Sturmgeschütz with white stars abandoned close to the crossroads of Baugnez.

The Greif« operation »is controlled by Otto Skorzeny. The group is composed by 2000 or 3000 soldiers (according to the sources) whose group is composed men speaking English and covered American uniforms. This force must pass through the breach, will disturb the backs and will try, if it has the possibility of it, to take the allied fuel deposits before those are not fired by their guards. The confusion created by the Skorzeny force must also be made profitable to advance and hold the bridges on the Meuse while waiting for the arrival of Panzers. This capture of the bridges, according to Skorzeny, was to be done under the German uniform. The arrival in the neighbourhoods as for him could be done under cover of their American uniforms.

Skorzeny realizes however that time that one gives him to set up this operation is insufficient to organize a complete brigade speaking English.
With the place, it joins together two battalions of tanks, a battalion of airborne troops and specialists in the transmissions with two battalions of its own elite troops.

Within sight of the difficulty in joining together American equipment (Skorzeny wanted 20 Sherman tanks and much of jeeps), it is seen constrained to make with 2 tanks and thirty jeeps. One provides him in the place some Panther disguised in TD M 10 (of the Tank American Destroyers lately arrived at the face and still badly known of the GI' S) like of Ford German, of the Czech and French cars painted in kaki, with the hope to take some vehicles at the time of his opening.

Only a company, formed of volunteers understanding at least an English element speaking by group, is entirely equipped with American. This special company must help the brigade to infiltrate back the American lines, to collect a maximum information to sow confusion and to make a maximum of sabotages.

In order not to be taken for target by other Germans, the vehicles carry a whole a yellow triangle to the back, the tanks have their in the same way turned gun, and the elements of the brigade should not fight first. Also, if German soldiers are met, the soldiers of Skorzeny must withdraw their American helmet.

The training of the men is overlooked complete from the operation to come. Very quickly, the noise runs that the operation to which they prepare is the removal of Eisenhower. Skorzeny, estimate that the hedging is excellent, and within sight of its reputation of kidnapper (it has already with its Mussolini assets), it lets the rumour be spread.

December 14, the units of Skorzeny leave Wahn to go to their gathering point close to Münstereifel. This same day, it takes officially the command of Panzer-Brigade 150 and brings together the commanders from its 3 Kampfgruppen (groups of combat). It is at this meeting that Skorzeny teaches them the reasons from the operation.

So certain brigades remained are wedged in the traffic jams during an invaluable time at the time of the attack of December 16, others, sometimes divided into small commandos in spite of very succeeded in infiltrating.
Thus even if the principal share ultimately remained only one failure in the offensive, the few commandos who infiltrated under the American uniform succeeded in sowing the doubt and the disorder in the Alliés rows which then saw Germans disguised in American everywhere. Forgotten passwords usually employed with the profit of questions rather turned on certain rules relating to American football or even names of this time's greats players.

Skorzeny, at the time of a interrogation will declare in August 1945:« In fact, we sent four commandos of recognition and two commandos groups of demolition during first days of the offensive. Moreover, one commando  went with 1ere SS Panzer Division, the 12th SS Panzer Division and the 12th Volksgrenadiere Division. Such a commando also accompanied each group by Panzerbrigade 150. On the 44 men sent in the Allied lines, 36 will return. The last commandos were sent on December 19, after what, the more not playing element of surprised, these commandos carried out normal raids of« recognition »under the German uniform. »
Later, Skorzeny will say that it thought that the number of commandos passed in the Alliées lines were 6 to 8 and that among those, two were captured.
One of the official figures on this subject indicates that 18 men were juged and were carried out either in Huy or Henri-Chapelle. Skorzeny will affirm as for him that only 4 of its men were shot.
A question arises then. Who are the 14 different one? Can one imagine that truths American soldiers not having been able to prove their identity were passed by  weapons? May it be also that of German privates having nothing to do with« Grief »and, benefitting from the hotter negotiable instruments of dead or captive Americans were made take and underwent the fate of the spies? Undoubtedly it will never be known!

What is certain on the other hand, it is that three members of the commandos of Skorzeny indeed were shot with Henri-Chapelle on December 23, 1944. It was  Günther Billing, Manfred Pernass and Wilhelm Schmidt.

Schmidt, Billing et Pernass at Henri-Chapelle on 23/12/44