11 & 12 May 1794, battle
of Courtrai:
The after action report of GM von Düring
(Bericht des Darmstädtschen Generals von Düring)
Translation
by Geert van Uythoven
Source: ‘Von D’ [possibly von Dalwigk] , “Feldzug der verbundenen Armeen
in Flandern, im Jahre 1794”, in ‘Neues militairisches Journal’ 10. Band 20. Stück (Hannover 1801) pp. 232-245.
“Your Royal Highness [the Duke of York],
Following is the report about the actions of 11 and 12 May, which I am
obliged to send to you regarding the Hessen-Darmstadt Brigade under my command.
After the brigade had joined the army corps of General FZM Graf
Clerfayt, in agreement with Your orders, it was continuously used for outpost,
advance- and rear-guard duties. I expected from the feelings of justice of the
FZM, that he will give the best statements about the behaviour of the brigade
on the 6th. While everything was already pushed back over Bevern by the enemy with heavy guns, the
brigade halted the enemy on all alone, and even managed to push the enemy,
after strong resistance out of Harlebeck village, and held the village
thereafter without flinching.
On the 8th, the army corps struck the camp near Vichte. The brigade
formed the rear-guard with part of the Grün-Laudon Freicorps, and occupied the
places Ingelmünster, Iseghem, and Casthem.
On the 9th, the dispositions assigned the brigade to the great chaussee
from Courtrai to Brugge, and the occupation of the terrain between Lendelede
and the Lis.
Early in the morning of the 10th, I received orders to dislodge the
enemy out of some brushwood a quarter of an hour on this side of the Heule
[brook]. The enemy did not resist long, but retreated from there, also out of
the camp they had just on the other side of the Heule, to the city [Courtrai],
at which occasion the ‘Schützen’ charged with the bayonet across the river,
into the enemy camp of huts, killed many and captured much loot. The Austrian
General, Graf von Sporck, also arrived on the chaussee with an infantry
battalion and some artillery, and took over command of the whole left wing.
Beside continuous artillery fire and musketry from the outposts, nothing else
happened this day.
On the 11th, around 11 o’clock in the afternoon [???], the enemy, which
during the previous night had strengthened the entrenched windmills around
Courtrai, and armed them with heavy guns, started bombarding us, and a short
while later the whole line was attacked by irregular dispersed infantry, which
pressed us strongly. This lasted for several hours, but when it became clear to
the enemy that they would not be able to penetrate, the attack slackened a bit.
Around 5 o’clock in the evening he advanced again in three closed columns, with
howitzers and cannon at the front, with numerous jaegers and light infantry.
And they really managed to come far enough, to lodge themselves in big houses
behind the houses closer to the Heule [brook]. On the left wing, of which I had
given command to Major von Schäffer, the enemy tried to repair the bridge that
was demolished the day before with pontoons; some well aimed cannon shots, as
well as flanking fire by the jaegers and light infantry, prevented this intention.
In addition, we were prosperous in the centre, because of the bravery of
the battalions ‘Schröder’ [Austrian] and ‘Landgraf’ [Hessen-Darmstadt], which
endured the fire of the enemy light troops, which was positioned behind houses
and fences, for several hours. The well-aimed fire of an Austrian 12-pdr, which
was attached to my brigade, dislodged an enemy group of 6 to 800 men, which had
lodged themselves close in front of the bridge, after which they abandoned
their intentions also here. On our right flank in the meanwhile, commanded by Major
Uz, our outpost in a watermill was forced to retreat by the enemy. The reason
why General Graf von Sporck or I myself were not informed about this, I do not
know. In the meanwhile the danger we were exposed to, to be taken in the right
flank, was not known to us until I, visiting my chain, found the posts linking
to my right and which were occupied by Austrian troops abandoned by them, and
instead occupied by enemy troops. Only just, and only due to the speed of my
horse, I managed to escape being made prisoner, as two enemy jaegers, hidden in
the corn, already reached for the bridle. General Graf von Sporck now, after
this event, and because he found himself completely cut off from communications
with General Clerfayt, did not hesitate a moment to order the retreat, which was
executed without any further loss. Around 2 o’clock in the morning, my brigade occupied
the position and outposts again, which they had occupied the day before.
On the 12th, early in the morning, Major Stockmar who commanded the
outposts at the barrier, reported to me that the enemy advanced along the
chaussee in closed column. After close observation, it became clear to me that
the enemy covered this column by his carabineers, so it was without doubt that
this was a serious attack. Convinced as I was that my positions were in no
danger to be forced easily, I speedily went to His Excellency the Commanding General
[i.e. Clerfayt] at Lengelede, to report to him personally about the situation, and
that General Graf von Sporck with the Austrian troops except one division which
stayed with Major von Schäffer, already was marching for support. His
Excellency allotted me a 6-pdr, and promised me troops in addition. However,
when returning, I encountered enemy light troops already between my position
and the headquarters, and when I arrived with my brigade, the enemy already
bombarded us with cannon and howitzers on the chaussee. Because of a
misunderstanding, the only 12-pdr left his advantageous position on the height
of Bronbielk, were my battalions were deployed in order of battle. Because now
there was no reply to the continuous enemy fire, I was obliged to retreat to
the barrier in front of Ingelmunster. Major von Schäffer also had to retire
from his posts at Hulst and Bavichoven to this line. In order to cover his left
flank, he ordered two grenadier companies allotted to him, to take the road to
St. Eloy, and to link up with the corps of General von Wangenheim until further
order.
In the meanwhile, the enemy pressured us with all might, and tried to
turn our left flank. Because of the resoluteness, with which my infantry and one
company of the ‘Callenberg’ Regiment [Austrian] opposed the enemy with the
bayonet and regular fire, they were beaten back. At the same time, the Austrian
12-pdr assigned to me, disabled an enemy gun on the chaussee. These events were
the cause that the [enemy] attack stalled for about an hour. When I noticed the
enemy irresoluteness, I despatched a few cavalry and some ‘Schützen’, which cut
down several of the enemy, and took 5 prisoners. Of these, and also from some
deserters, I learned that the column advancing along the chaussee was at least
8,000 infantry and a 1,000 cavalry strong. And that the column which had moved
along the Rousselaer chaussee the day before, was even stronger. So again, I
went with all haste to the Commanding General [Clerfayt] in Iseghem, to ask for
orders how to behave, and for support. Before the ‘Callenberg’ battalion
[Austrian, apparently the support assigned to GM von Düring] arrived, the enemy
again attacked with all force. My line was much to extended, and ammunition was
running low. Especially the jaegers and the 1st ‘Callenberg’ division had ran
out of ammunition completely. The men had not slept for three nights now, had
no bread since two days, and still their morale was high. While in the
meanwhile the Mandelbeck [=brook] was right behind us, I decided to retreat my
troops into the village [Ingelmünster] except for the ‘Schützen’ and pickets,
and to concentrate myself on the defence of the bridge. The Austrian
Lieutenant-Colonel Schwarzinger of the reserve-artillery gave me a 12-pdr and a
6-pdr. He himself was of great service to me in aiding with throwing up an
earth wall in front of the bridge. The demolishing and defence of two other
bridges on my left flank was entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel von Linden, and
Major von Schäffer, whose activities cannot be praised to much.
Sadly the brave Lieutenant-Colonel Schwarzinger was soon wounded by a
musket ball, and the labourers ran, and showed to my consternation in their flight
that the Mandelbeck ran only two feet water. From the 6-pdr the whole crew,
except one gunner and a ‘handlanger’, beside nearly the whole [horse] team, were
shot down. One 12-pdr did one shot only, after which it was declared useless,
probably because of loading it too quick. Hundreds of the enemy infantry
already crossed the water between Iseghem and Ingelmünster, so that I have to
send back the remaining 12-pdr for fear losing it altogether. My cavalry in the
meanwhile managed to keep these troops in respect for quite a while. While
after repeated reports to my Commanding General [Clerfayt] about the precarious
situation I received order to defend the village [Ingelmünster] to the last
while supports were being send, I ordered to attack the advancing enemy with sorties
by cavalry and artillery. In this way was able to hold the village for another
quarter of an hour. However, as no supports arrived, nothing could be brought
to bear against the enemy and his heavy cannon but small arms fire at the
bridge, the enemy crossing the Mandelbeck on the right and the left, and all
ammunition had been fired, I ordered the battalions to execute an orderly
retreat. I ordered the huge amount of reserve artillery on the chaussee to
retreat, and only two of my 3-pdrs, on the road leading to the bridge, received
my explicit order to maintain firing as long as all troops had pulled out of
the village. The enemy cavalry was held up by several shots; but then they galloped
across the bridge, right into the centre of the village where Lieutenant-Colonel
Hornig and 6 other officers, and several wounded forming the rear-guard, were
taken prisoner. Here I charged them with the remaining Chevaux legers Regiment [Hessen-Darmstadt],
much weakened because of the numerous detachments. I was so lucky that I not
only threw the enemy out of the village again, but also freed all prisoners
except artillery Lieutenant Schüler. While in the meanwhile nothing was heard
of the promised supports, we were completely out of ammunition, and because the
complete Austrian reserve artillery was in danger of falling into enemy hands,
I was not able to hold this place [Ingelmünster] any longer. Therefore I
ordered a slow retreat, which was executed with the greatest order despite the
heavy pressure, without any more loss. Arriving at a distance of one and a half
hour from Ingelmünster, I heard the fire of the advancing Austrian troops.
Therefore I ordered a halt, and advanced with my rear-guard again. At my
arrival at Ingelmünster, I found the village already retaken again by a 5,000
men strong Austrian corps.
As I have lost two cannon in this engagement, I hope that His Royal Highness
[i.e. York] will not hold this sacrifice against me, as I am convinced, and I
can count on the statements of the Austrian staff officers, that I saved
several hundred brave soldiers, the whole Austrian artillery reserve, and all
other artillery that was with me.
The loss of my brigade consists of 1 cavalry captain killed; 1
lieutenant-colonel, 1 cavalry captain, and 8 lieutenants wounded, of which one
of the artillery made prisoner; Cavalry Captain Dalwigk, Captain and
Quartermaster-Lieutenant von Gall, and Captain Pistor, are badly wounded. From
the NCO’s and others there are 26 dead, 169 wounded, and 20 made prisoner; the
cavalry has 2 dead, 17 wounded, 3 missing and made prisoner; 37 dead and
wounded horses, 3 captured. According to the statements of the prisoners and
deserters, enemy loss is substantial.
It is to regret that our jaegers on the 2nd day, because of lack of
ammunition, because of the distance of the magazines assigned to me, not could
be used offensively.
The above, Your Royal Highness, is the true story, and not made any
better, of the affair on the 11th and 12th. What remains is the wish of me and
my comrades, that Your Royal Highness will be satisfied about our behaviour,
and another last wish, that Your Royal Highness will do us the honour to take
us under his own command again. So that we will be able to share in the
glorious deeds of Your Royal Highness. Finally, I would very humbly want to
point out to Your Royal Highness, without trying to obtain an excuse for the
troops entrusted to my command, that the task we had according to the
dispositions that were laid down, was to big for our strength and powers.
With the deepest devotion I have the honour to stay,
Your Royal Highness,
Thielt, the 15th May 1794,
Your
submissive servant,
G.E.
v. During”
© Geert van Uythoven