1813 The Prussian 1st Infantry Regiment at Goldberg

THE 1ST INFANTRY REGIMENT

IN THE COMBAT OF GOLDBERG

23 August 1813

(A correction on Fr. Aug. Nösselt’s “Geschichte des Feldzuges in Schlesien im Jahre 1813, p. 178)

By: von Kurnatowsky

translated by Geert van Uythoven

“The 1st Infantry Regiment (1st East-Prussian) had, during the memorable war of 1813, often the occasion to distinguish itself. One of these occasions was the combat of Goldberg on 23 August 1813 in which, despite the gigantic superiority of the enemy, it succeeded in restoring the fight completely, maintaining its position against the utmost efforts of the enemy as long as the commanding general had planned - a faith of arms rightly regarded as one of its most brilliant. The more surprising was for many of those of the regiment participating in this, to read passage generally known by the announcement that was made, from the following work that just appeared: ‘Geschichte des Feldzuges in Schlesien im Jahre 1813’ from Fr. Aug. Nösselt, former preacher in Küfstein and Breslau, 1817. In this passage, in which the author tells about the combat of Goldberg on p. 178, he states the following:

‘The more surprising it was, although the retreat was ordered through the defile of Rochlitz, that everything tried to push its way along the chaussee to Liegnitz. Therefore some cavalry had to round up the men routing to Liebnitz, so that they did not fall in the hands of the enemy there. In addition the colour of the 1st Regiment came back completely alone, carried by an NCO. To protect it, immediately a section was formed commanded by Lieutenant von Döring, which had already been dispatched to look for the colour. The dismounted guns were also saved by Major von Stengel, etc.’

It is without doubt, that the above event can been misunderstood by those not well informed, much to the disadvantage of the 1st Regiment. Therefore, I feel myself obliged to correct the above description, and to given an account of the combat of Goldberg to the military public:

During the afternoon of 23 August, the brigade of Duke Karl of Mecklenburg-Strelitz was deployed near Goldberg, probably to prevent the rash advance of the enemy. After a murdering artillery bombardment, to which we only could reply with one 6-pdr battery under the then Captain von Huet, our centre, consisting only of Silesian landwehr which found itself under fire for the first time, began to waver. This moment was exploited by the enemy cavalry which attacked, supported by substantial infantry masses. Because of the situation the brigade was in at that moment, the attack could have mend disaster if not the 1st Infantry Regiment, more specifically the 2nd Battalion, had counterattacked with levelled bayonets, throwing back the cavalry which attacked it several times, even pursuing it, recapturing the battery which had been overran, and restoring the fight again.

During the murderous fighting that took place during this combat, one after the other in a shot period of time the original standard-bearer of the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment NCO Thomas was killed, NCO Raudies, who resumed his place, dangerously wounded. The colour fell now to NCO Scheries, which at the same moment suffered a concussion and fell to the earth, while the battalion continued its advance against the enemy. At this moment, a renewed enemy cavalry attack followed against the battalion. NCO Scheries was not able to reach the square, and found himself cut off from it by the enemy, and therefore retreated, supported and accompanied by several also wounded soldiers. As the fighting still continued, the NCO joined a cavalry squadron which had been send back, leaving Rochlitz to the right and marching behind the village.

Soon after the enemy cavalry attack just mentioned, the retreat was resumed and well over Rochlitz, being informed there about the whereabouts of NCO Scheries by some of the wounded lying on the market place. After learning about him, the brigade- and regimental commander, the present-day General von Lobenthal, dispatched the then regimental adjutant Lieutenant von Döring to lead NCO Scheries back to the regiment, in which he soon succeeded. In the meanwhile the retreat continued, and well by those troops still on the battlefield, marching in all order through the defile of Rochlitz to behind the village, and later to Jauer.

The event as described by mister Nösselt, and especially his statement that cavalry was send after the routers on the road to Liegnitz cannot be denied here. This however could only take place when, as was not the case, the rout took place in that direction.

Every single member of the 1st East-Prussian Infantry Regiment has until now avoided to speak out openly about the lucky exploits of this regiment during the years 1813 and 1814. Even more reason for me, having had the honour to command the regiment in person for quite some time, to feel myself obliged to report about these circumstances as described by mister Nösselt. That was has been told here is the truth, that the 1st East-Prussian Infantry Regiment Duke Karl von Mecklenburg-Strelitz fulfilled its duty in a most honourable manner during the combat of Goldberg, can be confirmed by his excellency General of Infantry Count York von Wartenburg, by his Highness Duke Karl von Mecklenburg Strelitz, by Major-General von Lobenthal, and everyone witnessing or participating in the combat of Goldberg.

Königsberg, 16 August 1817

[Signed:] von Kurnatowsky”

Source: von Kurnatowsky, “Ueber das gefecht von Goldberg den 23. August 1813”, in ‘Militair-Wochenblatt’, 2. Jahrgang (Berlin 1817) pp. 285-286

For comparison: George Nafziger, “Napoleon at Dresden, the Battles of August 1813” (Chicago 1994) pp. 43-44 & p. 46: “(…) The French artillery fire quickly dismounted three guns from Prussian Battery #1 and set Hohberg afire. (…) The French artillery then concentrated on the Prussian center, decimating the landwehr standing in dense columns. (…) The three landwehr battalions forming the center of the Prussian line were to suffer incredible losses during this engagement. (…) Oberst Lobenthal pulled the 1/,2/2nd East Prussian Regiment from the second line. He deployed the 1/2nd in line, while the 2/2nd remained in column. The 2/2nd East Prussian Infantry Regiment counterattacked with bayonets, pushing the French back.

However, the withdrawal of those two battalions opened a hole in the middle of the Prussian line, through which the French quickly sent a force of cavalry. At a distance of 800 paces from the Prussian lines, the 2/2nd East Prussian Regiment found itself surrounded by French cavalry, and began a desperate withdrawal back to the safety of its lines. Only the quick thinking of Oberst von Warburg, who led the 3/,4/Mecklenburg-Strelitz Hussars forward in a counter charge, saved the regiment. (…) Despite the heavy fire and an unrelenting fire from French skirmishers, the hussars advanced to engage the French cavalry assaulting the 1/1st East Prussian Infantry Regiment. They were met by the French cavalry, and though they withdrew, they allowed the 2/1st East Prussians to escape.

The French counter battery [fire] had pounded the Prussian artillery. Only 3 Prussian guns remained. Though the continued their fire, they were unable to slow the assault by 24 squadrons of French cavalry against the 1/’2/1st East Prussian Infantry Regiment. Prince Mecklenburg put himself at the head of the 2/1st East Prussian Infantry Regiment, and carrying the regimental flag in his own hands, pushed back the French in an effort to allow those three guns to escape.

Mecklenburg reformed his brigade on the Bruckenkretscham heigths. His brigade had lost 1,780 men. As he withdrew, his forces were covered by the 1/2nd East Prussian Regiment (…)”`

p. 46: “Prince Carl had suffered heavy losses from the 1st, 3rd, and 4th battalions of the brigade’s 6th Landwehr Regiment. These forces were reformed into a single battalion under the command of Major von Fischer.”