The tactical proportion of howitzers in cannon-batteries

ABOUT THE TACTICAL PROPORTION OF HOWITZERS IN CANNON BATTERIES

("Ueber das taktische Verhältnis der Haubitzen in den Kanonen-Batterien")

Translated by Geert van Uythoven

Source:

- Anonymous: " Ueber das taktische Verhältnis der Haubitzen in den Kanonen-Batterien", in ‘Militair-Wochenblatt’ 5. Jahrgang (Berlin 1820) pp.1672-1676

"At the moment, again the question has been raised if the combination of howitzers with cannon in one and the same battery is advantageous, or disadvantageous. This combination is an old habit. Such is the case nearly from the same moment on that one altogether started to regard batteries as the tactically basic entities of the artillery, and as such fixing it at a certain number of guns. The Germans were the first to compose batteries out of cannon and howitzers together; the Spanish and French copied this much later.

Gustav Adolph was compelled to organise batteries as tactical entities. The flighty splitting up of guns during the period of linear tactics itself did not annul this basic rule. It puzzles historians that in a time, during which one had an open eye for weaknesses, on the other hand cannon batteries were mingled with howitzers; so that a certain independence was intended. This contradiction can only be explained by the detachment system of that time, which asks for independent detachments. The present-day tactics knows no other: in the close combination of all three arms [i.e. infantry, cavalry, and artillery], the battery is the tactical basic entity within the Division, as well as in the fundamental order of battle; the brigade deployment.

During the Seven Years War and later on the field artillery appears tactically in three basic forms:

1) regimental guns;

2) batteries, and

3) reserve guns.

Only the last two forms had howitzers; the first not. An exception on this are the Saxons, who during a few campaigns attached 4-pdr howitzers to their grenadier battalions.

As combinations of both kinds of guns seems so natural, and so obvious as well, this might be the reasons that authors did not take the trouble to define the reasons for this development more closely. Still, this subject deserves a closer look and explanation, as experience has learned that not always the most efficient use is being made of the howitzers in the batteries. That means that they operated in the firing line, trying to stay in pace with the cannon fire; or that their ammunition was saved very conscientious. In all cases they are regarded as something subordinate, instead of being treated in tactical respect as something complementary (co-ordinated). Proof for this is, that in accounts of gun battles, the howitzers are seldom mentioned, as if it is not worth to mention their exploits separately. From where derives the indifference regarding this weapon? Is the ground for this maybe the lack of opportunities to give a based judgement of the characteristics of howitzers within the cannon batteries? The opponents of a combination with cannon state that many combat situations are possible, in which both weapons cannot be used simultaneously, and that therefore part of the battery is doomed to a certain passivity, or at least will not be able to achieve what could have been achieved when the composition would be similar [i.e. only one kind of weapon within the battery]. Further: often the strength of a battery is calculated as the total amount of guns present, while only the cannon (so only three quarters of the battery) were active; that at the most dangerous moments, during close range canister combats, the howitzer are at a great disadvantage compared with cannon; that altogether cannon, because of the unreliability of the howitzers, not gain much in any combat. We cannot deny all these facts. It is only that in general has been decided for a combination, and no European artillery makes an exception of this rule. But still, on the other hand we may not be blind for the advantages of this combination.

Even more, it seems that these advantages are still not acknowledged generally, and not exhaustively treated. One is limiting himself to much to both major characteristics of the howitzers:

1) Its use as a curved firing gun in general, and

2) their projectiles as a hollow sphere.

However, their combination with cannon has other advantages, based on the combination itself.

If the question: “To what purpose serve the howitzers in cannon batteries?” is asked in general, there is only one answer to give. Namely: they should serve complementary, as a completion. It is necessary to learn about the advantages in their whole extent. One allows me to make a comparison here. As a complement for general combat situations, Divisional cavalry appears in the infantry Divisions; for specific combat situations, the horse artillery appears in cavalry Divisions (‘Gefechtslehre beider verbundenen Waffen’ by E. von Decker, introduction). Should for artillery combat, the howitzers not be regarded as complement to the cannon?

The word ‘complement’ refers to certain conditions. In the meanwhile, it would betray scarce knowledge of the abilities of howitzers, when one would regard them as a complement and nothing else. As there exist many combat situations in which their solitary use would be very disadvantageous. And therefore one would be wrong in regarding the howitzers as completely subordinate to cannon. One should distinguish three different relations in artillery combat:

1) Were cannon will have the main effect;

2) were howitzers will have the main effect, and

3) were both kinds of weapons will have a combined effect.

Until now, historians apparently did not understand the need to treat all three relations different when writing accounts of artillery combats.

The artillery is a firing arm only, and in addition, long range combat is characteristic. Because of this it distinguishes itself completely from all other firing arms. The new tactics placed their effectiveness at the longer close ranges in the right perspective, and only short-sighted authors prohibit their use at musket ranges. Artillery combat has to distinguish three moments, or better classifications:

1) Combat at longer ranges;

2) Combat at medium ranges, and

3) Combat at close ranges.

The limit were no.1 begins is partially defined by the technical characteristics of the gun, partially by the boundaries of the battleground. The limits of no.2 and 3 are much more unclear; partially influenced by the probability of a hit, partially by the moral element within the artillery itself. Because of this, one battery would decide to limber up and retreat, while another one would not fear to remain in position. Often, the decision is made because of the laughable value attached to saving the guns. Therefore, in this respect, the tactician can count on a maximum range, but he can never rely on a minimum.

The artillery is useful in an offensive, as well as in defensive roles; however, the defensive element is superior, and therefore artillery is able to excel more in such a role as in an offensive one.

Cannon fire directly; their projectiles raise only minor above the earth’s surface, its effect is more in the vertical flat and as such it is judged. Therefore, the so called terrain usually decides about their usefulness. Obstacles on a level plain, and finally the condition of the ground (weak or hard) have a major effect. In order not to be influenced by the terrain too much, one takes heavier calibres into the field.

A roundshot, arriving at its destination, has a singular effect only. Canister makes cannon effective at close range, and in certain instances independent and defensible against every other arm.

The display of power of cannon has a physical as well as a moral aspect, however the first aspect is the major one. Soldiers who will fear the noise only, do not deserve this name.

Howitzers must combine throwing and shooting into one gun. Fulfilling one condition will of course have a negative effect on the other one, and because of this the howitzer became an unreliable gun. Still, a combination of both was necessary, to make the gun usable in the field, and to prepare its combination with cannon. They are effective not only against visible, but also –as a throwing gun- against targets behind cover. Its effect is more in the horizontal flat, and it dominates broken ground and intersected terrain more as cannon do.

In long range fire fights the howitzers are able to display their whole effectiveness; at medium range they are paralysed, and the smaller charges they have with them are only a minor substitute. At close ranges, the abilities of howitzers are far below those of cannon.

A grenade, arriving at its target, will have a double effect; as roundshot and as an exploding hollow sphere. The effect of the latter is bigger on morale as that of a regular roundshot. Only experienced soldiers will endure continues grenade fire.

Form the above can be concluded that: Cannon are suited for defensive combat, howitzers are suited for the offensive.

The howitzers complement artillery combat because of the following characteristics:

1) They enable the artillery to operate on every terrain;

2) they add more offensive elements to the artillery;

3) they complement fire combat at long ranges;

4) they enable the execution of many secondary tasks (incendiary, lighting up, etc.), and

5) they enlarge the moral effect of artillery fire.

One should not believe that the abilities of cannon would diminish because of this; they will always have precedence, and because of their greater reliability maintain their efficiency. The artilleryman should never forget the basic rule: for what can be achieved with cannon, one should not use howitzers.

Howitzers, regarded as a combination of two conditions, will never reach an absolute perfection. Therefore, quantity should replace quality. This leads to howitzer batteries, and from these the twofold purpose of these guns derive:

1) Serving as a complement to the artillery combat. For this purpose, the howitzers should operate in small detachments. And

2) operating using their characteristics to the utmost. For this purpose they should operate in larger formations.

So far in general. However, in order to be able to make the right judgement about the question that was asked, a closer view at the internal tactical nature of artillery is necessary. The field artillery has, in relation to its allocation in the armies, a twofold purpose:

1) As direct support to the troops themselves –light foot and artillery batteries, and

2) to gain larger advantages by independent operations –reserve artillery, utilised according to the principles for the reserve, consisting of all the usual field calibres.

The first part belongs to the troops, the latter to the whole force.

The first part, as small as it may be, has to be organised for independent artillery combat if it should reach its goals. The latter part as well, but here it finds another basis. As in this case the goal will in some situations be reached by complete batteries (12-pdr, 6-pdr, horse artillery, howitzer batteries), in other situations by parts of separate batteries. This is the difference. The goal is the same, but the result is reached by other means.

Only by a combination of cannon with howitzers it will be possible to give artillery combat a certain perfection. And from this derives that all brigade batteries (foot and horse as well) should consist of cannon and howitzers out of necessity; then only in this way perfection will be reached. Question remains if the reserve artillery also has to consist of separate independent units? It seems to suffice if this is the case with the reserve artillery force as a whole, and this purpose can be reached if it is composed of all calibres, with the right proportion in numbers.

The present-day common calibres are the 6-pdr and 12-pdr cannon. From this another question derives: does every calibre need its own howitzer complement, i.e. the 6-pdr cannon 7-pdr howitzers, and the 12-pdr cannon 10-pdr howitzers, or both maybe –as with the Saxons- a medium calibre (8-pdr howitzers)?

For the 6-pdr batteries the calibre of the howitzers may never be smaller then 7-pdrs, if these should be regarded as a complement to the long range artillery combat. In such case, the throwing range would have to be necessarily longer then the firing range of the 6-pdr cannon. The opinion of General von Scharnhorst about this subject is literally the following: “Because of the fact that in many instances there has to be fired at considerable distances (ranges), the howitzers are an indispensable complement to the 6-pdr canon, and their frequent use finds reason in their usefulness at long ranges. The person who is not able to take into account the whole picture, and therefore will not note the uncertainty of the howitzer on medium distances, would easily be inclined to oversee the huge profit and characteristic use of howitzers. This consists not only in setting fire to villages, and bombarding entrenchments, but especially in its capability of harming troops at long ranges.”

So 7-pdr howitzers –heavier pieces could have a negative influence on the manoeuvrability of the light field guns- are a necessary tool to make the 6-pdr batteries tactically complete and independent.

For the horse artillery the howitzers are even more essential, something that needs no further proof. It will suffice to remark that their offensive characteristic will fully come forward in this case. Indeed, when the effect of howitzers at closer ranges would not be so subordinate, one would wish the horse artillery to have an even greater number of howitzers as they have present-day.

The 12-pdr batteries have, compared with the 6-pdr, because of their longer range an important advantage, and in this regard they need no howitzers as a complement. They are preferably used in defensive roles, and here the question should be asked: “What advantage would both howitzers give them in static positions?” Is it not the case that two 12-pdrs instead of the howitzers would raise the fighting power of the battery, contrary to the drop caused by the presence of both 10-pdr howitzers? For that matter, would it not be better, when in static positions, to separate the heavy cannon from the howitzers completely, in order to use both according to their own characteristics, completely in accordance with the goals and intentions? And finally: has the combination of the heavy calibres with howitzers really more advantages as disadvantages? The advantages of their combination are the following:

1) For 12-pdr batteries there are separate cases imaginable in which they will have to make a stand independently. In such a case, howitzers will give them an advantage;

2) the advantage of a reinforced long range artillery combat is also the case with 12-pdrs, however not so decisive because the cannon themselves have a longer range, and

3) a mixed battery will dominate the terrain much better.

On the other hand, the disadvantages of their combination are the following:

1) One is forced to add 10-pdr howitzers to 12-pdr cannon, to be able to equal these partially in throwing range, partially in the effect of canister. However, we cannot hide the fact that this is a waste of power: then at one hand the throwing range of 10-pdr howitzers is substantially longer as that of 7-pdr howitzers; on the other hand, their grenades do not explode in more pieces then those of these. If the howitzers are separated from the 12-pdr cannon, the reason mentioned first [i.e. the throwing range] will not be valid anymore. One could do with 7-pdr howitzers, saving much on equipment and maintenance. And although it should be noted that 10-pdr howitzers are more accurate then 7-pdr howitzers, this difference could also be solved by some technical adjustment for the latter ones. In all cases however, the usefulness of 10-pdr howitzers compared with 7-pdr howitzers are in no proportion with the greater costs, as is sufficiently proved by experience;

2) the defensive power of 12-pdr cannon –and that is even their main task- is weakened by every attachment of howitzers, on the contrary raised however by exchanging them for 12-pdr cannon;

3) with the saved costs new howitzer batteries could be created, of with the present-day number –there is only one battery for a whole army corps- obviously is much to small;

4) In static positions, in every case the situation will dictate the deployment of cannon; in other cases deployment of howitzers. When the latter are separated from the first, more unity in leadership will be the case, and every kind of gun could be used and treated according its characteristics much better then it is the case at present, and

5) Only seldom, reserve-guns will find themselves in a situation in which they will have to operate independently. So for what reason should howitzers be attached to them? And if such a situation would arise, it would suffice to attach separate sections of an howitzer battery to it. At present however the howitzers are removed from the line, to be deployed in another place, leading to disadvantageous isolation.

Because of the above one can state that:

1) The 6-pdr foot and horse batteries need the 7-pdr howitzers. In which way these should be treated and deployed is treated in the Gefechtslehre. The same applies to the half measure to include one howitzer when detaching half batteries. All half measures are no good, and

2) reserve batteries do not need howitzers. Yes, I dare to state that for the 6-pdr batteries as well. One should organise them into batteries of eight cannon, preferably creating new howitzer batteries out of the saved ones, preferably 7-pdr ones.

The latter measure has more advantages. Can we deny that the real tactical use of howitzers is much less known then the use of cannon? Their removal would take away the task of the commander to make himself more familiar with the characteristics and tactical proportions as is the case now, acting in dispersed order. And because of the reason that it is the nature of humans to pay more attention to the complete situation, as to separate parts. A commander of an howitzer battery will look at the terrain with a totally other view then the commander of a cannon battery. Unity in leadership will guarantee unity in action, and this is the basis of all tactical deployment of force. How many outstanding moments in which howitzers can be been used to their perfection, are lost now because of the reason that the commander pays much more interest to the three times as strong amount of cannon? The commander is responsible for the correct leadership and deployment of all his guns; question is if this responsibility also extends with the same earnest to the howitzers inside the batteries? Enough. Whatever we will believe about the proportion of howitzers within reserve batteries; they still remain stepchildren, and they do not deserve to be treated as such. Their removal shall and must result into a much better use. Their characteristics will be studied more closely. And should we not recognise this as the way to gain better results with them, as they are able to achieve today?

Someone who dares to bring forward different views [like me] should not be afraid for opposition. Hail to him, if these are not stones thrown because of prejudice, because of which in most cases the arm to throw has already been raised.

Finally the question remains, if the 10-pdr howitzer calibre is necessary at all, or if we cannot do completely without them? it seems to me that the 10-pdr howitzers were introduced because of their analogy with 12-pdrs, instead of their bigger calibre proper. If this is not the case, then one should ask himself why we take 7-pdr howitzer batteries and not 10-pdr howitzer batteries into the field. If the howitzers would be removed from the reserve batteries, namely the 12-pdr batteries, then every reason would disappear immediately, and one will be able to save substantially on equipment and maintenance –and in relation to their horse teams of eight horses in tactical manoeuvrability.

In June 1820"