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Gunners who have read the history of the Regiment know that in 1870 Britain reverted from RBL Ordnance to RML, a step now regarded as retrograde. Military historians on the whole attribute the dumping of the RBL guns to failure of the breech mechanisms. The question therefore arises, why were the faults not detected and rectified during the extensive trials the guns underwent before acceptance by the Ordnance Select committee responsible? After all, the Committee were said to have been greatly impressed by their service. First, it must be remembered that during the trials the guns were manned and maintained by detachments trained by the makers. Trouble began after they were issued to units and/or ships. We shall therefore examine the conditions then prevailing in the services.
During the 1860s 60% of the rank and file were illiterate. Also, to the majority the working of even the simplest mechanical device was incomprehensible. Many of the NCOs were little better - and they did most if not all the instructing. Officers rarely instructed anyone. Many were prejudiced against breech-loading - or against any other 'new-fangled idea' for that matter, especially if invented by a civilian such as Armstrong. 'What was good enough for Grandfather is good enough for me', seemed to be the general attitude. The so-called 'scientific education' they received at Woolwich should have warned them to explain technicalities peculiar to the new guns to the NCOs so they could pass the information on to the Gunners, but evidently they failed to do so. They complained bitterly at having to re-write the Gun Drill '... because the gun loaded at the wrong end ...'. They went on to complain that '... the guns were so complicated that the ignorant Gunners would never, ever, learn how to handle them.' And it seems few made any attempt to teach them.
In China, where the first 12-prs saw action in 1860, the guns were said to have performed well, but a certain Battery Commander complained that after a week's wet weather the breech screws became so stiff with rust that the rate of fire suffered. Apparently the 'scientific education' received at Woolwich did not mention that iron went rusty in the rain if not dried and oiled. Obviously he had neglected to see that his Gunners were trained in basic maintenance - or worse, that his NCOs were not 'on the ball'.
The few faults that came to light early in the service of the Armstrongs were soon remedied. For example, occasional stripping of the lead sheath from projectiles when fired was cured by galvanising them before applying the lead. Of course the media avidly seized upon this complaint with loud condemnation of '... guns which were a menace to our own troops from pieces of flying metal ...' They did not explain to readers that soldiers were in no danger from guns at peace-time practice.
Early wrought iron vent pieces sometimes gave trouble but were soon replaced by steel types which stood the strain better, and each gun carried a spare. The so-called failure of vent pieces, loudly trumpeted by the media, was invariably traced to bad drill, eg the No 2 not tightening the breech screw sufficiently - or by the No 1 not ensuring he did so by checking the indicator provided for the purpose. Of the 570 12-prs issued to RA units only 13 were ever returned to workshops for repair. Of these three were condemned while the rest were repaired at little cost. They gave excellent service in this country.
Admittedly Armstrong breech mechanisms were crude by modern standards, but they worked reasonably well if properly maintained. The chamber and vent piece ring had to be kept scrupulously clean at all times; the slightest bit of dirt on either meant trouble. Also, wear had to be kept within strictly defined limits, a point not always brought home to the old-time artificers who were primarily blacksmiths, and who did not appreciate its importance. Thus faults lay more with the people responsible for the guns than with the guns themselves.
Although Armstrong himself stated he did not believe his system suitable for guns heavier than field, so anxious were the Navy to re-equip they ordered 100 110-pr (7-inch) RBL guns without any trials of a prototype! Then when they found the heavy vent pieces extremely difficult to handle in a rough sea, they howled for the return of their old SBML 68-prs! Public confidence in Armstrong equipments declined as the media took few pains to distinguish between fact and fiction in their coverage of complaints. Prejudice raised its ugly head, MPs got into the act, questions were asked in the House, and the inevitable enquiry ensued.
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WL Ruffell Issue 98 June 1998 |
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