THE SILESIAN CUIRASSIER REGIMENT

AT VAUCHAMPS

 

14 February 1814

 

by Von Briesen

translated by Geert van Uythoven

 

“The account of the fighting of 14 February 1814 in Plotho’s ‘Der Krieg in Deutschland und Frankreich in den Jahren 1813 und 1814’ (3rd part, p.186), contains an exchange of cavalry regiments, which can be corrected most clearly by giving a short account of the participation of the Silesian Cuirassier Regiment in this battle.

 

When it was reported that a huge mass of enemy cavalry was threatening our right wing, to the right of La Chapelle village, the Silesian Cuirassier Regiment (about 400 horses strong), which had marched at the end of the column until now, and the 8th Silesian landwehr Cavalry Regiment under Major von Kleist (about 150 horses strong), received orders to observe these under orders of Brigadier Colonel Graf [‘count’] von Hacke. The horse artillery of Captain von Tuchsen was ordered to follow them, but was not able to execute this order because of the swampy terrain.

 

Both regiments were deployed to the right of La Chapelle. They tried to secure their front by ordering forward the 4th squadron of the Silesian Cuirassier Regiment (Cavalry-Captain Graf Haugwitz), who send out flankers to the front. These were however not able to withstand the pressure of a somewhat covered cavalry mass of several regiments, consisting for the greater part of seasoned troops coming from Spain. Especially while at the same time a numerous cavalry advanced to the left of the village against our left wing. By this six times superior attack, the cuirassier regiment lost Cavalry-Captain von Kurβel (present-day major), which was seriously wounded and taken prisoner, and about twenty horse; of the landwehr cavalry, Major von Kleist was wounded. If the enemy cavalry had been able to make a proper charge, had they been master of their horses, both weak regiments would despite all their efforts undoubtedly have been thrown back on the defile about 400 paces backwards, and be destroyed for the greater part. They however made front before the village supported by the fire of twenty to thirty skirmishers in the outskirts of it. After that, Colonel Graf Hacke calmly led them left around the village on to the plain lying behind it. The enemy making no further effort to attack, but retreating instead, the cavalry deployed again here.

 

The enemy main corps seems to have been arrived, and the enemy cavalry (according to Plotho’s very correct returns 6,000 horses strong) in huge masses on both wings, again tried to turn our right wing. The Silesian Cuirassier Regiment was ordered to observe this cavalry. I have to make the remark here, that the small brook streaming between La Chapelle and the great road was so swollen and flooded, that it resembled a significant lake in front of the small forest before Etoges, lying between the regiment and the army corps. On very wet and swampy ground, covered by flanker Züge, in this critical circumstances the Silesian Cuirassier Regiment slowly retreated, until finally every single cuirassier had used all the ammunition in his pouch. General von Grolmann noticed the peril the regiment was in, and ordered the 1st Silesian Hussar Regiment to advance. Both regiments were now retreated by Colonel Graf Hacke to the place were the lake ended, with the right wing of the Silesian Cuirassier Regiment resting on the small forest, with the left of the 1st Silesian Hussar regiment resting at the lake (with Champeaubert behind them on the left). In this way, the defiling of the troops retreating behind them was completely covered.

 

The enemy cavalry, becoming aware that it was high time to undertake something, deployed with great depth, and attacked the 1st Silesian Hussar Regiment and forced it back; the Silesian Cuirassier Regiment, taken in the flank by this outcome and at the same time attacked in front by a similar mass deployed in depth, had also to retreat. It retreated however only to the defile of Etoges, which was occupied by forty to fifty schützen of the Silesian Schützen Battalion, and made front before the entrance in the small forest. The enemy did not dare to follow, except for a few brave ones. In this way it covered the retreat of several guns, as well as wagons, until everything had passed the defile. Only then Colonel Graf von Hacke retreated. Later the Silesian Cuirassier Regiment and the 1st Silesian Hussar Regiment (and not the latter alone) were both assigned to hold the outposts before Etoges.

 

On this day during which, from early until well into the night, the Silesian Cuirassier Regiment fought against a tenfold superior enemy, lost beside the already mentioned Cavalry-Captain von Kurβel about forty horse, mainly because of exhaustion of the swampy ground, and while there was no foddering nor drinking all day.

 

By this honest account of the part which this regiment had in this fighting, the plain account which can be confirmed by General von Grolmann and Graf von Hacke themselves, recognises the reader of Plotho’s work the differences with this account, but will also be convinced that it can only be caused by an exchange of identities.”

 

 

Source: “Kriegsgeschichtliche Erläuterung”, in Militair-Wochenblatt, 3. Jahrgang (Berlin 1818), pp. 580-581.

© Geert van Uythoven