BERGEN OP ZOOM,

THE BRITISH SURPRISE ATTACK

8 March 1814

translated and edited by Geert van Uythoven

Source: Jan Egbertus van Gorkum, “De bestorming der vesting Bergen op Zoom op den 8sten Maart 1814” (Leiden 1862) 96 pp. + map.

Note: Jan Egbertus van Gorkum was the major Dutch engineer, attached to Graham, who designed the plan for the attack. As some kind of a diary he describes the day by day events leading to the attack. I have translated the relevant parts describing these events.

“(…) It was during that period of time that I, during an interview with General Bülow in Breda about the state of the mutual armies, and more specific about the lack of siege guns with the Prussian army corps, which he had not been able to take with him during his advance, as well as the lack of such equipment with the British army, a fact because of which the Allies could have been hold up by the fortresses, brought forward the idea, that with the present-day weak condition of the places the French still occupied, one should not have to think about a regular siege, and that most could be captured by a forceful attack (attaque de vive force), if the defences would be in decline; if it would lack the necessary artillery and if the garrisons as well would be to weak to occupy the main wall sufficiently and to guard the weak points. In addition, in order to undertake such an attack, it would suffice to make ourselves acquainted with such weak points, something not difficult with the ruling dissatisfaction of the inhabitants about the French rule.

The day after this interview, on behalf of General Graham, it was asked to me if I believed Bergen op Zoom was susceptible to such an attack. I answered that the strength of the garrison and its means of defence inside the fortress were unknown to me at that time, but that I did not doubt about the susceptibility to such an attack.

Other military matters were the cause of several other meetings with Sir Graham later on, matters not directly related to this affair, but nevertheless the cause that both, the commander of the Prussian army corps Von Bülow, as the one of the British army Sir Thomas Graham, requested His Royal Highness the Sovereign of the Netherlands, to place me at the service of their headquarters.

This request granted, in favour of the latter commander in chief, I received, by order of the Cabinet of the Sovereign dated 24 January 1814, though the commissary-general of war, the order to go to the headquarters of the general-en-chef of the British army at Oudenbosch, and to place myself under orders of this army commander.

(…)

On the 29th, I received order from his excellency to investigate the strength and means of defence of Bergen op Zoom, in order that in case that the situation and the war-events would deem it necessary to make ourselves master of this fortress, and to offer him, the general, a design for this. As this investigation before everything else led to a reconnaissance, I immediately went to the neighbourhood of Bergen op Zoom, and presented three days later an extensive report of my local discoveries on which the design of an attack could be based.

On my arrival in Oudenbosch the headquarters were ready to transfer to Bracht; the French were dislodged from their positions and retreated to Merxem, and shortly after our arrival I was send by the general-en-chef [i.e. Graham] to The Hague, with letters for the Sovereign and the English ambassador lord Clanearthy. Having the opportunity to present my written report and design to His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange, His Royal Highness told me that, as soon as he would have been charged with the command of the army, my proposal would be executed.

Until 19 February I was ordered to remain in The Hague, to take letters with me from the Sovereign for the British general en chef. Next day I found his headquarters at Groot Zundert, and after having handed over my despatches I was invited to participate in the inspection of a Dutch infantry brigade, with which the troops under orders of Sir Thomas Graham had been reinforced. This brigade consisted of seven battalions, commanded by Major-General de Perponcher. During the parade held by the general-en-chef, two battalions of well-equipped veteran soldiers, which had served during the war in Spain and had been clothed and armed in England, made a good impression, contrary to the other five battalions, which although consisting of veterans and trained men as well, lacked much in attitude as well as in clothing and armament.

(…)

On 24 February I was ordered to appear before General Graham. After having consulted me about the still existing possibility of an undertaking against Bergen op Zoom, he ordered me to resume my investigations and preparation of means to undertake the attack immediately; he confirmed this oral order by a written authorisation, to try to come in possession of this important fortress by offering a very substantial amount of money as well, stating to approve all my actions in this matter.

Since a few days, alarming news about the Prussian army corps under Von Bülow had been in circulation; it was said that he had retreated, and that he would have to retreat further, in order to cover the Netherlands, at which the French main army under Napoleon seems to have taken direction – And because of the fact that communications of the French between Roubaix and Antwerp, only temporarily cut off by a Prussian battalion at Oudenaerde, had been re-established again. Because of this the garrison of Antwerp could be reinforced sufficiently enough to be able to throw back the 9,000 men British on Willemstad, and possession of Bergen op Zoom in these urgent circumstances was deemed indispensable by Sir Thomas Graham.

(…)

Desertion in the meantime had spread throughout the [French] garrison, especially among the recent drafts, mostly consisting of Flemish. As a result, strength of it was estimated not higher then about 3,000 combatants.

(…)

[Van Gorkum describes how the French garrison of Bergen op Zoom was busy strengthening their defences] These were the most important and for my purpose sufficient reports, when on 6 March Captain de Bčre arrived from The Hague, send by His Royal Highness the Sovereign, authorising me orally to undertake an attack on Bergen op Zoom when proposed by the commander in chief of the British army.

During the night from 6 on 7 March the headquarters of Sit Thomas Graham received very alarming news, among other things that the city Rheims had been recaptured by the French, and that the Allied troops in the vicinity of this city had been defeated, after which the main army under Napoleon had cut off communications with the Netherlands and seemed to advance on us.

After having told me this news, Lieutenant-Colonel Carmichael-Smyth, commander of the engineers in the British army corps, being send by General Graham in the morning of the 7th from Calmthout to me in Steenbergen, around eleven o’clock in the morning told me that his excellency had ordered him to inform about the task entrusted to me, regarding the fortress Bergen op Zoom. My reply was that I was ready with everything, had made all necessary inquiries, and had completed my local investigations as much as necessary. The lieutenant-colonel found me in the process of putting the finishing touch to a detailed design, with a description of all points of attack, which I gave over to his judgment.

Convinced about the possibility of succeeding in this undertaking, burning of desire to enlarge the glory of the British arms by executing it, this field officer accepted my proposals with enthusiasm. And when I declared to him that the execution of the undertaking during the evening of the next day, being 8 March, would be very suitable, as the tide of the water as well as the weather would serve us, his enthusiasm grew even more, because the general en chef wanted to possess the fortress as soon as possible.

In complete conviction that the general would execute the design, necessary measures were taken to prepare and to supply the necessary tools and instruments, and it had been agreed upon that I would be in Wouw at two o’clock in the afternoon, were the general would be with his staff and suite, who in the meanwhile would receive the design, with the description of the attack.

Except for taking care of a sufficient amount of reliable and able guides, on whose bravery and suitability success in entering the fortress would especially depend, I took care of providing for the necessary ladders, while for leading the attack-columns (colonnes d’attaque) - three according to my design - was stipulated that the first column would be led by me, the second by Captain-Engineer F. van der Wijck, who had been at the disposal of the general since a while now, and the third or feint attack by the former Captain de Bčre.

(…)

On the morning of the 8th, Lieutenant-Colonel Carmichael-Smyth made known to me that Captain-Engineer F. van der Wijck was absent and no where to be found, and that I therefore had to choose another reliable leader for the second column.

(…)

Around one o’clock in the afternoon, I went from Steenbergen to Wouw, were I met Captain de Bčre on my invitation, and were the commanding General Graham arrived, accompanied by many generals and field officers of the various arms and his staff. These generals and field officers, chiefs of departments of artillery and engineers, united in a council of war, before which I was requested to unfold my design. After having done this, I returned with Lieutenant-Colonel Carmichael-Smyth to the room were Captain de Bčre was; the captain proposed to add a third similar attack to the two on which already had been specified, and well across the wet ditch behind ‘De Zoom’ ravelin, now frozen, as he knew this part of the terrain very well and he believed it would be very easy to reach the main wall by using this route.

Despite my objections, based especially on my received knowledge that the enemy was very alert at this part of the defences, having a strong post, united with the guard of the gate under arms during the night, and in addition adding that it not seemed very wise to me to spread the troops that much or exposing them to danger unnecessary, the officer succeeded in receiving permission for the attack. This was made only more easier because of the fact that the general preferred a bigger amount of points of attack. So the attacks were defined on three real ones, and one feint attack; the already mentioned Hooibroek remained leader of the feint attack, while Captain de Bčre, leading the third attack, chose the younger brother of Hooidonk as his aide.

Recalled to the council of war, the commanding general told me that had decided to execute the undertaking the following night at the decided hour, with the known third attack on the ‘front der Zoom’ added. To execute three firm attacks, 3,300 men had been marked out, of which the guards would form the left wing or first colonne d’attaque against the ‘Oranje’ bastion, under General Cook, 1,000 men strong. The second under Lieutenant-Colonel Maurice, 1,200 strong, against the front of ‘de Zoom’. And the third or right column, which had to attack the entrance of the harbour, under Major-General Skerret, 1,100 men. With the latter was the 44th Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Carleton, who had requested my mediation to become part of it. Finally, for the feint attack, a few hundred men, I believe 250, had been marked out, a sufficient amount which therefore attracted lesser attention from me. But the announcement of fewer then 3,000 men, for an attaque de vive force to capture this large, extended and well guarded fortress, at least regarding the main wall, struck me in such a way that I allowed myself the remark, that when his excellency did not have more troops available for this attack, it would be unwise to undertake it:

- Because if one would be able to penetrate into the fortress, of which I had no doubt, still one had to calculate that some, maybe even heavy loss would be sustained while approaching or climbing the walls, as one could assume that the enemy inside the fortress would be alert, and strong resistance would be encountered at more then one point;

- That in all cases, even if the whole force marked out for the attack would make it over the walls unharmed, would be only a third of the force needed to occupy the walls alone;

- And that in this case the garrison, being stronger then the attackers, would be forced to go over to the offensive, becoming attacker instead of defender, and that fighting would break out inside the fortress, were the terrain was more favourable for the garrison then for the British troops fighting on unknown terrain;

- And as the general had the intention not to venture into the city but only to occupy the walls, not less then 6,000 men would be necessary;

- And that by occupying the main walls only, the enemy would stay in possessions of the places of arms, market places and other concentration points, being able to wait until daylight to see how the situation was, and to attack the forces on the walls one by one.

These considerations seem to have found some approval in the council, and again the general requested me to leave the room. Outside, in the room of Lieutenant-Colonel Carleton, Major-General Skerret and Lieutenant-Colonel Carmichael Smyth joined me, of which the former, in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel Carleton, expressed in an emphasising way that he believed my remarks about the force destined for the attack well-founded. However, Lieutenant-Colonel Carmichael Smyth added that I did not know the British guards; that one guard could be counted equal to three French. To which I replied that in occupying the large extend of main walls not bravery or physical strength was important, as well the spot every men would occupy, and that I would protest even stronger if one would plan to remove these troops away from each other in detachments.

Lieutenant-Colonel Carmichael Smyth and Major-General Skerret returned to the council of war again, and I was also recalled, for the last time now, in order to hear from his excellency the commanding general, that beside the given number an additional two regiments would participate in the undertaking, both strong enough to reassure me on my considerations, and that from now on I would be able to execute my design, as far as it was related to my own services.

(…) [Then follows a description of Bergen op Zoom and its history]

Moving on to the strength and composition of the garrison, I have to remark that the returns of Colonel Le Grand are more or less consistent with the reports I received. According to the returns received by me, strength was:

2,300 men infantry

200 men artillery and engineers

450 sailors

Added to this should the huge number of officers without troops, gendarmes and other men not belonging to a specific corps, adding up to a total of 3,000 combatants; while the garrison according to a report of Le Grand, during a parade held on 5 March, consisted of 2,700 men, namely 4 infantry battalions and 6 veteran companies, together 1,984

- 2 artillery companies 129

- ˝ miner company 42

- sailors, about 400

A total of about 2,555.

A number with the gendarmes, customs and isolated men added, were by Le Grand estimated at about 2,700.

We expect however, that in this number includes not all soldiers present inside the fortress, as it is unthinkable that of the 5,200 men, initially present on 23 December 1813, 2,500 have deserted. Of the sailors anyway, none had left their post and their number was exactly the same on entering Willemstad, and entering Antwerp later, over 450, while the number of veterans, according to the returns of 12 December, was 600, and who surely would not have suffered from desertion. From all this, one can conclude that the strength of the garrison was over 3,000 men. In this strength are not included the considerable amount of field officers, captains, and members of the general staff, belonging to the artillery and engineers, with whom the fortress, as a result of the evacuation of Willemstad, Klundert, Geertruidenberg, and Breda, was filled up by coincidence, and who during an undertaking as this, each one in particular, added more to the defence then a greater strength of armed forces would have done.

(…) [Van Gorkum cites Le Grand] “Desertion among our youthful men was encouraged by the citizens. The Belgians and Fleming’s took advantage of the periods they stood on guard on the outworks, to go over to the enemy.”

(…) [Then follows a description of the preparations for the attack]

The order of attack, given by the commander in chief, followed this design, however with the very important deviation that the troops, when having climbed the walls, should not leave them, while my proposal to the commander in chief on the contrary enclosed that the attacking troops, after having united and established communications with the outside by opening the Bosch Gate, immediately would have to occupy the powder magazine between the Bosch and Wouw Gates and guarding it; after which two detachments, united and supported by the entering troops, would advance to the market place, one along the Boschstraat, the other along the Hoogstraat, and capture the four field guns placed here in front of the main guardhouse.

(…) [Then follows a detailed description of the attack] It must have been around this time that the commanding officer [of the Royal Scotts], finally waking up and perceiving what he had to do, despatched an officer to General Graham with the request to send him artillery through the Water Gate. Responding to this request, the general ordered two guns to move through the ‘Kijk in de Pot’ retrenchment to the covered road on the waterside. Here a ditch prevented them to advance any further, and the general requested me to aid the artillery and to direct it a way to reach the Water Gate.

(…)

A quarter of an hour before, at a moment the French were already master of the ‘Belvedčre’ bastion and the broken courtine behind the ‘Stoelemat’ ravelin, and as such of the flanks that could command the ditch of the ‘Oranje’ bastion, the general en chef Sir Thomas Graham summoned me to him in front of the house at Burgvliet. He told me that the two regiments, about which had been spoken earlier, had arrived now, but that they could not enter the retrenchment by using this way, because of the amount of fire directed against the ladders, and the fact that the route along the Water Gate had also been cut off by the fire of the Water Fort. I answered that general Cooke should still be able to open the Antwerp Gate. (…) The general left me with a satisfied expression, seated on a horse and accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Engineer Carmichael Smyth, and spurring his horse he moved inside the ‘Kijk in de Pot’ retrenchment. What happened after this, and if the general still was able to give the necessary order, I do not know. However, about half an hour later the general again summoned me to him and told me that I could return from here to Steenbergen, were an experienced doctor would be at my disposal; and that the had ended unsuccessfully.

(…)

It was impossible for the designer of the plan [i.e. Van Gorkum himself] to reason with the commander in chief, once the troops were inside the fortress and having succeeded in reaching their main goal, to used these troops united. Every time he received the answer: “if we are there, leave everything else up to the commanding general inside the fortress.”

© Geert van Uythoven