The Armstrong Gun

Part 3: Action in Taranaki

The year 1860 saw the start of the first Taranaki War and the despatch of more British troops to New Zealand. Among them was 'C' Field Battery, 4 Brigade RA (1), equipped with six RBL 12-pounders and commanded by Capt Henry Mercer RA (2).

The performance of smoothbore artillery against the skillfully evolved Maori fortification system encountered during the 1845-46 campaign had not been impressive. Ohaewai's palisades had withstood at point-blank range (3) not only field guns but even a ship's 32-pr. At Ruapekapeka a much more imposing array of ordnance - three naval 32-prs, an 18-pr, two 12-pr howitzers, a 6-pr gun, plus four mortars and two rockets managed to make a breach, but only after bombardment lasting the best part of a day. Thus the arrival of the new rifled guns was awaited with great interest.

On 13 March 1861 the Battery arrived in Auckland in the ship 'Norwood' with their guns and associated stores and a quantity of ammunition and other equipment including two 10-in and two 8-in mortars. Total cargo amounted to 700 tons. The ship could not discharge at the wharf, probably because she carried ammunition, but had to anchor some distance out in the harbour and be discharged by a lighter. Despite all the double handling involved the task was completed by the gunners in a week, very good going under the circumstances. The unusual enthusiasm for such unpopular work was due to the fear that the war might be over before they could fire a shot. Even the officers assisted!

On 12 March half the battery plus the mortars embarked on the colonial war steamer 'Victoria' bound for Taranaki where operations against Hapurona then entrenched at Te Arei had already been dragging on for some weeks. Lt Hunter RA was left behind with the rest of the battery to await the arrival of Capt. Watson RA from Australia with 180 horses.

Capt Mercer's party arrived at the Waitara River on the morning of the 13th March. All stores and equipment were landed in surf boats without loss. That same afternoon the Armstrong guns were taken out of their packing cases, cleaned and assembled. The ammunition was examined and everything pronounced complete and in good order.

In the meantime Maj Gen Sir T.S Pratt, whose famous long sap (4) was then being dug, directed Capt Mercer to select a suitable gun area the next day. While Mercer was carrying out his reconnaissance Lt Pickard RA (5) had the men do gun drill to refresh their memories after the long voyage from England. At the same time the artificers were put to work making poles for bullock draught pending the arrival of the horses.

The three guns moved out at 0600 hours on Friday 15 Mar and came into action at No 7 Redoubt, one of the eight built to guard the sap, about 800 yards (732m) from Te Arei. Gun platforms were carefully levelled, planks being placed under wheels and trails to prevent their digging in and to ensure accurate laying.

Accompanied by Lt E.C. McNaghten RA (6), Capt Mercer went to the forward infantry positions in order to study the enemy works at close quarters. Fortunately a three-day truce requested by Wiremu Tamehana was then in progress so he was able to make detailed observations unmolested! Te Arei was not the usual heavily palisaded pa, there being some open picketing but no heavily-timbered stockade. The Maori were entrenched in lines of rifle pits sited along the crests of the surrounding hills, the whole position forming a curve about 2000 yards (1821 m) in length. Patches of scrub and stunted bush afforded ample cover of which good use had been made. Rarely did they show themselves.

To the newly-arrived officer the situation was extraordinary for he found himself facing the enemy with apparently nothing for artillery to fire at. His first reaction was one of disappointment; obviously he could not lay on a spectacular smashing of timbers and a breach through which the cheering 'forlorn hope' (7) could charge to death or glory in the time-honoured Victorian fashion. Yet among the troops the power of the Armstrongs had grown with the telling; many of the soldiers being uneducated and totally ignorant of artillery matters believed a few shells would makc Te Arei disappear in a flash and a cloud of dust, and were waiting expectantly for this to happen. All eyes were on Mercer and he was not sure what he had to do. To his credit he admitted as much to men 'on the spot' and asked them what they knew of Maori defensive works and methods of manning them. The old hands said he would see plenty of action when the truce ended!

They then went on to say that the rua, as the Maori called his rifle pits, were constructed to provide overhead cover from the spherical shell hitherto fired at them. First a narrow trench was made, then on the side nearer the pakeha, it was dug out somewhat in the shape of a shoe, the earth so removed being thrown to the top rear upon rough wooden beams placed there to support it. The Maori only showed themselves to deliver their fire - they then smartly retired inside the rua. From the description of the dugouts Mercer estimated that shell fitted with time and concussion fuzes (8) fired three or four feet (about 1m) below the top of the excavated earth would penetrate the pits and burst inside. He then returned to the gun position to put his ideas into effect.

In the meantime the truce had ended and firing resumed on both sides. As his instructors had promised Capt Mercer now saw plenty of targets; puffs of powder smoke soon enabled him to pinpoint the enemy positions. He ranged (9) on to each strongpoint in turn after which he ordered the guns to be loaded and left laid on selected points. An officer watching through glasses ordered fire to be brought down whenever movement was detected.

Over the next three days the Armstrongs provided support for working parties moving to or from the head of the sap by neutralising (10) enemy fire, and assisted in beating off two attacks on the British right. As may be expected, everyone wanted to 'have a go' at laying and firing the new field pieces but they only rate a mention in surviving records; Lt Pickard and Sergeant Major R. Hayes are reported as having 'made some excellent practice'. Full credit of course must go to the regular layers who were usually Bombardiers or Corporals (11), all those who witnessed the action being greatly impressed with the accuracy of the fire. Early on the morning of the 19th March the Maori capitulated.

Capt Mercer was anxious to ascertain the effect of the 12-pr shellfire at the target for after all the shell is the weapon of the artillery, and made a number of enquiries to this end. Both Colour Sergeant J. Moran RE at the head of the sap and Bombardier T. Singer, No 3 Battery 12 Brigade RA, with the Coehorn mortars (12) observed the success of the fire. Being much closer to the 'sharp end' (13) these NCOs were able to observe the 12-pr shells bursting inside the rifle pits. After the action spokesmen from the Maori side, including Hapurona himself. confirmed the effectiveness of the fire which caused many casualties. Capt Mercer was reported as being 'fully convinced of the decided superiority of rifled ordnance over smooth bored'.

Prior to 15 March the following smooth-bore ordnance had been deployed against Te Arei: two 8-in Naval guns, four 4.4 Coehorn mortars, one 9-pr field gun, and two 24-pr howitzers. With the Armstrongs came four more mortars, two 8-in and two 10-in. The 8-in gun and the mortars fired common shell only, the 9-pr fired shot, case and shrapnel, and the 24-prs common shell, case and shrapnel. When it is remembered the Maori had nothing comparable with which to retaliate the firepower he faced was formidable indeed, but it had failed to dislodge him.

Exploding shells merely made holes in the earth of his overhead cover which could be easily repaired. Fragments rarely penetrated into the rua and caused few casualties. Even the harassing fire (14) at night did not shake him although he found it extremely objectionable - he considered it quite unchivalrous because it upset his repair programme! But the 12-prs sought him out in the very places he thought safe; they were the 'last straw', the ultimate cause of his surrender.

In war, attack demands retaliation. At no time during the New Zealand Wars did the Maori have an artillery arm worth calling such. From time to time he acquired from unscrupulous traders at exorbitant prices a few old ships' guns with little ammunition and still less chance of replenishing it. Furthermore the carriages were useless for mobile operations which meant that when he abandoned a pa he was obliged to abandon his guns also. Their usefulness was therefore negligible.

After Te Arei a number of Maoris stated that if the war was renewed they would resort to ambushes and the shooting of unarmed men to make up for their lack of artillery. They realised that building pas only to have them knocked down by gunfire was a waste of time and energy, that they would achieve more by fighting from the bush where man for man they were better campaigners than the British. Had the chiefs given this appreciation the attention and coordination of effort it deserved the conflict might have ended more to their advantage.

Thus both sides received a lesson in the power of rifled breech-loading field artillery. In Part IV of this article we shall examine other natures of Armstrong gun as employed in New Zealand.

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NOTES

1. Now 94 (New Zealand) Medium Battery RA. Return

2. Henry Mercer entered the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, as a Gentleman Cadet on 19 Nov 1840. He was promoted to lieutenant on 12 Dec 1845, 2nd Captain 23 Feb 52, Capt 15 May 55. He served in the Crimea where he earned the Crimea Medal with Sebastopol Clasp. At Rangiriri on 20 Nov 1863, after an attempt by the main body of the 65th and 14th Regiments to storm the central redoubt failed because the ladders brought were too short, General Cameron ordered the Royal Artillery to attack, a most extraordinary decision to say the least. Capt Mercer led thirty-six of his gunners armed with swords and revolvers to the assault, but they were beaten back also. He was shot through the mouth and died of wounds on 25 Nov 1863. The town of Mercer is named after him. Return

3. First version: A corruption of the French point blanc (white point), with which the centre of early continental targets were marked. The soldier was instructed to aim at this point, and when he hit it he scored a 'point blanc' in the same way as we use the term 'bullseye'. When he could repeatedly hit this point the range was increased, so that 'point blank range' meant one at which the centre of the target was rarely missed. Second version: 'Point blank' or zero on the gunner's quadrant (used for laying the gun for elevation), i.e. point blank range was that achieved with the barrel of the gun horizontal. Return

4. A ditch or trench dug to give troops approaching a defended locality cover from fire. The Engineer rank of Sapper is derived from it. Return

5. Arthur Frederick Pickard entered the RMA as a GC on 7 Aug 1855. He was promoted to Lt on 22 June 58, Capt 28 Sep 71, and Brevet Major on 6 Jan 1872. He won the VC at Rangiriri on 20 Nov 1863 for assisting the wounded (including Capt Mercer), when none of the men could be induced to perform that service, the ground over which they had to work being exposed to a cross-fire. Return

6. Edmund Charles McNaghten entered the RMA as a QC on 10 May 1853, and was promoted Lt on 1 Aug 55. He was killed in action at Te Arei, Taranaki, on 17 Mar 1861, twelve months to the day after he fired the first shot in the Taranaki Wars, while observing the enemy position from a point near the end of Pratt's Long Sap. Return

7. A party of troops directed to make a frontal assault upon a defended work. Return

8. Meant they could be set to burst at any point on the trajectory, or on impact. Return

9. The process of adjusting range for all the variables encountered in gunnery, e.g. wear in gun, wind, air and charge temperatures, barometer, difference in height gun-target etc etc. Today a predicted range is worked out by computer and theoretically the first shot should hit the target. Return

10. The object of neutralising fire is to keep the enemies' heads down and prevent them from firing aimed shots. Our own troops can then carry out a task with a minimum of casualties. Return

11. A Bombardier wore a single chevron, a Corporal two. Nowadays they are Lance Bombardier and Bombardier respectively. Return

12. Invented by Menno, Baron van Coehorn (or Coehorn)(1641 - 1704), a Dutch Army engineer and master of siege warfare. A handy and useful little piece with a range of about 800 yards (732m), it figured prominently in the New Zealand Wars; the NZAC still had two when they were disbanded in 1886. It was still current armament in Gambia and British Honduras as recently as 1924! A New Zealand Coehorn still on its original wooden bed may be seen in the Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum, Waiouru. The calibre refers to the diameter of the shell; the piece was 4.5-in. It was fired at a fixed elevation of 45�, range being altered by varying the propellant charge. Return

13. A soldier's name for the forward defended localities (FDLs) on the battlefield. Return

14. Single rounds usually fired at night at irregular intervals at different targets in the enemy lines. It is designed to deprive him of sleep, keep him on tenterhooks, and thus reduce his fighting efficiency. Return

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