The ‘Cordon System’ in Flanders, winter 1793-94
translated by Geert van Uythoven
Source: “Feldzug der verbundenen Armeen in Flandern, im Jahre 1994” by ‘von D.', which appeared in ‘Neues Militairisches Journal’, 9.Band 18. Stück (Hannover 1798) pp. 169-212.
Events at the outposts, while the troops were in their winter cantonments during January, February, and March 1794.
The French undertook
nothing during winter; they were reorganising their armies, exercising, and providing
their recruits with weapons. They precisely followed the rules, which the art
of war dictates in a similar situation. By continuously alarming the outposts,
by executing raids on these, by simulating marches, and by constructing empty
camps, the Allied armies had to be constantly on the alert, and were prevented
to undertake activities of themselves, or to enjoy their rest.
Usually, French
activities consisted of a simultaneous attack on many points along the whole
chain of outposts: at some points they would try to raid the outposts and to
take the men prisoner; at other points they would collect supplies, and plunder
the villages. In this way, beside reaching their aim, they gained local
advantages. In addition, the light troops of the Allies became demoralised,
while their own troops received more confidence in their own power and
abilities.
General alarms of
the chain of outposts of the Allied armies in the Low Countries [in the
beginning of 1794] took place:
1. from
17 to 23 January
2. from
1 to 14 February
3. on
28 February
4. from
11 to 19 March
5. from
24 to 30 March, and
6. on
6 April
Probably the real intentions of these actions were not recognized; one held them for signs of the French lust for plunder, and lack of provisions. Everywhere, the Allied armies remained passive during these actions. However, these events were a clear sign of what the French would do on a bigger scale later.
The way the
outposts were arranged is very special, and deserves to be described as a
contribution to the history of the art of war during the Revolutionary Wars.
The whole chain of outposts in the Flanders was divided in several districts.
Every district had a range of several hours. To form the chain, each district
was provided with a few light infantry companies, and as much light cavalry.
Both came in the same cantonments. The chain itself consisted of a line of small
pickets, formed by the light infantry and cavalry, which were so close to each
other that no one was able to pass between the vedettes and pickets without
being detected. Usually, traverses were constructed on the main roads for the
infantry. At many places, were no natural barriers were present against an
enemy attack, a line of fleches was thrown up, 300 paces from each other. These
were for a part occupied by 3 men only, of which one was always on guard. To construct
these fleches, peasants were pressed from the nearby villages, and the ease
with which labourers could be found were maybe the cause that so many fleches
were thrown up. The commanders of the districts of these chains of outposts
were mostly young staff-officers, which had distinguished themselves by their
energy and their knowledge about this kind of service; sometimes captains were used.
Everywhere, the older troop-commanders had to accept that they had to serve
under a younger outpost-commander, sometimes even those of a negative character.
Seldom were the
light troops strong enough to form the chain of outposts in the appointed
district; in these cases, the lack of men was solved by ‘commanding’ soldiers
from the nearby cantonments. If there were no light troops present at all, the
whole chain of outposts was occupied by ‘commanded’ soldiers. This was often
the case during 1793 and the beginning of 1794 with the Hanoverians, Dutch, Hessians,
and English. The main points of the chain received a somewhat stronger
occupation; however seldom stronger then a hundred men. Behind this chain were
the cantonments of the Avant-Corps or the main army, of which the nearest ones
usually were the supports of the outposts. These troops however were not under
the command of the commanders of the outposts, and were seldom cantoned in a
way that they were able to support the chain of outposts in time. In addition,
the villages nearest behind the outposts were sometimes strong, sometimes weak,
sometimes not occupied. This changed accordingly to the movements the armies
made. The arrangement of the outposts was nearly always the same. While these
for the greater part were positioned on the borders of the Austrian
Netherlands, and as such were covering Austrian subjects; they were more
regarded as a protection for the country, then as a line of protection for the
cantonments, or troops that were encamped further behind. In addition came that
many robots [‘mechanische köpfe’] gave so much value to the arranged
line, that they believed they would make a big mistake if they would leave a
small brook, a fence, or another insignificant barrier to be closer to the
supports, or to have a better sight on the terrain in front. Even officers
which had knowledge of the arrangement of outposts from the 7 Years War, let
themselves be roused by these arrangements which were against all principles of
the service of outposts.
In vain it was
told to them, that between the pickets and the corps from which they were send,
as well as by numbers, as well as by distance, a certain proportion had to be taken
care off; that these wide lines of outposts, far from the cantonments and close
to the enemy, would suffer from al thinkable accidents; that it would be better
to have several points which had a strength of their own, which would have been
changed and replaced often, to keep the enemy in the dark about our
arrangements and could not undertake anything with definite results. Nor
accidents, nor examples from former times, nor acknowledged principles, were
able to change the direction of these mechanical made arrangements.
To given an
example in order to explain the above arrangement of outposts, we will give a
detail from a chain of outposts in March 1794 between Menin and Hollebeck, with
a range of 3 ½ hours.
Post
|
nr. |
The post consists of: |
Total: |
|||||||
|
|
|
Füsiliers |
Cavalry |
|||||||
|
|
|
officers |
NCO’s |
Gefreite |
soldiers |
officers |
NCO’s |
troopers |
men |
horses |
|
On the [river] Lis from
Menin to Werwick |
1 |
|
1 |
|
6 |
|
|
|
7 |
|
|
2 |
|
1 |
|
6 |
|
|
|
7 |
|
|
|
3 |
|
1 |
|
9 |
|
|
|
10 |
|
|
|
4 |
1 |
1 |
|
8 |
|
|
|
10 |
|
|
|
5 |
|
1 |
|
9 |
|
|
|
10 |
|
|
|
6 |
|
1 |
|
9 |
|
|
|
10 |
|
|
|
7 |
|
1 |
|
10 |
|
|
|
11 |
|
|
|
8 |
|
1 |
|
10 |
|
|
|
11 |
|
|
|
Garrisoning Werwick |
9 |
1 |
6 |
|
60 |
2 |
4 |
60 |
133 |
66 |
|
From Tenbriel supports of
100 men |
10 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
26 |
|
|
|
30 |
|
|
11 |
|
1 |
|
9 |
|
1 |
10 |
21 |
11 |
|
|
12 |
|
|
1 |
4 |
|
|
|
5 |
|
|
|
13 |
|
1 |
|
9 |
|
|
|
10 |
|
|
|
14 |
|
1 |
|
6 |
|
|
|
7 |
|
|
|
15 |
|
|
1 |
6 |
|
|
|
7 |
|
|
|
16 |
|
1 |
1 |
15 |
|
|
|
17 |
|
|
|
Zantvoorde besides
supports of 100 men |
17 |
|
1 |
|
15 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
30 |
14 |
|
18 |
|
1 |
|
15 |
|
|
|
16 |
|
|
|
19 |
|
1 |
|
10 |
|
|
|
11 |
|
|
|
Hollebeck |
20 |
|
1 |
|
10 |
|
|
|
11 |
|
|
21 |
|
1 |
|
10 |
|
1 |
12 |
24 |
13 |
|
|
Total: |
|
3 |
24 |
5 |
262 |
3 |
7 |
94 |
398 |
104 |
|
|
|
Supports: |
200 |
|
||||||
|
Total: |
598 |
104 |
||||||||
[signed]
von Kegelwitsch
k.k.
Major
We want to make
the following remarks on the above:
1. The real strength of the posts in this arrangement is usually at half strength only; for example strength of the post in Werwick was usually only 30 men, instead of the 60 given above.
2. The
enemy occupies the terrain directly in front of these posts; Busbeck, and even
part of Werwick, situated on the right bank of the Lis, so that both sides were
watching each other constantly.
3. Cheluwe
and Cheluvelt were at this time only weakly occupied, and most outposts had an
different commander as the troops in the villages.
4. The
above arrangement was used from 28 October 1793 until 26 April 1794, and
therefore the enemy was completely familiar with the arrangements.
It was during these circumstances, that the [French] General Daendels who commanded in this region, having his headquarters in Comines, had no trouble in following his orders to alert the Allied posts opposing him continuously, and to take them prisoner. Because he could, because of being so close, at any moment attack part of the posts with a much superior force without having to use many troops, to take these prisoner, before the troops cantoning in Cheluwe and Cheluvelt were able to support them. This happened on 24 October 1793, 19 January, 28 February, 11 March, and 6 April 1794, with a very painful result for the Allied forces in this region.
© Geert van Uythoven