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Chapter 10

EPILOGUE


The reason for VADM Kurita's withdrawal was never clearly made public, even after intense interrogation by U.S. officials after the war had ended. When Centre Force broke off action with Taffy III and headed north to regroup, it was still considered a potent force to be reckoned with. At this time Centre Force consisting of battleships YAMATO, KONGO, HARUNA, and NAGATO, heavy cruisers TONE and HAGURO, light cruisers NOSHIRO and YAHAGI, and at least six to eight destroyers. Vice Admiral Kurita's force was far from defeated and was more than able to proceed toward Leyte Gulf to complete its "one way" mission. Unknown by VADM Kurita, there was little along the way to stop him if he chose to do so.

If the remaining ships of Centre Force had continued their sortie toward Leyte Gulf, it would have been interesting to see how RADM Oldendorf's old battleships and Seventh Fleet surface forces would have dealt with them. As said earlier, his ships supply of amour-piercing ammunition was nearly depleted. Since the old battleships were at least five knots slower than those of Centre Force, a running fight was not desirable.

Rear Admiral Oldendorf deployed three old battleships, five cruisers, and two destroyer squadrons twenty-five miles eastward of the northern entrance to Surigao Strait. The remaining forces were kept inside Leyte Gulf. Whether these two groups could have effectively engaged Centre Force would never be known.

The Americans lost six warships at Leyte Gulf, almost 37,000 tons. Compared with the Japanese loss of 26 warships weighing over 306,000 tons, it was clearly an American victory. The Japanese loss figures are remarkable considering how Third Fleet failed to effectively deal with Centre Force. The number may have been much more higher and one sided if ADM Halsey's Task Force 34 would have meet Centre Force as it debauched from San Bernardino Strait at midnight on October 24.

Five of the six American ships sunk in the Battle of Leyte Gulf were from Taffy III, four of which, were sunk directly by VADM Kurita's Centre Force. The costs in lives to Taffy III were 1,130 dead and 913 wounded. A large majority of these deaths occurred during the two days the crews of CVE GAMBIER BAY, DD JOHNSTON, DD HOEL, and DE ROBERTS tragically spent in the water awaiting rescue, another grave error committed by the Americans. The two remaining American vessels, both carriers, were sunk by kamikaze attacks. The figures below do not include those ships damaged on both sides.

American losses at Leyte Gulf & the Battle Off Samar:

1 Light Carrier:

    PRINCETON

2 Escort Carriers:

    GAMBIER BAY & ST LO

2 Destroyers:

    HOEL & JOHNSTON

1 Destroyer Escort:

    SAMUEL B. ROBERTS

The Japanese lost twenty-six front line warships during the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

1 Fleet Carrier:

    ZUIKAKU

3 Light Carriers:

    ZUIHO, CHIYODA, & CHITOSE

1 18-inch Battleship:

    MUSASHI

2 14-inch Battleships:

    YAMASHIRO & FUSO

6 Heavy Cruisers:

    ATAGO, MAYA, SUZUYA, CHOKAI, CHIKUMA, & MOGAMI

4 Light Cruisers:

    NOSHIRO, ABUKUMA, TAMA, & KINU

9 Destroyers:

    NOWAKE, HAYASHIMO, YAMAGUMO, ASAGUMO, MICHISHIO, AKITSUKI, HATSUTSUKI, WAKABA, & URANAMI

The reasons for VADM Kurita's withdraw no doubt must have been many. We can only speculate about what his concerns were which led to his decision. Here is what I believe he was faced with:

Next we will look at what the Japanese did right at Leyte Gulf:

Although the Battle of Leyte Gulf resulted in an overwhelming American victory, much did go wrong on the side of the U.S. Navy. Here is how the American's blundered:

On paper, an American victory at Leyte Gulf was not difficult to imagine. The American's held the advantage in all categories of warships except heavy cruisers. Carrier airpower was by then clearly the striking power of the fleet and contributed significantly to the American victory at Leyte.

After the battle, Rear Admiral C.A.F. Sprague summed up his account of their ordeal stating, "The failure of the enemy main body and encircling light forces to completely wipe out all vessels of this task unit, can be attributed to our successful smokescreen, our torpedo counterattack, continuous harassment of the enemy by bomb, torpedo and strafing air attacks, timely maneuvers, and the definite partiality of Almighty God."

When the Battle of Leyte Gulf was finished, the Imperial Japanese Combined Fleet could never again threaten the U.S. Navy as a capable offensive fighting force. With their sea lanes to their oil fields and raw materials in the southern region severed and their Navy defeated, Japan would unconditionally surrender in less than one year.

It was the Navy's carrier air power that saved Taffy III from complete annihilation. Indeed, it was the aircraft of the Taffies themselves that ultimately saved them. The bond between the men who manned the ships and the men of the aircraft squadrons is forever strong, each owing the other a great debt of gratitude. Let us never forget the heroism and valor displayed by CDR Ernest Evans and LCDR Robert W. Copeland, both whom placed their small ships in harms way against impossible odds. They gave their all for the defense of the escort carriers. The name's JOHNSTON, ROBERTS, and HOEL are set in stone in the annals of surface warfare history, never to be forgotten. The GAMBIER BAY, refusing to strike her colors, reflects U.S. Naval tradition at the epitome of its finest hour. Quite rightfully, we shall never forget the sacrifices made by these fine ships and the gallant men who fought them and their embarked aircraft squadrons on October 25, 1944.


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Honor the Missing in Action and Killed in Action of Taffy III

We do remember.  We won't forget.


Robert Jon Cox [email protected]
last revised September 01 1996
Copyright Robert Jon Cox 1996 all rights reserved
Void where prohibited.