THE ENGAGEMENT AT ZWEVEGEM

Saxon landwehr receives its baptism of fire,

Belgium, 31 March 1814

by Geert van Uythoven

“Spring 1814, General Maison manoeuvred to fend off the advance of the Allies into the northern departments. During the second half of the month March he was in Lille with 8,000 men, and decided to reinforce himself with part of the garrison of Antwerp. For this purpose, he struck camp on 22 March, drove Major von Hellwig out of Menin, occupied Courtray [Kortrijk] and made a swift movement to Gent were he surprised Colonel Bihalow [standing here with a Cossack regiment]. After having united himself here with the troops coming from Antwerp, he quickly returned, being back in Courtray on the 30th.

The Duke of Weimar, who stood before Maubeuge at that moment, became worried about Brussels, and quickly concentrated here, summoning Count Walmoden, who just arrived at Louvain [Leuven] to join him. General von Thielmann was at Oudenaarde, and advanced to Avelghem on that same day. His corps consisted mainly of Saxon landwehr, which hardly had time to form and to train in the use of weapons, The Allies had planned a general attack, which apparently was prevented by the quick movements of General Maison.

General von Thielmann, noticing the retreating enemy, and learning from his scouts that the French corps had the intention to retreat back to Lille, did not want to let the opportunity pass to strike at the enemy. He decided therefore to attack next day, without even waiting for the arrival of Count Walmoden and that of the Saxon General von Gablenz, both on their way to Oudenaarde. Therefore he advanced in the early morning of the 31st along the chaussee leading from Avelghem to Courtray.

The initial attack was successful; the French most forward troops were defeated, and the advance guard advanced past Sweweghem [Zwevegem]. From here, a lateral road leads to the left to the chaussee which leads from Courtray to Tournay [Doornik]. General von Thielmann ordered Major von Hellwig to advance with his corps along this lateral road as far as the chaussee, to cover the left flank of the attack. In the meantime however, while advancing further to Courtray, Thielmann found out that the complete enemy corps was still present and that he was in no position to engage in any serious fighting. Therefore, he ordered his troops to retreat on Sweweghem, and to take up positions here. Executing this order however became difficult, because in the meantime, five companies of completely untrained troops had been ordered out to skirmish, and were totally driven back by the French. This caused an irregular rout, as was to be expected, and two line battalions had to dissolve nearly completely into skirmishers to restore order.

At the same time, General Maison had ordered the greater part of his force to advance along the chaussee to Tournay, which was only weakly held by the Allies. These were encountered by Major von Hellwig when he came close to the chaussee, and at the same time becoming aware of the retrograde movement in his back, he ordered the retreat as well. Von Hellwig’s official report about this engagement says the following:

‘(…) We succeeded in pushing back the enemy over Sweweghem. From here I was detached to Belleghem, on the road to Tournay, to push back the enemy from this side as well. Before I arrived here though, the Saxon corps had already been thrown back. (…) Therefore I would, because the enemy now also pushed forward at Belleghem as well, be cut off, and had found no way out for my cavalry in the accidented terrain, if I had not been so vigilant in observing their movements. (…) As it was now I managed to return unharmed, and covered the retreat of the Corps, which was continued to Oudenaarde.’

The biography of General von Thielmann, published by Cavalry-Captain von Hüttel of the Royal General Staff, states about this combat that the Division Barrois etc. turned the left flank totally uncovered by the ‘unexpected’ retreat of Von Hellwig’s Corps to Oudenaarde, attacking the brigade of Prince Paul von Würtemberg successfully. This representation is not in accordance with other earlier reports. As Major von Hellwig’s retreat, as far as it was decided by him himself, did not go further then the chaussee, were he reunited with General von Thielmann, using his infantry to cover the continued retreat. The reports say nothing as well about any turning of the left flank, supposedly caused by the retreat of Major von Hellwig. Prince Paul von Würtemberg commanded the Saxon landwehr, which had seen fighting at Sweweghem previously, and as the retreat was already in progress when Major von Hellwig returned on the chaussee, he could not easily have been turned. And even less having caused the retrograde movement of him, and the retreat of the whole corps. Therefore, the word ‘unexpected’, if it should have a purpose, is vague in this case, and does not add anything to the description of the events besides maybe showing that the commanding general believes the retreat to be ‘unexpected’, as long as he did not know the cause of it. General von Thielmann for that matter had not expected the resistance he encountered, and therefore it would probably be better, to prevent any wrong interpretation of this phrase, to explain the situation and to change the account accordingly.”

Source: Militair-Wochenblatt, 14. Jahrgang (Berlin 1829), pp. 4136-4137.

© Geert van Uythoven