THE SILESIAN CUIRASSIER
REGIMENT
AT VAUCHAMPS
14 February 1814
by Von Briesen
translated by Geert van Uythoven
“The account of the fighting of 14 February
1814 in Plotho’s ‘Der Krieg in Deutschland und Frankreich in den Jahren 1813 und
1814’ (3rd part, p.186), contains an exchange of cavalry regiments, which can
be corrected most clearly by giving a short account of the participation of the
Silesian Cuirassier Regiment in this battle.
When it was reported that a huge mass of
enemy cavalry was threatening our right wing, to the right of La Chapelle
village, the Silesian Cuirassier Regiment (about 400 horses strong), which had
marched at the end of the column until now, and the 8th Silesian landwehr
Cavalry Regiment under Major von Kleist (about 150 horses strong), received
orders to observe these under orders of Brigadier Colonel Graf [‘count’] von
Hacke. The horse artillery of Captain von Tuchsen was ordered to follow them,
but was not able to execute this order because of the swampy terrain.
Both regiments were deployed to the right
of La Chapelle. They tried to secure their front by ordering forward the 4th
squadron of the Silesian Cuirassier Regiment (Cavalry-Captain Graf Haugwitz),
who send out flankers to the front. These were however not able to withstand
the pressure of a somewhat covered cavalry mass of several regiments,
consisting for the greater part of seasoned troops coming from Spain.
Especially while at the same time a numerous cavalry advanced to the left of
the village against our left wing. By this six times superior attack, the
cuirassier regiment lost Cavalry-Captain von Kurβel (present-day major),
which was seriously wounded and taken prisoner, and about twenty horse; of the
landwehr cavalry, Major von Kleist was wounded. If the enemy cavalry had been
able to make a proper charge, had they been master of their horses, both weak
regiments would despite all their efforts undoubtedly have been thrown back on
the defile about 400 paces backwards, and be destroyed for the greater part.
They however made front before the village supported by the fire of twenty to
thirty skirmishers in the outskirts of it. After that, Colonel Graf Hacke
calmly led them left around the village on to the plain lying behind it. The
enemy making no further effort to attack, but retreating instead, the cavalry deployed
again here.
The enemy main corps seems to have been
arrived, and the enemy cavalry (according to Plotho’s very correct returns
6,000 horses strong) in huge masses on both wings, again tried to turn our
right wing. The Silesian Cuirassier Regiment was ordered to observe this
cavalry. I have to make the remark here, that the small brook streaming between
La Chapelle and the great road was so swollen and flooded, that it resembled a
significant lake in front of the small forest before Etoges, lying between the
regiment and the army corps. On very wet and swampy ground, covered by flanker Züge,
in this critical circumstances the Silesian Cuirassier Regiment slowly
retreated, until finally every single cuirassier had used all the ammunition in
his pouch. General von Grolmann noticed the peril the regiment was in, and
ordered the 1st Silesian Hussar Regiment to advance. Both regiments were now
retreated by Colonel Graf Hacke to the place were the lake ended, with the
right wing of the Silesian Cuirassier Regiment resting on the small forest,
with the left of the 1st Silesian Hussar regiment resting at the lake (with
Champeaubert behind them on the left). In this way, the defiling of the troops
retreating behind them was completely covered.
The enemy cavalry, becoming aware that it
was high time to undertake something, deployed with great depth, and attacked
the 1st Silesian Hussar Regiment and forced it back; the Silesian Cuirassier
Regiment, taken in the flank by this outcome and at the same time attacked in
front by a similar mass deployed in depth, had also to retreat. It retreated
however only to the defile of Etoges, which was occupied by forty to fifty schützen
of the Silesian Schützen Battalion, and made front before the entrance in the
small forest. The enemy did not dare to follow, except for a few brave ones. In
this way it covered the retreat of several guns, as well as wagons, until
everything had passed the defile. Only then Colonel Graf von Hacke retreated.
Later the Silesian Cuirassier Regiment and the 1st Silesian Hussar Regiment (and
not the latter alone) were both assigned to hold the outposts before Etoges.
On this day during which, from early until
well into the night, the Silesian Cuirassier Regiment fought against a tenfold
superior enemy, lost beside the already mentioned Cavalry-Captain von Kurβel
about forty horse, mainly because of exhaustion of the swampy ground, and while
there was no foddering nor drinking all day.
By this honest account of the part which
this regiment had in this fighting, the plain account which can be confirmed by
General von Grolmann and Graf von Hacke themselves, recognises the reader of
Plotho’s work the differences with this account, but will also be convinced
that it can only be caused by an exchange of identities.”
Source: “Kriegsgeschichtliche Erläuterung”, in
Militair-Wochenblatt, 3. Jahrgang (Berlin 1818), pp. 580-581.
© Geert van Uythoven