Horse artillery

The use of horse artillery during the Revolutionary Wars

by Geert van Uythoven

Popular view is that horse artillery was mend to keep up with, and support cavalry. That was why the gunners were individually mounted. Although it was definitely done, it is not the whole story! To these web pages two contemporary views have been added, about the use of horse artillery {1789 and 1802}. To illustrate this, the following is a compilation of pieces about the organisation of horse artillery, and how horse artillery was used in practice.

I
Source: Jhr. J.W. van Sypesteijn, "Geschiedenis van het Regiment Nederlandse Rijdende Artillerie" (Zaltbommel 1852) pp. 1-2:

"(…) one sought means to arrange the field artillery in such a way, that it would be able to follow the movements of the other parts of the army [i.e. infantry and cavalry]. The material that was used earlier, was to heavy: because of this the artillery was not able to move quick enough, despite the enormous amount of men and horses. Therefore, the artillery could not be used with the effect that was expected, and, in case of defeat, the artillery often had to be abandoned and was captured by the enemy.
The necessity to arrange the field artillery in another way, became evident when one was opposed by Russians cavalry, which was accompanied by artillery during the 7YW. Frederick the Great, convinced that the strength of his cavalry was used to the utmost in mass cavalry charges, and knowing that his cavalry would be exposed to infantry- and artillery-fire, sought means to give his cavalry some kind of protection. He found this in the horse artillery, which always followed the cavalry, and which could prepare and support the attack."

II
Source: N.J.A.P.H. van Es, "Het Historisch Museum van het Korps Rijdende Artillerie" Volume I (Arnhem 1898) p.7:

Base for the formation of 2 companies of Dutch horse artillery, 'Rijdende Artillerie', was a memorandum drawn up by certain Seeger, who stipulated the following basics: "to follow the cavalry every where and so to increase their independence; to prepare and to support the attack; to protect the cavalry against enemy infantry and artillery-fire; to support the pursuit, etc."

III
Source: Robert Brown (Corporal in the Coldstream Guards), "An Impartial Journal of a Detachment from the Brigade of Foot Guards, commencing 25th February, 1793, and ending 9th May, 1795" (London 1795) pp. 65-67:

[On 23 May 1793, the French were dislodged from Camp Famars. Brown was a spectator of this action]: "The troops which displayed their valour and activity most, were the Hanoverian flying artillery, with the British light cavalry, and those of the several other nations, as the nature of the engagements were chiefly adapted to their mode of warfare, in pursuing a flying enemy in an open country, where very few impediments occur to obstruct their progress. It was a glorious fight, as the morning was serene and clear, to see the line of battle formed for an extent of several miles; in one lace squadrons of cavalry charging each other in full career, in another the enemy flying and our's pursuing, with the flying artillery, displaying all the skill and dexterity peculiar to themselves; and the brigade of guards was so situated in the morning, that they could behold almost the whole scene of action at one view."

IV
Source: Geert van Uythoven, "Voorwaarts Bataven!" (Zaltbommel 1999) p.141:

[This event took place on 6 October 1799, during the battle of Castricum] "Not long after this, a British column advanced along the beach, preceded by four squadrons of the 11th Regiment Light Dragoons and four guns, covered on their left flank by a force of skirmishers moving along the edge of the dunes. To stop their advance Gouvion ordered Aubrée to advance a squadron of the 16e Régiment Chasseurs à Cheval. Covered by these he deployed a battery across the beach, consisting of six guns of the 4e cie/4e Régiment Artillerie Légère commanded by Captain Couturier and a division of the Batavian 1e Cie Artillerie te Paard (2 guns). Another squadron of the 16e Régiment Chasseurs à Cheval and one and a half battalion of the 98e Demi-Brigade supported this force. The British cavalry only noticed the squadron chasseurs à cheval that was mentioned first, and charged it. After coming within canister range, the chasseurs à cheval unmasked the artillery battery, which commenced firing and inflicted heavy casualties . The British had to retreat, and pursued by the French cavalry they retreated as far as the village Egmond-aan-Zee, were they finally rallied behind the British infantry. The French cavalry did not engage these troops, but retreated orderly to their former position."

V
Source: Geert van Uythoven, "Voorwaarts Bataven!" (Zaltbommel 1999) pp.140-141:

[This event took place on 6 October 1799, during the battle of Castricum] "In the evening, the British troops occupying Akersloot were counterattacked by a Batavian force under the command of artillery-captain Hendrik Frederik Cordès. He had received permission from Colonel Gilquin to attack the British with a volunteer force, consisting 50 infantry, 40 troopers of the 1e Regiment Zware Cavalerie and 16 gunners (on horseback) of his own 1e Compagnie Artillerie te Paard. Sending forward an advance guard of three gunners, he followed with 33 infantry and the horse, while the remainder of the infantry advanced in skirmishing order to his right, to dislodge the enemy from some brushwood and the forward houses. The British opened fire on the advancing Batavians, but afraid of being cut off retreated into Akersloot after noticing the advance of the cavalry. There the British took up defensive positions; two battalions forming the centre, their left covered by a squadron light dragoons and on their right, behind a drawbridge, a 6pdr gun and a howitzer. Cordès noticed that the British were unsteady, and after asking Gilquin to support him with an infantry battalion he slowly advanced on the British. However, Gilquin did not send any support, and therefore the Batavians had to retreat again. While the infantry took up position in the centre, Cordès positioned the cavalry and his gunners to the left behind some cover, in such a way that the would be able to attack any British attack on the infantry in its flank. This plan worked beyond expectation; the British advanced with an infantry battalion towards the Batavian infantry, and were promptly attacked by Cordès. The British had no time to fire before the Batavians were at them, but managed to form a loose line behind a ditch. In spite of this obstacle, they were fiercely attacked by the Batavians, who jumped across the ditch with their horses, or even on foot when the horse refused to jump. The British battalion was broken and took flight, with many men throwing away their muskets in the process. The pursuing Batavians captured ten prisoners. Because it became dark now, and afraid of being cut off by enemy cavalry, Cordès retreated to Uitgeest and the fighting ended. Batavian losses were four horses wounded."