- 'The Fight for Jerusalem'
- Nearing the End of Turkey's Four Hundred Years' Rule
- by Lovat Fraser
The Conquest of the Holy Land
the mayor of Jerusalem and Allied officers - in Jersualem
We are witnessing in Palestine the last and greatest of the Crusades. Seven hundred and thirty years ago the Sultan Saladin captured Jerusalem, and, except for two brief intervals, the Holy City has been under Moslem rule ever since. The Turks have held Jerusalem for exactly four hundred years. They seized it in 1517 and it seems possible that they will lose it in 1917.
It should never be forgotten that Jerusalem is a holy place in the eyes of Moslems as well as Christians. The Turks claim it as the third of their Holy Cities — the other two being Mecca and Medina. They still hold Medina, where they have an isolated garrison, but the Grand Sherif has ejected them from Mecca.
The bulk of the Turks do not regard this war as a Jehad, or Holy War, although attempts to invest it with sanctity were made a year or two ago at Constantinople. A Jehad is a war waged by Mohammedans upon "unbelievers," in order to propagate the doctrines of Islam by the sword. In this war Mohammedans are fighting on both sides. Indian and Russian Mohammedans have not hesitated to go into battle against the Turks. The Arabs of the Hedjaz have definitely thrown off their allegiance to the puppet Sultan of Turkey, against whom nearly the whole of the Arab nation is in revolt. They deny that the men in power in Constantinople are true Moslems.
Want of a Coherent Plan
In the Near and Middle East, in short, the war has no religious character, and all who know the East are well aware that this fact is of very special importance in considering the larger bearings of the current situation. Though the Young Turks are out of touch with Islam, they and their German masters are deeply conscious of the prestige enjoyed throughout the East by the possessors of the Holy Cities. Not only have they lost Mecca, not only are they besieged in Medina, but they have also been thrust from the cities of Kerbela and Nejef in Mesopotamia, which are regarded as sacred by all Shiah Mohammedans. Prestige as well as military necessity therefore bids them fight hard for Jerusalem.
In the past the allied campaigns against Turkey have never been conducted on any really coherent plan. We missed our true chance of striking at Constantinople, which should have been seized the moment Turkey entered the war. The operation would then have been easy. Afterwards, instead of battering our heads against Gallipoli, we should have landed at Alexandretta, in the great bight of the Syrian coast, and have taken Aleppo, which would have enabled us to cut the Bagdad Railway. Our expedition to Mesopotamia grew almost by accident into a great enterprise. The same may be said of the invasion of Palestine. Even to-day, with powerful armies in both these regions, we are not really strong enough to attain our full purpose.
In 1916 our forces gradually pushed across the peninsula of Sinai towards the Egyptian frontier, which touches the shore of the Mediterranean at Rafa. Water was our greatest difficulty, but the army carried its water supply with it, and a railway followed at its heels. In March, 1917, our main body moved forward into Palestine. Gaza was attacked on March 26th, but though some of our cavalry worked round from the east and actually entered the city, our assault from the south failed. The army fell back a few miles, and again advanced upon Gaza on April 17th. This time the attack was delivered on a wider front.
Palestine and Mesopotamia
On the left our troops established themselves firmly within two or three miles of Gaza, but on the right we made no progress, partly because the Turkish artillery was of heavier calibre than our own. The Second Battle of Gaza lasted three days, and its result did not fulfil expectations. No despatches have been published about either the First or Second Battles of Gaza. Sir Archibald Murray, who had been in charge of the operations, was replaced early in the summer by Sir Edmund Allenby.
During the whole of the summer and autumn Allenby was preparing for a fresh advance. His army was reinforced, and he accumulated supplies. The Turkish officer in charge of all the military enterprises in Syria was Djemal Pasha, whose headquarters are at Aleppo. He is governor of the province, a capable soldier, and a man worth watching. He seems to have maintained a curiously independent position in Syria.
Early this autumn General von Falkenhayn, who was removed from his position as Chief of the German General Staff after his failure at Verdun, arrived at Aleppo to take charge of the military operations in Asiatic Turkey. He was gradually followed by German forces which are substantial, though not of alarming strength. Rumours of dissensions between Falkenhayn and the Turks have since reached the west. It is said that Falkenhayn wanted to attack Allenby in Palestine, whereas Enver and his friends were eager for an attempt to retake Bagdad.
Tigris Advance to Tekrit
The whereabouts of the German units which concentrated at Aleppo have not yet been disclosed, but, so far as can be judged at the time of writing, the advocates of an attack upon Bagdad had their way. The policy seems to have been that the main thrust was to be made against Maude in Mesopotamia, while Allenby was to be held in check.
Meanwhile Maude, a cool and resourceful soldier, was not idle, and he evidently determined to get his blows in first. His front was spread out like a fan. His left flank was on the Euphrates at Feluja, his centre on the Tigris at Samarra, and his right flank on the Dialah towards the Persian frontier. We must not exaggerate the importance of his preliminary operations, though everything he did was neat and clever. He began on the Euphrates on September 28th, when he completed an advance of twenty-eight miles and rounded up the entire garrison of the Turkish advance base at Ramadie. This garrison seem to have consisted entirely of units which fell back from lower down the Euphrates when Bagdad fell. Next, on October 18th, he cleared his right flank on the River Dialah, advancing to Kizil Robat, close to the frontier, and drawing the Turks into the foot-hills. Finally his advanced centre forces marched thirty miles up the Tigris, defeated the Turks at their advanced base at Tekrit, and occupied the town.
In the third week in November we learned that Maude had returned from Tekrit to his old advanced base at Samarra.
But meanwhile the Turkish assumption that Allenby could be held in check on the borders of Palestine has been crushingly disproved. After a night march, Allenby's right wing attacked Beersheba on the morning of October 31st, and by nightfall, had taken the town. Next night the troops on his left wing attacked and carried the Turkish advanced positions before Gaza. Then he rolled up the whole Turkish line, from the right, and on November 6th he finally captured Gaza. The entire Turkish forces in this region retreated, fighting stubborn rearguard actions, and losing large numbers of prisoners and great quantities of war material.
Strategical Situation
Following Napoleon's example, Allenby has since marched up the coastal plain of Philistia to Jaffa, covered on his left by the sea, and on his right by the cavalry forces moving amid the hills. He has cut the railway to Jerusalem, and has been within twenty miles of the Holy City, but has preferred first to establish himself at the port of Jaffa, which has a practical roadstead. We may not speculate about, his further movements, but it may be noted that in a recent speech Djemal Pasha appeared to be preparing his hearers for the possible fall of Jerusalem.
The strategical situation in both Palestine and Mesopotamia is now extraordinarily interesting, and it is necessary to point out that in both regions the British forces are not in absolutely invincible strength. The death of Sir Stanley Maude on November 18th is a grievous loss. Neither Allenby nor Maude's successor is yet in contact with the Turkish forces originally based upon Aleppo. In a word, Falkenhayn has not yet shown his hand, and we must be prepared for surprises. If he has gone towards Bagdad, will he hurry back to meet Allenby, or will he let Jerusalem go ? My own impression is that he will not now change the plans attributed to him, but we shall soon know.
In any case, we must sternly disregard all dreams of a junction between Maude's successor and Allenby at Aleppo. They are operating in common, but they cannot meet. The distances are too great, the difficulties insuperable. If Allenby can conquer all Judea, and possibly Samaria, his advance will still have important political and strategical results. He will have won Palestine from the Turks, and he will have created a very solid menace to the Bagdad Railway route. On the other hand, Falkenhayn can do a great deal of mischief if he revives the plan of the Turks in 1915, and detaches a mobile force to operate through Persia towards Afghanistan.
two pages from a British magazine
