French artillery and skirmishing tactics during the Revolutionary Wars

by Geert van Uythoven

Paddy Griffiths makes a good case in 'The Art of War in Revolutionary France' that those early clouds of tirailleurs were not so much a deliberate light infantry tactic, more what happened when a mob tried to form line and engage in a running musketry engagement."

Although Paddy has a lot of good points in his book, I disagree on his opinion about the French skir tactics during the 1793-1795 period. I believe that the French 'deliberately', and sometimes with decisive results, used enormous amounts of skirmishers to wear down and to outflank Allied positions, as well as occupying parts of the terrain suited for such tactics. However, these skirmisher tactics were only part of a whole, and has to be looked at as such. To illustrate this, I will give you the opinion from H.P.R. von Porbeck. Von Porbeck was a Hessian officer, who participated in the 1793-1795 campaigns in the north. He was among one of the first analysing and describing the events happened, and my opinion is that he is reasonable objective in his observations. I am convinced he does not try to explain why the Allied lost so many battles, but wrote down what he saw happening with his own eyes, and experienced himself. Von Porbeck is best known for his massive work "Kritische Geschichte der Operationen welche die Englisch -combinirte Armee zur Vertheidigung von Holland in den Jahren 1794 und 1795 ausgeführt hat" 2 Vols (Braunschweig 1802 & Konigslutter 1804). Beside that, he published on his own account the military magazine "Neue Bellona. Oder Beiträge zur Kriegskunst und Kriegsgeschichte" 10 Volumes (Leipzig 1801-1806), and numerous articles for other magazines. I rank him at the same level as Jomini, Clausewitz, and Archduke Charles. To bad he was killed at the battle of Talavera, 1809…

This quote is taken from the article believed to be written by Von Porbeck: 'Ueber die Ursachen der vielen Siege und des Kriegsglücks der Franzosen auf dem festen lande in diesem Revolutions-Kriege; besonders in Hinsicht der flandrischen Feldzüge' in: "Neue Bellona", 2. Band (Leipzig 1802) [my translation]:

p.357-360: "The amount of very well served artillery available to the [French] generals during their attacks and retreats, were used to their utmost: always they were placed in dangerous spots, doing the greatest damage to the enemy, supported the attack, and covered the rout of their raw infantry. Important service was their horse artillery. Their crews consisted of the smartest, strongest, and most active men of the army, and became an invaluable aid to the bad French cavalry. They [the horse artillery] were first on the battlefield, and left last, and were present with all battles.
In addition, it was with the French commanders fundamental that they did not note their own loss of guns -which were easy to replace on a daily basis-, if these same guns would be able to do enormous damage to an advancing enemy, by firing several shots of canister at point blanc range with devastating effect, after which the guns were nailed and their crews retreated. (Click here for an example of the French use of artillery) Only when in this way the French overall retreat was favoured, the French generals had to explain their loss.

When attacking in Flanders and Brabant, the French generals did not form a broad front with troops in lines, or they would posses a 3:1 numerical advantage; they most of the time attacked in columns, in the intersected terrains, with its many fences and walls, using for the advance the broad Netherlands chaussée's. With the artillery at the front, and with thousands of skirmishers on both flanks, the columns broke into the weakly held positions of the Allies with force; only deploying when they had reached favourable terrain, and dug themselves in. This way of fighting, very suitable for the character of the French soldier [sic!], who is light, but effectively armed, who knows to utilise every corner, brushwood, tree, hillock or ditch to his advantage in the man-to-man combat. A combat in which every man wants to distinguish himself in the eyes of his companions by bravery and skill, to show his part in victory, competing in bravery and egoism, in high spirits, by negotiating fences, brushwood, and other obstacles, and usually reaching the purpose by outflanking the enemy positions and in this way forcing them to retreat.
The French skirmishers went so far with this way of fighting, that during the attack on Menin and many other places, during which they should have laid down in cover on the glacis, often stood straight up in order to kill the gunners by shooting through the embrasures, braving the constant fire of the garrison.
These combats 'en debandade', which were utilised by the best light infantry, consisting of hand-picked men, brave and skilled marksmen, not selected by their length, and led by the best hand-picked officers. With forces consisting of thousands of skirmishers they made detours of hours length, threatened the flanks and communication lines of the enemy, and became as such an integral part of the system of attack for the French generals.
This art of using light forces, utilised in intersected terrain, as was extensively present at the flank positions of the Allies in Flandern and at the Sambre, gave the French even with the same strength of forces the edge against the Allies, which lacked enough light infantry trained for this kind of war, and only able to oppose them with line infantry not trained or equipped for this.
But what the French generals favoured most during these battles, was first, the enormous amount of men available, enabling them to replace the frontline troops several times during their fight against the weakly held, seventy hours long cordon of posts (Click here for an example of the French use of mass skirmishers); secondly the basic of the system of terror utilised by them, not to spare their soldiers, while every loss was immediately replaced, and they had not to account for those losses."