- from 'the War Illustrated', 27th October, 1918
- 'What Bulgaria's Surrender Means'
- by Lovat Fraser
Dominos Falling on the Balkan Front
- left - coverpage from a French patriotic penny novelette
- right - Allied soldiers comtemplating a Bulgarian monument after the surrender in 1918
The war moves with such amazing rapidity that it is only possible just now to select themes which have a definite and comparatively stable character. On the French and Belgian fronts the situation is so fluid that it changes from day to day, but in the dramatic unconditional surrender of Bulgaria to the triumphant Allies we have a theme which represents a settled fact.
I cannot say that I fully share either the disposition to condemn Tsar Ferdinand without reserve or to exonerate the Bulgarian people, which is shown in some organs of the daily Press. I know something of Bulgaria. In my opinion Tsar Ferdinand was in some respects not altogether a bad ruler, and he certainly did much to develop the resources and the influence of his country. Had he been wholly bad the Bulgarians would not have stuck to him for so many years. He intrigued for his own hand, but he tried to intrigue for Bulgaria also.
I do not in the least believe that Bulgaria meant from the very beginning to take up arms on the German side. I am sure that the corrupt gang which controls Turkish affairs intended from the outset to join Germany, but both Ferdinand and the Bulgarians sat on the fence. The selfish thought of ruler and nation alike was to do the best they could for themselves, regardless of honour and political morality. What really brought the Bulgarians in against us was our failure at Gallipoli, which they thought vital. The vision of all the Balkan peoples is narrow, and their political thought is parochial. They, are chiefly influenced by what happens next door.
Peasant Race
The Bulgarian Army was far more in sympathy with German and Austrian professional military thought than with Russian military ideas. General Savoff and other prominent Bulgarian officers made a tour of both German fronts about the beginning of 1915, and returned to Sofia imbued with the conviction that Germany was going to win. When they watched from Dedeagatch our repulse at the Dardanelles the conviction deepened in their minds into absolute certainty.
The Bulgarians are a peasant race, and are sullen, mistrustful, and grasping. They possess neither the generous warmth and the larger vision of the Serbs .nor the gay volatility of the Greeks. I do not condemn the Bulgarians for their qualities, which are the outcome of hundreds of years of servitude to the Turks. Is it realised that half a century ago the very name of Bulgaria was almost unknown in Europe? The people looked askance even at the Russians who liberated them in 1877. Yet they have shown themselves brave fighters in the last ten years.
In 1915 the Bulgarians considered that they were the victims of treaties made over their heads. They knew that after the Russo-Turkish war the Treaty of Berlin most unwisely deprived them of that bigger Bulgaria which had been embodied in the terms of peace at San Stefano. As to the Balkan wars of 1912-13, they were oblivious of their own rank treachery in turning their arms on the Serbs and Greeks, an act which shows that politically they are no more to be trusted than the Germans. They thought of the Southern Dobruja, seized by Rumania, and still more of Monastir and Southern Macedonia, which they alleged was their ancient heritage ceded to Serbia.
I am not going to express any view about Monastir and Southern Macedonia, for the simple reason that I do not know the rights or wrongs of the question. I do not believe anybody knows. I have listened to dozens of arguments demon- . strating that, on the racial basis, Monastir belongs to Bulgaria, and to other dozens proving that it should go to Serbia. The Monastir issue is like bi-metallism, about which you can prove anything you like. But war settles argument, and Monastir must go to Serbia, whose gallant soldiers have paid the price with their blood. I am sure the Bulgarian claim is sincere, but not at all sure that it has any real foundation.
Firebrands of the Balkans
In any case the Bulgarians have put themselves out of court. They sought the arbitrament of the sword, and own themselves thoroughly beaten. We must not listen to the cry of "Pity the poor Bulgarians!" already being raised in some quarters in 'England. If we start putting all the blame, on the kings, and profess to regard the peoples as innocent sheep led. astray, we shall next hear it said that the Kaiser is the only criminal in Germany. Our soldiers know better.
The Bulgarians have betrayed their Russian liberators, betrayed the common cause of the Balkan peoples, and betrayed their own future. Just as Germany must never again be allowed to plunge the world into woe, so the Bulgarians must never again have the power to set the Balkans aflame. We want a durable Balkan settlement, but not one which will leave the Bulgarians on top. Their national guilt is almost ineffaceable. The atrocities they have committed on the hapless Serbs are as bad as any of the crimes of Germans and Austrians.
I shall not discuss in detail the operations of the troops of six allied nations, which produced such a glorious victory in Macedonia under the direction of General Franchet d'Esperey. The British troops on the right flank had as hard a task as any, because they held the strongest portion of the Bulgarian forces on their part of the front. Their advance - north of Lake Doiran to Strumnitza was made through a region extraordinarily difficult for troops, and contributed greatly to the final overthrow of the enemy ; but the Bulgarians were beaten in spirit before the attack began.
Enormous Possibilities
There can be no doubt that the allied attack hastened a surrender which was already in contemplation. The Bulgarians have lost the bulk of their war material, and almost incredible quantities of stores. If the Germans and Austrians were to pour streams of reinforcements into the Balkans the Bulgarians would fight for them no more.
But can the Austro-Germans check the allied advance northward through Serbia and into Bulgaria? That remains an open question, but we must not expect to see the Allies continue their progress with a rush. The Austrians hold a good line through the middle of Serbia, and undoubtedly they can reinforce it. They are far to the south in Albania, where recently they pressed the ardent Italians back. The Germans may bring certain, units from Rumania, but not too many, for already there are signs that the Rumanian nation is preparing to throw off the German yoke. But how are the Germans to operate on Bulgarian soil, in the midst of a people which has broken off relations with them?
The real difficulty for the Allies is discernible in the limited strength of their forces based on Salonika. General Franchet d'Esperey's victory was not the outcome of superior numbers, but of valour and tactical skill directed against a dispirited army.
We can see the enormous possibilities which lie at the back of Bulgaria's surrender. We cannot see so clearly how we are to find sufficient forces to exploit them to the best advantage and with the required promptitude. The United States has taken no direct part in the eastern campaigns, and has never declared war on either Bulgaria or Turkey. Italy cannot neglect her own front, still menaced by Austria. The French and ourselves are participating in a gigantic struggle all the way from the Belgian coast to the Vosges. Large additions to the allied forces in the Balkans are needed if they are to make their way to the Danube, and it is not easy to see how big reinforcements are to be found just now.
Cutting Germany's Eastern Routes
Yet a glance at the map printed on our back page this week reveals the vast consequences of Bulgaria's withdrawal from the war, and of the right of free passage through Bulgarian territory which the Allies have obtained. The first and greatest result is that we can cut Germany's main road to the Near and Middle East, which consists of the railway that passes through Sofia and Constantinople. It is not even necessary to enter Bulgaria, for the severance can be made at Nish in Serbia, the junction where the Sofia line branches off. Should we reach the Danube, that invaluable river route, which has been of so much benefit to the Germans, will be also blocked. We can stretch out a hand to martyred Rumania. We can compel tottering Austria to create a new front on her eastern borders.
But Germany has another route to the East, passing through Southern Russia and across the Black Sea into the Caucasus. Not until we have cut that route also shall we have finally shattered the German dreams of Eastern dominion. To do it we must get into the Black Sea, and we can only pass the Dardanelles when Turkey follows the same road as Bulgaria and sues for peace.
Turkey is in sorry plight. Her Palestine and Syrian armies have been destroyed, and she has lost Damascus and Beyrout. She knows that sooner or later she will see allied armies attacking her in rear in Bulgaria. She knows that Germany c armies have been destroyed, and she has lost Damascus and Beyrout. She knows that sooner or later she will see allied armies attacking her in rear in Bulgaria. She knows that Germany cannot help her now.
The day must soon come when the warships of the Allies will steam into the Black Sea, and when that day dawns the Ukraine Republic will collapse, Bolshevism will vanish, Russia will be freed, Rumania will be rescued, and Germany will look no more upon "the morning light of the East."
