Austrian tactical flexibility

during the Revolutionary Wars

(refuting yet one more myth)

translated and remarks by Geert van Uythoven

Note:

According to many sources, historians, and others, during the Revolutionary Wars the Allied forces were not capable of coping with the changed situation on the battlefield, having to fight less orderly, but numerical much superior revolutionary French armies. I came across primary material which proves the contrary.

On 12 March 1794 the Allied commander of the Northern Theatre, FM Friedrich Josias Prinz von Coburg-Saalfeld, issued a General Order to his army, laying down the tactics how his Austrian troop commander had to fight the French revolutionary armies. This Order is of great importance to us, as beside proving that the Austrians indeed were capable and prepared to abandon their linear tactics and to use more flexible structures and tactics, according to the situation, it explains the way the Austrians did battle in the Northern Theatre during the years 1794 and 1795. The translation of part of the Order is given below.

‘ALLGEMEINEN ARMEEBEFEHL’

12. März 1794

“The numerical superiority of the enemy may never be the cause that a commander, which has laid down his plans against them, is having doubts. The enemy lacks the advantage of military order, and the ability to execute regular and quick movements. Therefore, one should always try to get ahead of the enemy with the attack. One should especially attack the enemy on the march, before he is able to deploy in order of battle. If the situation dictates, for example when defending a prepared position, reserves have to be prepared to act against the flanks of the attacking enemy. In this way every Austrian commander will make the best use of the inexperience of the French Generals, and the lack of training of his troops, to counter his superiority in numbers.”

“When a detachment of Austrian troops occupies a prepared position or entrenchments, for the occupation force only a third, or at the most half of the available infantry and artillery should be used. The remaining part of both arms and the cavalry should be held in reserve. They should throw themselves at the enemy unexpectedly, and hamper the erection of batteries. Ammunition should not be wasted on great distances. Heavy canister fire at the appropriate range, and musketry at 300 paces, will bring a quick decision. Because of the fact that the enemy field artillery is of a heavier calibre, the parapets should be made of sufficient strength, while they otherwise will not give enough protection to the troops. Abatis [‘Schleppverhaue’] on the appropriate distances should hamper the enemy advance and deployment.”

“When attacking enemy entrenchments the artillery, concentrated against a few chosen spots, should advance while keeping up a heavy fire, and the infantry should follow it closely in the same number of huge detachments. The horse follows at some distance, prepared to make the most of every chance they receive to attack the enemy troops deployed between the entrenchments.”

“Fortified villages should also be attacked at the weak spots only. A preparation with canister and howitzer grenades has a mighty effect. Infantry columns, which boldly break through at these chosen spots advancing inside, will cause fear under all troops occupying the place. In the meantime, the horse will go around the village, cutting of the retreat of the enemy routing in disorder, cutting down everyone who not surrenders. In the same way, fortified woods and abatis are attacked.”

“When in front of our position villages are situated at a small or longer distance, they will be occupied with light troops only. When an enemy superior force advances, these will retreat before being attacked seriously or dispersed. If such forces occupying places without any significance to the safety of the main position would resist more persistent, in the end they still would have to give way to the superior enemy. In that case, they will be thrown back on the main position in a disorderly rout, and as such making a bad impression to the whole corps. If woods are situated close in front of a position, which would have to be occupied, one should only place light troops there, and fortify them.”

“When the enemy occupies and advantageous position, against which the chance that an attack would be successful is improbable, one should try to invite the enemy to leave this position with manoeuvres and feints, and attack only when he has left the protection of his position. If a frontal attack on an enemy position is not possible, often one can operate on his flanks with decisive results. Against an impregnable enemy position one should also never order a useless artillery bombardment, if this has not the goal to deceive the enemy while preparing an attack in any other way.”

“The situation dictates that during the upcoming campaign the battle lines are extended whenever possible: In order to oppose the enemy superiority with a front which artificially has the same extension, and to prevent a threatening envelopment. At the same time, enemy superiority dictates to hold back reserves in every position and in every combat, in order to be able to execute decisive actions. Without being able to increase the strength of the troops, this can be done when the number of independent units, being the battalions and squadrons, is multiplied. Because of the fact that a bayonet attack of the untrained enemy infantry, as well as the choc of their badly organised cavalry has not to be feared, depth of our order of battle can be decreased without any disadvantage. The third rank of the infantry and cavalry will therefore form reserves from their own companies and squadrons. In the camps these will form a special battle line [‘Treffen’], and stay together as a separate detachment, except when having to execute long marches far away from the enemy and without any fighting ahead, in which case they will rejoin their parent units as the third rank again. These newly created battalions and squadrons are preferably used as a reserve, at every occasion that will arise to be launched to break into the enemy flanks.”

“The commanders of the detached corps have to double their alertness and activity. They have to decide on all movement according to the circumstances, and they have to study the terrain closely. Finally, they have to bring the enemy off balance by numerous repeated, bold and forceful undertakings, for which purpose especially nightly surprise attacks, raids, and ambushes are recommended.”

© Geert van Uythoven