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FOREWORD


Between October 23 and 26, 1944 the United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Combined Fleet fought a crucial series of sea battles for the control of the Philippine Islands. These battles were collectively recorded in U.S. Naval history as the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval battle in history, consisted of four separate major fleet actions which spanned three days of intense fighting. The first engagement which took place on the afternoon of October 24 involved long range U.S. carrier air strikes against a Japanese surface force. This engagement became known as the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea. Next, the Battle of Surigao Strait, was the last battleship-to-battleship clash of the war, occurring early in the morning on October 25. Shortly thereafter, the most unimaginable spectical of the Pacific War occured, the Battle Off Samar. The last clash, the final U.S. carrier air strikes, was named the Battle Off Cape Engano, this occurred during the morning and afternoon of October 25.

All battles took place in or near the Philippine archipelago, a group of over one-thousand islands, in the center of the Japanese "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Prior to the war in the Pacific and the subsequent Japanese invasion, the Philippines had been under American dominance. They were a spoil of war bounty obtained by the Americans shortly after Commodore Dewey's Asiatic Squadron defeated the Spanish fleet in the Battle of Manila Bay in 1898.

Over seventy major Japanese warships participated in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, nearly the entire remaining fighting strength of the Japanese fleet. They faced an enormous U.S. fleet of over 120 major surface combatants which included eight heavy and eight light aircraft carriers. During the Battle of Leyte Gulf, nearly every type of ship and weapon system developed to date was utilized by both sides, truly making it the greatest naval battle in history.

The great diversity in warfare in which this battle was fought is shown below:

SHO-GO

Admiral Soemu Toyoda, Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Combined Fleet, and his staff were the masterminds of SHO-GO. It was an operation, which if it worked, was aimed at stopping the American advance in the Pacific. Coming too late in the war, it was a plan of desperation. At this point in the Pacific war, Japan was already a defeated nation. Nearly three years of war with the Americans had taken its toll on their armed forces. Japan had been at war continuously since September 18, 1931, when they invaded and conquered the Chinese portion of Manchuria.

In the summer of 1944, after their devastating defeat in the Marianas, the Japanese conceived Operation SHO-GO. It was a plan for the strategic defense of the homeland that encompassed the four land areas thought possible for the next American offensive.

When the Japanese realized the island of Leyte in the central Philippines was the next American invasion point, SHO-GO was implemented. A bold daylight sortie would be made by all available fleet assets to converge on Leyte Gulf to repel the American landings. Timing, of course, was critical. The attack on the American beachhead was scheduled to take place within two days of the American landings, when their transport ships would be most vulnerable to ship and air attack.

During September, the Japanese airfields in the south and central Philippines came under heavy attack from Admiral Halsey's Task Force 38 aircraft. Over two hundred planes were lost by the Japanese for the loss of 8 American.

After the success of these raids, the landings at Leyte were approved in favor of a landing on Formosa. It was now believed the Japanese position on Luzon and the central Philippines had been weakened significantly.

The implications of the Leyte landings filled the Japanese with great dismay. To lose the Philippines would mean the loss of their hard fought Empire and the war.

Amphibious landings on Leyte

The amphibious landings on Leyte were orchestrated by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of all Pacific Forces and VADM Thomas Kinkaid, Commander Seventh Fleet. They would be the most important of the Pacific war to date. To support this crucial undertaking, the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the most powerful fleet ever assembled, would support the landings with every available ship.

Vice Admiral Kinkaid, embarked in his command ship WASATCH, commanded 738 ships at Leyte Gulf, a vast armada of every type of auxiliary, amphibious, and combatant ship in the U.S. inventory, except the large fleet carriers.

Guarding the Leyte beachhead were the Northern and Southern Fire Support Units, commanded by Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf and RADM G. L. Weyler respectively. Their firepower came from five of the Pearl Harbor battleship veterans, WEST VIRGINIA, TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA, MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA, and one other, the MISSISSIPPI.

The old battleships of Pearl Harbor were not sent to Leyte Gulf to fight other warships, indeed, because they were considered nearly obsolete, they were sent to the invasion beach itself to conduct shore bombardment. Since they were not expected to fight ship-to-ship engagements, only three, WEST VIRGINIA, TENNESSEE, and CALIFORNIA, were fitted with the latest Mark-8 gunnery fire control radar. The remaining three old battleships, MISSISSIPPI, MARYLAND, and PENNSYLVANIA retained the outmoded, inaccurate, Mark-3 gunnery fire control radar.

The remaining Seventh Fleet fighting assets assigned to the Fire Support Units and other support roles were a bit more impressive than the old battleships. They included three heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and nineteen destroyers, many new. This constituted a formidable fighting force against any opponent.

Excluded from this force were the actual amphibious forces of Seventh Fleet that brought the foot soldiers to Leyte. Separated into two landing groups, Northern and Southern, they would disembark the troops from the landing ships, liberty ships, and cargo transports. The landing force also had its own screening ships, consisting of several cruisers and many destroyers.

Embarked on the light cruiser NASHVILLE was General MacArthur himself. He had kept his promise to the Filipinos, when, thirty-one months earlier he had stated, "...I shall return...." And return he did; seventy to eighty thousand troops landed on the first day of the invasion, October 20.

The Escort Carriers present at Leyte Gulf

No modern fleet would be complete without air power. Seventh Fleet's punch came from one of the lesser known vessels assigned to the fleet. They were the CVE's, or escort carriers. These were the smallest of the American carriers that became well known for their extensive use in the Atlantic ocean sinking German U-boats. In the Pacific Fleet, the escort carrier was used for other roles than those available to its big brothers, the large fleet carrier and light carrier. On any given day a CVE pilot might fly Combat Air Patrol, bring water to thirsty army troops, hunt submarines, bomb bridges, perform reconnaissance, or the ship itself, be used in an auxiliary role to ferry replacement aircraft to the larger fleet carriers. Such was the life of a CVE pilot, less than glamorous when compared to their brothers on the large fleet carriers.

The escort carrier's present at Leyte Gulf were headed by Rear Admiral Tommy Sprague, Commander Task Group 77.4. They consisted of eighteen baby flattops, separated into three equal six-ship Task Units, called "Taffies." At Leyte Gulf, the mission of the escort carriers was to provide direct air support for the landings and to put up Combat Air Patrols to protect the invasion fleet. The escort carriers at Leyte Gulf boasted 235 fighters and 143 torpedo planes. Each Taffy had a small screen of three destroyers and four or five destroyer escorts. Most of the men who manned the ships of Task Group 77.4 were reservists who had never seen any major action.

One draw back that would rear it's ugly head at Leyte was the lack of training received by the escort carrier pilots. Although the CVE's carried some armor-piercing bombs and torpedoes, they were not adequately stocked nor were their pilots adequately trained in warship-attack tactics.

Although the CVE's were designated as "aircraft carriers," the term is misleading. They were hardly a match in comparison with the larger light and heavy carriers of the fleet. One-third the size of the heavy carriers, they were cramp, unarmored, thin-hulled vessels, unable to launch and recover aircraft with the ease of the larger carriers. Despite their many restrictions, the escort carriers pulled a heavy load at Leyte Gulf.

All three Taffies were stationed east of Leyte Gulf, on a north-south axis. Rear Admiral Tommy Sprague himself, commanded Task Unit 77.4.1, known as Taffy I. His task unit operated ninety miles southeast of Suluan Island, near Mindanao. One-hundred miles to the north lay RADM Felix Stump's Task Unit 77.4.2, Taffy II. His group was parallel to the entrance of Leyte Gulf. The northern most group of escort carriers, Task Unit 77.4.3, Taffy III, belonged to RADM C.A.F. Sprague. Taffy III sailed thirty to sixty miles off the shore of Samar, the large island northeast of Leyte. The escort carriers of each Taffy were further organized into a two or four ship section, each commanded by another Rear Admiral.

From the beginning the escort carriers were operating on three assumptions:

The escort carriers arrived off Leyte Gulf on October 17, and quicly were placed in a high operations tempo to support the amphibious landings.

When the escort carriers arrived at Leyte they were fully loaded with their proper aircraft armanent mix of rockets, depth charges, consusion bombs and the like. Each carrier also held about twelve torpedoes and a small amount of semi-armour piercing bombs.

The officers and men who manned the ships in Task Group 77.4 never imagined they would have to directly fight a major fleet engagement on their own. They had become acustom to their support role and placed their trust in the large carriers and big guns of the U.S. Third Fleet.

U.S. Third Fleet

Seventh Fleet's reliance on the large fleet carriers and fast battleships of Third Fleet was unmistakably sound. Guarding VADM Kinkaid's invasion fleet was ADM William F. Halsey's offensive Third Fleet. He had under his direct command, Task Force 38, consisting of four powerful carrier task groups. This was the cream of the American fighting fleet at Leyte Gulf, the armada that would destroy the Japanese fleet, if the opportunity presented itself.

Admiral Halsey, as Commander Third Fleet, flew his flag in the new fast battleship NEW JERSEY. It was here he and his staff made the decisions which would direct the course of the battle.

Admiral Halsey was given two objectives in the Leyte battle plan. First, to "cover and support forces of the South-west Pacific Fleet (Seventh Fleet) in order to assist in the seizure and occupation of objectives in the Central Philippines" and to "destroy enemy naval and air forces in or threatening the Philippine area."

One final clause was added to the last objective, giving Admiral Halsey a free hand in whatever he did, "In case opportunity for destruction of major portion of the enemy fleet is offered or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task."

Admiral Halsey believed this last clause was added so he would not hesitate to attack the Japanese if the opportunity offered. Admiral Spruance used extreme caution and failed to press his advantage during the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944. Admiral Spruance was privately criticized by Halsey for not aggressively attacking the Combined Fleet when the opportunity arose. As history had shown, this was the primary difference between the two admirals, each a direct opposite. Offense, not defense, was to be Admiral Halsey's battle cry. The stage was now set for ADM Halsey to use his vast Third Fleet assets.

Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, Commander of Task Force 38, was embarked in his flagship, the fleet carrier LEXINGTON. It was his responsibility to issue orders to his four task group commanders. However, during the course of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, he was often by-passed by Halsey which led to serious consequences.

The strength of the task groups came from the eight heavy and eight light carriers, which carried 1,178 aircraft. They were supported by VADM Lee's six modern, 16-inch gun, fast battleships, IOWA, NEW JERSEY, MASSACHUSETTS, SOUTH DAKOTA, WASHINGTON, and ALABAMA. The fast battleships were divided into three groups, two each, assigned to Task Groups 38.2, 38.3, and 38.4. All four task groups contained several cruisers and many destroyers.

Imperial Japanese Navy Combined Fleet

Four Japanese surface forces participated in SHO-GO which included every type of ship in their inventory. Three surface battleship-cruiser-destroyer forces would drive the Americans from the Leyte beachhead. The last force, consisting of aircraft carriers and two old hybrid carrier-battleships, would be used as a decoy to draw Third Fleet northward, away from Leyte. During this stage of the war due to fuel shortages, the majority of these ships were stationed at two widely distant locations. Located in the Japanese homeland at Kure Naval Base in the Inland Sea were the Mobile Fleets remaining aircraft carriers. Far to the south at Lingga Roads, near Singapore, were the major surface combatants.

The Northern Force was led by VADM Jisaburo Ozawa. He was considered the most talented Japanese Naval Officer remaining in the fleet. He was originally scheduled to attack from the north with Japan's remaining carrier forces. After the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" in June 1944, the Mobil Fleets total carrier aircraft strength was depleted to just over one hundred aircraft. Thus Japan had large fleet carriers remaining in her fleet, she just didn't have the aircraft or trained pilots to man them. It was then decided, the force VADM Ozawa would take to Leyte would be used as a decoy to draw the American Third Fleet north.

The Northern Force, an impressive array of Japan's few remaining warships, would be the sacrificial lamb, laid on a plate for the Americans to consume. In order for SHO-GO to work, this force would have to draw ADM Halsey's Third Fleet north, away from the Leyte invasion beach. The Japanese striking forces would then have a chance to rush in behind Third Fleet and disrupt the invasion. If VADM Ozawa's force could achieve this goal, his mission would be considered successful.

The strike on the American Leyte invasion force would come from the three remaining forces of the Japanese Combined Fleet. The most powerful group, the formidable First Strike Force "A" and "B," was comprised of thirty-two front-line warships. From their training location near Singapore, these two groups would transit together to Leyte Gulf via the Sibuyan Sea and San Bernardino Strait. This route was the long way around and would take a considerable amount of time and consume a large amount of precious fuel oil. In addition, they would have to rely upon friendly air cover if their sortie was to be successful. Upon reaching the Philippine Sea, First Strike Force was to sweep down the east coast of Samar from the north, and attack the invasion beach and shipping. Any American warships encountered along the way were to be destroyed.

Admiral Toyoda, Commander of the Combined Fleet, placed his trust in seasoned warrior VADM Takeo Kurita to command First Strike Force. Under his experienced guidance, First Strike Force was to lead the Japanese Navy back on the road to victory. Late in the war, he was second in ability only to VADM Ozawa as a tactician.

Aiding VADM Kurita was Striking Force "C," commanded by VADM Shoji Nishimura. His force was directed to attack the American invasion fleet from the south of Leyte via Surigao Strait. With First Strike Force, they would meet up in Leyte Gulf, close the pincher, and shoot up the transport ships and shell the troops on the beachhead.

The last leg of the Japanese pincher that was also planned to storm into Leyte Gulf was a cruiser-destroyer force led by VADM Kiyohide Shima. This force was designated as the Second Striking Force by the Japanese GHQ.

Vice Admiral Shima had not been included in the SHO-GO planning initially, and now as a last-minute ploy, his forces were directed to "cooperate" with those of VADM Kurita's. In addition, he was also directed to "cooperate" with VADM Nishimura's Striking Force "C." This poor, last minute planning by the Staff at General Headquarters in Tokyo only complicated matters. Not only did the plan suffer from poor organization, but a personal conflict also existed.

Vice Admiral Shima's six months' seniority to VADM Nishimura caused the ladder much discontentment. The relationship between the two admirals was anything but cordial. Vice Admiral Shima was a political power within the fleet and had thus worked his way up through the rank structure. In contrast, VADM Nishimura was a salty "sailors admiral," gaining his flag rank through the command of sea-going ships and squadrons. As it turned out, due to their personal differences or stubborn pride, the coordination of their attack would be non-existent.


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Honor the Missing in Action and Killed in Action of Taffy III

We do remember.  We won't forget.


Robert Jon Cox [email protected]
last revised July 31 1996
Copyright Robert Jon Cox 1996 all rights reserved
Void where prohibited.