History of light troops

by Geert van Uythoven

Note:

There are many myths about the roots of the light infantry and its tactics, as it was used during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. The following could, in a nutshell, shed some light on this matter.

“The fighting against the Corsicans under their leader Pascal Paoli in two campaigns, finally ending in 1769, was too remarkable for not making a huge impression in France, especially while they had to fight no other enemy at that time. During these two campaigns, the first one unlucky as well, the massive French army had been kept busy by a nation of only 175,000 inhabitants. Most of the French officers returning from Corsica had experienced a lot, and came back with new views of how one should attack or defend accidented terrain. And how troops should be trained for this kind of waging war. The necessity of trained light infantry became from now on more clear and generally accepted. The Royaux Corses Regiment was trained in running, crawling, lying down, dispersed fighting and concentrating, and as such was the first standing regiment which was trained for light service in peace time.

The American War of Independence would lead to further perfection of light service. The British, who had their experiences of the beneficial use of light troops during the Seven Year’s War still fresh on their minds, began this war with excellent trained troops and a substantial number of jäger units. Advantage remained on their side as long as the Americans, lacking good artillery, disciplined infantry, and brave cavalry, accepted battle in the open. They retreated however inside the woods and the accidented terrain. Here they fought like savages, with the instinct of hunters. Beside their physical abilities they possessed an extraordinary speed; found their way in the most barren forests; fought always dispersed; evaded battle when victory was unsure; never missed when firing; and used stealth to their utmost advantage. This way of waging war was new to the British. Their Hessian troops, as well as the Scots, did excellent service, and on returning to Europe they brought with them the important experience of the service of light troops. The French, participating in this war on the side of the Americans, had already learned this lesson on Corsica the hard way, and here their maxims were honed even more to perfection. However, the French as well as the Hessians did not succeed in translating their experiences into theory and practical education.

After the American War of Independence, the various nations tried to remedy the lack of light troops in various ways. Prussia created twenty light infantry battalions out of two freicorps and twelve garrison regiments, under the name of fusiliers. In addition, every infantry company received a certain number of Schützen. The Austrians believed to be able to meet the demand with their Grenzer and Tyrolean’s. The British and French had a light infantry company in every regiment. The Dutch had educated Jäger, armed with rifles (von Bylandt), and in 1793 a volunteer corps drawn from all regiments, which according to the situation did good service. The Hessians had a light infantry battalion and a jäger corps of two companies, formed out of sons of foresters. Hessen-Darmstadt raised in 1790 the fusilier battalion Von Wrede, based on sound principles, and in 1793 the jäger battalion Von Schäfer out of sons of foresters.

The French revolution would accelerate the usual slow military evaluation of the light service. Out of necessity light service was introduced into the French army, and Europe was completely taken by surprise when the enormous advantages of this new tactic became visible to all when used in the right way. From this moment on, light infantry service could be regarded as something newly created, taking its rightful place among the other tactics used. The French, exalted by the events of their Revolution, were brave enough and had much endurance. They could make use of all means of the enthusiast nation, but they lacked trained armies and experienced generals to fend off the enemies coming from all sides. The lightly armed and badly clothed citoyens, carrying the cartridges in their pockets, not caring for the following day, did not have the right character for forced service in the line. They were in their element when able to fight in a lose formation, trusting on their bravery and skill, making good use of the terrain. To remedy the lack of training and to accustom his fresh troops to the enemy, Dumouriez raised two corps of 400 to 800 men. These made daily raids and were relieved every eight days. Because of this advantageous arrangement, in the end the whole French army possessed the ability of light service. In addition, the French tirailleurs, which constantly were relieved, were opposed by always the same Allied skirmishers, therefore finally gaining the upper hand and the advantage over the enemy which they until now had sorely missed.

Training and necessity quickly created a kind of troops of which smart generals, understanding the spirit of the young troops, would know how to make good use off. Huge swarms of dispersed skirmishers, using the terrain to their utmost advantage, covered the advance of the army; prevented the enemy to make use of its vulnerability; kept the enemy busy in a painful way; while separate corps threatened its flanks and back. Especially educated nor armed with rifled muskets, these tirailleurs constantly outclassed the enemy infantry because of their rate of fire with the more efficient muskets. The tirailleur system was recognised as the most efficient in battle by all of Dumouriez’ successors, as only in this way one was able to create warriors to be used for every military undertaking, out of inexperienced conscripts in such a short period of time.

How big however the advantages gained by the French in waging war was with such tactics, they would succumb in a war in which this way of fighting was the second nature of the inhabitants. From the hands of their own countrymen the Republicans would gather new experiences, serving for the use and enhancing the training of their infantry, creating an arm for which no terrain was an insuperable obstacle, for which no undertaking was too difficult. The Royalist Vendeans had sworn to sell their lives as costly as possible, and in 1793 and 1794, in Bas-Poitou, Charette and his six hundred men fought a cunningly and lucky campaign against 30,000 Republican soldiers. With extraordinary physical abilities, practised marksmen as the were, they constantly outclassed the Republicans with guile and their use of the terrain: retreating; victorious; constantly evading the superior forces; instantly disappearing, reappearing again in other places; capturing isolated posts; leaving the enemy in the dark about their real strength and plans, they became the most deadly and exhausting of all opponents. Only with the utmost exertion the Republican forces scarcely managed to defeat these bands, which made themselves dreaded with tactics adapted to the terrain, and by ignoring all danger and hardships. Their order of battle was always the half moon, with both wings formed out of the best marksmen. They fired unceasingly without any command, with equal certainty when walking or standing still, so that it was difficult to resist their deadly fire. When it seemed that the enemy would be victorious, they would break off the fight. If victory would be on their side, they fell on the enemy from all sides, pursuing him with the utmost ruthlessness and speed.

The Spanish War of Liberty gave another example in their guerrilla’s of the use of good light infantry in suitable terrain. Compared with the Vendeans their quality was more or less the same, but they were much more numerous.

Because of the lessons learned during these wars, as well as forced to it by changed tactics, all nations have paid much attention to the training of light infantry, authorised by the greater need for them. During the later years of the Napoleonic wars, every combat was started by skirmishers; they defended the most important positions; they prepared the decisive moment in battle.”

Main source used:

“Versuch einer Geschichte der leichten Truppen“, in ‘Militair-Wochenblatt‘, 6. Jahrgang (Berlin 1821) pp. 1875-1877.