‘About the Cossacks, and
their usefulness in the field’
(‘Ueber den Kosaken, und dessen Brauchbarkeit im Felde’)
by [the Austrian] Captain A.
Prokesch
Translated by Geert van Uythoven
Note: This piece seems to be related to the piece ”Ueber Kossacken”, by Major a. D. Graf von Münnich, placed on the internet by Oliver Schmidt: http://www.grosser-generalstab.de/aufsatz/kosaken.html. It is not clear what the connection is between both pieces, but the greater part, maybe all of Von Münnich’s piece is (sometimes literal) part of Prokesch’ piece. These parts are marked green in the translation beneath. Looking at both pieces, it also seems that Prokesch’ piece is more complete, and that von Münnich’s piece is a mere compilation of snippets.
Source: Osterreichisches Militairisches
Zeitschrift, 3. Band, 9. Heft (Wien, 1824) pp. 270 – 339.
part 1
(pp. 270 – 280)
‘The Cossack is
the eye of the army’, said Suvarov. Many that are no Suvarov, threat him
as a mere servant [Frohnknecht]. Dispersed during the war over all
branches and auxiliary duties of the army, Cossacks are used in an unworthy
way. He has to serve all; he is the servant of field surgeons, orderlies, and
all kinds of clerks; he has to escort the women from place to place; he is the
courier for all less important letters of headquarters. On what is this abuse
based? On an unfounded opinion, that the Cossack is only useful for pursuit –
in addition however at his best in plundering, robbery, burning, generally for
all excesses of war.
This
statement should justify the reduction and the paralysing of the most mobile
part of the Russian army, but it only proves the self-interest or the ignorance
of those who state it. Experience refutes this delusion. This alone can correct
the superficial and easy supposition, which proves ones lack of an own opinion.
More
common and moderate is the view of those, who at least do not challenge the
cultivation of the Cossacks for the European art of war. They admit that they
can do great service when operating against enemy horse; they regret however,
that the Cossacks are not trained and changed into a more regular force,
finally to be turned into a regular one. This view has to be looked at somewhat
better.
The
Cossacks of the Guard, and the Uhlans of Tschougoniev, proved to which
efficient light horse the Cossack can regulated to. One cannot doubt about his
ability for this. However, does the Russian army lack regular light horse? What
would be the gains of turning Cossacks into such an arm? They would provide the
Russian army with something it does not need, and deprive it from something
that is irreplaceable. The light horse, which can hold its own against the
light horse of all other European armies, would be augmented above necessity:
the Cossacks however, which are a unique asset of the Russian army, would be
lost. A state which would give up its singularity, and which would not know to
use its internal powers, giving more importance to the form as to its essence,
would be doomed…
But
from were comes the opinion, even from more moderate and experienced persons,
that a Cossack can only be used against horse, not also against foot? Some of
them, speaking fluently, believe that the reason for this is the innate fear of
a Cossack. This explanation is ridiculous, in the mouth of a Russian however
even dishonourable for him, who says it. With what right can someone state such
a thing, that a numerous tribe of his people, under the same sky, grown up with
him on the same soil, speaking the same language, praying to the same God in
the same way, accusing him from not having a certain quality of which he
believes he has the right to grant it to himself in the highest form? When
however experience would confirm the prejudice that a Cossack is useless
against foot, the reason for this should have other causes; causes, outside of
the being of the Cossack, and of which we have the opportunity to learn about.
The Cossack, much feared by the enemy horse, will also be feared by the enemy
foot, as well as by its artillery, when the following points are taken into
account:
1. That a Cossack regiment has its full complement of men, i.e. 500
strong, when it takes the field 1).
Of the seventeen regiments under
Wittgenstein and Winzingerode –Generals who knew how to value this arm, being angry
every time it was abused; to see the man that wields the sword, and who wears
the name of the Emperor on his breast, lowered to a mere servant—the strongest regiment counted only 320 horse. In other
corps, there were regiments fielding only between 80 and 120 horse. In
addition, from these numbers the best men were taken to escort the numerous
wagon trains of the army, to escort the hordes of prisoners backwards, etc.
As such, the rest remained totally useless for service against the enemy.
2. Every separate Cossack unit has to be commanded by a more
educated Russian, or a foreign officer.
The superiority in knowledge of the
European art of war that officers of other branches have, which is openly
acknowledged by the Cossack, will give them the confidence which every soldiers
needs to have in his commander. The Cossack feels
that as a leader he can only serve in an inferior way in battle against western
nations; seldom he will oppose its leadership. Active, adroit, bold as
he is, he can be an excellent NCO; but out of him would mostly become a useless
officer. The NCO is the real soul of the Cossack regiment. He owes his position
nearly always from his service and his fame 2). He is, as Dnevalnoi
(‘daily man’), the real basis for internal order, direction and service. He has
all the responsibility. If he becomes commander of a separate detachment then
he will act according to the rules; his total ignorance will be
disadvantageous; he will change quickly in a tyrant for his subordinates; and
he will use his position to accumulate trophies and loot; he wants to become
wealthy, and to survive to enjoy his wealth; he has the sole goal of loot when
leading his subordinates against the enemy, or he will try to escape harm as
much as possible, in order to receive the approval of the Hetmen for preserving
and maintaining his troops. Without doubt there are
exceptions, but these are to few in comparison to state that this is not
the rule, which seems to be unjust to them. However, at this time these
exceptions enlarge the usefulness of this arm enormously, and is indeed
required in the wars against the European armies. Exceptions are always
reliable; they have the advantage to be a double reward. –The whole Russian
army knows Colonel Tschernozubov 8 as an educated and excellent officer; he is
one of those, who managed to raise up from a common Cossack through every rank.
The whole Russian army adores Colonel J. Girov, a worthy old man, who fought
during forty years of service in over two hundred battles. Named never else as
‘father’ by his regiment, strict but caring, just and undaunted, presenting his
breast to every bullet that would threaten his troop. Although covered with
wounds, one saw him at the front of his men in every attack during the latest
war. His sons had the honour to be allowed to fight at his side, and when he
let them go from there, it was only because he would chose them for the most
dangerous missions. This old grey men, marked by three sword cuts inflicted by
a Turkish hand, is still a pledge of honour to his whole regiment 3).
However, as already said, these exceptions do not refute the
rule. The incompetence of the Cossack to fulfil the position of a high ranking
officer comes most to the foreground when he reaches the rank of general. In a
time span of thirty years, the history of the Don Cossacks show us only two
exceptions, Jlowaisky 11 and Count Orlow-Deniszov. Many Cossack-officers, still
very useful as a colonel, lost their reputation when they became general. But
even the undertakings and results achieved by those who upheld their
reputation, are far below the results achieved by Russian officers of the
regular army, achieved at the head of Cossacks. The glory gained by the
Generals Diebitsch, Paul Kutusov, Geslaving, Koudaschev, and Kaissarov, and the
Colonels Pahlen, Löwenstern, Davidov, and Czernitschev are examples of this.
Even strangers succeeded in achieving faiths of arms with this arm, which no
innate Cossack leader was able to match. What did Winzingerode not achieve with
his small troop under the walls of Moscow, in the face of an army of 180,000
men, commanded by a general like Napoleon? In which brilliant way did not led
Tettenborn the Soulin 9, Denisov, Grebzov, and Kommissarov
Regiments from Russia into the heart of Denmark and France? With which
distinction did not the Cossacks serve under Benkendorf, Dörnberg, Geismar,
Nostitz, and Barnikov. Under these foreign leaders we saw them in the streets
of Berlin, against the bridge of Lüneburg defended with grape-shot, against the
tenfold numerical superior force of Marshal Davout –on foot as well as mounted,
in marshes, moors, level as well as mountainous terrain, yes even on the glacis
of fortified places. Undaunted, adroit, indefatigable, victorious. Led by such
leaders there is indeed no one who does not acknowledge the excellence of the
Cossacks.
Another reason because of which Russians, or even
foreigners, have to be preferred for leading the Cossacks above the innate, is
that the latter are seldom known, seldom have important contacts within the
empire and army, for which special attention is paid by the higher and highest
to the troop commanded by them. And no troops need more to be cheered up, need
the insurance that one will notice them, as the Cossacks. A reward, preferably
the cross of honour, will make them happy; they will never have enough crosses,
and the most cowardice will do everything he can to earn one. An educated
Russian or a foreigner at their head will give them a bigger chance to achieve
this, then an innate. The Cossack believes he will not be overlooked, and he
hopes that a brilliant faith of arms will get known to the Emperor himself.
This hope is the greatest incentive that can be given to a Cossack. His Emperor
is for him nearly equal to God, and for both he has the same fear and devotion.
To be noticed by the Emperor, even from a distance, seen by him when fighting,
will fill him with enthusiasm. If the Emperor would ride at the head of a
detachment of Cossacks once, no troop would achieve more as this one 4).
3. It should be defined specifically that the Cossack-officer, on
the march as well as in battle, never may leave the post assigned to him.
This is even more necessary because of the fact that these troops have no trumpeters. Therefore the execution of all movement, maintaining order, deployment, etc. has to be directed by voice, or by signs of the officers. With these troops it is often the case that at the moment of danger the officers, and even the NCO’s, prefer to urge on the stragglers and to chastise the unwilling instead of being an example to the men by cool steadiness and simply doing their duty. This behaviour can even be observed with the bravest; then there are those, who believe that this has to be seen as an important part of their duty. Often there are other reasons. The soldiers in all cases, although very bravely overall, wants to see the man at the front when in danger, the same who passes by in front of him on parades, for who’s glory he will sacrifice blood and life, who earns honour and pride through him. He wants that this person, who has so many privileges, and is able to earn so many distinctions, at least takes his duty serious, sharing the danger with him. Especially the Cossack has the habit of never taking his eyes off his leader, to have him always right in front of him like his guiding star, to honour him as the bravest of all. So the officer who wants to be victorious at the head of Cossacks, always have to be at the front of them. This troop is not to be urged on from the flanks; for this the line is much to extended, movement is to disordered. The leader must be thirty paces in front of them. Indeed, when attacking, everyone wielding a sword should be at the head of the troop, under severe punishment when not 5).
4. When marching, or in battle, a rear guard of 15 to 20 horse,
under a strict but valued NCO, is indispensable.
If this measure is not taken, a third of the whole troop will
disperse in stragglers for a thousand reasons. This habit is one of the old
ailments of the Cossacks. During the 1814 campaign
one found out, that a chain of Cossacks had been created from Paris to the Don,
with posts formed like a troop on the march, and making a business of
transferring the loot they could not take with them personally home by handing
it over from one person to the other.
5. It is further indispensable that the colours stay with the troop
during battle.
Trough a rare error regarding the
means of protecting the colours, during the last time span some regiments had
the habit to send back the colours when danger came close. In this way, the
positions close to the colour, which formerly were posts of honour and a reward
to the bravest, have now –strangely enough !-- become a gathering place for
cowards and stragglers. Tettenborn kept the colours out of the melee during
dispersed combat, in order not to divide the power of his attack by concern
about it, but it was placed close behind the line under protection of a few,
serving as a rallying and turning point for the whole troop. In closed fighting
it was never permitted that the colour left its place at the front of the
detachment. And even then he never lost one colour. But he was also
ensured that the last Cossack would fall before it would be given up. Then a Cossack not only believes that the honour of his
unit is connected with the colour; he is also connected to it by religion. A
regiment that would return to its homelands without its colour, was not only
dishonoured, but was also signed by the hand of God, stigmatised.
6. It is a leader never allowed to interfere with the economical
relations, indeed with the internal affairs of his unit.
In this case, morals and customs are deeply embedded, and
religious aspects are so integrated, that all things traditional have become
relics, which cannot be changed unpunished.
Footnotes:
1) The regiment
consists of 5 squadrons (sotnia); a squadron counts 100 lances, 1
cavalry-captain (sotnik), 2 or 3 cornets (choronugii), and 10
NCO’s (ourirdniki).
2) The position of NCO, and of the cornet
is occupied by the Hetmann.
3) J. Girov, since fourteen years Inhaber
of his regiment, but still poor. He did his first service in the Sifoiev
Regiment.
4) Tetterborn placed a German officer at
the head of each Cossack regiment. This one would be informed about all aspects
of the whole plan for the undertaking. These received the orders, and they were
obeyed by the Cossack-Colonels without any reluctance. They formed the medium
through which every officer commanded the troop. In this role, the Cavalry-Captains Herbert, Bismark, Bothmer, and Lieutenant
Redlich distinguished themselves, and became renowned trough their rare
faiths of arms.
5) All superior ranks are armed with
swords.
© Geert van Uythoven