Valentini’s ‘About the
‘Schützen’ and their tactics’
(‘Von den Schützen und ihre Taktik’)
Translated and remarks by
Hans-Karl Weiß and Geert van Uythoven
About
Valentini:
"G. W. v. Valentini (1775 - 1834) war u.a. mit Berenhorst befreundet;
Yorck von Wartenburg war sein Gönner. Valentini nahm u.a. an den Kriegen 1792 -
1794 gegen die französische Republik teil und bewährte sich in den
Befreiungskriegen in den Schlachten bei Aspern und Wagram, nahm in russischen
Diensten am Kampf um Rustschuk teil und war ab 1828 preußischer
Generalinspecteur. Valentinis 1799 erschienener Erstling über den kleinen Krieg
bildete den ersten Teil der insgesamt 3 Teile umfassenden "Lehre vom
Krieg" (1820 - 1824).
[SW: Militaria]
"G.W.
v. Valentini (1775-1834) was friends with Berenhorst, among others; Yorck von
Wartenburg was his patron. Among other, Valentini took part in the 1792-1794
war against the French Republic, and proved himself during the Wars of
Liberation at Aspern and Wagram. He enlisted in the Russian army and took part
in the fighting at Rustchuk. From 1828 on he was Prussian General Inspector.
Valentini’s first work about the ‘small war’ that appeared in 1799, would
become the first part of the three part series “Science of War”
(1820-1824)."
Note:
Valentini served in three
armies (Prussian, Austrian, and Russian), most of the time fighting against the
French.
He published three
volumes about the Science of War (one about the “Kleinen Krieg” the other two
volumes about the “Krieg im Großen” the “big” war). The one about the “Kleinen
Krieg”, small war - originally published in 1799 - compiles basically most of
his experience gained while fight the French in the early Revolutionary Wars.
This work was re-edited and published later, and certainly some more experience
and wider and broader understanding of the art of the small war, as well as the
incorporation of the experience gained in the Napoleonic wars, is evident.
In the translation, I
retained the word “Schützen”, translated something like: “shooter” - soldiers
trained to fight in open order and to shoot targets as marksmen. Tirailleurs
would probably be an appropriate translation as well. Valentine usually makes a
distinction between Schützen and Jäger. Further, the word “debandade” is
translate as “dispersed”. One should note however that skirmishing was in
general most of the time more or less a “formation”, and open order would maybe
most appropriate to describe it. The skirmishing line should be controlled by
officers and NCO’s, in order to be able to react accordingly to tactical
situations. This might be a difference to the early French “horde tactics” in
1793 - where the skirmishing troops were more or less a wild mob [as described
by many Allied primary sources].
Source:
Valentini, Generalmajor Freiherr
von, "Die Lehre vom Krieg", 1. Theil, "Der kleine Krieg und die
Gefechtslehre: Abhandlungen über den kleinen Krieg, Und über den Gebrauch der
leichten Truppen, mit Rücksicht auf den französischen Krieg" (original:
Leipzig 1820) Vierte ganz umgearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage, 13 Pläne (Fourth
edited and re written edition (Berlin, 1836)
Von den Schützen und ihre Taktik.
§. 51.
"Nichts kann den
entscheidenden Angriff der geschlossenen Infanterie kräftiger begründen, als
das gezielte Feuer der Schützen. Wenn des Feuer jener erstern Truppenart nur
bedingungsweise entscheidend ist, und gewissermaßen nur als Einleitung zu dem
beabsichtigten Bajonetangriff betrachtet wird, so liegt dagegen im Schießen und
Treffen das eigentliche Element der Schützentaktik. Die Schützen müssen daher
in der allgemeinen Schlachtordnung der Armee, das Vordertreffen bilden, dem mit
der Artillerie gemeinschaftlich ausschließlich die Pflicht obliegt, den Feind
aus der Ferne zu verderben, und den zum Gefecht in der Nähe und selbst zum
Handgemenge bestimmten Truppenarten, nämlich der Linieninfanterie und der
Cavallerie, gewissermaßen vorzuarbeiten. Avanciert die Infanterie, so
debandieren die Schützen sich vor deren Front, und halten sich, indem sie
ständig auf dem Feind schießen, immer um hundert oder einige hundert Schritt
vor derselben.
Beim
Angriff müssen die Schützen die ganze Front des Feindes beunruhigen, wenn man
auch, wie dies gewöhnlich der Fall ist, nur einen Theil der feindlichen
Stellung zum Hauptangriffspunkt ersehen hätte. Abgesehen auch von dem Abbruch,
den diese debandierten Leute dem Feinde wirklich thun, so werden sie auch noch
vorzüglich dazu dienen, ihn überall zu beschäftigen. Vielleicht ziehen sie seine
Aufmerksamkeit von unserm gewählten Angriffspunkte ab, und geben uns dadurch
Gelegenheit, unter Begünstigung des Terrains, ihn mit unserer Hautmacht
unerwartet au dem Leib zu kommen.
Am
leichtesten wird uns dies gelingen, wenn wir ihn zum frühen Feuern verleiten
können, weil, wie schon oben erwähnt ist, der Pulverdampf die Bewegungen dies
angreifenden Theils seinem Gegner verbirgt. Man lasse daher seine Schützen
schon auf weite Distanzen, auf fünf bis sechs hundert Schritt, auf den Feind
feuern. Ist dies nur von einiger Wirkung, wie es, wenn die Schützen im Feuern
geübte Leute sind, wohl vorauszusetzen ist, so wird der Feind vielleicht
bewogen werden, sich früher und stärker mit ihnen zu enfilieren, als es
eigentlich der Klugheit und den Kriegsregelen gemäß wäre."
About the
Schützen and their tactics
§. 51.
"Nothing can prepare the decisive
attack of formed infantry more forceful than the aimed fire of the Schützen.
While the fire of the first branch of troops [i.e. formed infantry] is only
decisive under certain circumstances, and so to speak to be regarded as
initiation of an indented bayonet attack, the shooting and hitting is to be
regarded as the main element of the Schützen tactic. Therefore the Schützen
have to form in the general order of battle the front line [’Vordertreffen’],
whose task it is, commonly along with the artillery, to damage the enemy from a
distance; to prepare the attack for the troops destined for close combat and
even for the hand to hand combat, that means the line infantry and
cavalry. Is the infantry advancing, the
Schützen disperse in the front of them and remain, continuing to fire
constantly at the enemy, about one hundred to some hundred paces in front of
them.
During the attack the
Schützen must keep harassing the whole front of the enemy, even when, as it is
commonly usual, on one part of the enemy position was chosen as the main point
of attack. Beside the damage that is really inflicted by the dispersed troops
on the enemy, they will serve splendidly to keep him busy everywhere. Maybe
they succeed in distracting his attention from our chosen point of attack, and
therefore giving us the opportunity to come to quarters with him unexpectedly
with our main force by using the terrain to our advantage.
This will be achieved by us
the easiest way, when we induce him to fire early, because as is mentioned
above, the powder smoke is concealing for the opponent the movement of the
attacking party. For that reason, one must permit the Schützen to open fire on
the enemy already at a great distance, at five to six hundred paces. If this
would have some effect, as is well to be expect, while the Schützen are
experienced marksmen, the enemy perhaps may be induced to fire on them
[’enfiliren’] earlier and much stronger as would be appropriate according to
prudence and the rules of war."
Pages 76 – 77
"The in §45 stated general rule
that infantry should not fire at a longer distances then three hundred paces,
is not to be applied to the skirmishers, Schützen, and tirailleurs. These are
forced, especially in small clashes and skirmishes, to deviate from it. Is the
enemy approaching with skirmishers to our position, if he is pressing back our
cavalry outposts and occupies terrain from which he can oversee our position at
perhaps 500 paces from our skirmisher posts, it would be not commendable to leave
him in peace and to wait until he perhaps will even approach closer 1) – What
can be done against an enemy which, like the French in the Revolutionary War,
fires at us from a distance of five- to six hundred paces, wounding people,
when the ground does not allow a counterattack?"
1) Footnote by Valentini: "The author would
not dare to give a general rule about the shooting ranges of a gun, if he would
not have witnessed himself, that the greatest adversaries of long distance
shooting were forced according to the circumstances to deviate form their
premises. Also the reader will note that long distance shooting is not
recommended as a general rule, but is only regarded necessary under the above
mentioned circumstances."
Page 77 – 78
© Hans-Karl Weiß and Geert van Uythoven