EFFECTIVE STRENGTH
OF THE COMBINED ARMIES
IN THE NETHERLANDS,
1794
translated by Geert van Uythoven
“1. Remarks about the unreliability
of the returns of the strength of an army, and about the amount of recruits
necessary to keep the army up to strength
Nothing is more deceiving as the returns of
the strength of armies. Usually, their strength is enlarged in the newspapers
and even in official reports. One does this as some kind of reassurance, one
wants to inspire himself and others with trust and courage.
In general one calculates the strength of
an army in battalions and squadrons. These however are so different in the
various services, that calculating according to this is very uncertain. An
Austrian battalion for example has on full strength 1,020 men, while many
Hessian battalions had during the last war only 360 men as a whole, at full
strength.
Calculating the strength in numbers of men
is much more certain then according to the number of battalions and squadrons.
But still uncertain if it is not clear how many men belong to the economic
structure of the army, the hospitals, the magazines, and transport of all kinds;
how many are sick, and how many are commandeered to the country, to fortresses,
etc. The total amount of these men in weakened armies often exceeds those remaining
to fight. For this reason, the Austrian army has created the category ‘Ausrückende
Stand’ [‘effective strength’] 1). One understands this as those
men which during an action really will advance against the enemy. Every return
of the strength of an army should consist of its ‘Ausrückende Stand’;
every other return always remains uncertain.
For example in December 1794, the
Hanoverian army had an original strength of 13,140 men. Present in fact were,
beside the prisoners, only 7,453 men; for service remain 3,854; against the
army however, only 1,824 marched out in the battalions! The Hessian cavalry had
an original strength of 1,820 men; 1,570 men were in fact present; only 849 men
however marched against the enemy. The above makes clear that it can easily be
the case that of an army of 40,000 men, against the enemy only 20,000 can be
deployed.
Of the full strength of the battalions the
following has to be deducted:
1. The men killed in battle, the deceased, the deserters and the men
that have been discharged;
2. The wounded and sick;
3. The prisoners and missing persons;
4. The commandeered men and those arrested. The commandeered men are
those serving in or guarding the hospitals, magazines, baggage, with the
headquarters, the artillery-reserve, the money wagon, etc.;
5. The artillerymen or ‘handlanger’, or those manhandling the
cannon 2);
6. Those escorting the ‘fouriers’ and carpenters, and those
that are with the bread wagons and the baggage of the officers;
7. Those commandeered within the regiment, for guard duties and
orderlies.
When one counts for the men killed in battle,
the deceased, the deserters and the men that have been discharged, half way the
campaign, a tenth of the original strength; for the wounded and sick a third:
then a six hundred men strong battalion is left with only 360 men, of which
still has to be deducted those mentioned above under no. 4, 5, 6 and 7, and those
that are away from the regiment for outpost and picket duty etc., if one wants
to know the effective strength of a battalion.
Taking this all into account, it is to
explain that of the Hanoverian army with an original strength of 13,140 men,
effective strength is only 1,824 men in December:
- 1,501 men were not present;
- 2,835 men were sick;
- 4,301 men had been taken prisoner and were missing;
- 634 men had been commandeered elsewhere;
- 314 men were serving the regimental guns;
- 328 men escorted the ‘fouriers’;
- 1,430 men were not with their colours because of guard duty,
acting as orderly, etc.
When one does not deduct the 4,301 prisoners,
which mostly fell into the hands of the enemy inside fortresses, effective
strength would still only be 6,125 men 3).
All this proofs that armies, which do not
have a depot of exercised recruits of a third of their strength, will half way
and at the end of the campaign only be able to bring only half the amount of
arms to bear against the enemy, then at the beginning of the campaign. Such
extraordinary amount of replacements will however not be necessary during the
second campaign, while the number of sick which is deducted during the initial
campaign, numbering at least a fourth of the total, will die about half, while
the other half will return to their colours.
So when one sends a battalion of 600 men
into the field; during the first campaign one will have to send about 300 men
in replacements, and during the second, third, etc. campaign about 150 to 200
men. Only then its total Etat will be about 900 men, and its effective
strength about 60 men, if it will not suffer especially hard. Have no
preparations been made for these replacements, the army will cost a lot of
money, and it still has no combatants when it has to do battle – one has a lot
of bread wagons, baggage,, officers, etc., and no muskets when the enemy
advances.
2. Strength of the combined armies
Strength of the combined armies in the
Netherlands in the year 1794 was:
In March: |
||
Commanding
officer |
Location |
Strength |
Prince von Coburg |
Valenciennes |
30,000 |
General Clerfayt |
Courtrai |
25,000 |
Prince von Hohenlohe |
near Maubeuge |
25,000 |
General la Tour |
Namur |
15,000 |
General
Beaulieu |
Luxembourg |
15,000 |
English,
Hanoverians & Hessians |
|
53,000 |
Dutch |
|
15,000 |
Total: |
|
178,000 |
In April: |
||
Commanding
officer |
Location |
Strength |
Prince of Orange |
near Landrecies |
30,000 |
Duke of York |
Cateau |
30,000 |
The Emperor |
between Guise
& Landrecies |
60,000 |
General von
Wurmb |
Denain |
12,000 |
Count Kaunitz |
on the Sambre |
15,000 |
General
Clerfayt |
in Flanders |
40,000 |
Total: |
|
187,000 |
In both lists, the regiments have been
counted at full strength, while with the English and Hanoverians the
reinforcements which will arrive later have already been included. According to
a more accurate calculation, the serviceable amount of troops in the armies in
the Netherlands, in June 1794, counted 123,796 combatants, as follows:
Army |
Strength |
Austrian army |
83,400 |
English army |
28,396 |
Dutch army |
12,000 |
Total: |
123,796 |
If the amount of sick, wounded, and
non-combatants are added, total amount is about 150,000 men.
The army on the Mosel and the Rhine had,
according to a note by the prince von Coburg to Field Marshall Mollendorf, the
following strength:
Army |
Strength |
Austrian troops on the Upper Rhine, including the Corps of Condé |
40,000 |
Pfalz-Bavarian troops, including the garrison of Mannheim |
20,000 |
Hessen-Cassel
& Hessen-Darmstadt
|
4,000 |
Schwäbische Kreis
|
6,000 |
Prussians
|
60,000 |
Saxons
|
10,000 |
Austrian troops
around Trier, etc. |
16,000 |
Total: |
166,000 |
Most probably these together fielded
together about 120,000 healthy combatants. The in the answer of Mollendorf to
the note by the prince of Coburg mentioned above, the Prussian army is
calculated at only 40,000 healthy combatants on 5 March, and the correctness of
the remaining returns is doubted. The whole might of the Coalition therefore,
between Basel and the sea, was therefore about 250,000 men.
3. Strength of the English army, in April,
June, and December of the campaign of 1794
In April: |
Full strength |
Present |
Serviceable |
|||
Infantry |
Cavalry |
Infantry |
Cavalry |
Infantry |
Cavalry |
|
English |
7,700 |
4,000 |
5,500 |
3,200 |
5,000 |
2,400 |
Hanoverians |
15,059 |
2,311 |
12,795 |
2,257 |
10,164 |
1,816 |
Hessen-Cassel |
8,665 |
2,151 |
8,371 |
2,062 |
6,028 |
1,603 |
Hessen-Darmstadt |
2,373 |
568 |
2,271 |
501 |
2,000 |
390 |
Baden |
729 |
- |
650 |
- |
500 |
- |
Summa: |
34,526 |
9,030 |
29,587 |
8,020 |
23,692 |
6,209 |
Total: |
43,556 |
37,007 |
29,901 |
In June: |
Full strength |
Present |
Serviceable |
|||
Infantry |
Cavalry |
Infantry |
Cavalry |
Infantry |
Cavalry |
|
English |
11,000 |
5,000 |
9,878 |
4,062 |
5,977 |
2,956 |
Hanoverians |
15,059 |
2,620 |
11,452 |
2,493 |
7,688 |
2,193 |
Hessen-Cassel |
8,665 |
2,151 |
7,611 |
1,857 |
5,790 |
1,720 |
Hessen-Darmstadt |
2,373 |
568 |
2,151 |
469 |
1,458 |
314 |
Baden |
729 |
- |
500 |
- |
300 |
- |
Summa: |
37,826 |
10,339 |
31,592 |
8,881 |
21,213 |
7,183 |
Total: |
48,165 |
40,473 |
28,396 |
In December: |
Full strength |
Present |
Serviceable |
|||
Infantry |
Cavalry |
Infantry |
Cavalry |
Infantry |
Cavalry |
|
English |
21,600 |
8,100 |
15,220 |
5,612 |
8,000 |
3,200 |
Hanoverians |
15,059 |
2,620 |
8,609 |
2,421 |
4,651 |
2,030 |
Hessen-Cassel |
8,665 |
2,151 |
5,089 |
1,756 |
4,329 |
1,669 |
Hessen-Darmstadt |
2,373 |
568 |
1,200 |
400 |
800 |
350 |
Baden |
729 |
- |
450 |
- |
300 |
- |
Summa: |
48,426 |
13,439 |
30,568 |
10,189 |
18,080 |
7,249 |
Total: |
61,865 |
40,757 |
25,329 |
The category ‘present’ also includes the sick,
wounded, etc.; or rather all men present, including officiers, ‘fourier’
escorts, etc. The category ‘serviceable’ is not the effective strength, but
includes al healthy officers, NCO’s, musicians and others. This number is therefore
higher then the number of real combatants. For example, the Hanoverian
infantry lists for June 7,688 men
serviceable, but had an effective strength of only 5,331 men.”
Footnotes:
1) [GvU]: ‘Ausrückende Stand’ is not the
same as ‘combatants’, as the latter includes often the commandeered men and
detachments, etc. ‘Effective strength’ is maybe the best comparable phrase, and
I will use it as such.
2) [GvU]: Especially the regimental and
battalions guns were usually served by men of the regiment or battalion itself.
3) [Gvu): There is a 27 men difference in
this calculation, which I cannot explain…
Source: Anonymous, “Stärke, innerer Zustand, und Kriegestheater
der verbundenen Armeen, in den Niederlanden, im Jahr 1794”, in ‘Neues
Militairisches Journal’, 8. Band
(Hannover 1797), pp. 274-286.
© Geert van Uythoven