“Essai sur l’infanterie légère, ou Traité des petites operations de la guerre, à l’usage des jeunes officiers”, par le comte Duhesme, Lieutenant-général ( Paris 1814)

translated by Geert van Uythoven

A contemporary German review of the above work.

“Didactical-military works, written by experienced and practical officers, are without doubt just as useful as they are rare. General Duhesme has participated during the whole Revolutionary War in various military ranks, most of the time commanding light troops¹⁾. He has written down his experiences in a work which appeared already over ten years ago, but never was commonly known in Germany. For this reason, a short review of the work may not be abundant.

The author believes, based on his experiences, in the basic rule that the difference between light and line infantry is much bigger then is commonly believed. And that the best line infantry regiment, able to execute all movements in front of the enemy, inside the whole battalion, with the greatest ease and precision; would be much lesser useful for skirmishing and serving at the outposts, then the most mediocre light regiment, because of the reason that the strength of troops lies in their own characteristics. A soldier of the rank and file will be strong because of the strength of the whole; as a skirmisher however he will feel himself isolated and abandoned. The light infantryman on the contrary, used to fight on his own, finds himself in the line much too narrowed, less brave and skilled. Therefore, the officer of light troops should find in this work a guide for the practical side of his service. The work begins with a history of the light infantry arm, then follows its suitability and use, beside a conveniently arranged contemplation of its organisation, strength, clothing and equipment; this is treated in the Instruction as a whole, as the main target of the whole book, and finally of the operations of the light troops in the field.

The introduction of the book --the history of the light troops-- is more then a historical summary of the tactic only, but spreads itself especially over the education of the new French tactic during the Revolutionary Wars, of which the author, as an eye-witness, says a lot of things which one would not read without interest. He has nothing to add to the organisation of the light troops already existing in France; light regiments for outpost duty, voltigeur companies for skirmishing. He wants to take the recruits from the mountainous provinces, and what he says about their preparation and physical training is not differing from what has been already written in German books about this subject. Regarding the drill, he expects much less as is expected from the line infantry; they should be trained not only in level, but also on in intersected terrain. He has, he says on page 180 [page 211 in my own copy though!], executed manoeuvres with his light regiments in Italy in 1805, marching them in close column through the vineyards in all directions, and forming line or column despite all obstacles.

When the whole regiment of 3 battalions is complete, the voltiguers of the right wing battalion are deployed 100 to 150 paces right, those of the left wing battalion as much paces left, and those of the centre battalion just as far forward, or backwards. When the regiment forms column to march against the enemy, these companies will cover the front and both flanks, and do the same when the regiment advances against the enemy in line.

The author declares himself against the use of a rifle to arm the light infantry, based on his own experience. He has (page 190) [pages 221-222 in my own copy!] raised a free battalion in Valenciennes in 1792, of which the grenadiers were armed with such a weapon. For close range defence, he ordered a two-sided long knife to be manufactured, which could be fixed to the rifle and looked very frightful. However, in practice it was of no real use, as during close combat it was often broken in two by the musket of the opponent. The first shot, for which one had sufficient time to load with a patched ball, was indeed very effective. However the following shots, which had to be done with cartridges and quick loading, were much less successful, and the range became substantially shorter. After a few months the soldiers themselves requested for their rifles to be exchanged for muskets.

From chapter 8 on the author speaks about the usual subjects regarding light duty: field guards, patrols, parties, scouting, posts, their attack and defence, retreats, foraging, convoys, etc. Illustrated with examples from his own experience. For the forward force of the advance guard he takes 400 to 500 horses and 100 men of the smallest and lightest marksmen, which in the hour of need jump on the back of a horse [behind a trooper], accompanying the cavalry everywhere. He mixes them with the [cavalry] skirmishers, and has high expectations of their fire. However, because of the fact that he was no cavalryman himself, one should first inform with this arm about the practicability of such a project. The whole work concludes with remarks about the use of skirmishers.

What the author brings forward from his own experience, to support his opinion, is a not unimportant part of his book. It will surely be read with interest and profit.”

Footnote:

1) Duhesme was mortally wounded during the battle of Waterloo, and was present in a house in Planchenoit, were after the battle Fürst Blücher had his headquarters. The Fürst provided him with his own room, and ordered his own surgeon to care for him, who remained with him until his dead which followed shortly after.

Source: ‘Militair-Wochenblatt’, 10. Jahrgang (Berlin 1825), No. 458, p.3203-3204

© Geert van Uythoven