1813 3rd Army Corps at Wittstock

THE PRUSSIAN

3RD ARMY CORPS

(GENERAL VON BÜLOW)

AND THE COMBAT OF WITTSTOCK,

22 AUGUST 1813

translated by Geert van Uythoven

Auszüge aus verschiedenen Tagebüchern:

From the journal of the 3rd Army Corps:

“On the 22nd, the enemy retreated most of its force from the heights of Trebbin, and united these with the troops which were deployed against Wittstock and near Wilmersdorf up to Löwenbruch and down to Jühnsdorf. General von Thümen pulled back a few battalions from Thyrow and send them to Wittstock. General von Oppen deployed with part of the cavalry reserve and with horse artillery in front of Ludwigsfelde, in order to be able to throw back the enemy when he would penetrate. The Wilmersdorfer heights between Wilmersdorf and the drainage canal had been occupied by some battalions under Colonel von Stutterheim.

Around noon, the enemy attacked these heights with a superior force, forcing Colonel von Stutterheim to retreat somewhat and to redeploy behind the drainage ditch; soon after the pass near Wittstock was forced, both sides fighting with much bravery. General von Oppen attacked the penetrated enemy with his cavalry, and although a few masses were broken, the enemy managed to hold on, while more and more troops and artillery defiled through the pass. The cavalry attack did not succeed completely, for reason that a raw Uhlan Regiment executed the first attack, not having the necessary experience to wield their lance able enough.

Because of the loss of the pass of Wittstock, General von Thümen, who had to retreat to Groβ-Beeren, found himself in a precarious position. Even more while much time was lost before all troops in the whole line had received the order to concentrate and to retreat. Nevertheless, the retreat was executed with all troops in close order, over Damsdorf to Groβ-Beeren, without being hampered by the enemy except for being targeted with howitzer grenades. The Division von Thümen united with 3rd Army Corps at ten o’clock in the evening near Heinersdorf. The 1st battalion of the Elb-Regiment, which stood in Klein-Beuthen and Jüttendorf, retreated to Saarmund.”

After the battle of Groβ-Beeren (23 August):

From the Parole Book of the 3rd Army Corps; Parole Order of 24 August 1813:

“His Royal Highness has expressed his highest satisfaction about the bravery and endurance shown by the troops during the battle that took place yesterday. I have to much proof of the generally recognised bravery of these troops, and again would like to express my deepest regards for the endurance, which I know, and which you all often showed. The brave and well directed Prussian and Russian artillery has supported our attack very good. However, satisfied with the behaviour of the troops, on the other hand disorders have taken place which deserve to be condemned. The constant yelling in the hindmost battalions, the firing of individuals during the retreat, the useless and untimely firing of muskets in camp are against all military discipline and highly punishable. Once again I make clear that I will hold the Division- and brigade-chefs, as well as all brigade-, regimental- and battalion-commanders responsible for such disorders, and every commander will be severely punished especially when often muskets are fired within camp, before the moment to do this has been fixed.

Signed: von Bülow”

Source: Militair-Wochenblatt, 30. Jahrgang (Berlin 1846), No. 30, pp.133-134.

For comparison: George Nafziger, “Napoleon’s Dresden Campaign – The Battles of August 1813” (Chicago 1994) pp. 92-95: “(…) In preparation for the day’s events, Thümen ordered the 4/5th Reserve Regiment and two guns from 6pdr Foot Battery #6 to occupy the pass by Wittstock. He ordered three companies of the Fus/4th East Prussian Regiment and three squadrons of the Pommeranian National Cavalry Regiment to support them. In addition, there already stood one and a half battalions on the Wilmersdorfer Weinberg Heigths, and the 1/Elbe Regiment and a cannon stood to the right in Jütendorf. (…) The two other dragoon regiments [of General Oppen] and 14 guns moved through Gross-Beeren towards Ludwigsfelde. (…)

(…) Around 5:00 p.m.. a cloud of Saxon skirmishers, from the 1st (Lecoq) Light Regiment and the Saxon Schützen of Brause’s Brigade, covering seven French and Saxon columns, moved forward to assault the Prussian position on the heights by Wilmersdorf. They were supported by the fire of a Saxon and a French 6pdr battery. Clausewitz, having completed his mission and seeing no point in being swept over by a greatly superior enemy, evacuated his position. The French and Saxons swept up to the crest Clausewitz had just abandoned. (…) Reynier had contended himself with a skirmish battle and the Weinberg hill fell into the French hands.

(…) Between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., Reynier decided to execute a frontal assault. He drew two battalions from von Sahr’s Division, one from the Anton Regiment and a battalion from the 2nd Light (von Sahr) Regiment. They moved across the swamp, towards Kerzendorf with the objective of supporting the march of Devaux’s brigade. Devaux’s brigade was formed in colonne serrée. The 1/35th Légère Regiment, leading, was assigned the frontal assault. The first attack was checked by the Prussian artillery firing canister into its dense ranks. The 1/35th broke and fled. Two further attacks were mounted, but also failed.

Then the 4/133rd Line Regiment, passing through the swamp behind a heavy force of skirmishers, arrived on the bank and obliged the battery to withdraw. As the Prussian battery withdrew, the Prussian defenders received the order to fall back on Ludwigsfelde.

Devaux, seizing on the opportunity presented by the withdrawal of the artillery, threw his brigade forward again, across the dike. His leading battalion, after pulling out of the village on the north, formed square with remarkable discipline and marched to the heights where the brigade formed itself in two lines. GM Oppen threw the 2nd and 4th Kurmärk Landwehr Cavalry Regiments (Sydow’s Landwehr Cavalry Brigade) and the Pommeranian National Cavalry Regiment at them without formally preparing to attack.

His attack threw back a few ranks of infantry on the French right, but having no reserve, he was checked before the second line. Then, some of the men of the first rank, who had thrown themselves to the ground, rose up and fired on the Prussian cavalry from the rear.

GM Oppen, not being discourage, threw a dragoon brigade forward. Oberst von Treskow, believing his orders ill understood, stopped his brigade under the French artillery and called a conference with his officers, explaining his intentions, then ordered the charge again. This stop allowed Devaux’s brigade time to reassemble and prepare to receive the attack. Rarely was such a perfect charge executed. The cavalry regiments advanced with decisiveness and with great order. Nonetheless, they were checked before an infantry that was prepared to receive them and they withdrew, rallying behind the 4/East Prussian Dragoon Regiment.”