THE COMBAT OF MAJALAHONDA

SPAIN, 11 AUGUST 1812

translated by Geert van Uythoven

A translation from German:

“On the 11th the whole army descended from the mountains to Torrelodones, where the CIC [i.e. Wellington] made Headquarters. The [KGL] Heavy Dragoon Brigade of Von Bock, which led the advance guard of this column, had struck camp at dawn, advanced as far as a few miles from Las Rozas, and encountered a substantial mass of enemy cavalry, of which the left wing was already engaged with the Portuguese Cavalry Brigade and a few Spanish guerrilla’s which had descended from Puerta de Ratamar. After having made some demonstrations on its right flank, the enemy retreated to Majalahonda through very broken and accidented terrain. They were pursued to here, but no use was made of an opportunity to press them in earnest in terrain so unfavourable for them.

About 11 o’clock in the morning the pursued was stopped. Lord Wellington, who had been present in person until now, ordered the Portuguese cavalry, twelve squadrons strong, to stay in front of Majalahonda with part of the horse artillery. The [KGL] heavy dragoons however had to return to Las Rozas, followed by the other part of the [artillery] battery.

The infantry, the 1st Light battalion of the KGL, had arrived here with six companies at nine o’clock, and was billeted in a huge house in the upper part of the place, separated from the lower part of the place by a small descending plain, about 300 paces long. Both other companies received the order to remain below on their arrival, with the provisions and baggage.

The German horsemen believed to be completely secure, protected as they were by twelve squadrons. So they made their stay as comfortable as possible. In the meantime however, around half past eleven, report came in that the Portuguese were very negligent in their duties. Therefore, a field picket of forty horses was commanded forward, taking up position divided in two troops in front of Las Rozas, in the direction of Majalahonda. Around half past three in the afternoon, this picket noticed that the enemy became restless, and that its outposts were skirmishing with the Portuguese. Totally inexplicable no heed was taken. One says because of the fact that the brigadier just had gome to bed to rest, and no one wanted to awake him. In addition, it appears that the infantry was not informed. One calmly continued caring the horses and receiving provisions. Not three quarters of an hour later the cavalry received the order to saddle up, almost immediately followed by the signal to form up. However, already minutes later, before this order could even have been executed, at the same moment that both [infantry] companies that had remained in the lower part of the place came under arms, the Portuguese and French arrived in Las Rozas simultaneously. Three guns of the artillery had been overrun by the former, which means that one had been prevented from serving them and they had been taken. Only both troops of the German pickets (Lieutenant Kuhls) threw themselves at them with deadly bravery, and partially hampered their advance. Single officers collected their men inside the walled Corals (gardens) of the houses, and threw themselves at the enemy, which of course had been disordered by now, as soon as they had ten to twenty men together. The infantry in the upper part of the place had formed up as well, and advanced on the small plain. Those present in the lower part dispatched skirmishers and occupied a previously fortified but now ruined house on the road to Escorial.

The enemy, which was defeated during the course of this war every time they had been engaged in man-to-man fighting with Germans, was thrown out of the place, reformed however on the other side and again charged the Portuguese which had rallied in the meantime. The Portuguese broke and again abandoned the heavy dragoons. During this attack, Lieutenant-Colonel von Jonquiéres had been wounded and taken prisoner. [The heavy dragoons] taken up by both [infantry] companies already mentioned, receiving fire from these as well as from the artillery which not had been captured, the enemy had to retreat to Majalahonda. But not before they returned fire with a few rounds from the guns they had just captured.

Around sunset the other English Heavy Dragoon Brigade (now commanded by Ponsonby, while Le Marchant had been killed) arrived. They were followed by the 2nd Light Battalion of the [KGL] Infantry Brigade. The fighting had however already ended because of the retreat of the enemy. The latter had suffered substantial fewer losses then the Allies; these had suffered the loss of the guns and many officers taken prisoner.

Again proof was given, as history has given so often before, that bravery alone does not make for a great warrior; and that alertness, carefulness, and caution never can give way to comfort, even in the most favourable circumstances. The individual bravery of the dragoons saved themselves from far greater damage. What would they have been able to accomplish against the enemy if not the adjutant or orderly had preferred to let his chief sleep, or when a reserve picket had been saddled up in the centre of the place?

Next morning one found, when advancing on Madrid, in Majalahonda the three guns with partially burned carriages. In addition, one found several wounded officers that had been captured by the enemy and had been abandoned. On their arrival in Madrid, the guns were equipped again. And while most of their crews managed to escape from the enemy, within a few weeks the whole battery was serviceable again.”

Source: Hartmann, “Abriβ der Operationen der Englisch – Portugiesischen Armee unter dem unmittelbaren Commando Lord Wellingtons vom 1. June 1812. Die Bataille von Salamanca und ihre Folgen bis zur Besetzung von Madrid, am 12. August, und Einnahme des Retiro am 14. August”, 6. Beitrag, in ‘Hannoversches militarisches Journal’, 4. Jahrgang, 1. Heft (Hannover 1834), pp. 76 – 80. Hartmann was a general-major in the Hanoverian army, and had served in the Peninsula as an officer with the KGL artillery.

Note: For more information about this combat, see Robert Burnham’s detailed article “A Devil of an Affair: the Combat at Majahalonda 11 August 1812” on the Napoleon Series

© Geert van Uythoven