BLATON AND LINCELLES, 18 AUGUST 1793

by Geert van Uythoven

As described in my piece about Lincelles, on 18 August the fortified village of Lincelles had been taken by the Dutch army, but a French counterattack had driven them out again. The British Guards recaptured Lincelles. A few kilometres from Lincelles the village Blaton was situated, also fortified by the French. The attack by the Dutch on Lincelles and Blaton was coordinated and simultaneously, and therefore I decided to describe what happened at both places on this day. Also to give some more background information to my piece on Lincelles. To start with, I will translate the complete after action report taken from the Journal from the Dutch commander in chief the Hereditary Prince of Orange:

Source: Journaal der Armée onder de orders van zyne Doorlugtige Hoogheid den Heere Generaal Erfprince van Orange etc. ['Journal of the army, commanded by his royal highness the hereditary Prince of Organe]; headquarters, 18 August 1793:

"His Royal Highness having agreed upon attacking the enemy posts Lincelles and Blaton, the following disposition was carried out, in agreement with the Duke of York, and planned by the Hereditary Prince in cooperation with Lieutenant-Colonel Gomez and Colonel Schöller in Imperial [i.e. Austrian] respectively Prussian service. The Duke of York has given the assurance that, if necessary, he would support the attack with troops.

Therefore in the morning, commanded by Major-General Van Drachstädt, from Werwick marched the 1st bat/Waldeck Regiment No.1 [German] with its battalion guns and the howitzer present there, beside the 1st squadron/Cavalerie Regiment ‘(Van der Duijn) van ‘s Gravemoer’, one light infantry company of the Korps van Béon [French émigrés], and the Jagers van Bylandt [light infantry].

These received the order to be in position on the height near the windmill of Blaton at five o’clock in the morning. At the same time, the following troops had to be present there: the Infanterie Bataljon Nassau-Usingen [Walloon], [the Infantry Regiment] ‘May’ [Swiss] and Infanterie Regiment No.1 ‘De Schepper’ [one battalion each], beside two squadrons of the Regiment Garde Dragonders [guard dragoons]. These troops march from the army under command of Major-General van ‘s Gravemoer, crossing the Lys using the pontoon bridge at Boesbeck.

This whole column is commanded by Lieutenant-General Fuerst of Waldeck, destined to capture the Blaton post. Attached to this column would, beside the battalion guns, two howitzers and two 12-pdr cannon.

The main column, commanded by the Commander in Chief General the Hereditary Prince of Orange, consisted of the battalion Hollandsche Gardes [Dutch Guards], the Garde Zwitsers [Swiss Guards], and the grenadier battalions ‘Van Breydenbach’ and ‘Van Plettenberg’; beside a battalion of the Infanterie Regiment No.6 ‘Van Welderen’, with its battalion guns, to which was attached two howitzers, two 12-pdr cannon, beside the Lijf-Eskadron [Life-squadron] of the Regiment Garde Dragonders, three squadrons Hollandsche Gardes te Paard [Dutch Horse Guards], and one squadron of the dragoon regiment ‘Hessen-Kassel’. To this main column the volunteers of Captain Matthieu were attached, to form the advance guard and the flank patrols, in addition Lieutenant-General van Mönster, and the Major-Generals Van Golowkin, Trebra, Rouse, Saumaise, and Van Nostitz. The main column was destined to capture the Lincelles post, and for this purpose they left their encampment near Menin at half past four in the morning, passing through this city and through Halluin village, en then to the right to Lincelles.

The jaeger, hussars and infantry march with their cannon from the post at Ronck under the command of Colonel Count Van Bylandt; he has to take up position on the heights near Blanc four, in an effort to try to cut off the enemy from Lincelles, and further to detach jaeger with some infantry on the road from Lincelles to Bonduës. The main post of this column however has to remain on the chaussee of Ronck, to prevent the enemy to debouch from Bonduës.

 

The column of the Prince van Waldeck has become master of Blaton without encountering much resistance. However, the main column attacking Lincelles met with more resistance. The Battaillon Hollandsche Gardes was deployed to the left, and except for its battalion guns to support its attack on the entrenchments, for which it was destined, it received a 12-pdr cannon and a howitzer. The Battaillon Garde Zwitsers was more to the right, and received orders to turn Lincelles, while the Hollandsche Gardes marched straight towards the village. After having fired heavily, the enemy was forced to retreat because both battalions broke into the village; one through the entrenchments, the other from behind, and according to the received reports enemy loss was substantial. While this attack was executed, the three remaining battalions were deployed in order of battle on a height between two windmills, beside part of the cavalry, while the other part was send out on patrol.

 

The column commanded by the Count van Bylandt, after having left behind a strong detachment on the height, advanced further and pursued the enemy up to Bonduës, after having already forced two entrenchments. Arriving in front of the third however they were obliged to retreat, because the canon was not capable to pass the second one.

 

Lincelles and Blaton both taken, in the first place the grenadier battalions ‘Van Breydenbach’ and ‘Van Plettenberg’, and the battalion of the Infanterie Regiment No.1 ‘De Schepper’, beside two squadrons of the Regiment Garde Dragonders, remaining there beside their battalion guns two 12-pdr and two 6-pdr cannon, all under command of Major-General van Nostitz. To this an engineer and a few labourers were attached, in order to erect entrenchments to the side of the enemy, and to demolish those on our side.

 

At Blaton remained Major-General Van Drachstädt, with the 1st bat/Waldeck Regiment No.1 and the Infanterie Bataljon Nassau-Usingen with their battalion guns, two 12-pdr cannon and two howitzers, beside one squadron of the dragoon regiment ‘Hessen-Kassel’, and one of the Cavalerie Regiment ‘(Van der Duijn) van ‘s Gravemoer’.

 

His Royal Highness beside the other generals and the remaining troops returned to Menin. But in the afternoon His Royal Highness [at Menin] received message that Lincelles and Blaton were attacked again, with such superior force that, if no support was send, a retreat would be inevitable. Lord the Duke of York was requested to send some of his troops, after which three battalions English Guards marched to Lincelles. When the Prince of Orange arrived at Lincelles the post was abandoned again, being stormed and captured by the troops mentioned.

 

In the meantime His Royal Highness as support had send back to Lincelles the battalion of the Swiss Infantry Regiment ‘May’, the battalion of the Infanterie Regiment No.6 ‘Van Welderen’, and two squadrons of the Hollandsche Gardes te Paard. They arrived in time to support the English, the battalions staying there with the English during the night.

 

The post Blaton, which was attacked at the same time by a numerically very superior enemy, was also evacuated by our troops.

 

On the same day, the enemy post Mouveaux was also attacked from Tourcoing. For this purpose, Major-General De Geuse marched along the road to Rijssel with four battalions, while Colonel Pfister marched along the road of Hautcarlier with a few hundred men. However, the enemy was so strong in numbers and entrenched on all sides, that it was not possible to capture this place. On the contrary, the Major-General mentioned was himself attacked in Tourcoing, with such a numerically superior force, that he had to request for support to headquarters. For this purpose, two guard battalions from the army were dispatched to Tourcoing, returning to camp the next day.

 

The same morning Colonel van Horn commanding the 5th battalion Van Waldeck [German], occupied a favourable position outside Roubaix village to await the enemy, which he attacked fiercely that morning, the mentioned colonel leaving behind a captain and fifty men of the Infanterie Regiment No.9 ‘Van Randwijck’ to cover his retreat, but the enemy was driven back with heavy loss.

 

On the same day a battalion of the Waldeck Regiment No.2 arrived to reinforce Roubaix, which was heavily under attack again at four o’clock. We were not able to gain any ground because of the heavy fire of the enemy. And as with the coming night a lack of ammunition had to be feared, Lieutenant-Colonel Von Haake proposed to attack the enemy with the bayonet. This was executed by all troops, while shouting fiercely. This had the lucky result that the enemy was disordered and subsequently routed, driven back inside a village behind Roubaix. When Lieutenant-Colonel Von Haake returned with his men, enemy fire to the left of the city was still heavy. Therefore, Lieutenant-Colonel Von Haake again requested his men to attack the enemy in the left flank with the bayonet. Again the attack was executed and very successful. Only darkness prevented that many prisoners would have been taken. Colonel van Horn is full of praise of the Waldeck battalion, but also of the battalion of the Infanterie Regiment No.9 ‘Van Randwijck’ which was present there, an also of the artillerymen.

 

The excellent behaviour of the troops during all these different attacks deserve all praise. His Royal Highness has already stated his satisfaction, and attached is a list of the officers which had the opportunity to distinguish themselves by their ardour and bravery.

 

According to the reports that have been received the enemy loss is substantial, estimated at 1,700 men.

 

 

List of officers which had the opportunity to distinguish themselves by their ardour and bravery during the affair on 18 August 1793, the battalions having executed their attacks with much order and undaunted, especially the Hollandsche Gardes, the Swiss Guards, the 5th battalion Van Waldeck and ‘Van Welderen’ No.6.

 

Lieutenant-General Baron Van Mönster

Major-General Van Golowkin

Colonel Van Kretschmar van Wyck, major of the Hollandsche Gardes, commanding the battalion

Colonel Constant, major of the Swiss Guards, commanding the battalion

Colonel C. Bentinck, major of the Hollandsche Gardes

Colonel Van Straubensee, Infanterie Regiment No.6 ‘Van Welderen’

Colonel Van Horn, 5th battalion Van Waldeck

[Lieutenant-]Colonel Von Haake, 5th battalion Van Waldeck

Colonel Muyson, Hollandsche Gardes te Paard

Colonel Yvoy, Hollandsche Gardes te Paard

Colonel d’Oultremont, Regiment Garde Dragonders

Major Prince Von Solms, with the grenadier battalion ‘Van Plettenberg’

Captain Matthieu, of the volunteers

Lieutenant Lasberg, of the volunteers

Captain Von Lowenstern, 5th battalion Van Waldeck

Lieutenant Fagel of the Hollandsche Gardes, as adjutant with General Lake

Lieutenant Zwicky of the Swiss Guards, has stormed the battery first

Lieutenant Torxicella, of the Infanterie Bataljon Nassau-Usingen

Cadet Kerseboom, of the Hollandsche Gardes te Paard, serving with the English patrols

Cadet de Jong, of Infanterie Regiment No.1 ‘De Schepper’,  with the Infanterie Regiment No.6 ‘Van Welderen’ during the second attack on Lincelles

Cadet Hartjelief, of Infanterie Regiment No.18 ‘Van Wartensleben’

Sergeant Krieg, Willekes, and Werth, of the Hollandsche Gardes

 

                                                                                                       Was signed,

                                                                                                       W.F. Hereditary Prince of Orange

 

P.S.: All officers of the battalions of the Hollandse Gardes and Swiss Guards, and those of the volunteer Corps of Matthieu have behaved outstandingly, and cannot be singled out.

 

Source: Letter to the States-General of the Dutch Republic; headquarters at Menin, 22 August 1793:

Honourable Gentlemen,

It is with much sorrow, that I have the honour to report to You that Major-General Nostitz has died of the wound which he received in the affair at Lincelles. Also I have the honour to send to you the list of dead and wounded, which we have sustained in the several attacks. Grenadier battalion ‘Van Plettenberg’ will march to Antwerp, leaving behind two companies in Courtrai to secure the magazine and the hospital.

After which I have the honour to be,

Your Honourable Gentlemen submissive servant

Signed,

W.F. Heriditary Prince of Orange

Commanding General

 

 

List of dead, wounded, and missing officers, NCO’s, and other on 18 August 1793, in the actions at Tourcoing and Roubaix

 

Killed:

Captain Van Horn; 9 privates

 

Wounded:

Captain van den Heuvel

Lieutenant Muller

Lieutenant van Troxel

Ensign von Reineck

7 NCO’s; 68 corporals and privates

 

Missing:

3 privates

 

Signed,

W.F. Heriditary Prince of Orange

Commanding General

 

 

List of dead, wounded, and missing officers, NCO’s, and other on 18 August 1793, in the actions at Lincelles and Blaton

 

Killed:

Major-General Von Nostitz

Major Van der Feltz

Major Muller

Captain Herman van Sonneberg

Lieutenant Leuckel

Ensign Severyn

Ensign Schminke

Ensign Hartjelief

2 NCO’s; 2 drummers; 55 corporals and privates

 

Wounded:

Colonel Van Burmania

Colonel Cornabé

Lieutenant-Colonel Harring

Major Panneboeter

Major De Bellangé

Major De Herrenschwandt

Captain Franc. Count Van Bylandt

Captain Van Quadt

Captain Count van Goltz

Captain De Vreé, senior

Captain Bom

Lieutenant Schmidt

Lieutenant Matthieu

Lieutenant Van Lasberg

Lieutenant Evers

Lieutenant Torricella

Lieutenant Scherer

Lieutenant Tuyll

Ensign de Vries

Ensign Cremer

Ensign Sabatier

Ensign Crommelin

Ensign Beurkin

Ensign Dolleman

12 NCO’s; 1 drummer; 161 corporals and privates

 

P.S. Among the wounded, many have such minor wounds that they are already doing service again.

 

Missing:

Lieutenant-Colonel Breydenbach

Captain Engineer Berg

Lieutenant Scheffer, senior

Ensign and adjutant Cageling

Ensign Bos

9 NCO’s, 7 drummers, 106 corporals and privates

 

Signed,

W.F. Heriditary Prince of Orange

Commanding General

 

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

Interpretation:

 

Here it is, a clear picture of the affairs at Lincelles and Blaton. However, looking at the above piece, and information deriving from other sources, some things have to be explained, clarified, and will lead to a somewhat different view as is depicted here. First it is important to ascertain why these actions took place.

 

During the previous period, the Dutch troops in this area had constantly been harassed and disturbed by French attacks which in most cases held a numerical superiority making good their lack of training. Although every time beaten back with severe loss, the fighting and the necessity to stay under arms fatigued the Dutch troops enormously. In addition, losses were sustained which were difficult to make good again. Examples are the combats near Tourcoing and Lannoy, which lasted for five hours. According to Van Ginkel, the attacks of 18 August were undertaken to get rid of the continuous French attacks, while De Bas states that the posts at Lincelles and Blaton had to be captured to improve the Dutch positions. At first glance these seems very plausible reasons. However, after both posts had been captured, they were voluntarily abandoned again the next day, as described and the reason why given by an anonymous German writer, most probably Von Porbeck:

 

“The French were not prepared to try to capture Lincelles again. The scenes of the previous day had been too painful for them to wish to repeat it again. Around noon [of the 19th], Lieutenant-General Von Wurmb [now occupying Lincelles with six Hessian battalions] to demolish all entrenchments, and to leave the place with music playing (‘mit klingendem Spiel’). This happened and in the afternoon around two o’clock the Hessians marched into camp near Menin again. (…) The Dutch did not occupy Lincelles again –The French however already the same day, and erected the entrenchments again. Despite the best intentions of the Duke of York, despite the excellent measures of the Hessian general, and despite the great bravery of the Hessians, the position on the height of Lincelles was very risky: on nearly all sides this post was surrounded by thickets and fields surrounded by brushwood. In the direction of the enemy the height had not a steep slope, and the terrain was open here; the general neither the English quartermaster-lieutenant, neither the adjutant, had been able to reconnoitre the terrain during the night despite all efforts. In front, on the left as well as on the right, were chaussee’s to Lille, and more secondary roads to the same place. The inhabitants were very republican, all spies, and had betrayed the Dutch. If the French in Werwick had thrown 500 tirailleurs inside the forest of Bousbeck during the night, to block any support from the camp, and would have attacked the Hessians frontally and on both flanks, as well as in the back; which means of saving them would have been left? Even with the greatest effort, it would have taken at least three and a half hours for any support from the camp [at Menin] to arrive. Therefore, the Hessians would have been sacrificed at this forward post without any purpose. It was pure luck that the enemy had so much respect [for them], and let them retreat safely.” 1)

 

From the above it seems that the Allies were not informed about the situation of both posts, and their exposed position caused by the layout of the terrain. So as it turned out later, because of a serious misjudgement of Allied high command, triggered by the continuous irritating attacks initiated by the French, an affair was fought without any gains at all, for the loss of hundreds of soldiers which were difficult to replace. Blame for all this could easily laid with the Commander in Chief of the Allied forces in this part of the Austrian Netherlands, the Duke of York. However, it seems that the whole idea for it was Dutch, and that the Hereditary Prince of Orange is the most responsible person for the debacle.

 

 

 

 

Conclusions:

1. A bloody battle was fought, initiated by the Allies, without any gains.

2. Cooperation between the Dutch and the Anglo-Allied armies was very good.

3. The Dutch army at this time had no rigid organisation or command structure; units were assigned to commanding officers forming ad hoc brigades and divisions which were adjusted according to the circumstances. This is in resemblance with the ‘Austrian System’ as described by Roland Kessinger in his piece ‘Managing Armies in the 2nd Coalition War 1799-1800 –The Austrian and French Approaches’ in First Empire magazine No.71 (July/August 2003). Placed by Roland in 1799-1800, one should not that rather curious the system the Dutch used was six years earlier! So is it possible the Austrians used the Dutch as an example? Or did the ‘Austrian System’ develop much earlier as 1799? The battle of Aldenhoven on 1 March 1793 2), and in addition the battle of Neerwinden a few weeks later, already show some kind of flexibility which resemble the ‘Austrian System’ as described by Roland. More research would be needed to come to a more definite conclusion.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1) Anonymous [Probably Von Porbeck]: "Feldzug der Verbündeten in Braband und Flandern im Jahr 1793", in Hoyers' 'Neues Militairisches Magazin, 2. Band, 2. Stück (Leipzig 1801) pp. 39-40.

2) See my article about this battle, that has appeared in First Empire magazine No. 68, Jan/Feb 2003.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Main sources used:

Bas, F. de: "Prins Frederik der Nederlanden en zijn tijd" deel 1 (Schiedam 1887)

Ginkel, J.P. van: "Het leven van Willem George Frederik van Orange" (Rotterdam 1802)

 

 

© Geert van Uythoven