The ‘Cordon System’ in Flanders, winter 1793-94
translated and comments by Geert van Uythoven
Source: “Feldzug der verbundenen Armeen in Flandern, im Jahre 1994” by ‘von D.', which appeared in ‘Neues Militairisches Journal’, 9.Band 18. Stück (Hannover 1798) pp. 169-212.
Part 1
Some reflections about the establishment of the winter cantonments of the Allied armies in the year 1794.
When we take a look at the cantonments of the Allied armies on a map, we note these were located between the sea and the river Meuse, inside a rectangle which is about 3 to 4 German miles wide, and 40 miles long 1). In front of this rectangle, at a distance of 1.5 to 2 miles, there are a number of enemy fortresses. This rectangle was only in the centre covered by three fortresses; Valenciennes, Condé, and Le Quesnoy. Nieuport and Ypern were not defensible, and not supplied with the necessary provisions and war materials.
It is difficult to find an example in history, were in such a bold way, in the face of enemy fortresses and armies, the whole army had been encamped in a chain of cantonments with a length of 40 miles. One only felt secure when the enemy was at a distance of 15 to 20 miles, and was covered by rivers and impassable mountain barriers. Frederick the Great abandoned Bohemia in 1745 and 1756, even after having won the battles of Soor and Lowositz [or Lobositz] during the late autumn, to be at a great distance from the enemy during winter, separated from him by impassable mountain ranges.
One cannot find anything to imitate when looking at the tactical part of the establishment of the winter cantonments. Nothing, which could be applied in comparable situations without being exposed to great dangers. One finds on the borders of the Lowlands a chain of pickets and quarters, which were able to prevent isolated attacks from parties and detachments, but which could not resist stronger corps. They were in constant danger of being penetrated and defeated separately, or by being ruptured by constant alarms and feint attacks. When for example the French in Lille [Rijssel] alerted the outposts near Tournay, Menin, and Ypern, and would advance from Comines to Menin with 3,000 men, they would risk nothing. But by doing this, they would activate all troops of the Allied armies in Flanders! For such an expedition, the French would need only 6,000 men at the most, which would be active for two days, while the Allies would have 40,000 men under arms for eight days! Those 6,000 men would retreat, inside of behind their fortresses, and would enjoy their rest like before, while the Allies from now on reinforced their chain of outposts, cantoning additional troops in the villages right behind the outposts to support them. These villages had been plundered by the enemy before, and therefore provided few means, the soldiers having to live very crowded.
Another operation the French could have executed, without risking anything, would have been even more disadvantageous to the Allies. If 6,000 men would have advanced from Lille, over Werwick, to Courtrai [Cortrijk], Menin would have fallen into their hands, and the whole British army, and Kinsky’s Corps around Tournay, would have to concentrate to dislodge them again. These 6,000 men could retreat without any danger after having executed this expedition if they would occupy Menin. If the French at the same time would execute demonstrations from Douay against Tournay, and from Dunkirk against Nieuport and Ypern, this corps would have been secured on both flanks, and the Allies would be in the dark about the intentions of the enemy.
To paint the disadvantages for the Allies, which would arise out of such an undertaking by the French against them in the situation they were, it is necessary to consider the events that would happen if such an undertaking really would have been executed.
The 6,000 men strong corps, which advanced on Courtrai, would have been estimated by the Allies to at least 30,000 strong 2). Report of the French advance from Douay to Tournay reached General Kinsky, the moment he received message that his outposts opposing Lille were under attack. So he was in no position to aid Courtrai. The Hessian corps in the meanwhile had concentrated between Ypern and Nieuport, and supported his alerted and maybe dispersed outposts. Part of the Hanoverian corps had concentrated near Ingelmünster. But while all this was happening, Menin had already fallen into enemy hands.
Over the following days, the Allied Generals had planned their reaction. They had decided to dispel the French from Menin. The troops receive the order to advance from several directions. The French now retreated from Menin to Lille, and their expedition had been finished. 6,000 men of the enemy in this way alerted the 40,000 to 50,000 strong Allied armies in Flanders, fatiguing men and horses for 14 days to 3 weeks, while having been outside their own cantonments for 4 or 5 days the most.
The picture that I painted here, about the disadvantageous position of the Allies in Flanders, will not seem to be exaggerated, when is taken in account that the French from Lille (were they had concentrated an enormous force) would be in the middle of the Allied cantonments around Courtrai before the head-quarters and general-quarters at Gent, Brugge, and Torhout [Thourout] would have been informed of it. In addition, because of the many sympathisers the French had in the Low Countries [see also note 2], the French were fully informed about the establishment of the cantonments in the Low Countries; they knew the areas in which they had to operate; and finally it was known to them that there were ample provisions of every kind present.
An undertaking of even greater importance would have brought success to the French under the circumstances as were described. When they would alert and penetrate the stretched chain of outposts at several points between the river Meuse and the sea; and would march at the same time with army of 50,000 men at Tournay, while another corps of 15,000 men marched at Courtrai; and finally 50,000 men would cross the Sambre beneath Maubeuge, it would be most probable that Kinsky’s corps would have been dispelled from Courtrai, or defeated before the British army would have been concentrated to come to their aid. They risked to be cut off from the Austrian main army completely, and to be eliminated in detail. There would be no other thing left as to retreat across the river Scheldt and to abandon Flanders. Nieuport and Ypern would fall quickly, because it was only able to hold them for a short while for lack of provisions. During these operations at the Scheldt, the Austrian main army would concentrate at Brussels, if the French would not advance too quickly: concentrating in the Binche or Mons area would already have been made impossible in this situation.
When the Allied armies had been lucky not to have been defeated or dispersed in detail in their cantonments because of this French attack, still the results would be the same, and Flanders would still have fallen into the hands of the French. When the Allies would have tried to engaged into combats with single corps or detachments, which is most probable because of the establishment of their cantonments, it would be easy and actually not to prevent that a part of the Allied concentrations would have been dispersed when the French would act speedily. In any case, the Allies would have arrived in the Brussels area shaken and demoralised. The French probably could continue their advance without much risk, not hampered by fortresses, and possible conquer the whole of the Low Countries. When the [1794] campaign had begun, this undertaking would have been much more difficult to execute.
The nature of the cause dictates that winter cantonments should be located behind fortresses which cover the enemy, on such a distance that when the outposts are attacked by the enemy, there is ample time to leave the cantonments and to concentrate.
When applying this principle, which always was followed by the great generals of history, the troops in the Low Countries would be placed in the following cantonments:
1. 25,000 men behind the Canal of Gent and Ostende, and ideally in Gent, Brugge, and Ostende.
2. The main army in and around Brussels, Mechelen, Louvain [Leuven], Lier, Dendermonde, and Antwerp.
3. The corps at the Meuse in Liège, Huy, etc.
4. An advanced corps of 6,000 men inside, and around Nieuport and Ypern.
5. An advanced corps of 6,000 men inside, and around Courtrai.
6. A corps of 12,000 men inside, and around Le Quesnoy, Valenciennes, and Condé.
7. 6,000 men inside, and around Namur.
8. To support the advanced corps, 8 squadrons and a horse artillery battery in each of the following districts:
a. In Rousselaer, Torhout and surroundings;
b. In Ath, Grammont, Lessines and surroundings;
c. In Braine-la-Leud, Genappes, Nivelles and surroundings;
d. In Perwez-le-marchez and surroundings.
In all, 34,000 men would form the advanced corps and supports, of which the infantry would have been cantoned inside the fortresses.
The infantry of the main army would have been concentrated in the bigger cities, to regain their lost discipline, to train and absorb the recruits in the companies, to exercise, and to repair their clothing. Important assets, without which an army never can do great deeds, and of which has to be taken care when the tactical establishment of the winter cantonments is fixed.
The above establishment of winter cantonments makes it necessary that:
1. Already during the autumn the fortresses Valenciennes, Le Quesnoy, Condé, Ypern, and Nieuport, will be supplied with the necessary provisions and war materials. Which is easy to accomplish, when the need for safe winter cantonments is anticipated in time.
2. That magazines will be created in Brussels and Termonde for ten days; in Antwerp and Mechelen for twenty days. This makes it possible, in case of a serious undertaking by the enemy, to concentrate at these places, and to engage the enemy united.
My own footnotes:
1) A German mile was 4,000 ‘geometric paces’; a geometric pace equalled 5 French feet or 6.1 English feet (source: Haythornthwaite’s “The Napoleonic Source Book”).
2) During 1792-1795, Allied intelligence was very poor, while the French were fully informed about the strengths and whereabouts of the Allies, due to sympathising inhabitants of the Low Countries etc. However, this would be a whole new story. Fact remains that the Allies nearly always estimated the strength of the French opposing them much higher then it was in reality. A clear example of this is the situation at Boxtel, September 1794. The Duke of York was of the opinion that he was opposed by Pichegru with 80,000 French while in fact Pichegru had less then 10,000!
©
Geert van Uythoven