Aircraft Carrier Tactics of World War II
There was a great transformation in aircraft carrier tactics beginning in August 1942. Although naval warfare naturally favors the attack, in just a short time new weapons and technology radically improved the power of the defense. By 1944, US Navy carriers were seriously threatened only by kamikaze human-guided missiles, and even they failed to sink a large American carrier.
Aircraft carriers were first developed in the 1920s. In the years before World War II, there were two main schools of thought about naval aviation. The first was that carrier based planes would scout for the main battleship fleet, soften up the enemy fleet, and spot for the big guns of the battleships. The second theory was that carrier aircraft would destroy everything afloat. (Hughes 88)
When World War II broke out in 1939, little was learned about carrier tactics because Germany and Italy had no carriers to fight with. When the war with Japan started in December 1941, both Japan and the United States had little idea how the war would be fought.
Japanese carriers made air strikes on US bases in late 1941, but it took until 1942 for combat between carriers. In 1942, carrier forces were split so that each carrier was escorted by approximately two cruisers and three destroyers. (Wukovits 39) These escorts surrounded the carrier at a distance in a circular "wagonwheel" formation. If the force needed to change direction, each ship would turn to the proper heading, maintaining the circular formation. This screen of escorts protected the valuable carrier with anti-aircraft fire. It would also fight off any surface ships which reached the task force and protect the carrier from submarine attack. (Hughes 88-90) The ships were manufactured so that their speeds were roughly comparable. A carrier group could travel at about 30 knots.
In 1942, naval aviators believed that an air strike from one carrier could sink two to three enemy carriers. Anti-aircraft defenses were weak. Because of this, carriers were dispersed in the theory that if the enemy could only find one carrier, they could only sink one carrier. Massing all the carriers in one screen would endanger them all unnecessarily. (Hughes 103)
Battleships were still a great danger to the carrier task force. At night, it was impossible for a carrier group to detect a force of battleships. Within the period of one night, a force of battleships could traverse the 200 mile range of aircraft and be within gun range of the carrier task force before morning. (Hughes 105) Even in daylight the threat from battleships was all too real. The decisive battle of Midway could have been very different had the Japanese deployed their numerically superior battleships in the front, and not in the rear, of their naval force.
Carrier based planes were of three types: torpedo bombers, dive bombers, and fighters. Torpedo bombers carried a single torpedo which was dropped and propelled itself toward the target. Dive bombers flew directly over the target, made a steep dive toward the target and released a bomb, then pulled out of the dive. In 1942, the United States used the Devastator torpedo bomber, which was soon replaced by the Avenger torpedo bomber. (Reynolds 145) The Dauntless dive bomber could carry 1,200 pounds of bombs. (Reynolds 79) The Wildcat fighter was inferior to the Japanese Zero fighter. It was slower and had a shorter range. (Reynolds 81) Due to this inferiority, the Americans developed a tactic in which two Wildcats flew in formation. If a Zero followed one of the fighters, the Wildcats weaved in and out so that one fighter could get a crossfire on the Zero. (Reynolds 64-5)
Each carrier had an air wing of 94 planes. Only 25% of these planes were fighters, which intercepted enemy air strikes and escorted the dive bombers and torpedo bombers on strike missions. The remaining 75% of the air wing were dive bombers and torpedo bombers. (Hughes 102) Since attacking the enemy before he attacked you was of such great importance, the carrier force had to locate the enemy by scouting. At the first carrier battle, Coral Sea, scouting was poorly done by both sides. American scouting was conducted by the Dauntless dive bomber. Instead of using valuable space aboard the carriers, the Japanese often used float planes from battlesips.
When the enemy was located, an air strike was usually made. The maximum range for an air strike with dive bombers and torpedo bombers was about 200 miles. These planes were escorted by fighters, but only 25% of a carrier's planes were fighters and some would be retained to protect the fleet. For example, in March 1942 two carriers made a strike on Japanese ships conducting the invasion of New Guinea. The strike was composed of 48 dive bombers, 25 torpedo bombers, and 18 fighters. Fifteen planes were retained to protect the carriers. (Cressman 41) At Coral Sea, two American carriers sent 54 dive bombers, 21 torpedo bombers, and 24 fighters to strike the Japanese fleet. Forty-three planes were lost out of 99 planes, but a Japanese carrier was sunk. The Japanese sank an American carrier with a force of 69 planes. (Wukovits 37) At Midway, three American carriers sank four Japanese carriers at a cost of one carrier. In one instance, an American torpedo bomber force attacked the Japanese without fighter escort and was nearly annihilated, and on the whole casualties were high. In the whole battle, 126 American planes survived out of 233 planes, and no Japanese planes survived out of 272. (Hughes 97) While making attacks, planes often came from the direction of the sun to make anti-aircraft fire less effective.
Early in the war ship losses were also high. In the beginning of 1942, Japan had 10 carriers to America's 4. (Reynolds 63) In August 1942, Japan had 4 carriers to only one American carrier. (Reynolds 121) But by August 1942, carrier warfare began to change. Before the war, the United States had started production of 24 new large Essex carriers, 9 smaller Independence class carriers, and an even greater number of small, slow escort carriers which were used to support ground operations. (Reynolds 132) In 1943, these carriers began to enter service, and due to factors detailed below, none of the new Essex class carriers were sunk. Starting in August 1942, new fast battleships were attached to carrier forces. They were used to bombard shore positions, provide anti-aircraft protection, and were detached at night to protect against the enemy fleet. New cruisers were made that were especially designed as anti-aircraft gun platforms. (Hughes 105)
In 1944, 65% of US Navy air wings were fighters as opposed to 25% in 1942. The Japanese, however, had only 34% fighters. (Hughes 102) New planes also changed carrier warfare. In 1943, the Japanese introduced a new dive bomber, but it could carry only 1,000 pounds of bombs, and in 1944 the Japanese introduced a new torpedo bomber which flew at 300 mph. American improvements were more impressive. In 1943, the US introduced the Helldiver dive bomber, capable of carrying 2,000 pounds of bombs, twice that of the Japanese dive bomber. In 1944, the US introduced the much superior Hellcat fighter with a range of 1,300 miles, much better than the 770 mile range of the Wildcat it replaced. It could also be fitted with bombs and sent on airstrikes when air superiority was assured. Also new was the Corsair fighter-bomber which could reach 417 mph and could be equipped with rockets and bombs to support amphibious operations. (Reynolds 145-9) Perhaps as important, the US Navy had a vast supply of well trained new pilots while the Japanese never adequately replaced their excellent pilots lost early in the war.
In 1944, the Japanese could scout to a range of 560 miles and attack at a range of 400 miles. In comparison, the US Navy could scout out to just 350 miles and attack at 200 miles. (Reynolds 139) Earlier in the war this could have been decisive, but this deficiency was largely negated by increased defensive abilities and technologies, not the least of which was the new invention of radar. Radar had many uses and was vitally important to carrier warfare. At Midway, Japanese lack of radar meant that their carriers were crammed with planes refueling and rearming when the decisive American airstrike arrived, leaving them extremely vulnerable at the worst possible time. In addition to detecting attacking enemy aircraft, radar directed intercepting aircraft and anti-aircraft fire and could find the enemy fleet. (Hughes 116)
Radar was also fitted on 5 inch anti-aircraft shells. These proximity shells exploded when near the target, instead of at a specific set time with previous fuses, vastly improving the effectiveness of the guns. (Hughes 116,132) The Bureau of Ordnance estimated that guns firing proximity rounds were four times more effective than guns firing regular time-fused rounds. (Rowland 286) Their performance in battle was impressive. Soon after their introduction, an American task force reported that it downed 91 planes of a 130 plane Japanese formation. (Rowland 287)
For medium range anti-aircraft duty, a quick firing Bofors 40 mm gun with exploding shells was adopted. These guns were later tied in with the fire control for 5 inch guns, bringing improvement to both gun types. (Rowland 386) For close-in anti-aircraft protection the newly adopted 20mm Oerlikon gun was 8 to 10 times more effective than the .50 caliber machine gun it replaced. (Rowland 235) New gyroscopic optical fire controllers which calculated a target's rate of change helped make the guns more effective than when used with a standard sight over the gun barrel. An early indication of improved effectiveness was in October 1942 when the battleship South Dakota shot down ALL 38 planes of an attacking Japanese force. (Rowland 382)
Anti-aircraft protection increased not only because of improved guns, fire control, and proximity fuses. The number of anti-aircraft guns was drastically increased. The battleship Nevada, an old Pearl Harbor survivor is a good example. It doubled its 5 inch gun armament from 8 to 16 guns, its four 3 inch guns were replaced by eight 40 mm quad mounts with a total of 32 gun barrels, and its eight .50 caliber machine guns were replaced by forty 20 mm guns. The battleship South Dakota completed during the war is another example. Originally planned to have three 1.1 inch quad mounts, by March 1945 there were instead seventeen 40 mm quad mounts. Instead of its planned twelve .50 caliber machine guns, in March 1945 there were no less than seventy seven 20 mm guns! (Rowland 243, 246)
Due to increased anti-aircraft capability and the greater numbers of carriers available, a new method of forming carrier task groups was necessary. In the Fifth Fleet, there were now 15 carriers. It would be impossible to control 15 carriers if each had its own protective screen, but this was now unnecessary. Therefore, task groups consisted of four carriers, three to five cruisers, and twelve to fourteen destroyers. With this method, there were only four separate carrier groups, making the carrier force much easier to control while the effective anti-aircraft protection made them safe from enemy attack. The Japanese had fewer carriers, lacked escorting ships, and had not significantly improved their anti-aircraft defense. Therefore, they provided a screen of 12 escorts to a group of two carriers. (Macintyre 255-6)
The battles of the Philippines Sea and Leyte Gulf in June and October 1944 destroyed Japanese naval aviation. Had the Japanese carrier force survived into 1945, it would have had to deal with a vastly improved American fighter plane, the Bearcat, and the Bat, the world's first radar equipped self guided glide bomb. (Rowland 342-3) But with the US fleet largely invulnerable to Japanese air power, poor Japanese anti-aircraft protection, and overwhelming US numbers, the Japanese fleet was destroyed along with any hope Japan had of victory.
Bibliography
Cressman, Robert J., "Carrier Strike Through Mountain Passage." World War II Magazine. November 1986
Hughes, Wayne P., Fleet Tactics. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986.
Macintyre, Donald., Wings of Neptune. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1963.
Reynolds, Clark G., The Carrier War. Alexandria, Va: Time-Life Books, 1982.
Rowland, Buford, US Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World War II. Government Printing Office.
Wukovits, John F., "Scratch One Flattop:, World War II Magazine., September 1988.