EFFECTIVE STRENGTH

OF THE COMBINED ARMIES

 IN THE NETHERLANDS,

 

1794

translated by Geert van Uythoven

 

1. Remarks about the unreliability of the returns of the strength of an army, and about the amount of recruits necessary to keep the army up to strength

 

Nothing is more deceiving as the returns of the strength of armies. Usually, their strength is enlarged in the newspapers and even in official reports. One does this as some kind of reassurance, one wants to inspire himself and others with trust and courage.

 

In general one calculates the strength of an army in battalions and squadrons. These however are so different in the various services, that calculating according to this is very uncertain. An Austrian battalion for example has on full strength 1,020 men, while many Hessian battalions had during the last war only 360 men as a whole, at full strength.

 

Calculating the strength in numbers of men is much more certain then according to the number of battalions and squadrons. But still uncertain if it is not clear how many men belong to the economic structure of the army, the hospitals, the magazines, and transport of all kinds; how many are sick, and how many are commandeered to the country, to fortresses, etc. The total amount of these men in weakened armies often exceeds those remaining to fight. For this reason, the Austrian army has created the category ‘Ausrückende Stand’ [‘effective strength’] 1). One understands this as those men which during an action really will advance against the enemy. Every return of the strength of an army should consist of its ‘Ausrückende Stand’; every other return always remains uncertain.

 

For example in December 1794, the Hanoverian army had an original strength of 13,140 men. Present in fact were, beside the prisoners, only 7,453 men; for service remain 3,854; against the army however, only 1,824 marched out in the battalions! The Hessian cavalry had an original strength of 1,820 men; 1,570 men were in fact present; only 849 men however marched against the enemy. The above makes clear that it can easily be the case that of an army of 40,000 men, against the enemy only 20,000 can be deployed.

 

Of the full strength of the battalions the following has to be deducted:

1.  The men killed in battle, the deceased, the deserters and the men that have been discharged;

2.  The wounded and sick;

3.  The prisoners and missing persons;

4.  The commandeered men and those arrested. The commandeered men are those serving in or guarding the hospitals, magazines, baggage, with the headquarters, the artillery-reserve, the money wagon, etc.;

5.  The artillerymen or ‘handlanger’, or those manhandling the cannon 2);

6.  Those escorting the ‘fouriers’ and carpenters, and those that are with the bread wagons and the baggage of the officers;

7.  Those commandeered within the regiment, for guard duties and orderlies.

 

When one counts for the men killed in battle, the deceased, the deserters and the men that have been discharged, half way the campaign, a tenth of the original strength; for the wounded and sick a third: then a six hundred men strong battalion is left with only 360 men, of which still has to be deducted those mentioned above under no. 4, 5, 6 and 7, and those that are away from the regiment for outpost and picket duty etc., if one wants to know the effective strength of a battalion.

 

Taking this all into account, it is to explain that of the Hanoverian army with an original strength of 13,140 men, effective strength is only 1,824 men in December:

-    1,501 men were not present;

-    2,835 men were sick;

-    4,301 men had been taken prisoner and were missing;

-    634 men had been commandeered elsewhere;

-    314 men were serving the regimental guns;

-    328 men escorted the ‘fouriers’;

-    1,430 men were not with their colours because of guard duty, acting as orderly, etc.

When one does not deduct the 4,301 prisoners, which mostly fell into the hands of the enemy inside fortresses, effective strength would still only be 6,125 men 3).

 

All this proofs that armies, which do not have a depot of exercised recruits of a third of their strength, will half way and at the end of the campaign only be able to bring only half the amount of arms to bear against the enemy, then at the beginning of the campaign. Such extraordinary amount of replacements will however not be necessary during the second campaign, while the number of sick which is deducted during the initial campaign, numbering at least a fourth of the total, will die about half, while the other half will return to their colours.

 

So when one sends a battalion of 600 men into the field; during the first campaign one will have to send about 300 men in replacements, and during the second, third, etc. campaign about 150 to 200 men. Only then its total Etat will be about 900 men, and its effective strength about 60 men, if it will not suffer especially hard. Have no preparations been made for these replacements, the army will cost a lot of money, and it still has no combatants when it has to do battle – one has a lot of bread wagons, baggage,, officers, etc., and no muskets when the enemy advances.

 

 

2. Strength of the combined armies

 

Strength of the combined armies in the Netherlands in the year 1794 was:

 

In March:

Commanding officer

Location

Strength

Prince von Coburg

Valenciennes

30,000

General Clerfayt

Courtrai

25,000

Prince von Hohenlohe

near Maubeuge

25,000

General la Tour

Namur

15,000

General Beaulieu

Luxembourg

15,000

English, Hanoverians & Hessians

 

53,000

Dutch

 

15,000

Total:

 

178,000

 

In April:

Commanding officer

Location

Strength

Prince of Orange

near Landrecies

30,000

Duke of York

Cateau

30,000

The Emperor

between Guise & Landrecies

60,000

General von Wurmb

Denain

12,000

Count Kaunitz

on the Sambre

15,000

General Clerfayt

in Flanders

40,000

Total:

 

187,000

 

In both lists, the regiments have been counted at full strength, while with the English and Hanoverians the reinforcements which will arrive later have already been included. According to a more accurate calculation, the serviceable amount of troops in the armies in the Netherlands, in June 1794, counted 123,796 combatants, as follows:

 

Army

Strength

Austrian army

83,400

English army

28,396

Dutch army

12,000

Total:

123,796

 

If the amount of sick, wounded, and non-combatants are added, total amount is about 150,000 men.

 

The army on the Mosel and the Rhine had, according to a note by the prince von Coburg to Field Marshall Mollendorf, the following strength:

 

Army

Strength

Austrian troops on the Upper Rhine, including the Corps of Condé

40,000

Pfalz-Bavarian troops, including the garrison of Mannheim

20,000

Hessen-Cassel & Hessen-Darmstadt

4,000

Schwäbische Kreis

6,000

Prussians

60,000

Saxons

10,000

Austrian troops around Trier, etc.

16,000

Total:

166,000

 

Most probably these together fielded together about 120,000 healthy combatants. The in the answer of Mollendorf to the note by the prince of Coburg mentioned above, the Prussian army is calculated at only 40,000 healthy combatants on 5 March, and the correctness of the remaining returns is doubted. The whole might of the Coalition therefore, between Basel and the sea, was therefore about 250,000 men.

 

3. Strength of the English army, in April, June, and December of the campaign of 1794

 


In April:

Full strength

Present

Serviceable

Infantry

Cavalry

Infantry

Cavalry

Infantry

Cavalry

English

7,700

4,000

5,500

3,200

5,000

2,400

Hanoverians

15,059

2,311

12,795

2,257

10,164

1,816

Hessen-Cassel

8,665

2,151

8,371

2,062

6,028

1,603

Hessen-Darmstadt

2,373

568

2,271

501

2,000

390

Baden

729

-

650

-

500

-

Summa:

34,526

9,030

29,587

8,020

23,692

6,209

Total:

43,556

37,007

29,901


In June:

Full strength

Present

Serviceable

Infantry

Cavalry

Infantry

Cavalry

Infantry

Cavalry

English

11,000

5,000

9,878

4,062

5,977

2,956

Hanoverians

15,059

2,620

11,452

2,493

7,688

2,193

Hessen-Cassel

8,665

2,151

7,611

1,857

5,790

1,720

Hessen-Darmstadt

2,373

568

2,151

469

1,458

314

Baden

729

-

500

-

300

-

Summa:

37,826

10,339

31,592

8,881

21,213

7,183

Total:

48,165

40,473

28,396


In December:

Full strength

Present

Serviceable

Infantry

Cavalry

Infantry

Cavalry

Infantry

Cavalry

English

21,600

8,100

15,220

5,612

8,000

3,200

Hanoverians

15,059

2,620

8,609

2,421

4,651

2,030

Hessen-Cassel

8,665

2,151

5,089

1,756

4,329

1,669

Hessen-Darmstadt

2,373

568

1,200

400

800

350

Baden

729

-

450

-

300

-

Summa:

48,426

13,439

30,568

10,189

18,080

7,249

Total:

61,865

40,757

25,329


The category ‘present’ also includes the sick, wounded, etc.; or rather all men present, including officiers, ‘fourier’ escorts, etc. The category ‘serviceable’ is not the effective strength, but includes al healthy officers, NCO’s, musicians and others. This number is therefore higher then the number of real combatants. For example, the Hanoverian infantry  lists for June 7,688 men serviceable, but had an effective strength of only 5,331 men.”

 

 

Footnotes:

1) [GvU]: ‘Ausrückende Stand’ is not the same as ‘combatants’, as the latter includes often the commandeered men and detachments, etc. ‘Effective strength’ is maybe the best comparable phrase, and I will use it as such.

2) [GvU]: Especially the regimental and battalions guns were usually served by men of the regiment or battalion itself.

3) [Gvu): There is a 27 men difference in this calculation, which I cannot explain…

 

 

Source: Anonymous, “Stärke, innerer Zustand, und Kriegestheater der verbundenen Armeen, in den Niederlanden, im Jahr 1794”, in ‘Neues Militairisches Journal’, 8. Band (Hannover 1797), pp. 274-286.

© Geert van Uythoven