- from the book ‘Tales of the Great War’, 1916
- 'The Story of a General'
- by Henry Newbolt, 1916
The Battlefields of Mons, the Marne and the Aisne
- left : a war-time portrait of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien
- right : a magazine illustration of British troops attacking on the Aisne
The Battle of Mons
The first day of battle—Sunday, August 23—began quietly enough; a shell or two at daybreak, and then our outposts were attacked all along the line, beginning from the right. At 8.0 A.M. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien received a visit from the Commander-in- Chief; at 9.30 he drove along his line in a motor to view the development of the German advance. He began by arranging with General Hubert Hamilton, commanding the 3rd Division at Mons, for the preparation of the second line of defence behind the salient. It was evident that the Germans meant to attack heavily at this point— the outward curve of the canal—and if they should succeed, as they almost certainly would, they must not be allowed to debouch to the south between our two army corps. The new line was to run from a bridge over the canal west of Mons, along a road which sloped away south- east through Wasmes, Paturages, Frameries and Bougnies to Givry. The bridge itself was at Pommereul, and was laid with explosives ready for demolition; it was in charge of a detachment of the Cornwalls. These arrangements were all well made, and when supplemented as you will hear later, they worked very satisfactorily.
Sir Horace started on his return journey some time after midday and was lunching in his car when a tremendous explosion was heard about a hundred yards in front. The German artillery had begun shelling the road with high explosives—our men have become intimate enough since then with Jack Johnsons and Black Marias; but this was a first experience for the General and his aides, and they sniffed the virulent fumes as they ,passed through them with peculiar interest. The artillery fire increased in violence from this moment onwards, and it soon became clear that von Kluck must have five or six hundred guns in action along the twenty-five miles of front. This meant that instead of one—or at the most two—army corps, which had been reported to our General Headquarters by the French, our army was being attacked by about four corps and outflanked by a fifth. But it had no intention of giving up the position.
The General now returned to his Army Headquarters at Saar-le-Bruyere to receive reports from his divisional commanders. The first thing which happened was what he had expected. The German attack on the salient had become too heavy to be resisted with any further advantage—the defence there was to be withdrawn to the second line as soon as it had made the enemy pay the full price. That it had certainly now done; von Kluck had sent his men against the bridges at Nimy and Ghlin in close order and in successive waves—they advanced, our men said, like the crowd coming away from a cup tie; and the Royal Fusiliers and Middlesex Regiment, who had the post of honour, held their ground and shot 'wholly together' like the bow-men of Cressy. They proved, once for all, the superiority of our infantry to the German in field fighting. The Kaiser's men came on in droves, firing from the hip, making a tremendous noise and hitting nothing. King George's men lay in a thin line sweeping them away with rifle and machine-gun fire, line after line, drove after drove, bunch after bunch, till the survivors broke and made way for a fresh mass. Nothing but the overwhelming weight of their artillery fire saved the Germans from a total repulse. They only succeeded after the machine-gun teams of the Royal Fusiliers had been wiped out time after time, and when one by one the guns themselves had at last been blown to pieces. Lieutenant Maurice Dease, the machine-gun officer, stayed till the end, though mortally wounded, and both he and Private Godley, who was also badly hit, were awarded the V.C. In their two hours of splendid endurance they had inflicted almost unimaginable loss upon the enemy. The regiment was then withdrawn through the town of Mons with the help of the Middlesex and Royal Irish, both of whom also showed great courage and suffered heavily.
During the afternoon the attack was continued along the straight piece of the canal to the left; here the bridges were blown up, but the enemy brought up pontoons and began to force a crossing. At 5 P.M. Sir Horace sent Major Hope Johnstone to communicate with General Hamilton, who told him that there was a small gap, between the 3rd and 5th Divisions, which made him uneasy. Hope Johnstone went on to the cross roads at Bougnies and chanced upon General Haking, the Officer Commanding the 5th Brigade (part of the 2nd Division) which was to entrench in a position there. He then returned hastily to Headquarters and reported what he had seen and heard. It was now 7 P.M. Sir Horace grasped the situation instantly and saw how to meet it. He had not a man left to put into the gap, but evidently there were troops near at hand which could be borrowed. He dashed off in his car to Sir Douglas Haig's Headquarters at Le Bonnet and asked for the loan of a brigade until next day. Sir Douglas consented to lend the 5th Brigade, and Colonel Maurice (one of General Hubert Hamilton's staff) was despatched to lead the Worcesters and Connaught Rangers in advance to the gap. These two battalions, with the help of some guns which made fine practice with shrapnel, drove back the German advance; and when the Oxfords and the Highland Light Infantry came up in support, with bayonets fixed, they found the work done and Frameries full of British troops asleep on the pavements. They went on themselves as far as Paturages and slept in the square there.
That night Sir Horace was well satisfied with all that he had heard of the day's fight. His men had made a good retirement from the salient, and had held the rest of the position well against great odds. A German attempt to turn his left flank had been brilliantly defeated by Allenby's cavalry division — they had moved right across our rear from right to left, a very difficult operation requiring excellent staff work, and most successfully carried out. The left had also been strengthened by the arrival from Valenciennes of the 19th Brigade, which came up from the lines of communication and was not under Smith- Dorrien's command. Best of all, the troops, as well as their General, though fairly tired, were in good heart for renewing the fight next day. They had come well out of the first round, and had had such unexpected success in killing Germans that they believed they could do better still. So they probably could have done, but the opportunity was to be unexpectedly snatched from them.
The General and his staff lay down soon after 10 o'clock; but their rest was not to be a long one. At 3 A.M. General Forestier-Walker, who had been sent for by Sir John French, returned with very disappointing orders. Sir John had been informed at 5 P.M. the day before by a telegram from General Joffre that the 5th French Army on our right was falling back, instead of advancing, so that the British army was exposed not only on the left flank but on the right as well, and must retire at once in order to keep in line. This could not now be done until the impedimenta had been got clear of the fighting troops, and of course there was no more sleep for anyone. The rest of the night was spent by Sir Horace in ordering this move and in seeing Sir Douglas Haig and settling on a course of action. Baggage and supply trains take time to be cleared away, and both Generals realised that while this was being done they would have a very stiff day's fighting. To withdraw in face of such numbers was a most difficult and dangerous operation.
But even difficult and dangerous operations can be carried out by British infantry if only they are well handled. This second day's battle—which was the beginning of the Great Retreat—may be described as an alternate right and left swing. No orders were given for it, but it took the following course. First, Sir Douglas Haig attacked sharply with the 1st Corps, while Sir Horace withdrew his left, which was exposed to much closer and heavier pressure from the enemy. Then Sir Horace in turn stood fast and hit hard on a line from Valenciennes to Frameries, while the 1st Corps withdrew behind his right, to the Bavai-Maubeuge road. Finally, Sir Horace again retired both his divisions and brought them into line on the west of Bavai.
At dawn the whole British force stood to arms and the Germans began a heavy bombardment. By the German programme our rearguards were to be first demoralised and then rushed; but they refused to accept the German programme. The 5th Brigade moved out of Paturages and Frameries and entrenched to the south of the towns; there they held on till 11 A.M., breakfasting on biscuits and chocolate, and the bread brought them by the Belgian people, who were flying before the enemy. Further to the left the 13th Brigade was inflicting a disastrous surprise on von Kluck's advance guard. The Royal West Rents, the Duke of Wellington's, and the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, had stoutly maintained their position in the town of Wasmes, occupying the streets on three sides of the market-place. When the artillery preparation was over the Germans entered the town at once, marching down through the streets from the north in close column. The machine-guns and rifles of the three regiments opened upon them at their most helpless moment, and brought them down in heaps. They continued their effort in the German fashion for two hours, marching to destruction with a firmness so unbroken as to appear mechanical. At the end of that time the streets were choked with their dead and wounded, and the 13th Brigade having succeeded in their delaying action began to retire gradually upon St. Vaast.
During these hours the staff of the 2nd Corps were back at the 1st Report Station at Hon, in front of Bavai. It was an anxious time; for when the attack of the 1st Corps was over, von Kluck had immediately reinforced his right, and was trying not only to keep the gap open between our two corps but to outflank Smith-Dorrien's left. The 15th Brigade was there, and quite early in the day Sir Charles Fergusson, the General of Division, had been obliged to send a request for cavalry to clear his flank. General Allenby at once moved up the 2nd Cavalry Brigade—the 9th Lancers, the 4th Dragoon Guards and the 18th Hussars—under General De Lisle. The 18th Hussars were at first ordered to dismount and open fire on the German advance, but of course at long range only, and it soon became evident that they could not put in a sufficient weight of lead to stop the immense masses in front of them. The only artillery available in support consisted of one battery of R.H.A. and one of R.F.A. The 9th Lancers and the 4th Dragoon Guards, who had also done good work for some time with enfilading fire from the railway embankment, were now back at the village of Audregnies, in the direct line of the German advance.
General De Lisle saw that the situation was becoming desperate and justified a desperate move. He sent orders to Colonel David Campbell of the 9th Lancers and Colonel Mullens of the 4th Dragoon Guards that the enemy's advance must be checked, and that the two regiments must be ready to charge if necessary. The word desperate is not too strong for such a resolution. The German force at and near that point was estimated at a division of infantry with their artillery, and it was proposed to stop this mass by hurling two regiments at it—say a thousand lances against ten thousand rifles, backed by fifty guns and a still larger number of machine-guns. But the order to move out of the village was received with delight, and every man of the thousand felt that the time of his life had come. The cavalry spirit is like fire, a fatal master but the most splendid of servants. Its true opportunity does not come once in a generation, but it is itself undying and can bide its time, for it is one of the primitive joys of human nature. Waterloo, Balaclava, Kimberley, Audregnies—this was only the fourth chance in a hundred years, but a spirit lives by tradition more than by experience—the real soldier is always a veteran. These cavalry men were as ready for their first charge as if it had been their twentieth.
The enemy were now advancing across open fields with corn standing in stooks. In order to give their guns as little chance as possible, the two cavalry regiments left the village in opposite directions, and made their way at the trot towards the front. When they cleared the lanes and appeared in the open the Germans broke up and ran for cover to the corn stooks; at the same time their machine-guns opened fire. The 9th Lancers led the charge, and they had got within about five hundred yards of the enemy when they suddenly found a barbed wire fence in front of them, too strong and high to be taken in any way. There was only one thing to be done—Colonel Campbell swung sharply to the right and the regiment rode for their lives along the wire, finally taking what cover they could behind a mill, some slag heaps, a railway embankment and a cemetery. The 4th Dragoon Guards followed them; the guns blazed and rattled—the charge was over in no* time, with heavy loss to us and none to the enemy.
But David Campbell was not the man to give up his job unfinished. He put his men in charge of Captain Lucas-Tooth and went off to get further orders from General De Lisle, cantering alone across the open under a hail of bullets as coolly as if he were running back to the pavilion at Clifton through a storm of applause. Lucas-Tooth in the meantime dismounted his remaining men and opened fire again on the enemy, who for four hours did not venture to come beyond the barbed wire fence. Our troops were then withdrawn and some of the 9th Lancers, under Captain Francis Grenfell (who was already twice wounded), helped most gallantly to bring away the guns of the 119th Battery R.F.A., the officers and men of which had almost all been knocked out.
The accounts of this charge which came in to Headquarters were at first unduly sombre. The effect produced by the cavalry was not yet known and their losses were overstated. Major Hope Johnstone, who had gone with Sir Horace to see Sir Douglas Haig about midday, heard that the 9th Lancers had been 'wiped out': their actual loss was 75 killed and wounded, and that of the 4th Dragoon Guards was 56. A better account was received in the evening when Colonel Campbell himself came into Bavai and dined with Sir Horace; but the losses were still believed to be very severe. Sir Charles Fergusson afterwards thanked General De Lisle for his efforts to help his division.
The position at Bavai, upon which the whole British force was now successfully retiring, was to be prepared during the day by civilians; but, except for a few trenches, very unlike the military pattern, practically nothing had been done in the way of preparing a position for a large force to hold. The Curie was secured for the Headquarters of the 2nd Corps; General Headquarters were already established in the Mairie. By nightfall the troops were reported to have safely reached the new line—Maubeuge-Bavai- Wargnies— and to be extremely cheerful. They were, of course, tired and hungry; but they had done well and knew it.
Now comes a touch of comedy. Sir Horace and his staff had done well too, and they too were tired and hungry. They dined at an inn called 'Le Paysan,' and when they went off to their beds ordered breakfast to be ready for 4.30 next morning. You may be sure they were punctual to the moment, and sharp set, with a hard day before them. Imagine their feelings when they found that among the risks of war was one which they had forgotten—there was no breakfast. The inn was deserted. Bavai had heard all about the doings of the Huns in Belgium; the people very reasonably thought it better to retire in front of the English than behind them, and during the night they had gone—men, women, children, old folk and all. The staff swore a little, laughed at themselves, and drove off to the 1st Report Centre at Monroux. There they were lucky enough to get some eggs and bacon.
The retirement was then continued. The impedimenta had been sent away at 2 A.M. There was a good deal of grumbling among the men; but it was generally believed that the French were beginning to hold the enemy on the right, and that a stand would be made all along the line in the next position, at Le Cateau. Sir Horace's face was watched as a kind of moral barometer. 'He looks a winner,' one man was heard to say, 'and that's enough for me.' But beneath the General's imperturbable coolness and courtesy there were serious anxieties. The two army corps had up to now been in fairly regular touch— they had actually converged on Bavai. But to-day they had to separate rather widely, Sir Horace passing to the west of the Foret de Mormal and Sir Douglas to the east, in order to avoid the thick wood and uncertain roads. It was arranged, at Sir Horace's request, that the start should be early and orders were issued for the force to be all south of the Valenciennes-Maubeuge road by 5.30 A.M.; but the 1st Corps found it impossible to keep time as accurately as they wished, and it was 8.30 A.M. before their last brigade got away. Even then they were delayed. Sir Horace, of course, knew nothing of the reasons; but he found the gap between his own corps and Sir Douglas's steadily widening, till the two were some eight miles apart. Lord Ernest Hamilton explains that this was, in fact, due to 'scares,' or reports of rearguard attacks, which made it necessary for some of the 1st Corps to halt, or even to go back at times. The Oxfords, for instance, had to retrace the distance from Leval to Pont-sur-Sambre, only to find nothing doing. The reports were probably spread by Germans, disguised as British officers.
The situation therefore was becoming anxious, and after midday a fresh disappointment had to be met. Sir Horace had spent the morning directing the retirement from his motor, and went finally about 3.30 P.M. to Le Cateau to see Sir John French. He failed to find him, for Sir John had started at 2 P.M. for St. Quentin, twenty-five miles off. From Sir Archibald Murray, however, the Chief of the Staff, he received Sir John's orders not to make a stand at Le Cateau, but to continue retiring. The General Headquarters were even then in the act of preparing to evacuate Le Cateau —clerks, typists and orderlies swarming off in motor-lorries to follow the Commander-in-Chief to St. Quentin. Sir Horace spent the next few hours in selecting a position in case he had to fight next day, and then drove to Bertry, where his own Headquarters were to be. On the way he saw some of General Sordet's French cavalry corps moving across to our left rear. They had been asked to help us during the retirement, but their horses had been too tired—they did their best for us next day, when they were most needed.
The evening was spent in the difficult task of finding out the exact whereabouts of the troops, many of whom had covered thirty miles, and whose rearguards were desperately engaged. It was not until 1.30 A.M. that this was done; and Sir Horace, by way of a night's rest, had to solve two problems. First, how was he to deal with General Allenby's cavalry division, General Snow's 4th Division of infantry and General Drummond's 19th Brigade—which were none of them under his command though actually fighting near his corps at the moment? And secondly, in face of the orders he had received, not to fight, how was he to save his weary force from being crushed in the act of retiring:— for the Germans were now close up and outflanking him on both sides? He quickly came to the conclusion that it was an occasion when he would be justified in disobeying his orders; and taking the cavalry, the 4th Division and the 19th Brigade under his command, he issued instructions for a battle at dawn.
Saving an Army
In the early morning of August 26, news came in that the 1st Corps had been attacked after dark at Landrecies and had inflicted a severe check upon the enemy. A Prussian division had made a forced march right through the Foret de Mormal, hoping to smash up our troops in their night quarters, when they were tired and off guard. They came up against the wrong men—Landrecies was occupied by the 4th Brigade of Guards. The most vivid account of the fight is that sent home by Lieutenant Percy Wyndham of the 3rd Coldstreams. 'Had a hurried tea and at 7 o'clock went out with the company (No. 3) to guard all the approaches to the town. We were told there were some English and French troops who would want to come through. Hardly was it dark, about 8 P.M., and raining, when we heard a body of men approaching. We challenged them to halt; they came on, answering in French. We told them again to halt; they were then only ten or twenty yards off, and with a yowl they sprang forward and yelled "Deutschland!" After that, words fail me. Hell was let loose. Our men lay down flat and poured volley after volley into them. I flattened myself against a wall and quaked. In about three minutes it subsided and awful groans filled the air. Then little Charles Monk came out and said, "Come on, No. 3, line the road!" and we all gathered round. Another company came up in support, and David (Bingham) got his machine-guns into action. Nothing can describe what followed. They kept charging up to us, and we replied with volley after volley. The men were marvellous, quite cool, and obeyed all our fire orders to the letter. I have never known anything like the bursts of fire. They then brought up a gun, at 200 yards, and fired lyddite point blank at us! My word, it was a caper. They kept coming on, and at about 12.30 made a final desperate effort. I thought we never could stick it, but we did. I just said my prayers as I lay, nose buried in the ground, and waited for my bit of shell or bullet. But, glory be to God! it never came. We drove them right back with our fire and they never came on again, and they tell me 2,000 of them never will again. Our losses were 119 killed and wounded.'
This news was cheerful enough in itself, but to the General of the 2nd Corps it meant that he could expect no help from his colleague. Sir Douglas Haig was evidently delayed far to the north and east of him, and von Kluck was forcing a wedge in between them. Sir Horace must play the game out alone—he was in the tightest of tight places, for he had his orders, and to obey them literally meant destruction. He knew how foot-weary his men were, and how near to discouragement; if he called upon them to retreat once more, with a confident enemy close upon their heels, the retreat must almost certainly become a rout. It would be no one's fault—the army would be annihilated by an overwhelming force; but it would be annihilated, and the Empire would be in mourning for fifty years.
The position was desperate; how could it be saved? By military skill, by high courage, by dogged endurance? All these qualities were necessary; but all put together, they were not sufficient—they could not make one corps the equal of three, or save it when surrounded from being forced to surrender or collapse. What was needed first of all was character. This is where games are the miniature of war and of any active life. We have all known good cricketers who could see clearly and make beautiful shots when nothing much depended on them, but who lost their form when a rot set in, and went to pieces with the rest. The great General is the one who never loses his form. Even if he is called upon to face some awful moment on which great issues hang, he will still see clearly, decide unhesitatingly, and play to win; and this he will do because he has the power to be always himself, to draw upon the vital reserve which we call character. None of our Generals had more of this power than Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien; he saved us in our greatest danger by being simply himself. We shall always read the history of those black days happily, because they are not a tale of hesitation or passive acceptance of disaster, but an example of how, by decision, by initiative, and by determination, drawn from the stores of his own past, a commander may turn to-day's defeat into to-morrow's victory.
Before daybreak on August 26, Sir Horace had made his two decisions. The first was that he must be master of his weapons. He sent word to General Allenby and General Snow that the cavalry and the 4th Division would come under his command. He made no bones about it, nor did they. It was not the moment to stand on etiquette or wait for official confirmation. The 4th Division was ordered to form the left of the line from Haucourt to Caudry, with the 3rd next it in the centre from Caudry to Troisvilles, and the 5th (with the 19th Brigade) on the right at Le Cateau. The cavalry were widely scattered; the brigade and a half near Caudry were to fall back on Ligny and try to guard the left flank, the two and a half brigades at Catillon were to move to the support of the right flank. The second decision was the great one—the one for which Horace Smith-Dorrien was born and bred. He made it in the small hours of the 26th, and shortly afterwards wired to General Headquarters to tell the Commander-in-Chief what he had decided. The reply he received was that the Commander-in-Chief wished to speak to him on the telephone: so at 7 A.M. he walked into the railway station at Bertry and asked to be put through to the British General Headquarters at St. Quentin. He soon heard the voice of General Henry Wilson, Assistant Chief of the Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, and at once explained to him the state of affairs as he saw it. 'My orders are not to fight but to keep on retiring. My men are too weary to march; before they can retire I must fight; a blow to the Germans is the only way of staving off a disaster; and the battle has actually begun.' General Wilson replied, 'Sir John did not intend you to fight, and he wishes you to break off the battle and retire at the earliest moment possible. He is anxious that you should not continue to fight a moment longer than is absolutely necessary. He cannot send you any support—the 1st Corps is incapable of movement. His opinion is that in not retiring you are risking a Sedan.' Sir Horace was prepared to take this risk. 'We shall put up a real grand fight,' he said, 'but with my men too weary to march, both my flanks in the air, and a vastly superior number of the enemy against us, no doubt there is a possibility of our being surrounded.'
General Wilson then suggested that Sir John French might be willing to come back 'and take over the actual command. But Sir Horace had no desire to avoid a responsibility that was rightly his own. 'I strongly deprecate that,' he replied.' The battle is now going on, on such an extended front that the troops would not know of Sir John's presence on the field, and it is not as if I had any large reserves which he could handle. After all, this is only the commencement of a great war, and if a disaster should occur, it is essential for the good of the cause we are fighting for that the Commander-in-Chief should be free to go to England and bring over another army. But my one chance is to fight and I am going to do it.' General Wilson could not conceal his admiration. 'Well,' he said, 'your voice is the only cheerful thing I've heard for three days.'
Sir Horace, as we have seen, had already made his preparations. His instructions for the fight had been issued to all the troops at 4 A.M., and at 2 A.M. he had sent to General Sordet an urgent message saying, 'I am going to fight, and I hope you will be able to cover my left.' Sordet sent back no reply, but in the hour of need he was there.
By this time the enemy had got the artillery of at least four army corps into position. Our guns were outnumbered, five to one; but they made a magnificent fight of it and inflicted huge losses on the Germans advancing in mass. So did our infantry; they made and lay in shallow trenches, some few of which had been hastily and unscientifically dug for them by devoted Frenchwomen, and they were desperately tired; but they shot as no other troops had ever shot, and for seven hours their enemies went down before them like cut grass. At one time the 4th Division, on the left flank, was forced back, but by a brilliant counter attack they regained their ground. Nothing could really shift them but overwhelming gun power. By midday the main artillery duel was over, and some of our guns, especially of the 5th Division, were silenced. This was a severe loss; for, to infantry, even the sound of their own guns is a support. By 2 o'clock the 5th Division had been outflanked, and pounded almost to pieces. At 2.30 Sir Horace received a message from Sir Charles Fergusson that he feared his men could stand it no longer, and were beginning to dribble away. Sir Horace sent him instructions to order the 5th Division to retire. He had not a word of blame for them; he knew they would not fail him till they were in extremes, and he sent instructions to the rest of the troops what to do in case they fell back. His only reserves were two battalions and one battery; these he had already had to use once, and now he sent them in again to cover the retirement.
For the moment the General had done his part; the task of carrying out his orders was for his subordinates. I have told you how Sir Horace took over General Grierson's staff: he was fortunate in finding such officers, for it was in his judgment largely due to this staff that the British force fighting at Le Cateau was able to be withdrawn. The Chief of Staff of the 2nd Corps, Brigadier-General Forestier-Walker, was a man of great nerve and ability, and a very rapid worker. He had drawn up concise instructions for the retirement of the several divisions, if such a move should become necessary, and consequently every divisional commander and staff knew exactly by what roads they were to move, so that the danger of their running into each other and getting blocked was provided against. Then the head of the Quartermaster-General's department, working in with him, had laid his plans for clearing the road of all unnecessary impedimenta, such as food and ammunition columns, field ambulances, etc. Thus, when the 5th Division were being forced back, all that remained to be done was for the staff to tell the commanders of the other divisions to conform to the movements of the 5th Division, which had already begun to retire by prearranged roads.
It was now past 3 o'clock and the 5th Division were coming back in great disorder. It is best to be precise about this, because exaggerated and even hysterical descriptions were sent over to England soon afterwards. Admirably terse and well balanced accounts also came in private letters; one of the best is by Lieutenant Frederick Longman of the 4th Royal Fusiliers, one of General Hamilton's reserve battalions. 'At 1 PM. we all thought we had beaten them off. Suddenly a tremendous burst of firing in the centre of our line; 3.30, order for a general retirement. Then I saw a sight I hope never to see again. Our line of retreat was down two roads which converged on a village about a mile behind the position. Down these roads came a mob—men from every regiment there, guns, riderless horses, limbers packed with wounded, quite unattended and lying on each other, jostling over ruts, &c. It was not a rout, only complete confusion. This was the Germans' chance. One battery of artillery sent forward, or one squadron of cavalry, would have turned this rabble into a complete rout, and the whole army would have been cut up piecemeal. Meanwhile, we were the only regiment I saw in any order. We had not been engaged, and had only lost one officer and about thirty men; we had also had a hot meal, so that we were in good condition. We went back in a succession of extended lines, in absolute order, and formed up behind a farmhouse near where the roads met. Here we waited in mass, while the rest of the army streamed past. It was a most trying half hour. It seemed inevitable that they would follow up, and then the jam in that village would have been indescribable—I have since heard that they had sustained fearful losses, and also a division of French cavalry was covering our retreat. When the rabble had got past we moved off, marching at attention, arms sloped, fours dressed, &c, through the village; 7.0 P.M., moved off again and marched till 10 A.M.'
Sir Horace too saw this, and no doubt he too hoped never to see the like again. But he gave not the least sign of dismay. His business was to save his army. He had already sent his car away, and was now on horseback, with some of his staff; the rest had gone, in accordance with a well-thought-out plan, to important points on the several roads along which the force was retiring, to maintain order and direct those who had lost their units. Sir Horace rode along the line, and hearing very heavy artillery firing to the westward naturally began to fear that the enemy were outflanking the 4th Division. To make sure about this the General with one A.D.C. galloped up a piece of rising ground, and perceived with joy and gratitude that the noise was not that of German guns only, but the short sharp bark of the inimitable French Horse Artillery. Sordet had played up, and our left flank was safe.
Sir Horace then rode back to the Roman road— the long and dead straight road from Bavai to Estrees by which the 5th Division were retiring. It was a dispiriting sight, for heavy rain was now falling, and the men who came staggering past were so tired and footsore that many threw away their packs and entrenching tools, and some could go no further, but rolled over by the roadside and were dead asleep in a moment. The greater number trudged on in a solid mass, units all broken up and mixed together, and groups of men all believing that they themselves were the sole survivors of their regiment. It might be thought that a General had no part to play here— Napoleon, on a day not unlike this, rode off with a 'tout est perdu; sauve qui peut.' Smith-Dorrien stayed among his men, knowing that all was not lost, because he had the power to handle them even in extreme distress. An American volunteer, who was present, has said the right word about him both here and afterwards. 'I speak,' he says, 'with profound recognition of his high attainments as a military leader, and of his great heart. Truly, a kinder man I have never met.'
You may imagine what it meant to these tired soldiers— tired a dozen times over, tired with four days' marching and fighting, tired with killing endless hordes of enemies, tired with facing for nine hours an irresistible tornado of shell and shrapnel—to come suddenly upon this, quiet commanding figure of their General. Here was the head of everything, the man who must know all that there was to know; yet he was kind, cheery, unhurried and unworried, walking his horse amongst them, talking to them in his cool, courteous voice, assuring them that all was well, that the attack was over, that they had beaten their enemy to a standstill, that they were only retiring to keep in line with the French Army and to share in the coming advance. 'Right ahead,' he said to one little bunch after another. 'You'll find a lot more of your battalion further down the road.' For two hours they had the comfort of this voice, and every minute that passed proved the words more true. There was practically no pursuit, no rearguard action: guns were still firing, but without effect. "Never mind the guns,' said the General, 'I'll look after them; you go quietly on.' They did go on. It was a very sorry crowd that worked their way back towards St. Quentin that night, but it was not a panic-stricken crowd. The Staff backed up their Commander; at the gate of every field, and the entrance of every by-lane stood an officer collecting a certain battalion or brigade. 'This way Suffolks, this way Manchesters, all this way the 14th Brigade.' It was a tremendous piece of work; more officers were borrowed to help the Staff, and the motor-drivers took a hand as well. The General himself, having done what he could for them, went on at 9 P.M. to report to his Commander-in-Chief.
He reached St. Quentin at 10 P.M. only to find that General Headquarters were no longer there—the Commander-in-Chief had gone back at midday to Noyon, thirty-five miles further and fifty-five miles behind where the battle was raging at Le Cateau. There was nothing for it but to follow. Sir Horace had left his staff on the road near Estrees, helping to keep the troops moving and straighten out blocks in the line of march. He now took Captain Bowley and Prince Henri d'Orleans in his car and ran down to Noyon, after arranging with Colonel Maclnnes, the Director of Railways at St. Quentin, for some trains to pick up the lamest of the men. His hurried journey was not a good substitute for a night's rest. It was long past midnight when they reached Noyon and woke up the Commander-in- Chief. Reports of the direst kind had reached him—he had been convinced that the 2nd Corps was no longer in existence, and Sir Horace's undefeated serenity seemed to him at first almost outrageous. When he realised that the fight had, in fact, achieved its object, and that the three divisions were being put in order to rejoin the line, his scepticism was overcome and he spoke in warm terms of Sir Horace's achievement.
The journey back was still a sleepless one; there was plenty to think of. When Sir Horace reached St. Quentin once more, at 5.30 A.M., the day's work was waiting for him. His staff had come in an hour before and were asleep on the floor. The bulk of the troops were still out on the road; they had to be brought in, built up into an army, and started again on their march southward. This was a heavy day's work, but it was not an impossible one; the men were unbeaten—their General had told them so and they believed him, for they saw that he was unbeaten himself. His divisional commanders and brigadiers were worthy of him; they had worked magnificently all night and their regimental officers had backed them magnificently in turn. In one of the finest narratives of the retreat there is a story which tells us just what we should wish to know about our men and their officers—how even in the hardest times they can keep their kindliness and self-restraint. 'Soon after sunrise we came up with two of our ambulance wagons, and one of our filter water-carts. The wounded were in such a state of exhaustion with the long trek and the awful jolting of the wagons, that Major Fawcett decided to find some farm where water could be boiled. He had hardly gone when a battalion of exhausted infantry came up, and, as soon as they saw the water-carts, made a dash for them. Hastily I rode up to them and told them that there was very little water left in the carts, and that it was needed for their wounded comrades. "I am thirsty myself," I said, and I am awfully sorry for you chaps, but you see how it is; the wounded must come first." "Quite right, Sir," was the ready response; "didn't know it was a hospital water- cart." And without a murmur they went thirsty on their way.'
Meanwhile, in St. Quentin, the General was busier and cheerier than ever. Our American volunteer saw a great deal of him this day, for he and his car were lent to him by Lord Loch. He says, 'It was good to see Smith-Dorrien's face and hear his voice. I had heard much of him during those days and never was he spoken of save in terms of affection. ... It was of inestimable value that morning in St. Quentin— Smith-Dorrien's smile. It put heart into many a man. ... It was a treat to watch the General, i Quoted by Mr. John Buchan, History of the War, vol. II.
Kindly and cheery, his personality pervaded everything about him. . . . Staff, officers, soldiers, everyone —all were parts of the whole. It was a lesson, watching him saving the scattered pieces of his corps and welding them into a fighting force that would be all the better for the awful experience through which they had passed.'
This last bit sounds an optimistic opinion, but it is strongly confirmed by a remark of Lieutenant Longman's, in a letter written a day or two later. 'At first my shoulders used to get rather tired with my load; now I have nearly doubled the load and don't feel it, and I can keep going all day quite happily and if necessary most of the night. Most of the men are very fit too. I would much rather go into action with the twenty men I have left than the fifty-nine I started with, as I can trust all of them to the last inch now, and before there were some semi-shirkers and many unfit.' Two-thirds of the platoon gone—that was a dangerously high rate of loss, if it was anything like general. The first reports which came in caused Sir Horace great anxiety; the 3rd Division alone believed their casualties to be 150 officers and over 5,000 other ranks. Another constant worry was the false news of rearguards hard pressed and throwing in their last reserves. Captain Bowley was sent back in the car to ascertain the facts and reported all the stories to be untrue. Altogether the day was a trying one to the nerves, and many officers felt it severely after the long bombardment of the day before, and the still longer march. The worst moment of all came late at night.
On this night, the 27th, the troops reached Ham. The retreat was not over, but the danger point was past. The enemy had hovered about the rearguards with cavalry and horse artillery, but his infantry had been too heavily punished to come on again; Smith- Dorrien had snatched their chance from them. It is impossible to overestimate his achievement. 'The extrication of the Le Cateau army,' says Lord Ernest Hamilton, ' from a position which on paper was all but hopeless, was undoubtedly a very fine piece of generalship.' And Mr. John Buchan says: ' No praise can be too high for the services rendered by the Commander of the 2nd Corps at Le Cateau.' The voice of the army is not less emphatic. One of Sir Horace's own Generals wrote: 'If the staff work went smoothly and well, it was only because we had a chief who knew his own mind, never hesitated about momentous decisions (Le Cateau at 4 A.M.!), but shouldered all responsibility and never fussed. I have since then often talked with other staffs, and have realised how they have been hampered even in the smallest routine work, and it has made me very grateful to the finest Commander I have ever worked under.' Finally Sir John French wrote in his despatch: ' I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the army under my command on the morning of August 26 could never have been accomplished unless a Commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity and determination had been present to personally conduct the operation.'
In our military history we have long kept one picture apart from all the rest—the great Duke riding in twilight behind the 52nd as they made the final advance across the field of Waterloo. We shall never see a moment of more complete triumph. But we have now another picture to set beside that—the quiet indomitable figure in the rain, facing the full stream of defeat. A very different scene, but the two go well together; for they both show what the spirit of man can do against material odds.
The Turn of the Tide
When the turn of the tide comes it is not at first perceptible, and in the Great Retreat there were probably few who realised the coming change when the troops began their weary tramp again at 4.30 A.M. on Friday, August 28. The officers, especially those of the different staffs, were haggard and worn; the men lame and grumbling. But with the British soldier grumbling is not akin to demoralisation; on the contrary, it is often a form of humour, and nearly always a proof of normal health. Mr. Coleman, who was carefully observing the 2nd Corps on this day, remarks that he had no hallucination of the army being a beaten one. 'The spirit of the men alone made it impossible to describe them as beaten.' The more he saw of them the more convinced he became of their invincibility.
Sir Horace himself got the same impression. He had the satisfaction—only given to real leaders—of seeing his men answer to his call like a pack of well-bred hounds. He spent hours among them, talking to them in the tone they knew and trusted, a tone confident and uplifting, but quiet and entirely free from any trace of persuasiveness or exaggeration. In their different way, officers and men give exactly the same account of its effect. One more thing they noted especially—their General treated them like men of sense, who might reasonably wish to know what they were doing. He explained to them the strategical plan of the French Generalissimo, and as the day went on a feeling spread that in the four days' fighting, and even in the retirement itself, the British force had not been unsuccessful but most gallantly successful. So their pride came back to them, and they in their turn cheered and encouraged their General. It was a fine thing for him to see their unbroken spirit and their anxiety to show up well before him; most of all he admired the splendid appearance and march discipline of the Artillery. The 15th Brigade had lost all their guns except two; but they had some magnificent fighting to remember, and they held their heads up, as well they might. Everything was in place, everything in parade order; they made a brave show, and at such times a brave show is the best of reinforcements.
The Oise was to have been reached this day; but the enemy's cavalry and horse artillery bothered the rearguards a good deal, and there were still a certain number of stragglers to be got in. This was work for the cavalry and they did it wonderfully, keeping the enemy back beyond St. Quentin till the last possible moment. The final sweep up was made late in the afternoon by Major Tom Bridges of the 4th Dragoon Guards, a tall soldier with a fine record. In the market-place at St. Quentin he found some hundreds of men lying helpless on the ground, dead to the world; they were the broken remnants of two good regiments, in need of food and sleep and still more in need of someone to wake the spirit that was sleeping in them. It seemed a desperate case, for they were past hearing the word of command or of persuasion.
When the reason is out of action, you must call to something deeper, more instinctive. Everyone who has ever marched to a band knows how music adds to your marching power without your thinking of it. Though the War Office had forgotten this, Major Bridges had not. He looked about St. Quentin, found a toy shop, bought a toy drum and two penny whistles, got two of his men to play the whistles and fastened the drum to his own belt. Then he paraded in the square, playing 'the British Grenadiers,' not probably with a very rich tone but in exact and spirited time. The beat of it got into the dead men's pulses and made them soldiers again. They staggered up and followed the toy band out of the town, and down the long dark road towards Noyon. When they were far on their way and marching well, their drummer thought he might safely leave them. 'I must go back to my own men,' he said. 'You go straight on, you are all right now.' But this was asking too much: they knew well enough what was lifting their feet every step of the way over those cobblestones. The drum, no doubt—but who could believe in the drum without the drummer? It had come at his word from nowhere and might be gone again into nothing if he left them. They refused to march without him. He did not leave them; he drummed them right into the town, got them fed and billeted and finished his own night upon the road.
Meanwhile the Staff had reached Cuts at half-past eight and were preparing for the almost forgotten luxury of a night's rest. Sir Horace himself had not averaged two hours' sleep in the six days. To-night he had four hours in a beautiful chateau; and his anxieties were much diminished. But the next day was to be a busy one. The General's first business was to withdraw his 3rd and 4th Divisions across the Oise. The enemy were, of course, trying to press them. Our aeroplanes reported large columns on the move, and about 11 A.M. heavy firing was heard to the N.N.E. and E. De Lisle's cavalry brigade had already been attacked near Plessis, between Ham and Guiscard. Their commander dismounted them south of the latter town and left them with some guns to hold the German advance, while he himself came to report. Sir Horace sent back two infantry brigades to support him, and after a fine little action of three hours the enemy were beaten off.
During the day General Pulteney and his staff came up. They were to take over the command of the 3rd Army Corps, which at present consisted only of the 4th Division and the 19th Brigade. Sir Horace arranged to hand over these troops next day, and then went off to Compiegne to General Headquarters, where Sir John French wished to see him. There he found also General Allenby, Sir Douglas Haig, and General Joffre himself. The Generalissimo was under the impression that a French attack near St. Quentin had been successful. Sir Horace returned to Cuts at dark, and found a humorous little surprise waiting for him—rather like the one at Bavai. He had intended to sleep in the chateau again and start at dawn; but his energetic Chief of Staff, by way of saving time, had already packed up and was moving Headquarters back to a farm at Les Loges, some six miles in the rear. This was so obviously right that there was nothing to do but accept the arrangement, with suitable comments.
On Sunday, August 30, Sir Horace blew up all the bridges over the Oise, and withdrew his corps to the line of the Aisne. At the first cross-roads he himself met the 4th Division, and told them the good news that the French were now coming into line. This, of course, raised hopes of a stand being made at last, and the troops broke into a cheer, which was perhaps as fine a farewell testimonial as any General ever received. Sir Horace then went down to Berneuil and saw them cross the Aisne, after which they passed from his command. That night he slept at Haute-la-Fontaine.
The 31st was an anxious day. Aeroplanes reported large columns of the enemy advancing north of Compiegne. The retirement had now to be conducted through a country full of deep wooded ravines and very steep roads, and some of the troops took a wrong turn. The heat, too, was tremendous; but, in spite of all, the men were reported to be improving every day.
At 3 A.M., on the morning of September 1, a Frenchman came in to 2nd Corps Headquarters and told Sir Horace that he had counted forty German guns and a large force of Uhlans moving at 1.30 A.M. through a village about five miles off, in the direction of the 3rd Army Corps, and this proved to be true. At daylight the 1st Cavalry Brigade, under General Briggs, found itself in bivouac at Nery within 400 yards of these Germans, and with their own guns—L Battery, R.H.A.—close by them in an orchard, a position not intended for fighting. The Bays and 11th Hussars at once took cover and opened fire with rifles and machine guns; but the German artillery was already in action and in a very short time smashed up all but one of our guns and concentrated their whole fire on the last remaining one. Their cavalry at the same time worked round to the south of the village and occupied a sugar factory.
But the game was not yet over, though the guns in action were now twelve to one. The 5th Dragoon Guards got round to the north-east and opened fire on the enemy's flank. Then at 8 A.M. the 4th Cavalry Brigade, followed by the Middlesex Regiment, came hurrying towards the sound of the firing. The combined fire of these regiments, with that of their fresh Horse Artillery, was too hot for the German gunners. They tried to withdraw their guns, but paid a heavy price for saving four of them, and had to abandon the other eight. As they retired, the heroes of L Battery were still firing at them, though Captain Bradbury, all his officers, and 80 per cent, of his men, were killed or wounded. Sergeant- Major Dorrell and Sergeant Nelson were left in command, and they and their dead Captain were all awarded the Victoria Cross. The fight ended with a pursuit by C Squadron of the 11th Hussars, who charged through the enemy's abandoned guns and captured a number of prisoners and led horses. On the following day they followed up the trail on their way south, and in a ride of the forest of Ermenonville came on a lot of German equipment and the four remaining guns.
Sir Horace now asked Sir Charles Fergusson to send a brigade towards Nery to help the 3rd Division to withdraw, and this was successfully accomplished. At the same time General Cuthbert, with the 13th Brigade, beat off a rear-guard attack, getting into the enemy's infantry well with his artillery. Sir Horace, as he watched the fighting at Levignon under a blazing sun, received a private telegram from England. It had been sent off only that morning and was a welcome proof that the communications with England were being admirably kept up in spite of difficulties. Headquarters that night were at Nanteuil-le-Haudouin, in a house prepared for a hospital; and news came in of an attack on the rear-guard of the 1st Corps at Villers-Cotterets, handsomely beaten off by the 4th Guards Brigade.
On September 2, the start was earlier still. The troops began to move at 2 A.M. and the General himself was off by 3. Before the heat of the day the troops had reached their halting place on the line St. Soupplets-Etrepilly; and from his Headquarters at Monthyon, Sir Horace had a fine view looking right across to the forts of Paris, the nearest of which was only 11 miles distant. French reserves and cavalry were at St. Soupplets, and the French 7th Army Corps was engaging the German 1st Army. A crisis seemed to be near, and now that we know what was the real state of affairs it is interesting to compare the impressions of our men at the front with those of their friends at home. Exaggerated reports had reached London, representing the retirement as not merely a retreat but a rout; and the fall of Paris was thought to be inevitable. It happened that afternoon that two poets were walking together down a quiet by-street in Westminster, when a Government official overtook them and told them in confidence that the French Government were to leave Paris that night. The poets went their way in silence. Presently the younger of them, who was specially interested in naval matters, said suddenly: 'If they get Paris, they'll demand the French Fleet as ransom!' The older poet, who knew better than anyone how this country had had to face mad dynasts in the past, said grimly: 'Then it only remains for us to keep them out of these islands, as we did before.' It would be idle to deny that they thought the outlook a dark one.
How very different it would have appeared to them if they could have planed over to France, and looked in, as we can now look in, upon the conference going on at that very moment in the British General Headquarters at Lagny. There we see Sir Horace with Sir John French, not in the least troubled about Paris, but busily planning to cross next day to the south bank of the Marne. This was a difficult operation, involving a flank march in face of the enemy; but Sir Horace was undertaking it with complete confidence and cheerfulness, justified by his experience of the still greater difficulties which he and his men had successfully come through. It was a wonderful report that he was able to give. His troops, it is true, were very short of equipment and of entrenching tools—over 80 per cent, of these had been lost at Le Cateau, and the fresh stores, to the amount of 70,000 tons, were still at sea, on the way to our new base at St. Nazaire. But it was impossible, he said, not to be struck by the splendid way in which all the rear road services were being conducted—the supply columns, ammunition columns and mechanical transport vehicles continued, in spite of everything, to arrive regularly. The General Staff work of the 2nd Corps was quite excellent, though probably since the days of Sir John Moore no Staff had ever been so highly tried. The Divisional Commanders, Fergusson and Hamilton, had the perfect confidence of their General, whom they had never failed for a moment. Lastly, the men had entirely recovered their spirits; they were getting fitter every day and wanted nothing but the order to go forward and attack. That order was to come sooner than they expected.
Next day, September 3, was spent in crossing the Marne and blowing up the bridges. The enemy not only failed to interfere, but were reported by our aeroplanes to be giving up the pursuit and moving off to the east towards Chateau Thierry, apparently to attack the French army next on our right. By midday on the 4th one German corps was crossing the Marne at La Ferté, six miles in front of Sir Horace. He did not feel sure what they were doing, but he was prepared to rest his left flank on the Paris forts and give them battle with every confidence, for he knew now how tired they were and how heavily they had been losing. At 3.30 P.M. he met the Commander-in-Chief at Sir Douglas Haig's Headquarters and discussed the whole plan of campaign. This was for him a memorable interview: Sir John French once more praised him highly for the way in which he had extricated his force, and also for the severe blow he had inflicted on the enemy by deciding to stand and fight at Le Cateau on August 26. He ended by assuring Sir Horace of his absolute confidence in him; and as Sir Horace had the same absolute confidence in his own officers, and they again in their men, it was clear that the army was a true army and in the best possible fighting condition.
The troops marched again the same evening to avoid the heat, which was very trying to both men and horses. The General and his Staff dined at Crécy—not of course the Black Prince's Crécy, but still a name of good omen—and arrived late at night before the Chateau de Villepateur near Presle, only to find it locked and deserted. The agent was discovered and knocked up and at midnight the house was opened. None of those who slept in that chateau will ever forget it, for it was there that they first heard beyond doubt of the turn of the tide. On September 5 the troops were resting all day, and Sir Archibald Murray came over to tell Sir Horace that General Joffre was ordering a general offensive for next morning. The 2nd Corps was to get on to the line Houssaye-Villeneuve; the French 6th Army were moving eastwards on the north of the Marne and would be at Lizy-sur-Ourcq by 9 A.M., while on Haig's right the French 5th Army would advance north at 5 A.M. In fact the two French armies formed an angle with the British Army at the apex, joining them, and inside the angle were von Kluck and von Buelow with six or seven German army corps. The retreat had drawn them down into this trap, and they would have to resist very stoutly if they were to escape being squeezed by the two sides of the angle closing in on them.
A great deal of surprise was caused among the military critics by this situation. They could not understand what was von Kluck's motive for suddenly turning eastwards on September 3, and marching across the British front to attack the French. Different theories were put forward—one was that he had never suspected the existence of the 6th French Army near Paris, and turned away to avoid it. Another story was that the Crown Prince was in great danger to the east, and had to be rescued at any risk. The French 'Official Review of the First Six Months of the War' states quite plainly that the object of the 1st German Army was first to envelop the Allies' left, and that when it had overshot the mark in this attempt, its second aim was to cut the French armies off from Paris and invest the capital. It is satisfactory to note that it fell to the lot of the British Army to upset both these plans. Smith-Dorrien's generalship made it impossible to envelop the left of the Allied line, and afterwards von Kluck's move to cut off the French from Paris was spoiled by the fact that the British Army filled the gap between. There is little doubt that he believed them out of action and thought he could march across their front with impunity. He would not have made that mistake if he could have been in our lines on September 5 and seen Sir Horace visiting his Divisions and giving them the welcome news of the coming advance.
a British artillery position on the Aisne
The Battles of the Marne and the Aisne
On Sunday, September 6, day broke upon a joyful army; the news of the advance was visibly coming true. The 2nd Corps was moving north-east towards Coulommiers on the Grand Morin. Sir Horace's Headquarters were to be at the Chateau de Combreux, near Tournan; and there during the morning he received a visit from Sir John French, who repeated, what no one could hear too often, that the general advance had begun and that the German 2nd and 3rd Corps were retiring before our troops. The news still seemed almost incredible. 'Thank goodness! we are advancing,' wrote one of the Staff in his notebook; he could not disbelieve the Commander-in-Chief in person. Sir John himself was in very good spirits, and told Sir Horace once more, at this appropriate moment, that his determined action in fighting at Le Cateau had saved the whole situation, and that he was recognising the fact in his despatch. The 2nd Corps continued to advance during the afternoon; they had no fighting, but the march was a thrilling one, for news came in that the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades were in action near Pezarches, and that the 6th and 5th French Armies on our left and right were heavily engaged and gaining ground.
On Monday the 7th, Sir Horace's Staff had a new experience. Headquarters were moved to a chateau which had been occupied by a German General, and the first sight of the enemy's traces was not a pleasant one. The house had been left in so filthy a condition that, after an effort to clean it, the A.D.C.'s had to give it up and move to another at Faremoutiers, which was a little' better. It may be remarked here, once for all, that although the Germans have the reputation of being clean and decent in their own homes, their treatment of houses occupied on campaign is often so wantonly beastly as to suggest insanity.
There was more fighting to-day; the German rearguard tried to stop McCracken's (7th) Brigade at Coulommiers. Of the four battalions, the 3rd Worcesters, 1st Wiltshires and 2nd Royal Irish Rifles were not hard hit, but the South Lancashires had a good many casualties. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade were fortunate in having another chance—this time at the enemy's cavalry. The first Garde Dragoner Regiment had a rear-guard in the village of Montcel and there they were marked by the 9th Lancers, a troop of whom charged at once and cleared them out. The enemy were then reinforced by two fresh squadrons from the north and one from the west of the village. Colonel David Campbell was on the south-west with his Adjutant, Captain Reynolds, and a troop and a half of his men—less than 50 in all. The Germans were double that number and they were evidently meaning to hold their ground. The 9th went at them at full gallop and passed right through them, losing a few men but pegging twice as many, and successfully joining their other troop behind the village. Colonel Campbell and Captain Reynolds were both among the wounded.
The Germans now made a fatal blunder; some of them wasted time galloping into the village and back again, and they then began to retire slowly towards the north. A disagreeable surprise was waiting for them. Colonel Burnett had by this time got round to their rear with a squadron of the 18th Hussars; he had dismounted his men and posted them with rifles and a machine gun among some corn stooks. The retiring enemy had to pass right along their field of fire; 70 Dragoner tried a charge, but were wiped out at 100 yards' range—the rest fled, leaving their wounded on the ground.
Early on the morning of the 8th, Sir Horace was informed by his aeroplanes that just in front of him, at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, on the Marne, there was a tremendous mass of German wagons, guns, and men, trying to get over the river. His orders were to advance on Chateau Thierry and reach the Marne, if possible, but the country near the Petit Morin is broken and covered with trees, so that it was easy for even weak rear- guards to hold up the pursuit. For instance, Doran's (8th) Brigade—the 2nd Royal Scots, 2nd Royal Irish, 4th Middlesex, and 1st Gordons—had great difficulty in crossing the Petit Morin in face of a battery of machine guns on the opposite side till, after J Battery, R.H.A., had shelled the position, the Royal Scots and Middlesex made a fine charge down and up, and captured the six machine guns and 200 prisoners.
At 3 P.M. Sir John French came to Coulommiers, well pleased with the way things were going, but naturally regretting the rapidity of the German retreat. After his departure Sir Horace went out to the front and found Sir Charles Fergusson north of St. Cyr. His troops had rounded up some Uhlans, but were prevented from advancing more quickly by the fire of some of our own artillery firing heavily from the right. They were very keen and fit, transformed by their successful march and a week of comparatively regular meals and sleep. 'One realises more and more,' wrote a young officer at this time,' that on this kind of show one's feelings and moods are purely reactions of the stomach. If I have eight meals a day, then for eight hours at least during that day everything seems rosy. If I go short of food for a day, no rumour is too gloomy to be true. A little brandy makes one think of home and the extreme probability of being there within a week—a very little will have this result—and last night my tot of rum made me feel quite poetical, and a smoky fire that smelt abominably of burnt bacon fat seemed to be quite a romantic camp fire.'
By nightfall the 2nd Corps had gained the south bank of the Marne; the General's Headquarters were at Doue, in a house evacuated by the enemy. As before, 'it took a lot of cleaning.'
The morning of the 9th was rainy. Fergusson and Hamilton advanced to cross the Marne at 5 A.M. They had had an unexpected piece of luck overnight in finding the bridges intact, and to-day they were able to get on faster than either the 1st or 3rd Corps. Sir Horace went out to see General Pulteney and the 3rd Corps, who were to cross at Ferté-sous-Jouarre, but were held up by broken bridges and by artillery and machine-gun fire. Sir Horace offered to help by pushing troops in between Fergusson and the 3rd Corps; but General Pulteney thought they could manage it alone. At this moment Sir John French came up, and expressed his pleasure at the rapid advance of the 2nd Corps. They were, in fact, enjoying their first success. The Royal Fusiliers ran right into a German convoy. 'Their guns and cavalry,' says Lieutenant Longman, 'cleared off at once, and the infantry—four battalions—were left behind to let the luggage escape. These we practically surrounded, and killed a large number, and captured I believe about 1,500. Most of the baggage escaped, with the exception of twelve wagons which the artillery bagged. This is the first real victory we have had.' About the same time Shaw's (9th) Brigade were delayed by some German guns on the heights above Nanteint, and the 1st Lincolns, after a fine fight in which they exterminated the gunners, captured the battery entire. The Cornwalls had a stiff fight in the woods before Montreuil, but the place was taken after dark by Cuthbert's (13th) Brigade. Finally, the British advance began to tell on the general position, for the two and a half German corps facing the 6th French Army on the Ourcq thought it wise to retire, as our army was uncomfortably near their flank. Sir Horace and his staff slept that night at Saacy. The 10th was a great day for our men, and a very bad one for the Germans, who began to show signs of being rattled. The early morning was wet, and the 3rd Corps were still behind; they had spent most of the night in repairing the bridge at La Ferté and La Ferté, like Crécy, was a name of good omen. In the days of the Black Prince the castle of Sir James Audley, the hero of Poitiers, stood here.
getting across it, but by midday they had caught up and the 1st and 2nd Corps were going hard ahead, in spite of the wet roads and the deep valleys. Sir Horace noted that the horses were much tired by the bad going, whereas the men seemed to improve in health and spirits, and were in fine fighting fettle. His cavalry —the 3rd and 5th Brigades under Hubert Gough and Chetwode—were reported to be enjoying themselves thoroughly, driving back the enemy and collecting stragglers. There were many woods in the line of march, all full of skulkers, and infantry battalions as well as cavalry were beating them up in every direction. The total bag of the 2nd Corps for the day was 2,000 prisoners, besides 'an enormous number' killed. The roads were a good sight to men who had done a retreat themselves only a fortnight before; haversacks and equipment lay about in heaps, with dead horses and men scattered among them. The enemy's troops of all arms were suffering worse than ours had done, and satisfaction at this was only natural. By a stroke of good luck the King's congratulations to the 2nd Corps reached the General to-day, and were received with enthusiasm.
The 11th was a more difficult day. General Joffre had ordered the British army to move north-east instead of north, and had also narrowed our front. This gave only two roads between three divisions, and made progress slow. The weather, too, was very thick, and turned to heavy rain, so that aeroplanes could not go up to reconnoitre. Also the sudden change to cold and wet made Sir Horace tremble for the health of his troops, many of whom had no greatcoats, waterproof sheets, or change of clothing. These things had been abandoned after Le Cateau and fresh supplies had not yet got through from our new base. Even the fresh men and guns to repair losses, which were said to have been 'already made good' by August 29, were not actually received till September 19; at this moment the 2nd Corps was still forty-two guns short, and though more German guns than that had now been captured, they were not available for use.
Still the day was not unproductive; the cavalry put in some pretty work, and many stragglers surrendered. The increasing demoralisation of the German rear-guards, even when composed of picked troops, was shown by an amusing episode. Lord Stanley, the young officer who was acting as extra A.D.C. to Sir Horace, was in charge of the led horses of the staff—about twenty in number, with ten grooms. He came, upon a detachment of Germans who were evidently far behind their corps, and though they greatly outnumbered his men he ordered an immediate advance upon them. They showed no fight but threw up their hands and surrendered in batches; and Lord Stanley found to his astonishment that with ten grooms he had captured 106 men and 4 officers of the Prussian Guard. This adventure, which was called 'Stanley's charge,' caused immense satisfaction and amusement. The grooms came in to Headquarters laden with spoils; Major Hope Johnstone's servant arrived hung round with helmets and equipment 'like a Christmas tree,' and was able to supply his master with a German automatic pistol in place of a revolver which had been lost. And when all the laughter was over, there remained the solid fact that Stanley had shown great decision and brought off a smart stroke.
Headquarters that night were at Rozet St. Albin, in a chateau belonging to the family of Berthier, Napoleon's Chief of Staff. The corrected list of casualties for the last two days came in; the 2nd Corps had lost 3 officers killed, 15 wounded, and 4 missing, and of other ranks 17 killed, 384 wounded and 69 missing. Considering the hardness of the fighting and the enormous losses of the Germans, the General considered that his men had come off well.
On the 12th the orders were to advance to the River Aisne and cross it. The advance was successful. Allenby's cavalry occupied Braisne and was supported there by the 3rd Division; Gough then seized the high ground close to the river at Chassemy and fell upon some German infantry, of whom he killed 70 and captured 150. But the crossing was impossible for to-day; the bridge at Vailly was strongly held by machine-guns; the bridge at Missy was reconnoitred by Lieutenant Pennycuick, R.E., who with great skill and courage floated down to within 150 yards of it and reported it to be badly destroyed. Night fell in torrents of rain.
But the army had no intention of being stopped by a river, even a deep river nearly two hundred feet wide. During that stormy night the 11th Brigade of the 3rd Corps succeeded in ferrying some men across near Venizel. At dawn the 11th and 12th Brigades managed to cross and establish themselves at Bucy-le-Long. Sir Horace went to a point near Venizel to watch the operations. Cuthbert's (13th) Brigade failed to cross at Missy, but Rolfs (14th) and Gleichen's (15th) eventually got over at Moulin des Roches, crossing man by man on a single line of planks, while the guns were passed over the railway bridge. On the right Hubert Hamilton succeeded in getting two brigades across after dark; the 1st Corps and the French 5th Army also got over, and part of the 6th Army. Happily it was a fine drying day and the food supplies came up splendidly in spite of the bad roads.
That evening, the 13th, Sir Horace went to see the Commander-in-Chief at Fere-en- Tardenoise. The next day, the 14th, he went again, and reported that the enemy were making a stand on the heights north of the Aisne, and had been sending back reinforcements both of infantry and artillery, and entrenching with barbed wire. General Wilson, who had seen General Joffre the day before, gave a cheering account of his confidence, and of the report of a French corps commander away on our right, who had buried 9,000 Germans in a single day.
This stand of the Germans proved to be something more than a rear-guard action; the battle of the Aisne had now begun, in the position selected and prepared beforehand by the enemy. It continued for the rest of the month, and though it died down into a siege it cannot be said to have had any decisive end. The fact is that the enemy had from the first intended only to use the line of the Aisne as a holding position, and to throw their real force against the Allied left, in accordance with their one idea of strategy—the outflanking movement. General Joffre perceived this, or rather anticipated it; for as early as September 11th he had begun strengthening his left, and on the 17th he ordered a special force to be constituted 'capable of coping with the outflanking movement of the enemy.' The Battle of the Aisne therefore developed as a series of local attacks on both sides, and Sir Horace on the 14th received definite orders to limit his operations to such local offensives. These blows and counter-blows were on the whole much in our favour; but in spite of heavy losses the German line remained practically unmoved, and our own casualties were not inconsiderable. Sir John French told Sir Horace on the 19th that they had already reached 10,000 in the week.
On the 20th, McCracken's (7th) Brigade were heavily attacked. They drove the enemy off gallantly, but lost fifteen officers and three hundred men in doing it. Sir Horace, who had watched the fight from Fergusson's position on the Serches plateau, at once arranged for the battalions which had suffered most to be relieved by others from the 16th Brigade, which belonged to the 6th Division, but had been temporarily taken under Sir Horace's command. During the night McCracken's remaining regiment—the 1st Wiltshires—made a spirited advance and cleared some woods with the bayonet, finding as they did so a large number of dead Germans whom they had killed in the day's fighting.
On the 21st, Sir Horace received some remarkable reports. A very gallant young Engineer officer, Lieutenant Hutton, of General Hamilton's Signal Company, had been drowned on the night of the 19th, while swimming across the Aisne with a wire, to establish communication between the north bank and Divisional Headquarters. Then a French farmer, in the position held by the 1st Corps, had been found with a telephone in his house communicating all our movements to the Germans. He had 50,000 francs on his person—the price of his treason—and was one of fifteen spies shot in two days. Thirdly, McCracken's Brigade had been again attacked, and though they easily repulsed the enemy, the casualties of the 3rd Division for the day amounted to twenty-five officers and five hundred men. The disagreeable part of this, they reported, was not the fighting but the impossibility of burying the German dead in front of our trenches—in one place they were piled up three deep, only eighty yards away, and they lay there for days and weeks. Lastly, news came from the 1st Corps of a German attack on the trenches of the West Yorkshires—the only one of their attacks which was even temporarily successful.
The full account of this Sir Horace heard on a later day, when he had gone over to visit his own old regiment, the Sherwood Foresters. It appeared that the West Yorkshires, who had only taken over the trenches the night before, were severely attacked by German machine guns and infantry, while their right flank was exposed by the absence of some Zouaves next to them, who were back at their dinner. The Yorkshires, being heavily enfiladed, were driven back and some of them were captured. But down the steep slope behind were the Sherwood Foresters, lying down in reserve, and further to the right were the 4th Dragoon Guards, dismounted. There was no time to fall in—the two regiments sprang to their feet, and rushed straight up the hill, officers leading. The Sherwood Foresters retook the Yorkshire trenches with the bayonet, but they lost no less than fourteen officers in their magnificent charge. The 4th Dragoon Guards, headed by their Commander, Major Tom Bridges, at the same moment retook the trenches on the right, and the Zouaves came scurrying back from dinner in time to do some useful bayonet work. A heavy fire was then opened on the retreating Germans, and they in revenge were seen to turn on their prisoners and shoot them down. Sir Horace was much impressed by this last incident, related to him by an eye-witness, and he afterwards repeated it to his own troops, warning them against entrusting themselves to the Germans, under any circumstances.
