Cavalry covering artillery

DEPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY COMMANDED TO COVER ARTILLERY

("Aufstellung einer zur Deckung von Geschütz kommandirten Kavallerie")

Translated by Geert van Uythoven

Source:

- ’Ein Kavallerieoffizier’: "Aufstellung einer zur Deckung von Geschütz kommandirten Kavallerie", in ‘Militair-Wochenblatt’ 2. Jahrgang, 61. Stück (Berlin 1817) pp.272-274

"The 52nd chapter of the Militair-Wochenblatt contains a thesis about artillery cover. Without going into these new ideas, I merely consider the case as it is right now, not how it should be, and will only treat the passage of the thesis were the author has the opinion that: “the case, in which batteries will act on its own with a proportionately cover of cavalry or infantry should be treated as a very rare case”. Regarding this statement, one should make an exception of the frequent advance and rear guard combats, to which I will limit my opinions in this article –which one also can treat as a contribution to ‘little wars’- as I believe that the horse artillery, in combination with single squadrons or a cavalry regiment, will form the forward [‘vortrab’] or rear force [‘nachtrab’] of an advance or rear guard of a corps.

The latest tactics which connects both arms so closely calls for the creation of such commands frequently, and the author of this article participated often in them during the 1812, 1813, and 1814 campaigns.

The more mechanical the deployment of the cavalry as a rule takes place in such cases, the more one should be surprised, that they nevertheless should receive the attention of the commanding officer in so many respects.

If cavalry is commanded to cover artillery during the pursuit of the enemy, or during a retreat, it will usually take up position close behind, or close to the flanks of them: so do single squadrons as well as regiments. Both ways, if not using the cover of the terrain ¹⁾, can impossible be regarded as efficient, then:

1) The enemy will expect this deployment when it will take place mechanically, and planning his attacks accordingly. When this attack succeeds, artillery and cavalry altogether will be defeated;

2) it will more or less uncover the flanks of the artillery, and finally

3) both forces are deployed close to each other, forming one target at which the enemy can concentrate his fire. The damage done by this has been shown by experience, and is already enough reason to act in this case also according to the spirit of the new.

To remove these disadvantages, according to the opinion of the author, the cavalry in advance and rear guards, which would be commanded to cover the artillery during the fighting, would have to take up a forward position on the flanks of the enemy. In an oblique direction in order not to present the enemy our own flank.

Assuming that a half horse artillery battery would have to be covered by two squadrons: so should one of these deploy 100 to 200 paces to the right and forward of the battery, and with an advanced right wing; the other one at the same distance with an advanced left wing, opposing the former squadron, to the left and forward of the battery.

The enemy forward or rear force, when not outnumbering us, would in such circumstances never dare to undertake an attack. If he nevertheless would try it, even when outnumbering us, he will not be able to defeat us, when beside these dispositions he will be opposed by a calm presence of mind, and a decisive use of the right moment.

Assuming that the enemy would attack the cavalry, it would present our artillery their flank. These would have to wait until they have advanced into canister range, and then fire, giving by doing this at the cavalry the signal to [counter]attack. If the enemy would direct his attack at the artillery, he would have to pay dearly during its retreat, when the conditions of not acting to rashly, and determination will be fulfilled by both arms.

For the remainder, anyone understanding the spirit of such dispositions will be able to think about other possibilities of attack, and will never doubt the way how to act defensively and offensively.

Form the above one can justly derive the disposition of a cavalry brigade, as for example in the case given in the theses in chapter 52 already mentioned, with a force consisting of five regiments in two lines with a horse artillery battery. The flanks of the enemy however could in such a case be threatened easier and more advantageous by forming wing columns in sections (‘Zügen’); our artillery would even be better covered, and the 5th regiment –if two lines of two regiments are formed- be used most efficient, by deploying it at a farther distance to cover our own most threatened flank. In such a case it could act more independent, using every advantageous opportunity to harm the enemy.

It has especially to be remarked that, when the enemy would deploy artillery against us, he would have to direct it against three points or, if he targets only one of these, leave both other unharmed. In such a case it should not only be permitted to the cavalry, but be their duty, to change position when they notice that the enemy has found the range at them; in which case they should by alternate movements move to a side, backwards or forward again, so that the tactical deployment of the whole position is not disturbed.

Stubbornly staying at a fixed position in such occasions is not perseverance, but obstinate courage, or even pedantry! One who cannot make the difference between changing position with leaving its assigned post, and who is calmly and steadfast prepared to sacrifice troops with such pedantry, will be the cause that much blood will be spilled for the fatherland for nothing.

When in the year 1647 Duke Ulrich von Württemberg commanded the Allied rear guard against Turenne, and was fired at by him during the attack on a defile near Augsburg, the immortal General [Turenne] praised the Duke, saying among other things: “The enemy squadrons did nothing else then changing position time and again, without flinching.”

A cavalry officer”

Footnotes:

1) For example when low ground will provide the cavalry a covered position which, as soon as it will not hamper our offensive, or deprive the battery from its protection, would have to be utilized. In all cases, every tactical rule is subordinate to the qualities of the terrain: in all cases they will dictate the commanding officer how to behave, and the sooner he is able to oversee its right utilization, the better knowledge he will have of the virtues a general needs to have.

[A few weeks later, the ‘Militair-Wochenblatt’ published remarks to the above in chapter 63. They will be placed on this website as well in the near future]