THE PRUSSIAN
1ST LEIB HUSSAR REGIMENT
IN THE BATTLE OF MÖCKERN,
5 APRIL 1813
translated by Geert van Uythoven
Auszüge aus verschiedenen Tagebüchern:
From the journal of the 1st Leib Hussar Regiment:
“At three o’clock in the afternoon we
departed and took the chaussee to Möckern. The [1st Leib Hussar] Regiment was
at the point of the advance guard. When it had passed the forest in front of
Möckern, message came in that a few squadrons of enemy chasseurs were inside
Lühe village. Lieutenant-Colonel von Sandrart received the order to chase them
out with two squadrons. He quickly advanced, but found the village empty;
however on the other side, between both roads leading from Lühe and Möckern to
Zehdenick, numerous cavalry was deployed. They were much to strong to be
attacked by two weak squadrons – fighting started between the flankers of both
sides. Lieutenant-General [Major-General?] von Oppen, who arrived, forbade a
serious engagement and ordered to manoeuvre and to maintain in close contact
until the whole advance guard had arrived. In the meantime, both remaining
hussar squadrons and the dragoon regiment under Major von Platen had arrived.
The enemy deployed a half battery against us and opened up, but its fire had
very little effect. Now General von Oppen ordered the attack. The cavalry had
deployed in an oblique position against the enemy. The dragoons were
placed on the right wing and outstripped the enemy on the right. Because of
their position they charged home first. The enemy was placed behind a
significant ditch, and believed themselves secure from a cavalry attack; the
ditch however was leaped over and the enemy defeated and completely routed. He
suffered heavily. The [1st Leib Hussar] Regiment made over sixty prisoners. The
2nd squadron did not come to grips with the enemy and followed as a reserve. At
this moment, the fighting on the left wing, with the corps of General von
Yorck, was the most fiercest. It only ended at nightfall.
About this fighting, it should be noted by
every observer that the lance is a bad weapon in untrained hands. The enemy
cavalry consisted mostly of lancers. In all other combats which the Regiment
during the war fought against lancers, not only was this observation confirmed,
but also proved that the lance in general does not deserve the profitable
opinion which is assigned to it by present-day fashion. When a lance-armed
cavalry is charged home and when the melee begins, she is lost when opposed by
any other cavalry armed with shorter arms. Proof for this is given by the
attack of the regiment on the 2nd and 4th Polish Lancers during the battle of
Dennewitz. Both regiments belonged to the cream of the French army. They were
defeated easily, we took ten officers and 120 others prisoner, the battlefield
was covered with dead, and we had not a single serious casualty caused by lance
stabs. The shorter cold steel arms are, the more secure and deadly. French
cuirassier and dragoon swords are definitely too long, and maybe even our own
sabres are.”
Source: Militair-Wochenblatt, 30. Jahrgang (Berlin 1846), No.
30, pp.132-133.
For comparison: Joh. Gust. Droysen, “Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Yorck von Wartenburg”
2. Band (Leipzig 1913) pp. 39-40: “(…) Bülow had arrived near Möckern around four o’clock,
with his dragoons, a fusilier battalion and four hussars squadrons and a
Cossack pulk. With the hussars he forced back a few advanced squadrons of the
enemy. The hussars pursued but were stopped by three successive ditches. On the
other side of these, the enemy cavalry was deployed with a strength of about a
thousand horses; a battery beside these, three battalions somewhat further
back. One heard the gunfire become more intense at Vehlitz. Bülow ordered the
dragoons to advance in support of the hussars. (…) Without delaying for one
moment longer or to allow the horse to catch their breath, these charged
further on and crossed the ditch with a hurra, Platen in front. ‘And so’,
the report states, ‘this two hundred horses strong regiment cut their way into
three regiments consisting of lancers, chasseurs and hussars, at least a
thousand horses strong, in such a way that all three regiments were cut to
pieces and driven before them. How little the regiment occupied themselves with
the taking prisoner of individual men is proved by the fact that they made only
86 prisoners, although surely at least the same amount was cut down, while the
embitterment was so strong that initially no pardon was given.”
For comparison: George Nafziger, “Lutzen & Bautzen, Napoleon’s
spring campaign of 1813” (Chicago 1992) p. 78: “(…) The advance guard was under
the command of General Oppen and consisted of four squadrons of the combined
Leib-Hussar and Combined Dragoon Regiment, Fus / 3rd East Prussian Infantry
Regiment, and Horse Battery #6. In Hohenziatz, they found the Illowaisky #4
Cossack Regiment, which joined them (…) Zucchi moved his small force behind
Zehdemick and formed it into three small squares. Each square was apparently
formed with two companies of infantry, which was an unusual occurrence. He then
covered the squares with 1,200 French cavalry of the 1st Light Cavalry Division
from Latour-Maubourg’s corps, and a horse battery, which had just joined them.
The
French cavalry withdrew behind the infantry so as to allow the French artillery
a clear field of fire on the Leib-Hussars. The Combined Dragoon Regiment
(formed from the Lithuanian and West Prussian Dragoon Regiments) and Captain
Steinwehr’s Horse battery #6 (four guns and two howitzers) arrived, and General
Oppen detached a single squadron of the Leib-Hussars [2nd squadron?] to protect
the battery while he led the remaining seven squadrons forward.
The
French were covered by a wide ditch and greeted his attack with musketry from
the French infantry. The chargin Prussian cavalry leapt over the ditch and
struck the French, losing 150 men in the attack. General Zucchi began
withdrawing with his cavalry and the six companies of the 2nd Italian Légère
Infantry Regiment. He was pushed by numerous allied cavalry and artillery.”
© Geert van Uythoven