was as Regimental
Staff Officer to a much more prestigious
unit, the 2nd Prussian Jager Regiment. This was
part of the Alpenkorps, a formation roughly
the strength of an enlarged division, which was
not normally used for routine trench holding
but was reserved for fighting in mountainous
country or for use as shock troops. Paulus
remained with the Alpenkorps for the remainder
of the war, moving to the corps
headquarters in 1917 and carrying out staff duties
throughout. He never commanded any
unit of any size at any time in the war.
The Alpenkorps served in Romania and Macedonia
in 1915 and early 1916 but in June of
that year was flung into violent action in the
later stages of the Battle of Verdun, making a
particularly successful advance against the village
at Fleury. The Alpenkorps took 2,000
French prisoners but two-thirds of its own strength
of 12,000 men became casualties during
this period. The corps remained on sectors facing
the French until May 1917 until withdrawn
for a rest. The next major action was during
the series of great German offensives in the
spring of 1918. On 9 April, the Alpenkorps took
part in the attack on the mainly British
sector on the Lys. After a further rest in Belgium,
the corps was back in action, in defence
this time, against the British counter-offensive
on the Somme which started on 8 August.
The corps had to be withdrawn after a particularly
hard fight at Epehy and spent the final
weeks of the war in Serbia.
The Armistice found Paulus holding the rank of
captain and with only the routine decorations
of the Iron Cross Classes I and II. Little is
known of the next few years, except that he
managed to stay in the small post-war army which
the Allies allowed Germany to retain.
He served a two-year spell as a rifle company
commander in the 13th Infantry Regiment
at Stuttgart (the commander of the Machine-Gun
Company was Captain Erwin Rommel)
but Paulus spent much more time on Staff duties
than with troops.
It was already clear that he lacked the qualities
of command. After one exercise in which he
did have to command a regiment, the directing
staff reported: 'This officer lacks decisiveness.
A personal report from his commanding officer
at this period gives an exceptionally clear,
and even prophetic, appreciation of Paulus's
personality and talents:
A typical Staff officer of the old school. Tall,
and in outward appearance painstakingly well
groomed. Modest, perhaps too modest, amiable,
with extremely courteous manners, and
a good comrade, anxious not to offend anyone.
Exceptionally talented and interested in
military matters, and a meticulous desk worker,
with a passion for war-games and
formulating plans on the map-board or sand-table.
At this he displays considerable talent,
considering every decision at length and with
careful deliberation before giving the appro-
priate orders.
His career in the 1930's took him increasingly
into the realm of mechanized forces. He
commanded one of the earliest motorized battalions
in 1934 and in the following year became
Chief of Staff at the new Panzer Headquarters
in Berlin. He adapted well to the new ideas
coming forward about mobile warfare. He was no
fervent Nazi and had nothing to do with
the formation of the Party or its coming to power.
But, coming from the middle class himself,
he probably approved of Hitler's 'man-of-the-people'
background, his spurning of the old,
rigid aristocratic class, and the policies which
brought work and prosperity toGermany and
new life to the Army.
Paulus's rise continued. He was a major-general
in 1939 and held the position of Chief of
Staff in the newly formed 10th Army at Leipzig
on the eve of the attack on Poland.
Paulus was to spend exactly one year in his new
position. His army commander was General
Walther von Reichenau, a blunt, forceful, ambitious
man and a very able battlefield commander.
Culturally, Paulus had little in common with
his chief but, professionally, they were a near
perfect combination. Reichenau hated routine
work, preferring to be out with his forward units.
Paulus kept all routine matters running smoothly.
The 10 th Army was soon renumbered,
and as 6th Army built a fine reputation for itself.
It swept through Poland without great difficulty
and was then transferred to the west for the
great 1940 offensive. On 10 May, the three corps
under command advanced across the narrow neck
of lower Holland and on into Belgium.
Little opposition was met until the British Expeditionary
Force was encountered on the line of
the River Dyle. Thereafter it was harder fighting,
pushing the British back all the way to the
outskirts of Dunkirk. The high point for Paulus
was his presence when Reichenau and King
Leopold signed the terms of surrender of the
Belgian Army on 28 May.
The 6th Army was not required for further operations
before France capitulated three weeks
later. It became part of the force earmarked
for Operation Sealion, the invasion of southern
England. The 6th Army's role was to embark at
Le Havre and form the left flank of the
landing, in the Brighton-Worthing area. Paulus
prepared the plans and there was a rehearsal
at St. Malo in mid-August. But this part of the
invasion entailed the longest sea crossing and,
as there were insufficient landing craft available,
6th Army's part in the operation was cancelled.
Paulus now received a new posting and became Deputy
Chief of Staff and Chief of the
Operations Section at Oberkommando des Heeres
(OKH, the headquarters directing all
operations of the German Army); a considerable
advancement for Paulus. OKH was at
Fountainebleau when Paulus joined on 3 September
1940 but soon moved to Zossen near
Berlin when the plans to invade England were
abandoned completely.
Paulus was immediately given the task of preparing
outline plans lor a venture which would lead to his own fate and that of
Germany. Hitler ordered plans to be prepared for an invasion of
Russia the following spring. Paulus was one of
the first to be involved in that mammoth project.
He impressed Halder, the Chief of the General
Staff, as businesslike and intellectually sharp.
The fact that Russia was a nation with which
Germany still had a non-aggression pact and with
which Germany had shared the conquest of Poland
does not seem to have troubled Paulus and
there is no record of his advancing any moral
or military objection. His wife realized on what
project he was working; she had earlier declared
her view on the immorality of invading
Poland and now expressed the same view about
the Russian venture. Paulus told her he had no say in the matter; it was
purely a political matter and he, as a soldier, must obey his orders. It
was the standard response of the professional
officer.
All that winter Paulus and his Staff laboured
on the planning for Operation Barbarossa. The
objective was the swift destruction of the Russia
Army which stood between Poland and
Moscow. Three Army Groups would carry out the
attack. The main thrust would be against
Moscow, 600 miles away. The two flanking Army
Groups were to capture Leningrad in the
norrh and the Ukraine in the south. Paulus's
old 6th Army, still under Reicheneau be part of
von Rundstedt's Army Group South. Once Hitler
had confirmed his decision to invade Russia
and active preparations commenced, the planning
phase Paulus's work eased. Paulus was
sent to see Rommel in North Africa at the end
of April 1941 and remained there for more than
two weeks He observed an attack on the besieged
British garrison at Tobruk, which failed and
both studied Rommel's style of command and consulted
with him on future plans. Paulus
returned to OKH reporting that Rommel was too
headstrong and that, unless curbed, would
require further reinforcement and thus imperil
the coming Russian operation. Paulus toyed with
the idea of asking for a field command now that
the plans for Barbarossa were almost complete.
He is believed to have considered advising Rommel's
replacement by himself but his wife
warned him against it, saying that his career
would not prosper in North Africa.
The invasion of Russia began on 22 June 1941 with
dramatic advances by the German mobile
columns. It was the start of a quieter time for
Paulus, for OKH was not planning any further
major operations elsewhere. Barbarossa, it was
hoped, would bring the war to a close. Paulus
watched with particular interest the progress
of the 6th Army. It took part in the great battle
which led to the capture of over half a million
Russians at Kiev. He and his old army commander, Reichenau, exchanged letters.
Reichenau was obviously in his element, often up with the head of his leading
unit. In August, Paulus was sent on a tour of the various headquarters
in Russia, to assess on behalf of OKH the competing claims for resources
by the commanders.
Paulus's career took an abrupt change of direction
early in December. Barbarossa had ground
to a halt in the conditions of the Russian winter.
Moscow and Leningrad held out, and Army
Group South had not reached the Caucasus. Its
commander, Field-Marshal von Rundstedt,
wanted to withdraw to a shorter line from which
to see out the winter, but Hitler refused
permission. Rundstedt resigned and Reichenau
was promoted to fill the vacancy. Reichenau
asked that his old colleague, Paulus, should
become the new commander of the 6th Army,
rather than one of the experienced front-line
corps commanders. Hitler and Halder, Chief of
the General Staff and Paulus's direct superior,
agreed and, on 5 January 1942, the man who
had commanded a rifle company for two years in
peacetime and then, briefly, a battalion but
had never commanded any unit in war, was given
the direct responsibility for an army of more
than a quarter of a million men. It was a fatefully
ill-judged appointment. Even before Paulus
reached his headquarters, his old commander and
patron, Reichenau, the Commander-in-
Chief, Army Group South, suffered a heart attack
and was replaced by Field-Marshal von
Bock, who took command of the Army Group on the
same day that Paulus reached his own
new headquarters.
The new commanders found a depressing situation.
Their troops, ill prepared for a Russian
winter, were under fierce attack from a reinvigorated
Russian Army. The plans which Paulus
had prepared for Barbarossa had not envisaged
such a situation. Hitler ordered that no
further withdrawals should take place. Von Bock
passed the orders on to his army
commanders. Paulus fought a conventional defensive
battle but he made a shaky start.
Von Bock judged that he did not handle a Russian
attack at Kharkov well, with not enough
vigour being displayed. Von Bock persuaded OKH
to replace Paulus's Chief of Staff and a
new man, Major-General Arthur Schmidt, arrived;
he was a staunch Nazi who would be
Paulus's Chief of Staff until the end.
But Kharkov was held and it was the Russians who
sustained the greater loss when their final
attack was beaten off in May. Paulus was awarded
the Knight's Cross and received
favourable publicity at home. The weather improved
and great plans were afoot for the
resumption of the German advance in the coming
summer. Paulus's son, Ernst, a junior tank
officer, was wounded at Kharkov and returned
to Germany for hospital treatment; he would
thus be absent when the 6th Army marched forward
again and would so survive the war.
A second son, Friedrich, would be killed in February
1944 at the Anzio beachhead in Italy.
The plans for the summer of 1942 were of the utmost
importance and their results represent
the watershed between Germany's years of victory
and of defeat. This period also marked the
removal from influence at the highest level of
the 'old guard' of professional German
commanders and their replacement by generals
more compliant to Hitler, and the advent of
Hitler himself to direct command of Army operations.
It was a time when the last remnants
of common sense gave way to crass over-optimism.
The old Barbarossa plan of 1941 was abandoned;
there were not enough troops remaining
after the winter losses to press ahead on all
fronts. The destruction of the Red Army remained
the only realistic hope and the South, the least
important of the 1941 sectors, was where
attention turned. Several variations of plan
were considered but Plan Blue eventually emerged.
After clearing its existing positions to secure
a more favourable jumpmg-off line, Army Group
South was to be split into two parts. Army Group
A under Field-Marshal List was to push
south-eastwards to encircle the Russian forces
near Rostov and then thrust on to capture the
Caucasus oilfields. Army Group B, whose main
component was Paulus's 6th Army, was to
push due east as far as the River Volga at Stalingrad
but not to capture that city, in order to
prevent Russian reserves moving into the Caucasus.
Field-Marshal von Bock objected to
the splitting-up of Army Group South and was
sacked for his pains; General von Weichs
took his place in command of Army Group B. Hitler
and his advisers still believed that the
hitherto irresistible Wehrmacht could destroy
all before it; the Russian defence of Moscow
during the past winter together with the results
of the more recent Battle of Kharkov were
believed to have been so costly that the Russian
Army was a spent force. The 6th Army
moved forward on 28 June 1942. It was the largest
German army on the Eastern Front with
5 corps (one of them Panzer) containing 14 divisions,
2 infantry, 2 panzer and 1 motorized.
It had 350 miles to go to Stalingrad. Initially
all went well. The Russian front line was swept
away and the panzers sped across the steppe,
pausing only to wait for fuel convoys to catch
up. The infantry trudged behind. The Russians
mostly melted away and avoided a stand;
Paulus's attempt to encircle them only succeeded
once when, after a three-day battle on the
River Don, 40.000 Russians were taken prisoner.
It was hot, wearying work. Paulus caught
dysentry but performed his duties efficiently.
There were constant anxieties about supplies
and about the huge, exposed left flank which
was opening up with every mile of the advance.
Hitler now changed the plans, strengthening the
northern drive towards Stalingrad and
enlarging its objectives. The 4th Panzer Army
was diverted from the Caucasus drive and sent
north towards Stalingrad with orders to join
with Paulus's 6th Army, and actually capture the
city of Stalingrad, not merely cut the Russian
communications by driving to the River Volga.
Hitler wished to deprive the Russians of the
large tank factory at Stalingrad and also to gain
the psychological victory of taking the city
which bore the name of the adversary who had
denied him the capture of Moscow the previous
summer. In this way Paulus and his army
were sucked into the Stalingrad graveyard.
Having crossed the River Don on 21 August, Paulus
set off on the last 60 miles to Stalingrad.
Two days later, his 14th Panzer Corps reached
the Volga, north of the city. But the infantry
was still straggling behind and the tanks were
short of fuel. The Panzer Corps commander
believed that he was in danger and sought permission
to withdraw; he was isolated at the
point of a long corridor far deeper into Russia
than any German had ventured, even in 1941.
Paulus sacked the Corps commander and ordered
the divisional commander who replaced
him to stand on the Volga, where support soon
reached him. A few days later, the head of
General Hoth's Panzer Army, diverted from the
Caucasus offensive, came up from the south
and reached the Volga south of the city. The
two armies met on 3 September and the
Russians in Stalingrad were 'encircled', with
the Germans on their front and flanks and the
wide River Volga behind.
Hitler's determination to take Stalingrad was
matched by that of the Russian High Command
to hold the city. Stalin ordered that the civilians
should not be evacuated. Soldiers and civilians
alike prepared the city for defence. Marshal
Zhukov, the best of Stalin's commanders, and his
Staff moved down from the Moscow front. The local
party chairman was Nikita Khrushchev,
who would one day become the leader of all Russia.
The decisive battle of the Second World
War was about to take place with Paulus at the
centre of the stage. He was the senior of the
two Army commanders present and would thus be
in overall command on the Stalingrad front
from first to last.
He attacked on 21 August, as soon as his army
had been concentrated, a straightforward
offensive on all sectors. Every German bomber
available was sent to raid the city on the night
of 23 August, some crews making three sorties.
Unopposed, the Luftwaffe bombed Stalingrad
from end to end. The Russians would turn many
of the ruins into little fortresses. Nine
German infantry divisions then attacked in the
centre, with 5 panzer and 4 motorized divisions
on the flanks. The Russians stood and fought,
and the city held. Two days later, Hitler repeated his orders: Stalingrad
must be taken.
September was an important month for the whole
German Army, with the drain of senior
officers who had challenged Hitler's policies
continuing. Field Marshal List, the commander of
Army Group A, fighting in the Caucasus far to
the south of Stalingrad, was anxious about the
failure to capture the summer's objectives and
the lateness of the season. He was sacked.
On 12 September Paulus flew out of Stalingrad,
met up with his own Army Group
commander, von Weichs, and the two went to Hitler
and pointed out the long, exposed
northern flank of Paulus's command, the long
lines of communications, and the lack of
reserves and reinforcements for Stalingrad. The
two generals were not as forceful in
expressing their views as List, were apparently
satisfied by Hitler's promises of support and his
belief that the Russians were nearly finished,
and they returned to the front. Later in the month,
Halder, Chief of Staff at OKH, also urged Hitler
to respond to the seriousness of the
situation in southern Russia. But Hitler refused
to listen and Halder, too, was sacked. His
replacement, General Zeitzler, was never allowed
the influence of Halder; Hitler had, in effect,
now taken over direct control of operations.
He was as determined as ever to press on with
the capture of Stalingrad despite all the warnings
of the professionals.
Back at Stalingrad, Paulus was finding that the
capture of the city was turning out to be a long
and costly affair, and winter was approaching.
He wished to halt his offensive, and withdraw
14th Panzer Corps to form a reserve. But Hitler
insisted that 6th Army must employ all its s
trength to take Stalingrad. Paulus made no further
protest but got on with the task at
Stalingrad. Would Hitler have listened if the
general had been less courteous, modest and
intellectual and more of a Reichenau or Rommel?
No one can say. It is certain that there
was now no one around Hitler powerful enough
to persuade him to call off the offensive.
Paulus's nominal strength was actually increased
at this time. Two formations of Romanian
troops - the 3rd and 4th Armies - were sent up
to hold the static fronts on either side of
Stalingrad, releasing German troops to fight
in the city. A new 'Romanian-German Army
Group' was envisaged to include the Romanian
troops and the German 4th Panzer and
6th Armies. Paulus himself was actually being
considered for a new Staff position in Berlin
at this time but, because of his Romanian wife
and relatives, was kept at the front,
earmarked to be Deputy Commander of the new grouping
which, in the outcome, never
came into existence. Another possible release
route for Paulus was his own health he was
suffering continuing dysentery and a general
rundown in health. He was urged to take sick
leave in Germany but refused.
The attacks on Stalingrad continued. A major offensive
had started on 13 September, Paulus
ordering that the city be cut in two by a drive
through the centre to the river bank. This was
successful but suffered heavy casualties. Professional
historians later judged that it would
have been better to attack from either flank
and advance up the bank of the Volga, cutting
of the Russians in the city from their nightly
flow of supplies across the river. Two panzer
corps commanders protested at the way their tanks
were being used in the city and added
their voices to the warnings of the general danger
of the situation. Paulus sacked them. The
fighting became vicious; it has often been described
as an urban version of Verdun. It was
close-quarter, room-to-room, cellar-to-cellar,
ruin-to-ruin fighting. Paulus's units wasted
away at the rate of 20,000 casualties a week.
By the end of October, only one tenth of
Stalingrad still held out, in the north of the
city. But the balance of strength was changing;
the earlier German superiority had gone. Stalingrad
was the first priority for Russian reserves.
Sufficient Russian troops were fed into the city
to keep the fight going there, but the
remainder were placed as secretly as possible
well to the north and south for a planned
counter-stroke. Paulus received a mere five battalions
of assault pioneers, flown in as
street-fighting specialists. At the end of October
Paulus warned Army Group B that the
Russians were gathering on his flanks, and Hitler
was informed. In early November, the
winter came. In the middle of the month. Hitler
sent Paulus a message urging one last effort
to complete the capture of Stalingrad.
On 19 November, the Russians struck (operation
Uranus). The attacks fell on weakly held
sectors north and south of the city, manned mainly
by Romanian forces in the north and by
a mixture of further Romanians and units of the
4th Panzer Army in the south. The Russian
plan was a simple one, to encircle all of the
German forces in the Stalingrad area. They
soon broke through the thin defences, particularly
in the north. Even the lowest private in
the German Army could see that the 6th Army at
Stalingrad was in serious danger. It was
the vital moment. Decisive action now could have
saved the situation. If Paulus had acted
boldly, sending some units north and south to
hold the Russians while withdrawing the bulk
of his force from the ruins of Stalingrad, then
much of his army would have been saved.
He should have acted quickly by giving his orders
and then either sent Hitler a signal,
'In anticipation of your approval, I have ...',
or he could have flown out to demand either that
his action be sanctioned or that he be allowed
to resign. Slow to comprehend the danger,
Paulus did nothing. On the third day of the Russian
offensive, Zeitzler formally advised Hitler
that Paulus should be given orders to withdraw.
While Hitler was making up his mind,
Göring, through Jeschonnek, his Chief of
Staff, promised that the Luftwaffe could keep
Paulus supplied. Hitler accepted Göring's
assurance, not that of his senior army adviser.
He ordered Paulus and his men to remain in Stalingrad
as a forward 'fortress' until the
following spring. Zeitzler informed Paulus of
the decision that day and Hitler followed with
a personal order on 22 November, the fourth day
of the crisis.
The Russians closed the ring on 23 November and
Paulus found himself cut off, with the
entire strength of his own 6th Army that had
survived the fighting in Stalingrad and also with
part of Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and the remnants
of some of the Romanian divisions from
the flanks. Also present were a mass of supply
and rear echelons, a Luftwaffe FLAK
division and two airfield organizations, a complete
fighter Gruppe, part of a Stuka Gruppe
and other air units. There were between 250,000
and 300,000 men in an area nearly
30 miles long by 20 miles wide, with its front
still in Stalingrad but most of its rear out on
the open steppe.
Paulus was now prodded by subordinate generals
into radioing Hitler for complete freedom
of action. Hitler replied on 24. November with
a Führer order: 'Create a pocket. Present
Volga front and present northern front to be
held at all costs. Supplies coming by air.' This
was to prove ultimately the death sentence of
the 6th Army. The only officer at Stalingrad
to show any independence of action was General
von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, the most senior
of the corps commanders, who urged Paulus, in
a memorandum, to withdraw without delay
before escape became impossible: 'The complete
annihilation of 200,000 fighting men and
their entire equipment is at stake. There is
no other choice. But Paulus, ever obedient to
superiors, refused to listen to him.
After closing the ring, the Russians almost ignored
the Stalingrad pocket, concentrating on
pushing the German forces in the Don bend back
as far as possible in order to increase the
gap between Paulus and any relief force.
The rest was slow descent into catastrophe. The
Luftwaffe never achieved a sufficient rate of
supply, with the result that Paulus's force steadily
declined in its ability to defend itself, let
alone break out. Field-Marshal von Manstein was
appointed to yet another new Army Group,
Army Group Don, with orders from Hitler to link
up again with Paulus, but it was nearly a
month before this effort could begin, on 12 December
1942. Von Manstein sent an emissary
by air to urge Paulus to do all he could to attempt
a break-out and meet the relief force. All
day the arguments revolved in Paulus's headquarters,
with Russian shells landing nearby. It
was the last chance for Paulus. In the end, as
ever the intellectual Staff officer rather than the
ruthless man of action, he refused to move, quoting
Hitler's orders that thepresent positions at
Stalingrad should be held. Von Manstein's valiant
offensive petered out and all hope was gone
by Christmas.
The Russians were ready to deal with Stalingrad
by 8 January 1943- They sent Paulus an
ultimatum, offering the alternative of honourable
surrender or complete annihilation. No guns
fired on 9 January while the terms were considered.
It is assumed that Paulus consulted Hitler;
there was a direct radio link. Paulus refused
to
surrender, once again following his orders to
the letter without any regard to local conditions.
The Russians attacked the next day. The final
agony of Paulus's troops lasted for three weeks.
The Russians advanced from west to east,
pressing the Germans back into the city. They
captured half of the pocket in the first week
and then again paused to demand surrender. Again
Paulus refused. By the end of the month,
it was nearly all over. Stalingrad was cut into
isolated German positions. The defenders,
particularly the German troops, fought fiercely
despite the appalling privations. The last
wounded were evacuated by air on 24. January.
Even Hitler must have realized by now that there
was no hope. He awarded Paulus the
Oakleaves grade of Knight's Cross on 15 January
and then promotedPaulus to Field-Marshal.
Knowing that no German soldier of that rank had
ever surrendered, he expected Paulus to
commit suicide after a last stand. On 31 January,
Russian troops reached the building in
which Paulus had his headquarters. A young Russian
officer entered and demanded, on
behalf of his superiors, that the Germans surrender.
After much parleying with Paulus's
staff, the Russian was finally led to Paulus,
who was lying listlessly on a bed. Through an
interpreter, the Russian demanded the surrender.
Paulus merely nodded. The newsreel film
of Paulus signing the surrender shows a haggard,
anxious man at the end of his tether.
A few units held out until 3 February but then
it was all over. Of the original garrison, 42,000,
mostly wounded, had been evacuated by air. The
Russians counted 107,800 prisoners 16,800
in the fighting and 91,000 in the final surrender.
There were twenty-four generals among them.
The number of Germans quoted as killed varies
between 72,000 and 100.000. The great
mass of prisoners suffered unspeakable misery
and privation. Only 6,000 ever returned home,
several years after the war.
The unrelenting Russians held Paulus for nearly
eleven years. He was kept under what might
be termed 'close house arrest' in Moscow and
was not harshly treated, although he was
subjected to the same pressure as was exerted
on all of the captured generals to form a
movement renouncing Hitler. Paulus held firm
against this until after the July 1944 bomb plot,
when he finally gave is support to the movement.
Hitler was furious that the most senior
German officer in captivity should turn on him
in this way. Paulus's wife was urged to renounce
his name; she refused. His surviving son was
detained but survived the war.
Paulus never saw his wife again; she died in West
Germany in 1949. Paulus was released in
November 1953, but only to residence in communist
East Germany at Dresden. Two years
later he contracted amyelstrophic lateral sclerosis
(motor neuron disease) and he died in a
Dresden clinic on 1 February 1957 at the age
of sixty-seven.
History gives a simple and unkind verdict on Friedrich
Paulus: gifted Staff officer, uninspired
commander, an unquestioning general of the 'orders-are-orders'
type. He was a man who
enjoyed the intellectual aspects of the profession
of war; he never questioned Nazism and
was willing to do almost anything ordered by
Hitler. Finally, when the fate of a quarter of a
million men rested in his hands, he 'froze' and
did little but let events take their course to the
complete destruction of his army and the miserable
deaths of most of his soldiers.
Source : Hitler's Generals by Correlli Barnett |