Demian about the use of
light infantry
Translated and remarks by
Hans-Karl Weiß and Geert van Uythoven
Source:
Demian, "Anleitung zum Selbst-Studium
der militärischen Dienstwissenschaft", 2. Band (Wien 1809)
The so-called second volume consists in fact
of two books, where the second book is titled "Die allgemeine
Gefechtslehre" (‘general fighting lessons’)
"And herewith we receive a special branch
of the foot soldier: the light infantry, whose establishment is more and more
urgently daily by the experiences of the unhappy Revolutionary War. As one has
far earlier recognised the far and big advantage of the light cavalry against
the heavy and the multiple use of the light artillery: even today there won’t
be a reasonable human being, who would dare to question the essential use of a
numerous, well instructed and well educated light infantry.
At the outbreak of the war in 1792 the
French Army was disorganised; the old troops had partially lost their military
spirit, their trust and discipline, and the new ones were lacking nearly all
basic ingredients for a usable soldier. Convinced and being thaught by costly
experiences, that they are not able to wage warfare in the open field with the
experienced and well drilled troops of their mighty opponents, they remained inside
fortresses, in unassailable camps and rugged terrain, and while we wasted in
front of the above mentioned places our best forces, they waged war to our
longs line of communications with the little war, tiring out and weakening
their opponents, which were only accustomed to linear war, were winning by
small advantages bravado and confidence and developed within two years into
best light troops. The French infantry dispersed and formed themselves equally
quick before the enemy. Armed with a normal musket, they knew how to approach
secretly and disappear by stealth, and they knew to use the composition of the
terrain from where they could fire safely at the enemy. According to the beat
of the drum the French Infantry knew to deploy safely in open or closed order,
and in case of emergency to form squares quickly to repulse interfering
cavalry. Pieces of cloth and equipment which were unnecessarily hampering him were
discarded, and very often when fighting during the summers it consisted of a
shirt only, light pantaloons and a pair of shoes without stockings, and a hat,
which was his only dress, his armament a musket with bayonet, which cartridges
he carried in his leg wear. No Alps with their eternal masses of snow and ice would
stop him. He climbed competitively with the mountain goats and was scaling down
from the region of the eagles through deep untouched snow into the surprised
valleys. He crossed rivers naked, the armament carried on his head, or he
marched through all rivers which waves were not reaching to their mouth.
Endless months without pay, often without shoes, shirts and stockings; he
disregarded rain, wind and cold. However, it was in the Vendée where the French
infantry were taught the highest degree of training. The terrible civil war, which
was rampaging here, and which atrocities were surpassing all the most terrible
which history showed up to then, was facing the French Infantry man with three
times more skilled hunters. Who, grown up in the forests of the Vendée, used
their skill gained by hunting game, and stirred up by fanatics and despair,
against the defenders of the hated Republic. Against these opponents, who
jumped over ditches of incredible width, who approached and disappeared by the
speed of a horse, who could do a sure shot in an instant of immobility, the
Republicans had without any doubt a more tough stand compared with troops which
were only skilled in line warfare. Such immense experience, well used by the young,
high tempered and educated leaders, being worked on by the genius and character
of the nation, must lead eventually to an immense advantage against the in
military terms famous enemies of France. While the slowly growing feeling of
the hot heads of France was giving birth to the conclusion that for a brave
infantry man nothing is impossible, and that there was even no such impressive
obstacle which could not be overcome by brave men in combination with bravado
and stamina.
And so it happened that, after ten years of
a bloody warfare which cannot be compared with anything in history, each army
returned home with a remarkable number of light infantrymen which are
indispensable today, regardless if one was not sure about the establishment, or
about the tendency or the creation of this arm.
Light troops are these who far more often
fight in dispersed or in skirmishing order (‘en debandade’), than in
close order, and who are moving faster than the others of their arm. They are
able to change their formation according to their whims or necessity of the
demand; with a wider front one has the assurance to take on a smaller one by
outflanking him, and destroy him with a crossfire. It is therefore evident that
a battalion in close order of heavy infantry, is being beaten by surrounding
light infantry, even when weaker in numbers. Further on, the character of light
troops assures that they can move and shot simultaneously; because the fire of
line infantry on the move happens only on the training ground. In any case, the
fire fight is at its best in dispersed order or when skirmishing, by which the
fire is the most effective, from a dispersed open line when each individual can
shoot without being restricted. In the results gained with fire of line
infantry in close order compared to skilled Schützen, the later ones are four
times more effective. Also the dispersed and constantly firing quickly
advancing line is suffering less than the slowly in Spanish step advancing
closed battalions. In all cases one will usually defeat neatly arranged
infantry, even in a frontal attack, when the skirmishers (tirailleurs) approach
as close as possible. Because the skirmishing infantry is not only superior in
column but also in line and is even superior to artillery; their power is only
surpassed by the choc of cavalry, because this attack can be delivered quicker
than skirmishers are able to defend themselves in a supporting and well formed
mass. The most remarkable power of the French infantry consists in the ability
to appear as well as in formed battalions as in a skirmishing line.
As to the establishment and the numbers of
such troops, the latest war has given undeniable proof that a well educated
nation has less need of light troops than a lesser educated. The brighter it is
in the heads of the common people the better they are in the mood to skirmish,
there their own common sense gives them thousands of small means which are not
present in the line. The common infantryman of an alert and educated nation
will be able to help himself better without extra orders while skirmishing,
than that one of a cumbersome nation. A nation which is combining these
characteristics with the love for their country would not need any light
troops, instead all units could be used as well as in close or open order, for a
picket line as well for holding a position, to fire at targets and all movement
being used as skirmishers, as well as to
the ‘normal’ fire and movements of the line. And by and large this is the case
for the French. Their natural alertness, the skill, which all are trying to
gain by running, jumping, swimming and fencing, and the won tendency for
skirmishing from both interests, provide that with few exceptions every
infantry man can be drilled for both kinds of fight. One can say that the whole
French infantry consisted during the war of light troops; because we know that
the grenadiers and the line troops, as well as the light half brigades could be
used in the same way and same advantage in every demanding circumstances, where
only a human being is able to go by using his two hands and legs, to jump, to
swim, to crawl or to slide. The Austrian Monarchy could especially from the
Hungarians and Grenzer raise the most formidable light troops, if one would
teach them in peace time the necessary lessons to fight in open order. The Grenzer
has the knowledge and skill for accurate shooting form earliest times, and even
according to the testimony of Frederic II this made them the best light troops.
How should one now drill this natural but raw talent? – Being grown up in the
forests, being used to all weather conditions, knowing all kinds of terrain,
and additional to the right shooting, beings accustomed to tricks and being
comfortable since his youth to the picket and so called cordon duty, they would
provide the army, being completely devoid of skilled light infantry, with a most
varying and useful service.
The less however a nation is inclined for
quick wit and alertness, as for exercising the body, the more necessary it is
to chose some people, who could be taught with art the possible grade of adroitness,
which makes an infantryman usable for all tasks; and the more clumsy the tactic
of an army is, the more it has the need for light infantry, to replace the line
troops, where their own slowly ness and clumsiness are not allowing them to
fight in open order. Foreigners however, as well as Inländer [foreigners
inside the country which had to flee form their own country], who have no
motherland, cannot be entrusted with the safety of the army; they belong to the
line only, and cannot be used for light infantry duty. The light infantry of an
army must consist of the most reliable, young and healthy naturals, of the core
of the nation, who could be entrusted with the safety of the army in both
hands; however they must also be organised, dressed and armed according to
common sense, and used always for their specific task. It is stupid and very wrong,
when one believes that the exercise in years of peace are only to be used to
build line troops, and that light troops will be build in war time by occasion
and demand at random, and the scoundrels are best enough to let themselves be
shot in fulfilling that task. The light troops who are only exercised during wartime
are not useful. Who does not know the clumsiness and the little reliability of
all newly formed Freikorps, and the impossibility to induce them with
the necessary strings of discipline? Only plundering and devastation are the
way of these, doing more damage to the peaceful inhabitants then to the enemy.
Neither instructed for close or open order they debouch against the enemy in
irregular lumps and run back when it becomes serious. Now the brave line units
stand deserted, being deployed in rank and file and having to observe being
threatened in the rear and the flanks by the enemy tirailleurs. No wonder, when
these then are forced to beat a quick retreat, without having fired a single shot.
Nevertheless they opposed the French often, who advanced in rough terrain in
open order, with files in skirmish order. But what advantage could they
achieve, as these brave battalions were only accustomed to fight in closed
ranks, having not the foggiest idea of ‘Tiraillieren’ [skirmishing],
that is combat in open order.
It is enlightening by itself, how
necessary it is to have always an infantry which is able to fight in open order
‘en debandade’. The experience did teach that the best line units in the
field are exposed to the loss of its most brave people, even its discipline and
its glory, when they are not provided with troops trained in light duty for
their cover and position, support and safety. It is however not at every
opportunity possible to provide a regiment, a battalion, or a small detachment,
a necessary part of light troops for their safety. For that reason it is the
essential need that in each battalion there is a selection of reliable men (that
not all and not a whole file is suitable we did already see) who have the
destination to surround the main body in all positions and marches and to cover
it; that it is impossible for it to be attacked at its weakest point by quick
attacks, nor can be intimidated by single skirmishers of the enemy. To secure
the deployment, the flanking moves and the retreat of the main body in the face
of the enemy and to cover it from the attention of the enemy, to occupy quickly
important positions in the vicinity, like farms, bridges, forests, ditches,
wine gardens and cultivated field and to clear away the enemy. To make sudden
diversions in the flanks and rear of the enemy, to ambush him, or when possible
to creep on to him and to take prisoners to gain reliable intelligence.
During the attack of the formed infantry,
these so called Tirailleurs, or ‘en debandade’ fighting men must, when
the ground is allowing it, annoy the flanks of the enemy and even try to outflank
and surround him as long as small troops are not in danger. It is almost
unbelievable what terror one can create when one succeed in appearing at the
rear, even with only a few men. One has examples that in this way small
detachments caused the loss of whole positions. Also during an attack with the
bayonet, where on does not want to fire, the tirailleurs must deploy in front
of the advancing enemy and continuously fire at the enemy. (…)
It is moreover recommended to annoy with
men in open order the whole front of the enemy, even when one has only the
intention to attack part of the enemies positions with a main attack only. Even
though that these tirailleurs do little harm, they give him work on all parts,
and maybe are withdrawing his attention from the chosen point of attack and we
will have the opportunity, especially when the ground is favouring us, to
achieve a surprise attack with our main force. The latter will especially then be
achieved easily when we can provoke the enemy to fire prematurely as, I stated
above, the powder smoke is concealing the attack of the opponent. Therefore one
permits ones own far advanced tirailleurs to open fire even on a far greater distance
against the enemy. Is this producing only some results, when the tirailleurs
are well skilled people in firing, which has to be evidently the case, perhaps
the enemy is provoked to engage earlier and stronger than he would have done
according to the rules of war and would haven been proper. (…)”
Pages 261 – 273
© Hans-Karl Weiß and Geert van Uythoven