The first glider assaults of the war, Eben Emael and the bridges over the Albert Canal.
Photographs courtesy of Kurt Engelmann, veteran of Sturmgruppe Granit

A photo of the entrance to the fort of Eben Emael taken in 1999. (Block.I or Werk.3)


The success of Fall Gelb relies upon us
Strategic objectives had to be taken to allow the advancing German 6th Army to pass un-hindered into Belgium as part of Fall Gelb (case yellow). These objectives were three bridges over the Albert Canal at Veldvezeldt, Vroenhoven and Kannes and the fortress of Eben Emael. This fortress  was built in 1932 and completed in 1935 at a cost of 24 million francs. It was a well situated, well armed and well defended strongpoint built into the side of the Albert canal with the natural defences on one side and an anti-tank ditch and barbed wire defences on the other. Eben Emael was considered to be virtually impregnable due to its location. It measured approximately 700m east to west and 900m north to south. It had a formidable arsenal of sixteen 75mm and two 120mm artillery pieces in 4 casemates and 3 revolving turrets. The field of fire from these guns allowed them to cover Maastricht to the north and Vise to the south as well as the 3 bridges across the Albert canal that were also to be taken.The two 120mm guns were encased in a huge rotating steel dome. All the artillery positions were connected by 4.5km of corridors, stairs and lifts and officers even  used bicycles to move around the complex. 500 Belgian artillery troops manned the large guns with an additional 500 men manning the immediate defences on the flat roof of the fortress, consisting of 60mm AA guns, searchlights and heavy machine guns. Two heavy machine gun bunkers sat atop the surface. Eben Emael also had dummy installations to fool any attacker. The only downside to Eben Emael was the lack of surface trenches and defences against infantry attack.

It was decided that a parachute assault was out of the question due to the limited space at Eben Emael and the chance of some men missing the drop zone. It would have to be carried out in light assault gliders.
The assignment went to Hauptmann Walter Koch who was to form a Para Assault Detachment (Sturmabteilung Koch) from men of his 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment and Leutnant Rudolf Witzig’s pioneer company from the 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment. This detachment totalled 11 Officers and 427 men, 42 of which were glider pilots who were also Infantry and Engineer trained.
They immediately started intensive training at Hidelsheim, carrying out attacks on wooden mock-ups of the fortress. The Glider pilots practised their landings in confined LZ’s and even used barbed wire wrapped around the landing skids to slow the landing of the DFS230 gliders on touch down. Then Gliders and men trained together on mock-ups of the fort to perfect the assault.
They were organised into 4 assault groups, each of which had a specific objective. They were each given a codename.
Granite were to take Eben Emael itself, Steel to take and hold the Veldvezelt bridge (Maasricht-Antwerp road), Concrete to take and hold the Vroenhoven bridge (Maastricht-Brussels road), Iron to take and hold the Kannes bridge (Maasricht-Liege road).
Witzig’s Group Granite who were to take the Fortress until relieved by men of the army's 51st Engineer Battalion, consisted of 2 Officers (Lt Rudolf Witzig & Lt Egon Delica) and 83 men, 11of which were Glider pilots.
Group Granit's 11 gliders and their JU-52 tows took off from two airfields outside Cologne at 0430 on the morning of 10th May 1940, following a flare path made up of single searchlights spaced 20km apart, with a group of 3 searchlights at Aachen on the German border to indicate the tow release point. There they were released at 7000ft still inside German territory and were left to glide to their target. Only 9 gliders landed atop Eben Emael, the first carrying the men of Troop 8 landed at 0524, closely followed by Troop 5 who landed directly on top of a machine gun nest, taking the first Belgian prisoners of the operation. Two gliders including Witzigs, which contained the reserve troop, had to abort shortly after takeoff and landed back near Cologne, the second glider to abort landed near Düren. Witzig managed to arrive at 0830 to re-take command after commandeering another glider and tow. The men from the second glider managed to link up later in the day after getting there on foot under heavy fire.


Above left and right:


Above: Unaware that their commander was not with them, the men of Group Granite (now under the temporary command of Hauptfeldwebel Wenzel from Troop 4, as Leutnant Delica was unaware of Witzig's absence) started to carry out their assigned objectives aswell as those of the missing Para’s. Within 10 minutes they had successfully  knocked out 9 of the casemates and pillboxes, using 2lb, 25lb and massive 110lb hollow charges, as well as flamethrowers. The small 2lb charges were used for destroying observation and sighting equipment, the 25lb charges were used for spiking gun barrels and destroying pillboxes and the 110lb hollow charges were used for smashing the thick concrete of the casemates and embrasures. At 0542 a radio message went out to Hauptmann Walter Koch "objective achieved, everything in order". They met sometimes quite stiff resistance from the Belgian defenders, who had even resorted to firing shells set with the minimum fuse settings. At one stage Leutnant Delica called in Stukas to bomb the stubborn objectives. The stukas did not succeed in destroying the targets but forced the gunners to keep their heads down whilst the engineers went to work placing their charges. One by one their objectives were destroyed and they held out until 1000 on the morning of the 11th when they linked up with men of the 51st Pioneer Battalion. Together they started to sweep the last of the resistance from the fort and made way for the Motorised Section of the Engineer Battalion to get through and relieve the Para assault group. Knowing the battle was lost; the Belgian commander Major Jottrand, surrendered the Fortress at midday on the 11th May and 1000 Belgian prisoners of war went into captivity. Group Granite suffered 6 dead and 20 wounded during the battle. 3 of the dead were a patrol sent into the maze of galleries within the Fortress and were ambushed by Belgian troops, 1 of them was killed at the Kannes bridge when the troop from the downed glider tried to cross. The Belgians suffered 23 killed and 59 wounded during the battle.

Gruppe Granit Objectives, Truppführer's und LS Piloten
Objective 16, Dummy Cupola. Oberjäger Heinemann - Trupp 7 - Uffz Scheidhauer
Objective 15, Dummy Cupola. Oberjäger Harlos - Trupp 6 - Uffz Ziller
Objective 17, Canal Nord 60mm AT gun. Oberjäger Harlos - Trupp 6 - Uffz Ziller
Objective 19, Mitte Nord MG turret. Feldwebel Wenzel - Trupp 4 - Uffz Bräutigam
Objective 13, Mitte Sud MG turret. Oberjäger Neuhaus - Trupp 9 - Uffz Schulz
Objective 12, 3x75mm guns. Oberjäger Arendt - Trupp 3 - Uffz Sapper
Objective 18, 3x75mm guns. Feldwebel Niedermeier (along with Delica) - Trupp 1 - Fw Raschke
Objective 24, 2x120mm guns. Oberjäger Maier - Trupp 2 - Uffz Brendenbeck
Objective 29, 4xAA MG's. Feldwebel Haug - Trupp 5 - Uffz Lange
Objective 31, Cupola Nord 2x75mm guns. Oberjäger Unger - Trupp 8 - Uffz Distelmeier
Objective 26, 3x75mm guns. Oberjäger Hübel - Trupp 10 - Uffz Kraft
(Trupp 11 - Oberjäger Schwarz with Leutnant Witzig - LS Piloten Uffz Pilz) (reserve trupp)
 
 


This famous photograph shows men of Assault Group Granite sharing a cigarette after the fighting.

The men in this photograph were identified by Kurt Engelmann, who was a member of Helmut Wenzel's Truppe.4.
From left to right: Eddi Schmidt T.4, Gerhard Becker T.5, Franz Jannowski T.5, Karl Polzin T.4, Wilhelm Stucke T.1, Unknown, Peter Zirwes T.6.

Five minutes before the gliders landed on Eben Emael, Group Concrete, comprising of 98 men in 11 gliders, commanded by Leutnant Schacht, landed near to their objective after recieving heavy AA fire from Maasricht. Belgian defenders were well dug in on the approaches to the Vroenhoven bridge, but were quickly attacked and overcome. The destruction of the bridge was prevented by a quick thinking corporal who charged the bridge bunker and separated the ignition connectors. Within minutes the bridge was in German hands and at 0530 a radio message was sent out,"objective taken, bunker blown up, bridge stands".
The gliders of Group Iron, under the command of Leutnant Martin Schächter with 90 men in 10 gliders, landed near the Kannes Bridge under a hail of fire. This was an important objective as it gave access to Eben Eamel from the landward side and was the route to be taken by the 51st Engineer Battalion and 151st Infantry Regiment. They dropped straight into a ensuing firefight between the Belgian defenders and an advance column of German Infantry which were way ahead of their schedule, Schächter was seriously wounded in the battle and replaced by Leutnant Joachim Meissner. The bridge was blown up by Belgian troops, which delayed Group Granite's relief. At 0540 a radio message was sent out,"objective reached, resistance great, bridge blown up, still passable with preps from engineers". The combined German units resisted Belgian counter attacks all day until they  were relieved later on in the evening of the 10th.

Group Steel landed the same time as Witzigs group at 0524 near the Veldvezeldt Bridge under the command of Oberleutnant Gustav Altmann with 92 men in 9 gliders. They met slight AA fire on approach and resistance on the bridge. The defenders in the surrounding trenches were quickly overcome and the concrete bunker on the opposite side put out of action. A machine gun bunker was built into the western pillar of the bridge, this was destroyed with grenades along with its 15 man crew. At 0535 Altmann signalled that "objective reached".
The struggle for the bridges on the Albert canal left many casualties. The Belgian defenders lost 400 killed in action. Parachute Assault Detachment Koch suffered 37 dead and 100 wounded, Group Steel lost 8 men, Group Concrete lost 7 men and Group Iron lost 22 men.
By the afternoon of the 11th May all the objectives had been successfully secured and the doorway to the west was open for the advancing Wehrmacht Army Groups with only the loss of a handful of men. The first tactical use of gliders had been a complete success. Eben Emael had become the only successful engineer assault carried out from the air, with 54 out of 85 men taking the fortress, out of this number, 2 troops of paras attacked dummy installations and were not involved in the actions against the dangerous objectives.



Below is an extract from the mission order for Assault Group Granit and the Trupp command for Trupp.1. The Trupp command lists the important personel, strength and equipment they were to take on the mission. Equipment varied slightly from glider to glider. This information comes from an original document, courtesy of Ian Tanahill.

Mission Order: Sturmgruppe Granite
Gruppführer: Oberleutnant Witzig, Deputy: Leutnant Delica
Combat Order:
To ensure complete surprise over exterior installations, which could endanger river crossings to the north.
In addition, attack the Panzer cupolas, casemates and AA positions.
Break up hostile attacks and defend until relieved.

1.Trupp commands:
Trupp.1.
1.Strength (1-2-5) with Leutnant Delica.
2.Truppführer: Fw.Niedermeier
3.Glider Pilot: Fw Raschke
4.Equipment: 6 rifles, 2 Mpi, 1 Flamethrower, 2 charges of 50kg, 3 bangalores, 5 charges of 3kg, 1 charge of 6kg, 1 folding ladder of 4m, 1 flare pistol, 1 explosive box of 25kg, 2 charges of 12.5kg, 2 large flag markers.
5.Order:
a) Attack Werk 18 (Artillery casemate, front to the north, 2x3m cupolas or 1x3m cupola).
b) Destroy Werk 18 if necessary.
c) Prepare Werk 18 for defence.
6.In case of failure of Trupp.1, Trupp.2 receives the order.
7. Messages to the Gruppführer (at Werks 19-21)



This operation and the others in Belgium on May 10th 1940, saw the first use of 2 secret weapons. Firstly the DFS-230 glider, which is described in detail within the aircraft section of this site. The other weapon was the hollow charge described below:
The Hollow Charge
The shaped charge had been invented in 1888 by an American by the name of Munroe. In 1910 it was improved by a German called Neumann and a Swiss gentleman called Morhaupt further improved the idea and offered it to the french, who were due to accept the weapon on exactly the same day that the Germans used their own version in anger, May 10th 1940.
The hollow charge worked on the priciple of concentrated force on one particular point and given the name, the "Monroe effect" after the inventor. The first demonstration by Monroe consisted of two parts. Firstly he placed some explosives on a steel plate. When ignited the plate was undamaged. For the second demonstration he scratched his name on one side of the explosive. This detonation resulted with his name engraved on the steel plate albeit back to front.
This basic effect had been improved in the late 1930's by German scientists and resulted in the half sphere device with a hollow cavitiy at the botom, which itself came in two parts to be easily handled by men who were to use it. This weapon was very delicate, any damage could result in a lesser result, which is one reason why they were delivered by Glider. Any damage to the seal and the resultant force could be diminished severely.
The device was carried by two men who would place both parts together and set it on the structure which was to be destroyed. The fuse would then be set and the men would take cover. The result from the 50kg charge can be seen below.


Above left to right:



Truppe 4 and the assault on Eben Emael by Kurt Engelmann
Our target, the fort of Eben Emael was supposed to be the strongest fortification in the world and was considered to have been impregnable. It was built between 1932 – 1935 and the location was chosen after the construction of the Albert Canal with its 60 meter high northeast wall. Steep concrete walls connected the fort to the steep sloping embankment of the Albert canal. Its surface was covered with barbed wire entanglements and interspersed with tank obstacles. A 400 meter long water filled trench underlined the defensive power of the west wall. The surface of the fort was 900 meters in length from north to south and approximately 700 meters at its widest point. The fort installations were divided into three levels. On the upper level, the armoured cuppolas, concrete casemates and AA Batteries protruded above the ground. The second level housed the command post, a hospital, ammunition storages, 6 generators that delivered the energy for the artillery traversing and elevating systems, lifts, lights and it also housed a communications center. The lowest level was made up of chambers, which housed the soldiers. The required strength of the fort was 1.200 soldiers. On the day of insertion the strength was 650 men plus a relief force of a further 233 troops who were stationed outside of the fort at Wonck.
In the preparatory phase before the insertion at Eben Emael, we carried out countless towed flights in daytime and during the night between November 1939 and May 10th 1940. We carried out bridge demolition training and field demolition training and in December 1939, we trained on the former Czechoslovakian bunker line. A scaled down plaster model of Eben Emael was always available as a training aid for us to examine. Absolute secrecy was ordered by General Student. There was no home leave and we were only allowed out of the barracks in groups. After several practise alerts the genuine alarm was sounded on May 9th 1940.
At 0430 on the morning of May 10th 1940, 32 tow groups from Köln Ostheim and 10 tow groups from Köln Butzweilerhof began their flight. Our assault group "Granite", started at 04.35 from Köln Ostheim with 11 gliders, which followed a line of beacons on the ground that showed our pilots the way up to the Dutch border. After a flight time of 31minutes and a distance of 73km from Köln, we reached an altitude of 2600 meters and when we reached the Vetschauer Mountain the glider was released. The glider leader of Truppe 4, Unteroffizier Brautigam (who held the world record in glider flying before the war) had like most of the other gliders, a rough flight during the tow.
Trupp.4

Trupp 4 pose for a photograph after the surrender of Eben Emael. From left to right:
Karl Polzin, Fritz Köhler (photo added after, not present in the original), Eddi Schmidt, Helmut Wenzel, Otto Brautigam (glider pilot), Fritz Florian & Kurt Engelmann.
Number 8 man Windemuth was wounded.(not present)

On our release we could see the Rhine and the sillhouette of the cathederal in Köln. At regular intervals we could see the flashing beacons on the ground that showed us the way to the border. Upon releasing at an height of 2600m, it was dawn and very cold in our glider, its thin fabric skin offered us no protection from the cold. After release the flight became smoother and on our right we could see the lights of Maastricht. The first tracer bullets appeared in the distance but none of the gliders of our assault group were hit.
After a gliding time of 20 minutes in which we covered 25km, we could see the outline of the fort and the Albert Canal from an height of 800 meters. Our glider pilot pointed the nose of the glider towards the ground as the AA fire started to come up from the fort.
Brautigam kept the stick forward and we took up a steep dive. The ground came rushing up toward us and after a short and very hard landing our glider came to a stop directly in front of our target. On our left we could see our objective, Casemate19, its machine-guns firing from casemate openings in the bunker wall.
After the hull of our glider dropped, our Truppführer, Helmut Wenzel, jumped out with 2 men who each carried one half of a 50kg hollow charge and rushed to the casemate. Wenzel threw a 1kg charge into the opening of the periscope and then ignited the 50kg charge on the steel observervation cuppola. In the meantime the rest of our Truppe had taken up position in the bushes in front of the rampart and our machinegunner, Polzin, took the casemate openings under fire. I and another man each took half of another 50kg pack and rushed toward the bunker. The second 50kg charge was suspended and ignited in front of a machine-gun embrasure. We threw ourselves behind a rampart four meters away, but we still felt the enormous shock wave when it detonated.
The charge blew a very big hole into the concrete wall of the casemate, so that an entry into the bunker was now possible. An awful view awaited us when we entered the casemate.
Casemate 19 had been destroyed and was no longer able to offer any resistance, our Truppe had accomplished its mission within 15 minutes of landing on the fort. We proceeded to drape a flag onto the bunker as a marker for the Luftwaffe to indicate that the casemate was in our hands. Now we had time to take a closer look at our surroundings. The detonations from the other positions had almost ceased by this time.
Our objective was equipped with 3 heavy machine-guns, 2 armoured searchlights, 1 artillery observation cupola and 1 light machine-gun to cover the entrance.
Our Truppeführer, Feldwebel Wenzel, then set up his command post against the rampart next to Casemate 19 and put the 7 of us into a defensive position. This location was chosen for a command post because of its excellent observation of the entire fort with the exception of the southern and western positions, which were located on slopes and could not be seen due to thickets.
Wenzel himself went to the next positions to find out which of them had not yet been destroyed, and at the same time, find our Assault Group Leader Oberleutnant Witzig, and report the capture of Casemate 19. On the way he met our radio operator, Gilg, who was also looking for Witzig to receive orders to set up the radio post. None of the other runners who had been sent out to find Witzig or members of Truppe.11 had been successful. Wenzel concluded that Truppe.11 had not landed on the fort.
Witzig’s second in command, Leutnant Delica, had flown in the glider of Niedermeier’s Truppe.1, which had landed approximately 400m south of Casemate 18, where heavy fire could still be heard.
Wenzel decided that Leutnant Delica was unable to assume command of the assault group due to his current position. Wenzel decided to act and he took command himself. He had the radio team set up their position at the northern rampart and established the dressing post there, as the initial fighting had already cost 2 dead and 12 wounded.
Wenzel arranged for radio contact to be established with Assault Group Concrete at Vroenhoeven, where Hauptmann Koch had his command post. He managed to give his situation report and also called up Stuka support to supress the positions at the entrance and to prevent supplies being brought up from the village of Eben Emael. Within 20 minutes, JU87 and HS126 aircraft appeared and put on a show of precision bombing. One He111 flew over the fort and dropped containers filled with fresh ammunition.
It was around 9am when a lone glider flew over the fort and landed not very far from the northern rampart. In it was Oberleutnant Witzig and Truppe.11, who had been forced to land on a meadow beside the Rhine when the tow rope broke shortly after take-off. In a relatively short time, Witzig was able to organise a replacement JU52 tow aircraft, which was able to land on the meadow and take-off again.
Witzig was quickly briefed by Fw Wenzel and he assumed command of the assault group. In the meantime, it had been established that Meier’s Truppe.2 had not landed on the fort. His pilot, Brendenbeck, had been forced to land at Düren near the Dutch border. During the course of the day, Truppe.2 had fought its way to the edge of the fort, but were unable to penetrate the fort’s defences, with the result that Casemate 24 had not yet been destroyed.
Heinemann’s Truppe.7, whose target was an armoured cupola on the northern tip outside the blockade belt and which turned out to be a dummy installation, was unable to join the fighting within the fort. Due to these set backs and the losses, our fighting strength had been reduced to 60 men, who were facing a force of approximately 600 Belgian soldiers in the fort and casemates.
By Midday things had quietened down. The sun was beating down and the men were becoming very  thirsty, particularly as everyone had expected to be relieved by this time.
A bunker in the southeast outside the fort suddenly began shelling our positions on the northern tip with shrapnel rounds, which was repeated at intervals throughout the afternoon.
Heavy gunfire broke out in the southwest of the fort shortly after 1pm. Witzig ordered Feldwebel Wenzel to move up with some men, but they were unable to locate the enemy in the difficult terrain.
For a short time we had to take cover in Truppe 3’s Casemate 12 as the fire became heavier and heavier. Feldwebel Wenzel was at this time wounded by a bullet, which grazed his head.
Several times we had to move against the Belgians in the vicinity of Oberjäger Arendt’s Casemate 12, as fresh troops had been moved up from Wonck. Although we suffered some losses, the Belgians were unable to make a successful co-ordinated attack.The shooting had stopped in this area after 6pm and Feldwebel Wenzel returned to the northern tip with his men. Oberleutnant Witzig deployed his further depleted Truppe to the defensive position at the northern rampart, particularly as it was becoming dark and it was unceratin whether the Belgians would launch a counter-attack on the fort. All of us were extremely nervous in the dark, everyone stared into the darkness with their weapons at the ready, expecting an attack at any minute.
Some artillery began firing at about 10pm, but we were lucky and did not suffer any further losses.
Casemate 17, a bunker in the canal wall, illuminated the canal with its searchlights and had successfully prevented the Army Pioneers from crossing until then. During the afternoon, Oberleutnant Witzig had already seen how dangerous this position was and sent Oberjäger Harlos and Truppe 6 to tackle it. On three occasions, charges were lowered on a rope and detonated beside the bunker, but its 60mm gun continued to fire.
In the northeast we frequently saw flares, which encouraged us to believe that the Army was not very far away. In spite of this, the night seemed endless, particularly as the artillery fire also kept flaring up against us.
Finally dawn approached and it seemed to us like a miracle that the Belgians had not launched a counter-attack and that we had survived the night.
At around 6am on May 11th , 1.Zug of Pioneer Battalion 51 under the command of Oberfeldwebel Portsteffen, had fought its way to the fort. We were glad to see that German relief forces were finally close.
It began to get light and our mood picked up again, we became aware of our hunger and above all, our thirst.
We suddenly came under fire again from Casemate 23 and from the northern tip we were able to watch 2 German anti-tank guns duelling with Casemate 17 on the canal wall. The shells fired from the canal bunker hit the village and church at Canne, but after a short time it was finally knocked out.
Time passed very slowly and we kept on hearing shots from the unclear area in the southeast, but there was no enemy to be seen.
At 1315, the fort was finally handed over to Oberstleutant Mikosch by the fort commander, Major Jottrand. The garrison of almost 1000 men began the trek into captivity.
Our assault group had suffered 6 dead and 18 wounded. Belgian casualties were 23 dead and 65 wounded. After burying the dead at the fort, we marched away, with some of our wounded having to be carried on improvised stretchers. This turned into a problem between the bushes and trees on the steep ground leading to the entrance position, particularly as some shooting broke out, which was apparently caused by some of the Army Pioneers.
We finally reached the entrance position and were able to take a short break. Some men rushed into the destroyed village, searched a bar and found the water that we had been longing for. We quickly quenched our thirst and took as much as we could for our wounded and other comrades.
We continued along the canal with the wounded transported some of the way on inflated bags. We became soaked when we had to wade part of the way through the floods.
We were then attacked by French bombers and since there was no cover we had to throw ourselves flat on the ground. Fortunately for us the bombs fell into the water about 40m away from us. We then continued towards the village of Cannes, where we handed our wounded over to the medics at the dressing station.
Our march then continued to Maastricht, which took us 2 hours. We spent the night on the floor between the classroom benches in a local school, where we were unable to forget the sounds of screaming shells and gunfire.
On May 12th, we received our first cup of coffee, what a pleasure! It was only then did we realise that it was Whitsun. Our trucks turned up at around midday and we set foo towards the Maas bridge.
There we had to withstand an attack by some 20 British bombers before our journey could continue. At around 6pm we reached Köln-Dellenbrück and after a short break we continued on to Köln-Ostheim, where a large reception and medal award ceremony awaited us.
On May 13th, we continued on our journey to Münster, where another reception was held in our honour. This time we were awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class by General Kesselring.
This was followed by a well earned 14 day leave, which helped us to forget the harships we had endured at Eben Emael.

Epilogue.
In further correspondence with Kurt Engelmann I asked about the wounded Windemuth and how the men felt when they heard that 6 of their comrades had fallen in the fighting.
"Windemuth was not seriously wounded and he came back to the Truppe after a short stay in hospital. I knew all of the men in Sturmgruppe Granite and we were shocked when we heard that 6 men had died."
I then asked about the fate of the men of Trupp.4.
"Helmut Wenzel saw action on Crete where he was wounded, he was later captured by US troops in Tunisia.
Otto Brautigam was killed in 1941 whilst flying a „Gigant“ glider.
Karl Polzin was mistakenly shot by an Officer in 1941.
Eddi Schmidt died in 1991, his service is unknown.
Fritz Koehler lives in Baierbross but he never attends any of the Sturmgruppe reunions.
Fritz Florian died in 1989. He was captured by the Americans in Tunisia. We shared the same POW camp from 1943-1945. I only saw him again in 1986, when as a citizen of the DDR, I participated in my first Sturmgruppe reunion. My invitation was camouflaged as a silver wedding anniversary as old comrades meetings were forbidden in the DDR. These events brought the unwelcome attention of the Stasi.
Windemuth. I had not seen him since 1940. He is supposed to have deceased in the meantime.
Rudolf „Ralf“ Witzig died on 3rd October 2001."
I asked about the surviving veterans of St.Gr.Granit.
"In previous years the 16 surviving veterans of Sturmgruppe Granite have met on the day of employment at Eben Emael – 10th May. We meet at Xanten and from there travel by car to the Soldiers Cemetery at Ysselsteyn in the Netherlands in order to lay wreaths on the graves of our 6 fallen comrades. In the meantime however, only a few veterans are able to make this journey."
Treue am Treue


Trupp.3

The men of Trupp.3 after the fighting. From left to right:
Erwin Franz, Helmut Stopp, Josef Müller, Peter Arent, Alfred Supper, Paul Kupsch. (missing - Gustav Merz was wounded)

Below is the truppe command for Truppe.3, listing men and their objectives:
Trupp.3
1. Strength (2/5) Truppführer: Oberjäger Arent, Deputy: Gefreiter Merz, Glider Pilot: Unteroffizier Supper.
2. Equipment - similar to Trupp.1
3. Order:
a) Attack Werk 12 (Artillery casemate, front to north).
b) Attack Werk 10 (Observation turret of the 6.5m cannon cupola)
c) Penetrate and defend Werk 12.
d) Success of task to be indicated with 4 by 2 swastika flags at Werk 12.
4. In case of failure, Trupp.9 receives the task order.


Interesting facts about the operation at Eben Emael and the bridges over the Albert Canal:


What happened to the men of Sturmgruppe Granit after May 10th 1940.
Trupp.1
Hans Niedermeier + 14.9.2002
Gerhard Raschke + 1982
Egon Delica + 1999
Heinrich List + 1942 Russia
Richard Drucks + 1944 Italy
Willi Krämer + 2002
Peter Gräf + 1986
Wilhelm Stucke + 1941 Kreta
Trupp.5
Erwin Haug + 1987
*Heiner Lange + 1995
Ernst Grechza + 1941 Kreta
*Franz Jannowski
*Egon Hartmann + 2003
Rudolf Stützinger + 1941 Kreta
Helmuth Bögle + 10.5.1940
Gerhard Becker + 1986
Trupp.9
Ewald Neuhaus + 1995
Günter Schulz + 1941 Kreta
*Ernst Schlosser + 1998
Wingers + 1960
*Rolf Jakob + 1990
Johann Körner – Fate unknown
Anton Seltmann + 1941 Kreta
Hans Braun + 1941 Kreta
Trupp.2
Max Maier + 10.5.1940
Bredenbeck + 25.5.1944 Jugoslavia
*Walter Meier
Gerhard Iskra + 27.2.1943 Tunisia
Wilhelm Ölmann + 1941 Kreta
Fritz Gehlich + 1944 Russia
*Paul Bader + 1942 Tunisia
Hans Comdür + 1941 Kreta
Trupp.6
Harlos + 1941 Kreta
Ziller + 1945
Werner Grams – Fate unknown
Peter Zirwes + 14.3.1942 Russia
Hans Grigowski + 1976
Franz Lukascheck + 1978
Richard Bläser + 1991
Walter Kippnick + 1991
Trupp.10
Willi Hübel + 10.5.1940
Erwin Kraft + Russia
Werner Guthan + 2002
Bansimir – Fate unknown
Kurt Jürgensen + 10.5.1940
Hubert Hansing + 1941 Kreta
Leopold Gilg
Paul Kautz
Trupp.3
Peter Arendt + 3.12.1942
Alfred Supper + 1968
*Gustav Merz + 1941 Kreta
Josef Müller + 1941 Kreta
Paul Kupsch + 1976
Helmut Stopp – Fate unknown
Erwin Franz + 2003
Trupp.7
Fritz Heinemann + 23.12.1999
*Heinz Scheithauer
*Aloys Passman + 1941 Kreta
*Michalke – Fate unknown
Harm Mülder
Wolfgang Schultz
*Wilhelm Höpfner
Wilhelm Alefs + 2002
Trupp.11
Fritz Schwarz + 1991
Karl Pilz + 1986
Uwe Johnsen + 1993
Rudolf Witzig + 3.10.2001
Fritz Kruck + 10.5.1940
Hans-Peter Krenz + 1981
*Otto Braun + 1991
Trupp.4
*Helmut Wenzel + 24.1.2003
Otto Bräutigam + 1941
Karl Polzin + 1941
Eddi Schmidt + 1991
Fritz Köhler
Fritz Florian + 1989
Kurt Engelmann
*Windemuth – Fate unknown
Trupp.8
Otto Unger + 10.5.1940
Hans Distelmeier
*Johannes Else – Fate unknown
Ernst Hierländer + 1944 Italy
*Kajetan Mayr
*Bruno Hooge – Fate unknown
Herbert Plietz + 1941 Kreta
Heinz Weinert + Russia
Key:
+ Died - with date if available
* Wounded at Eben Emael

Coming soon-New trupp photographs!

This wartime postcard shows the Officers of Sturmabteilung Koch being presented the Ritterkreuz for their part in the assaults on Eben Emael and the bridges over the Albert Canal on May 10th 1940. The photo was taken on May 16th at Führerhauptquartier "Felsennest", 50km south west of Bonn.
From left to right: Hauptmann Walter Koch, Oberleutnant Rudolf Witzig, Oberleutnant Gustav Altmann, other officers present are: Oberleutnant Otto Zierach, Oberarzt Dr. Rolf Jäger, Leutnant Egon Delica Leutnant Helmut Ringler, Leutnant Joachim Meissner, Leutnant Gerhard Schacht. Not present was Leutnant Martin Schächter, WIA.


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